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Major changes have been occurring almost unnoticed in staple value chains in 
Asia. The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains documents and explains 
the transformation of value chains moving rice and potatoes between the farm 
gate and the consumer in Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China, and India. 
The changes noted are the rapid rise of supermarkets, modern cold storage 
facilities, large rice mills, and commercialized small farmers using input-intensive, 
mechanized technologies. These changes affect food security in ways that are 
highly relevant for policymakers across Asia—the rise of supermarkets provides 
cheaper staples, more direct relations in the chains combined with branding have 
increased traceability, and the rise of cold storage has brought higher incomes for 
potato farmers and all-season access for potato consumers. The book also joins two 
debates that have long been separate and parallel—food industry and agribusiness 
development and market competitiveness—with the food security and poverty 
alleviation agenda. 
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What the experts say 
Excellent!—Ray Goldberg, George M. Moffett Professor of Agriculture and Business, 
Emeritus, Harvard Business School
… One of the best, most relevant, and most useful publications I’ve come 
across on this topic in the last 50 years (at least)—Patrick Labaste, Practice 
Leader, Agriculture and Rural Development, World Bank
... an important book.... this will become a seminal study whose influence will 
resonate over the next decade—Grahame Dixie, Agribusiness Unit Team Leader 
Agriculture and Rural Development, World Bank
… the predominance of marginal and small farmers has been growing in 
South and East Asia. Linking these farmers to markets and increasing 
efficiency in the food value chain are key issues of agricultural development 
today. This book makes a substantial contribution in this field by analyzing 
the transformation of the organization of production, storage, milling, and 
marketing; and the distribution of marketing margin between farmers and 
off-farm operators, for rice and potato in Bangladesh, India, and China.* The 
book is an important milestone in advancing the knowledge of the evolution 
of agricultural marketing.—Mahabub Hossain, Executive Director, Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee, now Building Resources Across Communities
This is a very important piece of work, made more so because there is a terrible 
vacuum of such studies in the agricultural development literature.—Charles 
Peter Timmer, Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Development Studies, emeritus, Harvard 
University and nonresident fellow at the Center for Global Development 
I find the analysis in Staple Food Value Chains most interesting.... I am 
drawing the attention of my colleagues to this important publication.— 
M S Swaminathan, Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha), India, and Emeritus 
Chairman, M S Swaminathan Research Foundation
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Foreword
Feeding nine billion people by 2050 is a top priority on the global agenda for sustainable and inclusive development. This task is especially formidable in Asia, where more than two-thirds of the world’s poor and malnourished 
people live. Food prices in Asia are projected to remain high and volatile, and 
food production is likely to be challenged by the combined effects of resource 
degradation and increasing climate variability and change. Ensuring food 
security in this region requires urgent actions to improve the productivity and 
climate resilience of agriculture and to upgrade the food value chains to ensure 
adequate and affordable food supplies. 
At the height of the 2008 food price surge, the Asian Development Bank 
commissioned the International Food Policy Research Institute (through technical 
assistance TA 3689-REG: Thirteenth Agriculture and Natural Resources Research 
at International Agricultural Research Centers) to conduct a study to evaluate 
staple food value chains in Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China, and 
India. The basic idea was to identify potential areas for reform to make food 
value chains more responsive to rising food demand and supply constraints.
Staple food value chains in Asia have generally been perceived as operating 
in a traditional mode, which is typically thought to be an extremely long and 
fragmented process in dire need of modernization. Surprisingly, the study 
revealed a totally different situation. Staple food value chains are transforming 
across the region, with fewer intermediate actors, better integration, and 
higher receptiveness to technological changes. 
This book, as its title denotes, documents the quiet revolution in staple food 
value chains now changing the face of Asia. It provides a systematic and rigorous 
review of the structural transformation pathways of these food chains and the 
catalytic roles that governments, the private sector, civil society, and international 
development institutions can play in the process. While not intended as a policy 
analysis for food security, the study provides critical guideposts for assessing 
and addressing all segments of the food chains that unnecessarily contribute 
to higher retail food prices. Most significantly, the book provides a clearer 
picture of how staple food value chains can benefit inclusive economic growth 
xii The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains 
trajectories. More and more, sleepy rural areas are waking up to an increase in 
jobs and incomes from new links with commercial urban centers and vibrant 
intermediaries, technologies, infrastructure, and policies. 
While there is no “one size fits all” model for modernizing these value chains, 
this book demonstrates that grassroots efforts are unfolding and gaps in 
knowledge are closing. With more proactive initiatives from governments, 
the private sector, civil society, and international development institutions, 
agriculture in Asia can be effectively transformed and food security ensured. 
Bindu Lohani
Vice President (Knowledge Management  
and Sustainable Development)
Asian Development Bank
Shenggen Fan
Director General
International Food Policy Research Institute
Shenggen Fan
Director General
International Food Policy Research Institute
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary
This book presents findings from a detailed study of how domestic staples 
value chains are structured and performing in Asia after the food price hike 
of 2007–2008. Three questions are asked in the study: (1) Are staples value 
chains transforming structurally? (2) Is the conduct of staples value chains’ 
actors transforming? (3) Is the performance of staples value chains leading 
to the inclusion of small-scale farmers, small-scale midstream actors, and 
workers, and (all else being equal) to lower food costs for consumers? To 
address the questions, about 3,500 farmers, traders, millers, cold storage 
facilities, and modern and traditional retailers of rice and potato value chains 
were surveyed in key rural producing centers that serve the large urban 
centers (Dhaka, Beijing, and Delhi) of three economies (Bangladesh, the 
People’s Republic of China [PRC], and India). Domestic value chains were 
chosen, as they accommodate 98% of the staples in the region. Rice and 
potatoes are the main grain and the main vegetable staple in these countries. 
The survey’s findings indicate that a transformational modernization is under 
way in these staple food chains, albeit at different speeds. In the rice value 
chain transformation, the leader is the PRC, which appears to be changing 
faster or has transformed further, especially in the remarkable development 
of its rice milling sector.  In the potato value chain, India is taking the lead, 
with the spectacular rise of potato cold storage facilities (CSFs) in Agra. 
Rapid but Differentiated Transformation
This transformation is a “quiet revolution,” as these changes are grassroots 
in nature. Important drivers of the transformation of rice and potato value 
chains have been the increase in scale and change in technology of rice 
milling and potato storage. On the demand side, there was a surge in 
the demand for potatoes and other vegetables with increases in incomes 
and in megacities’ populations. This created, in turn, a demand for off-
season supply of potatoes and for higher-quality rice. On the supply side, 
the number of medium–large mills with modernized technologies and 
of modern CSFs has increased rapidly. Both the diffusion of CSFs and the 
modernization of mills have been favored by direct government subsidies 
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as well as indirect government support through major investments in 
road improvement and the installation of energy grids so crucial to milling 
and cooling.
Specific features of the transformation by value-chain segment are as follows: 
•	 Upstream segments of the value chains. There is great heterogeneity 
in farm sizes and distribution of nonland assets. But all farmers, regardless 
of how small their plots are, are commercializing as they engage in nonfarm 
labor markets and use more external inputs per hectare. Factor markets 
for farm machines, water, and land rental are vibrant. Armed with mobile 
phones, farmers are more informed of what, how, and for whom to produce. 
•	 Midstream segments. Rice mills are modernizing. Driven primarily 
by the private sector, and coupled with technological change, mills are 
consolidating. The number of small village mills has declined rapidly, 
particularly in the PRC and India. Especially in the PRC, and to some extent 
in Bangladesh, rice mills have changed their procedures and are buying 
directly from farmers, selling directly to agents in wholesale markets, and 
branding and packaging the rice. These changes may make the chain 
more efficient, and certainly help in quality differentiation and traceability. 
 The rice and paddy wholesale segment has also been transforming rapidly, 
especially in the PRC and Bangladesh, and somewhat in India. The roles 
of village traders linking farmers and rural wholesale markets or mills, and 
of semi-wholesalers linking rural mills and urban wholesale markets or 
supermarket chains, have diminished greatly. Traders in wholesale markets 
have made important investments in warehouses and trucks and have on 
average increased their scale. 
 There has been a rapid spread of modern potato CSFs, especially in India 
and secondly in Bangladesh. Farmers rapidly took up using cold storage 
and dropped their traditional storage methods. Massive investments went 
into CSFs of all sizes. The scale has been rising over time, and thus a process 
of consolidation is occurring. Investment in CSFs has been encouraged by 
partial government subsidies and by government investment in the electricity 
grid. Most of the trading has shifted to the CSFs from the government-
mandated wholesale markets.  Farmers, even small-scale ones, ubiquitously 
use the CSFs, and have gained significant price advantages from storing. 
 Consumers gained the advantage of greater year-round access to potatoes. 
The surveys found that two-thirds of the potatoes sold in Delhi and Dhaka 
had been cold stored.
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•	 Downstream segments. Supermarkets have penetrated urban rice 
retail, most deeply and widely in Beijing, where they have about half the 
market. Delhi supermarkets have only started to penetrate the rice market, 
with about 7% of sales.  This penetration can be expected to accelerate, 
given that foreign direct investment in retail was liberalized in September 
2012. In Bangladesh, supermarkets have barely started to enter the market. 
Supermarkets have been slower to penetrate the urban market for potatoes, 
as well as for other fresh produce (a lag that follows international patterns). 
Supermarkets and traditional rice shops and stalls have been shifting from 
loose, unbranded rice to packaged, branded rice. This has progressed 
furthest and fastest in the PRC, driven by the practices of modernizing rice 
mills. Branding allows traceability in the supply chain for rice in particular, an 
important development. Packaging also helps signal quality differentiation. 
Traditional retailers in Beijing tend to buy rice from wholesale markets, where 
an important share of traders are agents of large mills, and wholesalers sell 
rice packaged with mill brands. Supermarket chains buy some rice from the 
wholesale markets, and some directly from large mills. 
Governments in Bangladesh and the PRC no longer directly engage in rice 
retail, but the government still does so in India. The survey showed that the 
Fair Price Shops’ share of retail sales was only about 15% in Delhi.
Catalytic Roles of Government 
Government’s roles have been important in enabling and at times providing 
incentives for the transformation: 
•	 First, governments have spurred transformation by investing in rural 
areas through (1) research and development, and distribution of seeds; 
(2) investments in irrigation canal, road, and railway systems; rural 
wholesale markets; power grids; and mobile phone communication grids 
in the 1990s and 2000s, all being essential to the transformation in the 
midstream that the study observed; and (3) investment in extension, 
which was important overall, but the data suggest a limited impact and 
availability of extension services in some areas, particularly in the Uttar 
Pradesh study zone in India. 
•	 Second, government subsidies have had important effects, but evidence of 
accessibility to and the impact of the services is mixed. Subsidies for rice seed 
and fertilizer sales in all the study countries, private tube wells in Bangladesh 
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and India, CSFs in India, and mill upgrading in all the zones all appear to 
have encouraged use of and investments in all these productive items, and 
all the items have played important roles in transforming the value chains. 
However, the survey results show that sometimes the subsidies were not 
going to the target beneficiaries. For example, tube well, fertilizer, credit, 
and seed subsidies in India went mostly to medium and large farmers, with 
little going to marginal farmers. A key policy implication is that, if large 
subsidies are distributed, great care should be taken to assure that they are 
properly targeted and delivered. 
•	 Third, the study points to the importance of farm input supply chains 
upstream from farmers and of midstream and downstream postharvest 
activities such as logistics and wholesale, cold storage and milling, and 
retailing. Little empirical research work has been done on these areas, but is 
needed for the policy debate and the systematic evaluation of policy impacts 
on food security. 
There needs to be a concerted public policy debate on how to enable and 
encourage input supply chains to become modernized, and on how to get 
midstream and downstream businesses to invest in upgrading equipment 
and expanding.
Food Security and Growth Strategy for Asia
The book provides guideposts on strategies for growth and food security.
•	 First, the off-farm components of the value chains are equally important 
even for staples—they account for about 40% of the total margins in the 
rice chain and 36% in the potato chain. Despite the importance of the 
postharvest segments, the food security debates in the Asian region focus on 
farm yields, and even just on rice farm yields. The productivity of processing, 
storage, and distribution merits nearly equal weight with the productivity of 
farms in the Asian food security debate. 
•	 Second, there is no “silver bullet” for the challenges facing staples value chains 
in the region. Rather, a variety of policy and program measures is needed 
at various levels of the supply chains in order to stimulate the efficiency and 
competitiveness of expanding staples markets. The most effective indirect 
government interventions occurred with a cluster of activities that supported 
various parts of the value chains in an integrated way. 
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•	 Third, the transformation and successes of governments and the private 
sector in dynamic areas feeding major cities documented in this study may 
provide lessons that could be applied elsewhere, in particular to other nearby 
zones and, if possible, to the poorest and hinterland areas. 
•	 Fourth, different policies are needed for the widely different zones and farm 
strata within them. Asian staples-producing farm areas and strata of farmers 
are not homogeneous. Rather, there is a wide degree of heterogeneity 
across rice and potato areas, and major differences across farmer strata. This 
implies that “one size does not fit all” and that government strategies need 
to be tailored to widely different situations. In particular, marginal farmers 
(compared with small and medium farmers) are at a disadvantage in these 
transformations. Hinterland zones can be at an initial disadvantage, but can 
learn from the experiences of the now dynamic zones where value chains 
are rapidly transforming. 
•	 Last, the growth, market modernization, and agribusiness and food industry 
themes and debates are often held at arm’s length from policy discussions 
on poverty reduction and food security. This study has shown that value 
chain transformation is important to farmers’ incomes, rural employment, 
and access to and affordability of staples for urban consumers. This is 
especially important, given that Asia’s urban areas are home to half of Asia’s 
population and account for two-thirds to three-quarters of its food demand. 
Harnessing the value chain transformation for food security should be front 
and center in the policy agenda of the 21st century.
PART A  
FOOD VALUE CHAINS
Introduction1|
The Context: The Debate over the Causes  
of the Recent Rice Crisis
During the last 50 years, Asia had gradually started to shift from concentrating on the general problem of growing enough grain to feed its populations—that is, sufficient “simple aggregate access to staples”—
to also thinking about a new food economy. Attention thus shifted to issues 
such as grain quality, equity of distribution, how to sustain the environment of 
staples production, and diversification into high-value products beyond staples. 
The trappings of a controlled staples economy fell gradually by dismantling 
most of the input and marketing parastatal system (except in India), reducing 
controls on foreign trade in grain, and partly liberalizing domestic markets. 
This double shift was encouraged by a trend of falling prices of rice and other 
staples such as potatoes. The shift was also fed by the Green Revolution that 
had rolled out over decades. While longer-term visions of climate change and 
sustainability challenges somewhat troubled the perception that the grain 
problem had been resolved, and shocks such as the world food crisis of 1973–
1975 occurred, in general, the reigning feeling in Asia was that the traditional 
grain problem had receded. As Headey and Fan (2010: x) noted “Cheap food 
has been taken for granted for almost 30 years. From their peak in the 1970s 
crisis, real food prices steadily declined in the 1980s and 1990s and eventually 
reached an all-time low in the early 2000s.”
Then came the food price crisis of 2007–2008. Food prices on world markets 
spiked in the largest rise since the 1973–1975 crisis, and then declined in the 
second half of 2008, although domestic prices remained higher than before 
the crisis in some countries. Rice prices in a number of Asian countries rose 
precipitously. The 2007–2008 crisis revived the fear of the grain problem. 
The title of an Asian Development Bank (ADB) report in 2008 exemplifies 
that worry: Food Prices and Inflation in Developing Asia: Is Poverty Reduction 
Coming to an End? (James et al. 2008).
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There was an outpouring of analysis and debate and conferences and books 
on the causes of the sudden crisis (for example, James et al. 2008, Dawe 2010, 
Fang 2010, Gulati and Dutta 2010, Headey and Fan 2010, Hossain and Deb 
2010, and Alavi et al. 2012). The explanations debated ranged from short-
term causes (such as droughts, floods, subsidies for biofuels, policies of export 
restrictions and precautionary imports, energy price increases, depreciation 
of the United States dollar, lower interest rates, and commodity market 
speculation) to medium-run causes (such as the rapid rise of the economies of 
the People’s Republic of China [PRC]) to long-run causes (such as declines in 
grain yield growth and impacts of climate change). 
Addressing or evaluating the causes of the 2007–2008 crisis is beyond the 
scope of this work, but leading analyses emphasize that rice is different. Dawe 
and Slayton (2010), Headey and Fan (2010), and Timmer and Dawe (2010) 
note that major Asian rice producers had good harvests in 2008, and that 
stocks were not low and even had increased in 2007–2008. Rice did not have 
the supply shock that wheat had (due to drought), the demand shock that 
corn experienced (caused by policies boosting demand for corn for biofuel 
processing [Naylor and Falcon 2008]), or the “speculative fervor” in commodity 
markets that impacted corn and wheat (Timmer 2009). And rice was not being 
heavily traded in world markets. Rather, Timmer and Dawe (2010: 7) note that 
while “the supply and demand fundamentals for rice were supportive of the 
gradual increase in world prices from their lows in 2001, … production had 
been increasing steadily, stocks relative to use had been increasing since 2003, 
and supplies available for export were adequate for normal demand.”1
The gist of the analyses of the 2007–2008 rice crisis is that short-term factors 
were the main causes of the sharp spike, in particular factors related to policy 
(including export restrictions and large precautionary imports), coupled 
secondarily with international trader speculation. These short-term factors are 
set against longer-term factors such as growth in demand and decline of yield 
growth. However, the longer-term factors did not provoke the spike, as they 
had been in place well before it. 
1 FAOSTAT (online) shows that world output of paddy trended up from 587 million tons in 
2003 to 689 million in 2008, dipped a bit to 685 million in 2009, and went to 672 million 
in 2010, with thus a 14%–15% rise during the 8 years, depending on the end date used. 
For Asia, paddy output went from 532 million tons in 2003 to 625 million in 2008, then 
to 619 million in 2009 and 607 million in 2010, hence a 14%–17% increase during the 
8 years depending on the end year of the trend. Supply (availability) of rice per capita in 
kilograms in Bangladesh during 2003–2007 (the available years in FAOSTAT that overlap 
with the foregoing paddy output trend information) showed a gently sloped trend from 
162 kilograms (kg) to 160 kg during the period, with corresponding figures being 80 kg to 
77 kg in the PRC and 68 kg to 71 kg in India: these trends show that supply was roughly 
steady during these years. 
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Purpose and Themes
So far, the focus of responses after the crisis has been (1) to turn back to farm 
production self-sufficiency strategies—Alavi et al. (2012) note a number of 
illustrative cases; and (2) to revive discussions about buffer stocks. Both were 
principal elements in the food security debate in the 1970s. The difference 
now is the emphasis on seeking a regional reserve (Briones 2011). In fact, the 
food security debate since the crisis has focused on raising farm yields and on 
addressing trade constraints and stock issues.
However, the debate has not yet taken on as a central theme the improvement 
of staples value chains. Rice, other grains, and key nongrains such as potatoes 
are staples in Asian countries. This book devotes attention to that gap in the 
debate. Such attention is complementary to, and fed in enthusiasm by, the 
great wave of debate on the recent food crisis. 
To be sure, the intraregional and domestic supply chains for staples could 
not have prevented the crisis and are not now adequate to resolve food 
price inflation in some countries. This secondary theme can be described as a 
“structural problem” in staples value chains in the Asian region.
One multicountry work treats the supply chain problem more directly. The 
World Bank study by Alavi et al. (2012) emphasizes a point made in most of 
the debate, but adds case studies based on samples of mills and traders and 
other key informants. They focused on intercountry rice value chains in some 
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Alavi et al. note 
that most small-scale rice farmers continue to use traditional farming methods; 
transport costs are high (forming a quarter of the import price); wastage rates 
are high in handling; supply chains are long with many steps from farmer to 
retail; mills are small and antiquated; and the whole system is fed by large 
outlays of subsidies. Alavi et al. emphasize the inadequacy of this more or less 
traditional, inefficient staples chain to respond to incentives or bring the rice 
economy to a new level—one in which regional trade and private investment 
can be relied on to prevent a new rice crisis. 
In the renewed debate in the region on food security strategy, reports such as 
Alavi et al. and ADB (2010), and articles in the popular press in Asian countries2
2 In India, for example, news articles frequently assert a link between high food costs and 
inefficient and wasteful, traditional and exploitative, food supply chains. This was evident 
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have been spurred by the food crisis and have revived a debate that had been 
put on the back burner since it had raged in the 1970s. The debate centers 
on how to solve the problem of the drag on the food economy thought to be 
created by traditional and poorly performing food supply chains. 
The 1970s debate was predicated on the idea that staples value chains in Asia are 
traditional, stagnant, and poorly performing, both in efficiency and equity, and 
that they are (1) peopled with “traditional farmers” (farmers using traditional 
techniques, buying few external inputs, and selling little to the market) who 
either little engaged in the market or engaged only with an exploitative village 
trader; (2) composed of long market supply chains of many links and segments 
(such chains are termed “intermediationally long”);3 (3) prone to exploitative 
relationships of tied credit–output linkages where traders lend to farmers and 
thus underpay and exploit them; (4) very wasteful in postharvest processes; 
(5) unable to differentiate quality and merely supply bulk commodities, not 
graded, labeled, or branded; and (6) a cause for poor consumers overpaying 
for their food. Such images of markets had empirical backing when Lele’s 
(1971) important work on the grain economy of India in the 1960s emerged. 
Lele found a surprising degree of integration and competition in the national 
rice market in India, in terms of arbitrage among urban wholesalers. However, 
she also showed that the more standard case (for example, Uttar Pradesh) 
was characterized by the “traditional” (intermediationally long and inefficient) 
rice supply chains, with a preponderance of local retail markets and village 
traders and small mills. Exceptions included very advanced chains such as in 
the Punjab.
The reaction on the market side to the specter of insufficient grain supply 
in the 1960s and 1970s was to erect parastatals to side-step the traditional 
supply chains, and regulations such as the Agricultural Produce Market 
Committee’s Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act (referred to as 
the “APMC Act”) still apply in India to control and license the traders and police 
the practices. The reaction on the farm supply side was to put in place the 
research, extension, and credit and input supply for a Green Revolution. 
recently in the uproar over onion price spikes, which were linked in the press to wholesaler 
speculation. The National Food Security Bill, promised in the 2009 general elections and 
now being vetted by a Parliamentary Standing Committee (Economic Times 2012), was 
engendered by the public debate over the food crisis, as well as long-standing debate over 
the food security needs of the poor. 
3 This term describes a value chain in terms of the number of its intermediary links. This is a 
term used in this book to analyze transformation of the value chain.
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With success and structural adjustment, in the 1980s–2000s many countries 
dismantled the parastatal system and liberalized the domestic market 
regulations. The result was increasing efficiency in grain markets, such as in 
Bangladesh (Ahmed, Haggblade, and Chowdhury 2000) and the PRC (Rozelle 
et al. 1997).
However, despite the experience of market liberalization and the Green 
Revolution, when the 2007–2008 crisis hit, the specter of the traditional 
supply chain boosting costs and prices was immediately and widely blamed. 
The blaming entailed employing much language and many images reminiscent 
of those used in the 1970s—as if the staples value chains had after all not 
transformed much along with the amazingly changed overall economies in 
which they functioned—economies in which there have been large income 
increases, rapid urbanization, diet diversification, and huge rural infrastructure 
investments. Moreover, government and multilateral institutions, spurred by the 
food crisis, called for upgrading the food value chains in the region; an example 
is the Operational Plan for Sustainable Food Security (ADB 2010). 
The current debate is both right and wrong in evoking the nature of staples 
supply chains as potentially important in the formation of prices. The debate 
is right in that the vilification of the supply chain implicitly admits that the 
supply chain is important in food price formation: in fact this book shows that 
the segments of the supply chain after the farm form nearly half of the value 
added—and costs—of the staples supply chains and thus of food costs facing 
consumers. But the debate is wrong in being so certain, and so accusatory, 
of the staples supply chains—assuming that they are so traditional, efficient, 
static, and stagnant that they remain as they were in the 1970s. 
In sharp contrast, the authors started writing this book realizing that, in 
the 2000s, actually very little systematic empirical evidence was present 
concerning the functioning of staples supply chains in Asia. There is in fact 
a major gap in the empirical literature in Asia on food markets, food supply 
chains, and their links to food security. And the authors ended the writing 
of the book realizing that, at least in the dynamic areas feeding the large 
cities of Asia, the staples value chains are now nearly unrecognizable when 
compared with the traditional ones of the 1970s. They have fundamentally 
transformed upstream (in the farm segment); midstream (in the mills, cold 
storage, wholesale, and logistics); and downstream (in the retail segment). 
Almost no research has been done on this transformation. This book is a 
contribution to filling the gap.
Further discussion of the gap in the empirical literature evoked above is 
necessary in order to contrast the empirical base and method used in this book 
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with the empirical approaches of the value-chain and supply-chain studies on 
staples that have come before. A review of the literature in each zone studied 
for this book showed that the great majority of studies focused on a specific 
portion of the value chain, such as the farm or the wholesale markets. Very 
few of the studies provided an integrated survey-based vision of whole rice 
and potato value chains. In fact, most value-chain studies used small samples 
of key informants per segment to “map” value chains, and most studies were 
on nonstaple items such as horticultural products. Cross-country comparisons 
tended to be of international value chains, emphasizing the trade aspect. For 
specific key segments of the staples value chains, amazingly little field survey 
research has been done: at most, a handful of survey-based rice mill studies 
have been conducted in Asia, in the 2000s. The same applies to potato cold 
stores and to rice and potato traders in wholesale markets and village areas. 
The paucity of hard evidence based on sample surveys about domestic 
staples value chains in the 2000s in Asia is because research had turned to 
documenting the effects of the Green Revolution on the diffusion of farm 
technology (and knock-on issues of sustaining that revolution). Research had 
also turned to either focus on policy reforms dismantling the parastatal and 
price control system, or (in cases such as India, where the government still 
intervened directly to buy and sell grain) on government actions and policies in 
lieu of putting significant research into surveys of the functioning of the private 
(traditional and modern) actors in the staples value chains.
To fill the important knowledge gap concerning the current functioning of 
staples value chains in the 2000s, ADB commissioned the International Food 
Policy Research Institute to collaborate with research institutions in the region on 
a detailed study of rice and potato value chains in Bangladesh, the PRC, India, 
and Viet Nam (the latter is not reported in this volume).4 
This book presents the findings of that study, and draws implications. The 
focus is on (1) domestic value chains of rice and potatoes; (2) private sector 
action in input supply, farming, processing, storing, trading, and retailing; 
(3) the incidence of policies and government market actions on private parties; 
and (4) the implications in terms of domestic market development policies.
The study and book complement the works reviewed above. The study and the 
book do not (1) aim to inform trade or storage policies or other topics in the 
trade and buffer stock debate; (2) examine international or intraregional trade in 
staples in any way; (3) examine government actions in the market except as they 
4 Viet Nam’s results will be reported separately owing to methodological differences.
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are part of the behavior of the private actors studied, such as the mills’ share of 
rice sold to government; (4) delve into the short-term causes or consequences of 
the recent crisis; or (5) attempt to explain current food price inflation. 
Sector and Area Focus and Research Questions
The study focuses on rice and potatoes because rice is a staple throughout 
Asia and potato is a staple in South Asia. Bangladesh, the PRC, and India (“the 
three economies”) are the focus of the book in order to compare East and 
South Asia. The PRC and India together produce and consume half of the 
world’s rice and a third of its potatoes, and they are the world’s first and third 
largest potato producers and consumers. The study was conducted in six zones 
(two in each economy, one being the area studied for potato and the other, 
the area studied for rice).
The study focuses on domestic supply chains because they involve nearly 98% 
of the rice and potatoes consumed in Bangladesh, the PRC, and India, and 
relatively little survey evidence is available in the 2000s on the functioning of 
these value chains, although they are often discussed in the domestic policy 
debates. The authors also did not want to overlap with the trade and national 
and regional stocks debate, which is another subject.
The focus is on the foremost supply chains of staples to the capital cities: 
Dhaka, Bangladesh; Beijing, the PRC; and Delhi, India. Supplies to the capitals 
are more “commercial” than supplies in the average zone in each nation’s 
economy, due to proximity to great cities. 
However, while the rice and potato zones studied are not representative of all 
the rice and potato production zones in Bangladesh, the PRC, and India, they 
are representative of the main zones supplying the large cities. These tend to 
be within about 6–8 hours by truck from the big cities. Circles with a radius of 
8 hours by truck or train around the 100 cities with more than 1 million people 
in the PRC or the 67 cities in India with more than 500,000 people cover a 
substantial part of the rural PRC and Indian populations. In India, that might 
be half the rural population—the half that, per information from wholesale 
markets, feeds the cities. Cities will hold 60% of the Asian population by 2025, 
from only 20% in 1960 (James et al. 2008). Understanding the supply chains 
from these dynamic, commercial, somewhat periurban zones is important to 
comprehending at least one major piece of the food security puzzle in Asia. 
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The questions addressed in the research for the book are summarized 
as follows:
(1)  Are staples value chains transforming structurally? That is, how 
are value chains for staples (rice and potatoes) differentiated and 
differentiating over time from traditional long chains of small-scale 
actors to intermediate and modern shorter chains including medium- 
and large-scale actors? 
(2) Is the conduct of staple value chains’ actors transforming? That is, 
are value-chain finance, value-chain actors’ procurement, and the 
production and marketing systems transforming? If so, how? Is the 
transformation broadly in the direction of “modernization” with capital 
intensification and technology upgrading, with quality differentiation, 
with contracting, and with disintermediation? 
(3) Is the performance of staples value chains leading to the inclusion of 
small-scale farmers, small-scale midstream actors, and workers, and 
leading (all else being equal) to lower food costs for consumers?
The study examines the differentiation both over space (mainly comparing 
similar zones, except for the Gansu, PRC potato site) and through time (with 
three points of recall of information on the value chains: the one-year 2009/10 
“snapshot,” along with some mid- and early 2000s recall data for some key 
variables that describe transformation of the value chains. 
Moreover, in Bangladesh, the PRC, and India, some situations continue to be 
traditional while others are more transformed, such as in the polar comparison 
of the Gansu potato zone with that in Agra, Uttar Pradesh, with the former 
remaining somewhat more “traditional” than the latter. This shows a cross 
section displaying a longitudinal story—a common device in the economics 
literature that uses a cross section to represent time series change by observing 
over space things that occur over time too. 
In addition, a longer view of the evolution and differentiation of value chains is 
obtained by comparing the results from the 2000s with the descriptions of the 
traditional supply chains for rice in the older literature, such as Lele (1971) for 
India and Chowdhury (1992) for Bangladesh. In those works, state and private 
urban wholesalers bought from rural wholesalers, and rural wholesalers bought 
from field brokers and village traders; then state and rural or urban wholesalers 
milled the paddy and sold the rice to the cities or towns or local village markets. 
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For potato, a similar system had prevailed except that processors and the state 
were not present, and there were no modern cold stores (just traditional 
on-farm storage). The PRC had a similar traditional system but with a twist: 
prior to liberalization in the late 1970s, rice was supplied by collectives and 
farm groups/teams to state collection points. With liberalization, that was 
displaced by a system similar to India’s traditional system for rice. 
Then, to the degree the rice and potato value chains observed are not like 
the traditional systems, the presence of transformation is inferred. The 
transformation has two axes. First is the transformation of individual segments, 
such as change in farm technology, in the structure of the trading segment, in 
the structure and technology of mills and of storage, and in the evolution of 
retail from traditional toward modern. Second is the transformation of linkages 
between the segments: while little contracting takes place between actors in 
the segments, the shape and length of the chains change, as subsegments 
are suppressed (like the disintermediation), and occasionally segments are 
eliminated (such as Beijing supermarket chains buying directly from mills, 
eliminating the wholesaler between them). 
The Structure–Conduct–Performance Paradigm
The study’s research questions can be grouped into the standard classification 
used in industrial organization studies to characterize subsectors or supply 
chains or value chains by their structure, conduct, and performance. 
Structure. In terms of structure, the following questions were asked: 
•	 How are rice and potato value chains structured? 
•	 What is the distribution across the three segments (defined in the next 
paragraph) of the formation of costs and value added? 
•	 What differentiation do value chains display in terms of restructuring from 
traditional into intermediate–transitional and modern supply chains? 
•	 How concentrated are the chains across segments and, hence, what share 
of a chain’s profits do farmers capture? 
•	 How concentrated are the value chains within subsegments—that is, 
what role do medium- and large-scale actors such as large farms, mills, 
cold storage facilities, and supermarkets play, compared with marginal and 
small-scale actors?
Structure is then assessed in two ways. First, structure in the value chains is 
represented by the distribution of output, costs, and profits across segments of 
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a value chain. The segments for the value chains studied are (1) upstream—the 
farmers, as well as suppliers of inputs such as land, water, labor, fertilizer, and 
chemicals; (2) midstream—the traders (village traders, rural wholesale market 
traders, and urban wholesale market traders) and storage and processors (rice 
mills and potato cold storages); and (3) downstream—the retailers. Knowing 
the structure can help determine, for example, whether the farmers’ share 
of total profit generated by the value chain is higher in a particular country, 
product, or quality of product, than in another.
Second, structure in the value chains is represented by the distribution of 
output, costs, and profits across subsegments in each segment. The relevant 
subsegments per segment are large- and medium-scale actors versus small-scale 
actors, on the one hand, and rural versus urban on the other. Knowing this 
structure, and its differentiation for a given product in a given zone or country, 
can answer questions such as whether there are several forms or versions of the 
rice value chain in a given country where one is “more traditional” and another 
is “more modern.” 
Relative modernity can be measured in one or both of two ways. 
•	 First, by length, as a proxy for transaction costs: a chain can be longer (with 
more actors) and thus more traditional; or shorter, with disintermediation, 
that is with fewer actors and more direct buying from suppliers. 
•	 Second, by scale, in principal, as a proxy for efficiency or market power 
or both: a chain can have one or more segments dominated by large- or 
medium-scale actors. 
These criteria comprise a spectrum of forms of a value chain, from most 
traditional to most modern, with various intermediate structures. An example 
of a modern value chain that satisfies both criteria would be where the retailers 
are supermarket chains, and they buy potatoes directly from farmers or rice from 
big mills that source directly from farmers. An intermediate level of modernity 
would be supermarkets buying from wholesale markets that then source from 
cold stores or from farmers at cold stores. A very traditional structure of the 
value chain would be where small-scale farmers sell to village traders who sell 
to rural wholesale markets who sell to semi-wholesalers (who both wholesale 
and retail) who sell to urban wholesale markets who sell via semi-wholesalers 
to small retailers in the city.
Conduct. In terms of conduct, a question is: What is the behavior of the 
actors in the value chains, differentiated into their segments and subsegments, 
and of the different kinds of value chains per product, including traditional, 
intermediate-transitional, and modern? 
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Conduct is assessed in four categories and three ways. The four categories of 
conduct correspond to how actors finance production, buy inputs, make their 
product, and sell it. The three ways each category is assessed are technical, 
physical, and/or geographical; institutional (such as standards and contracts); 
and organizational. The four categories and three ways are elaborated on below.
The first category is related to finance, specifically value-chain finance, and in 
particular, buyers’ credit to suppliers and suppliers’ credit to clients. A value 
chain may be financed from within the chain or from sources external to it. 
Finance from within the value chain is based on the value-chain relationships, 
such as a trader advancing funds to a farmer who buys inputs, produces 
a crop, and markets the crop to the trader. Finance from outside the value 
chain is predicated on value-chain relationships, such as a bank lending 
to a mill because it has a contract with a retailer, which contract substitutes 
for collateral. 
This book focuses only on finance within the value chain: trader, miller, cold store, 
and retailer credit to suppliers and clients. Value-chain finance is one of many 
ways that value-chain actors can finance their production. Other examples include 
self-finance, which predominates, and credit, which is not always predicated on 
value-chain relationships, such as a straight bank loan or microcredit. All value-
chain actors may also provide credit services to each other—farmers de facto 
lending to traders, traders advancing cash to farmers, retailers getting credit 
from mills, retailers allowing delayed payment by consumers, and so on.
Finance within the value chain is assessed in the three ways already noted: 
(1) technical and /or physical: assessing the quantitative importance of traders’ 
credit to suppliers and buyers; (2) institutional: evaluating whether traders’ 
credit is linked to contracts and/or specification of meeting certain standards 
such as of quality; and (3) organizational: whether the credit is funneled via 
organizations such as cooperatives. 
The second category is related to input procurement. Farmers buy inputs; 
traders buy intermediate inputs such as paddy and potatoes and factor inputs 
such as trucks, petrol, and labor; mills buy intermediate inputs such as paddy 
and factor inputs (electricity, equipment, labor, and transport services); cold 
storage facilities buy factor inputs (electricity or diesel, labor, and equipment) 
and could buy intermediate inputs; and retailers buy intermediate inputs 
(potatoes and rice) and factor inputs (stalls, transport services, and labor). 
Input procurement is assessed in the same three ways: (1) technical and/or 
physical: assessing the quantitative importance of the kinds of inputs such 
as purchased seeds and herbicides in farmers’ costs, or transport services 
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in traders’ and retailers’ costs, the geography and socioeconomics of their 
sourcing (such as whether the traders buy from small-scale farmers, whether 
retailers buy from small mills, and so on); (2) institutional: evaluating whether 
traders’ credit is linked to contracts and/or specification of meeting certain 
standards such as of quality; and (3) organizational: determining whether the 
credit is funneled via organizations such as cooperatives. 
The third category is related to output production technology. All actors in the 
value chain are considered to be producers, not just the farmers. Farmers grow 
paddy and potatoes; millers mill paddy and produce rice; cold storage facilities 
store potatoes; traders buy or broker potatoes and rice or paddy and perform 
a service of storing and transporting and selling; and retailers also buy, store, 
transport, and sell the produce. 
Production technology is assessed in three ways: (1) technically, in terms of the 
inputs used, such as the intensity of labor use and capital per unit of output: 
for example, a supermarket may be more capital intensive than a traditional 
retailer; (2) technically, in terms of the scale of production and of farm, plant, 
or stall; and (3) economically, in terms of costs incurred (intermediate input 
and factor prices paid) by different actors.
The fourth category is related to selling and marketing output. Farmers sell 
paddy and potatoes; millers sell milling services; cold stores sell storage and 
other services; traders sell logistics, grading and sorting, and marketing services; 
and retailers sell the final product. This is assessed in the same three ways: 
(1) technical and/or physical: assessing the quantitative importance of the 
various kinds of products, such as varieties and qualities of rice; services such as 
providing delivery or credit along with the primary product or service; and the 
geography and socioeconomics of their marketing; (2) institutional: whether 
the marketing is done on contract or a spot market, and per standards or 
without; and (3) organizational: whether marketing is done in cooperatives or 
associations or individually, and off-market versus in clusters such as wholesale 
markets and wet markets. 
Performance. In terms of performance, the value chains as a whole and their 
component parts or segments can be analyzed with respect to two outcomes: 
efficiency and equity. Of course there is a trade-off between them—for example, 
a cost in the system can be cut by disintermediation via eliminating village traders 
(a common trend), but that means an equity effect (employment) on small-scale 
traders. Efficiency measures the cost of food and resources that were used to 
move the crops from the farmers’ fields to the retail shelves. This book does 
not present partial or total factor productivity analyses, but rather comparative 
cost estimates over actor types and study zones per product. The study also 
14 The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains 
evaluates traditional versus modern retail prices for rice and potatoes. Equity 
measures the “inclusion” of poorer groups in the value chains and the effects 
on poor consumers. This is analyzed by comparing prices earned by different 
scales of farmers (i.e., small-, medium-, and large-scale), and their participation 
in different value chains. Implicitly, this issue is also addressed in the other 
segments by examining structural change, in particular, concentration within the 
trading, mills, cold storage, and retail segments. Food prices charged by different 
kinds of retailers are considered, but the study did not include consumer surveys.
Structure of the Book
Chapter 2 presents selected background information for the study zones 
regarding rice and potato production, consumption, trade, and policies as well 
as the sampling framework. Chapters 3–6 (Part B) present the findings of the 
study’s surveys on rice value chains—first on the upstream or farm segment, 
second on the midstream segments (domestic traders and rice mills), third on 
retail, and fourth on costs and margins across the value chain. In the same 
manner, Chapters 7–10 (Part C) present the findings from the study’s surveys 
on potato value chains. Parts B and C are necessarily similar and often use 
the same language, given the subjects studied and the methods used. Part B 
is intended for readers interested in rice, and Part C for those interested in 
potatoes, who may not want to refer back to the rice section to understand 
the information fully. Parts A and D are relevant to both the potato and rice 
sections. Part D synthesizes the findings on the overall value chains and presents 
policy implications.
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Sector Overview,  
Study Areas, and  
Sampling Framework
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This chapter provides background information for the rest of the book. The first two sections lay out the key points about the rice and potato sectors;1 their patterns and trends in the sample zones in the economies 
studied—Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and India—in 
terms of imports and exports, consumption, production, domestic marketing; 
and the key points of government policy on the two products. The last section 
briefly describes the study areas, and discusses the survey methods and 
sampling framework used in the study.
Rice in Bangladesh, the People’s Republic  
of China, and India
Rice Imports and Exports
External rice trade was a very minor part of all three rice economies studied, 
which were basically self-sufficient in rice. With some modest yearly fluctuations, 
about 2% of rice consumption in Bangladesh was imported in the 2000s. Rice 
trade was relatively insignificant in the PRC, accounting for less than 1.5% of 
total consumption or production. The PRC was a very small net rice importer in 
1995 but a net exporter in 2000, 2005, and 2009. In 2000 and 2009, the PRC 
exported 1.8 million tons of rice (less than 1% of its output). India exported on 
average 4.6% of its rice output during the crop years (CYs) 2001/02–2008/09. 
India’s rice imports had been negligible (less than 1% of total rice consumption 
in any year since 1990). 
1 For information about detailed trends and patterns in the staples sectors in Asia, see, for 
example, Dawe (2010), Pandey et al. (2010), and Sombilla, Hossain, and Hardy (2002), for broad 
information on the rice sector in Asia. Similar literature is not available for potatoes in Asia.
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That very little rice was externally traded by any of the economies studied 
justifies the focus on the domestic market as the rice value chain’s end point.
Rice Consumption
Rice was important in the food consumption basket of all three economies 
for consumers of all income strata. Nearly all the food grain consumed 
in Bangladesh was rice, but rice comprised only about half the food grain 
consumed in the PRC and India. However, there are differences between rural 
and urban areas. For example, in the PRC, in 2004, urban residents consumed 
51 kilograms (kg) of rice per capita, while rural residents consumed 93 kg.
The importance of rice as a share in the diet of most Asian consumers has been 
declining during the last several decades, as analyzed by Timmer and Dawe 
(2010). The share of rice in calories for all Asian countries in the Food and 
Agriculture Organization’s food balance data sheets was at its highest in 1970 
in the midst of the Green Revolution, at 38.2%, and then trended down to 
29.3% by 2007 (FAOSTAT 2012). Among the economies studied for this book, 
that shift was greatest in the PRC (from rice being 38.7% of calories in 1970 
to 26.8% in 2007) and Bangladesh (from 75.1% in 1970 to 69.8% in 2007), 
and least in India (from 32.4% in 1970 to 29.9% in 2007). The downward drift 
was very slow until 1990 and then much faster (as Asian incomes increased). 
By 2007, only 30% of calories in Asian consumers’ diets came from rice 
(comprising 5% of their food budget in money terms). The calories from rice 
changed in the PRC (from a low of 444 in 1961 to a high of 872 in 1990, then 
dropped to 799 by 2007) and India (from a low in the 600s in the 1960s–1970s 
to a high of 781 in 1990, then dropped to 703 in 2007). The calories from rice 
rose slightly in Bangladesh in absolute terms (from a high in the 1,500s in the 
1960s–1970s, down to 1,311 in 1980 and 1,473 in 1990, and up to 1,591 in 
2007), as Bangladesh rode through the Green Revolution, a prolonged crisis, 
and a long recovery.
This is part of a longer trend of decline in rice consumption in Asia in the 
last several decades. Timmer and Dawe (2010) noted that the decline had 
accelerated in the last decade and should be expected to continue for some 
time because (1) the income elasticity of rice demand is falling over time; 
(2) as rural-to-urban migration occurs and incomes rise, the elasticity trends 
downward; and (3) the income elasticity is lower in urban than in rural areas 
and among richer than poorer consumers. This general decline of course 
disguises heterogeneity among age groups, regions within countries, and 
across the economies themselves, but the overall trend is clear.
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More broadly, the gradual decline in rice consumption is part of a trend of a 
declining share of cereals in Asian diets, which are diversifying (Pingali 2006)—
part of the general phenomenon known as Bennett’s Law (Bennett 1954). 
For example, the Government of India (2010) report shows that the share of 
cereals in the total food budget of Indians had decreased during 1997–2006, 
in the rural areas from 55% to 35% and in urban areas from 35% to 25%.
Paddy Production
A few key observations on paddy production in the study countries follow.2
First, the extent of land under rice cultivation had not changed much in 
Bangladesh, the PRC, and India during the last several decades. In Bangladesh, 
almost three-quarters of total cropped land was devoted to paddy cultivation. 
That area had changed little over time, at roughly 10 million hectares (ha) 
of paddy from 1986 to 2008. In the PRC, the rice area rose from 27 million 
ha in 1961 to 35 million ha in 1980, then dropped to 30 million ha during 
the 2000s. In India, rice was planted in about 22% of all cropped areas in 
CY1989/90, but that dropped to 19% in CY2008/09. 
Second, paddy production varied widely within zones. This was especially so in 
India and the PRC, large economies with substantial interregional differences. 
In the PRC, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Heilongjiang were the three largest rice-
producing provinces, accounting for about 14%, 11%, and 8% (respectively) 
of rice area and about 13%, 10%, and 8% of paddy output (CRRI 2009). The 
PRC has three major rice-producing regions. Region 1 (the northeast), including 
provinces such as Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, produced japonica rice 
only. Region 2 (the east), including Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Hainan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Sichuan, and Yunan provinces, produced only 
indica. Region 3 (southeast), including Anhui, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang, 
produced indica and japonica. Heilongjiang (the province studied for this 
book) was the PRC’s largest japonica rice-producing province and Hunan was 
the largest indica-producing province. Rice production in the PRC had been 
shifting from south to north since 1980. The rice area in Heilongjiang increased 
from 206 ha in 1980 to 2.25 million ha in 2008, while in Zhejiang, another 
major rice production area in the east, rice land declined from 2.5 million ha in 
1980 to less than 1 million ha in 2008 as the province industrialized and 
agriculture diversified.
2 “Paddy” refers in this book to unmilled rice and not to the field in which it is grown.
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In India, rice production was somewhat geographically concentrated. India’s 
top five rice-producing states were West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar 
Pradesh (the state studied for this book), Punjab, and Orissa. In CY2007/08 
they contributed 60% of rice production, with 15%, 14%, 12%, 11%, and 
8%, respectively, of India’s total rice production (Government of India 2009a). 
This geographical distribution of rice production had not changed much over 
time—the same five states produced 59% of India’s rice in 1986.
Third, the average rice farm was small in the study zones. In Bangladesh, the 
average farm size in 2000 was 0.46 ha and in the PRC, the average farm size 
was 0.67 ha (Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2010). In India, the average size 
of operational holding (for all crops) in 1995–1997 was 1.41 ha (Eastwood, 
Lipton, and Newell 2010), and rice farms averaged 1.33 ha overall in India, 
while that in Uttar Pradesh was 0.83 ha (Government of India 2001). As will 
be discussed in Chapter 3 with the presentation of study results for rice farms, 
these national averages masked significant heterogeneity in rice farm sizes in 
each study zone and among the three (in Bangladesh, the PRC, and India).
Fourth, paddy output and yields had increased greatly over time in the three 
zones due to the diffusion of improved varieties and irrigation (which allowed 
multiple cropping). 
In Bangladesh, due to the proliferation of shallow tube wells and the 
development of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of dry season (boro) rice, rice 
yields had increased dramatically, and the share of dry season rice (irrigated) 
had increased from 10% of the country’s rice production in CY1966/67 to 
61% in 2008 (Asaduzzaman 2009). The consequence was that paddy yields 
rose from roughly 1.8 tons per hectare (t/ha) in 1990 to 2.5 t/ha in 2000 and 
to 3.0 t/ha in 2008. Output jumped from about 15 million tons to about 
30 million tons during the same period, even though the area under rice 
changed little. With irrigation, seasonality in the rice market in Bangladesh had 
decreased. By allowing multiple seasons of cropping, irrigation had reduced 
seasonal fluctuations in rice prices. While the seasonal price spread was 15% 
between the peak and trough in the 1960s, the spread declined to less than 
10% during 2000–2009.
The PRC, the world’s top rice producer and consumer, produced about 190 
million tons of paddy per year—close to one-third of the world’s total output. 
The PRC’s paddy yields had more than tripled since 1961, when they were 
roughly 2 t/ha, to 6.6 t/ha in 2010 (SSB 2010). The PRC’s rice culture also 
had “deseasonalized” with the diffusion of irrigation. Commonly, the PRC rice 
crop has three seasons: (1) a planting in January (early indica planted in the 
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southern PRC); (2) a mid-year planting (in May, such as indica in the south and 
japonica in the north); and (3) a late year crop of indica, planted in July in the 
south. From 1990 to 2009, statistics show a shift toward mid and late rice, 
reflecting a shift toward japonica and increased rice production in the north, 
and toward mid- and late-season rice in the south. 
In India, yields had doubled since 1960, from roughly 1 t/ha to 2.2 t/ha in 2010, 
and production had risen by 41%, from roughly 70 million tons in CY1988/89 to 
99 million tons in CY2008/09. Paddy production in India had also become less 
seasonal. The share of dry season (irrigated) paddy in total paddy production 
had increased from 37% in 1960 to 57% in 2008 (Government of India 2009a). 
While yields had risen in all three economies, the South Asian zones lagged 
behind the PRC: Bangladesh and India yields were about 35%–45% of PRC 
yields. Hence, although the PRC had less rice land under cultivation than did 
India and Bangladesh combined, the PRC produced 190 million tons of paddy 
yearly versus 130 million tons for Bangladesh and India combined.
Fourth, the diffusion of HYVs occurred rapidly in all three economies, especially 
before 2000. 
Bangladesh had widely adopted HYVs, as the expansion of irrigation facilities 
allowed planting in the dry (boro) season (Asaduzzaman 2009). Hossain 
(2009) noted that, from 1987 to 2000, Bangladesh’s share of cultivated rice 
land under HYVs increased from 33% to 60%. 
The PRC’s rapid yield increase can largely be attributed to the adoption of 
hybrid rice. The PRC’s hybrid rice program was started in 1963, and hybrid 
seed was released commercially in 1976 (Gulati, Chen, and Shreedhar 2010). 
Less than 1% of rice area was planted to hybrid rice in 1976, but this increased 
to about 54% in 1991 and about 63% in 2008 (Li, Xin, and Yuan 2009). 
In India, HYVs were introduced during the Green Revolution. HYVs comprised 
only 7% of all rice in CY1968/69, but the share grew to 58% by CY1982/83 
(Singh and Kaur 1990) and 74% by 1999 (Directorate of Rice Development 
2002). As in Bangladesh, the adoption of HYV rice as a rainy season (kharif) crop 
in drier areas in the Indo-Gangetic plain (such as in Uttar Pradesh) increased 
quickly in the 1980s along with the widespread diffusion of private shallow 
tube wells. Rainy season rice is double cropped with irrigated wheat in the dry 
season (rabi). In higher rainfall areas, such as West Bengal (as in Bangladesh), 
the spread of tube wells and HYV rice allowed double cropping of rice (Fujita 
and Hossain 1995). Fujita and Hossain show that HYVs diffused most rapidly 
 Sector Overview, Study Areas, and Sampling Framework 21
in the 1980s, coinciding with the most rapid increase of tube wells in the rice 
areas. In contrast with HYVs, hybrid rice had spread slowly in India, and only 
approximately 2% of rice production was from hybrid varieties. To encourage 
the spread of hybrid rice, India implemented a policy for subsidizing its seeds 
(Economic Times 2010).
Fifth, the diffusion of new varieties had been accompanied by a shift to higher 
quality rice (quality here refers to cosmetic attributes such as the length to 
width ratio of the milled kernel). In Bangladesh, high-quality rice varieties 
were rapidly adopted because of high yields, shorter maturity, and relatively 
good grain quality, causing a shift away from coarse varieties (Hossain, Bose, 
and Mustafi 2006; Minten, Murshid, and Reardon 2012). The PRC produced 
two main kinds of rice: japonica and indica. The area planted to japonica had 
expanded from 11% of the total rice area in 1980 to 29% by 2000 (Hansen 
et al. 2002) and about 29%–30% during the 2000s (Lee and Kim 2007). The 
expansion occurred mainly in the northeast, in three provinces, one of which 
(Heilongjiang) was used in the study for this book. The shift in quality in India 
had been least marked: while India is known on the world market for its high-
quality rice, called “basmati,” it comprised just 1%–2% of the country’s total 
rice production (NBARD n.d.).
Rice Value Chains and Markets
First, in general, the value chains can be grouped into four types that were 
found in the zones studied (from Noagoan to Dhaka, Heilongjiang to Beijing, 
and Shahjahanpur to Delhi): 
(1) The most traditional rice value chain was “geographically short and 
intermediationally short”3 and was the local supply chain of paddy 
grown by the farmer, dehusked in a local village mill, and consumed 
by the farm household or sold to the local village market for local 
consumption. 
(2)  The rural–urban traditional rice value chain was “geographically long 
and intermediationally long” and featured sale of paddy to local 
brokers (village traders) who then sold it as paddy or had it milled in 
village mills and then sold it to rural wholesale markets, where in turn 
3 The term “geographically short (or long)” refers to the relative distance between the farm 
and the retailer, and “intermediationally short (or long)” refers to the number of actors or 
steps the rice goes through from the farmer to the consumer.
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the rice was bought by wholesalers from cities. The rice was then sold 
to semi-wholesalers (who sold to retailers) and/or traditional retailers.
(3) The intermediate (or transitional) rice value chain, which was 
“geographically long and intermediationally medium,” entailed the 
rice farmer selling paddy directly to mills, which then (a) sold rice 
to city wholesale market traders, or (b) sold paddy to rural or city 
wholesale market traders who had it milled and then sold the rice on 
the city wholesale market. At the city wholesale market, traditional 
retailers bought the rice directly. 
(4) The modern rice value chain was “geographically long and 
intermediationally short,” with the rice farmer selling directly to mills, 
which then sold to supermarkets and/or urban wholesale markets to 
sell on to supermarkets and traditional urban retailers. 
Part B of the book shows that in the Bangladesh study value chain (Noagoan 
to Dhaka), the rural–urban traditional value chain still dominated, but the 
intermediate (or transitional) value chain was emerging quickly, due to direct 
sales to mills. In the Heilongjiang study, the intermediate (or transitional) 
and modern value chains dominated. In the Shahjahanpur–Delhi study, 
the intermediate (or transitional) value chain strongly dominated, with the 
continued use of village traders and rural wholesale markets upstream, but 
direct sale from mills to urban traders downstream. The most traditional 
value chain no longer had a significant presence (in fact, it had a very minor 
presence) in any of the study zones. Only in the PRC had the modern value 
chain emerged in a significant way. 
Second, rice farmers had a substantial marketed surplus rate in all three zones 
studied.4 In Bangladesh, while paddy output had more than doubled since the 
1960s, the marketed surplus rate had increased by a factor of six or more, from 
12% in the 1960s to 49% in the 1990s (Chowdhury and Haggblade 2000). 
Nationally, while about one-third of rural households were net sellers of rice, 
a large number of farmers also sold paddy at harvest and then bought rice at 
some point of the year (Klytchnikova and Diop 2006). 
In India in general and in the study state of Uttar Pradesh in particular, paddy 
was primarily a commercialized crop. Uttar Pradesh’s marketed surplus rate 
was 63% in CY1988/89 and 80% in CY2006/07, with the latter similar to India 
as a whole (Government of India 2009a).
4 The marketed surplus rate is sales divided by output.
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Third, market integration appeared to be advanced. In Bangladesh, since the 
1980s, food grain markets had become well integrated over time and space 
(Ravallion 1985, Goletti 1993, Dawson and Dey 2002, and Murshid et al. 
2009). The integration may have been driven by major investments in road 
infrastructure. Wider availability of mobile phones may have helped. There also 
seemed to be little collusion between traders to fix prices, except during short 
periods (Chowdhury and Haggblade 2000, Goodland 2001). 
In the PRC, Huang and Wang (2001) showed that rice markets were increasingly 
integrated. The difference in prices among regions was much lower in the late 
1990s than in the mid-1990s. Part of the decline in price differences among 
markets may also have been due to falling transaction costs resulting from 
improved infrastructure and an increasingly competitive transport industry 
(especially in trucking). The majority of the PRC’s rice (in fact, about 70% or 
more) was moved by truck. This was a big change in the PRC’s rice economy, 
where most rice used to be moved by train and ship or boat. 
In India, there was evidence that rice markets were regionally integrated (Ghosh 
2000), but also that integration was imperfect across regions (Jha, Murthy, and 
Sharma 2005), with the imperfection ascribed to heavy government intervention 
in the rice market. Yet Ghosh (2011) found that rice market integration had 
improved markedly between the premarket liberalization period (before 1991) 
and the reform period (after 1991 and into the 2000s). 
Fourth, in the rice milling segment, there had been an expansion followed by 
technological change and concentration during the last several decades in the 
three economies studied. This change is indicated in several reports, although 
little research has been done on it.
In Bangladesh, the hitherto ubiquitous hand pounding of paddy was being 
displaced by milling. In the initial phase of change, from the 1960s through 
the 1990s, the number of mills increased rapidly, from 6,155 in the 1960s to 
50,868 in the 1990s. The scale and technology of the mills changed somewhat 
during that period: In the 1960s, no paddy was milled in large mills, but by the 
1990s, about 15% of it was processed in large mills (automatic and “major” 
mills) and the rest was milled by small huller mills (Chowdhury and Haggblade 
2000). In the second phase, during the 2000s, the larger mills were beginning 
to displace the small ones. Murshid (2011) noted that from 1990 to 2009 
the number of automatic and semi-automatic larger mills rose quickly, rapidly 
displacing small mills. In some districts, the process had proceeded far by 
2009; for example, in Noakhali in Chittagong Division, large mills accounted 
for more than 90% of all milling.
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In the PRC, most paddy used to be processed in its approximately 100,000 
town-level mills (McKee 2010), but in the last decade in particular, paddy 
milling in large mills had increased rapidly. Examples of companies with large 
mills include the PRC’s China Oil and Food Corporation (COFCO) and the 
Singaporean Wilmar International. In 2003, about 74% of mills were owned 
by the private sector and 26% by the public sector. By 2011, corporations with 
large mills milled an estimated 20%–25% of the PRC’s rice. 
Most village mills with capacities of 5–10 t/day had closed during 2003–
2008. The remaining mills had a capacity of 50–200 t/day. In 2007, the 
PRC had about 7,600 milling companies, 5.1% fewer than in 2008, but the 
number of mills with capacities exceeding 400 t/day had increased from 
81 in 2007 to 115 in 2008 (He and Wen 2009). 
In India, the mill sector’s trends were similar to those noted above. Rice milling 
was fully in the private sector domain. Until 1996, rice milling was reserved by 
law for small-scale operators. But in 1997, the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) 
Act of 1958 and Rice Milling Industry (Regulation and Licensing) Rules of 1959 
were repealed, thereby allowing medium and large companies to enter the 
business. This quickly led to substantial technological modernization in milling, 
as hand pounding was replaced by hulling and shelling machines, and small 
mills were displaced by medium and large ones. 
By 2003, 50% of India’s rice was milled using modern technology (i.e., hullers 
with disc shellers, equivalent to automatic, and rubber rollers, equivalent to 
“semi-automatic”); 40% was processed using single hullers (small mills, which 
produce for farmers’ domestic consumption); and 10% was hand pounded, 
mainly for home consumption (Government of India 2003). 
Direct and Indirect Government Roles in the Rice Value Chain
The government’s direct role in rice markets was in general limited, although it 
was greater in India than in Bangladesh or the PRC. 
In Bangladesh, the public sector’s role in food grain markets had declined 
significantly over time. Private food grain imports were legalized in 1993, and 
by 2007/08 the government had only a 9% share in grain imports. The share 
of government purchases in total rice output declined from 4% at the end of 
the 1980s to 2% in 2007/08 (Chowdhury 2010). 
The PRC government discontinued its rice shops in the early 1990s and limited 
itself in the 2000s to purchases in order to stock public reserves. In 2008, the 
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government purchased 7.5 million tons (4% of national output) of rice for public 
stockpiling for price stabilization; these stocks were then sold to private traders. 
The government set an indicative floor price but did not have strict enforcement 
mechanisms in place so that prices tended to fluctuate around the floor price. 
In India, the government was much more involved directly in the rice market 
than in the other two economies, and, contrary to the trend elsewhere in 
Asia, that involvement was rising (Rashid, Cummings, and Gulati 2007). The 
Government of India bought 15.8% of rice output in CY1996/97, 25.1% in 
CY2000/01, and 29.5% in CY2007/08. The government undertook these 
purchases by mandating that mills in certain states (such as in the study state, 
Uttar Pradesh) sell part of their rice to the central government. The government 
then sold this rice to consumers, mostly via the Public Distribution System in 
rural and urban areas. Moreover, the government declared minimum support 
prices, but, as in the PRC, the government did not have a mechanism to strictly 
enforce the prices so de facto they were merely indicative, and there is evidence 
that traders frequently did not adhere to the required prices.
All three economies’ governments had, however, a substantial role in the rice 
market. That role consisted of selling subsidized seed and fertilizer to farmers; 
providing some subsidized credit; providing public extension services; and, in the 
PRC, giving direct subsidies to farmers. The expenditures for these items were 
significant parts of government budgets for agriculture. However, the survey 
found in all zones that the share of subsidized inputs bought from government 
stores was in general a minor share of farmers’ total input purchases. 
Potatoes in Bangladesh, the People’s Republic  
of China, and India
This section presents the context of general trends in potato trade, consumption, 
and production in the economies studied. 
Potato Imports and Exports
In all three economies, very little potato was imported or exported. Bangladesh 
exported about 0.2% of its potato production, and it imported none; the PRC 
imported 2% of its consumption, and exported 1% of its output (Scott and 
Suarez 2012). India imported less than 1% of its potato consumption and 
exported less than 1% of its domestic output. For simplicity, the analysis in the 
study focused on the domestic market.
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Potato Consumption and Production
Potatoes are an important basic food, and the leading nongrain food in 
Bangladesh, the PRC, and India. The PRC consumed 32 kg of potatoes per 
capita per year; Bangladesh, 23 kg; and India, 15 kg. Potatoes attained their 
leading rank among vegetables only recently in South Asia, especially in the 
last several decades as incomes had been rising substantially. Potatoes were 
consumed mainly as a vegetable accompanying a rice or wheat base, and were 
generally considered a “luxury staple” (Bouis and Scott 1996), with fairly high 
income elasticities in South Asia and moderate but positive income elasticity 
in the PRC. Thus, potatoes were a “normal good” in all three economies (not 
an “inferior good” whose demand declines with income, as occurs with the 
potato in the United States and Western Europe). Moreover, the ratio of the 
potato to rice calorie price in 2010 was an estimated 4.0/1.0 in Bangladesh, 
3.2/1.0 in the PRC, and 7.0/1.0 in India. Thus, it was thus much more expensive 
for consumers to obtain their energy needs from potatoes than from rice; 
instead potatoes served as a source of diet diversity, vitamins, and taste variety. 
In Bangladesh, potatoes were also by far the leading vegetable and a main 
food product. While the country produced 49.0 million tons of rice in 2010, 
potatoes ranked second (among all crops), with 7.9 million tons; other fresh 
and/or leafy vegetables together were a distant third, at 1.4 million tons. This 
ascendance of potato was much more abrupt and recent than in the PRC 
(discussed below): potato output was only 0.3 million tons in Bangladesh 
in 1961; it edged up to 0.9, 1.1, and 2.9 million tons in 1980, 1990, and 
2000, respectively, and then abruptly surged to 7.9 million in 2010—a 26-fold 
increase in total (and a 10-fold per capita increase) in 5 decades. Thus, much 
of the growth was only in the last decade.
In Bangladesh, moreover, potatoes had an elasticity of demand with respect to 
income, ranging from 0.87 among the wealthiest urban quartile to 1.17 among 
the poorest urban quartile, and 1.02 among the wealthiest rural quartile to 1.67 
among the poorest rural quartile (Bouis and Scott 1996), based on 1973/74 data 
(not updated since). These high income elasticities (and high calorie prices relative 
to rice) led Bouis and Scott to call potatoes a “luxury staple” in Bangladesh. 
Ahmed and Shams (1994) used rural survey data from 1991/92 and found a 
total-expenditure elasticity for potato of 1.15, also very elastic (compared with 
0.68 for rice). These figures again, as in the PRC, suggest that with growing 
incomes, potato consumption will continue to increase. 
In the PRC, the world’s leading producer of potatoes since 1993 (Wang and 
Zhang 2010), potatoes were by far the leading vegetable, and a main food 
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product. In 2010, the PRC grew 75 million tons of potatoes on 5.1 million ha, 
well above any other single vegetable category (tomatoes ranked second at 
42 million tons and cucumbers third at 41 million tons). Fresh leafy vegetables 
(apart from cabbage, which is reported separately by FAOSTAT) together 
constituted 133 million tons. The potato figures can be compared with the 
PRC’s production of 197 million tons of rice and 115 million tons of wheat 
(FAOSTAT 2012). Potato output was only 13 million tons in 1961, growing to 
26 million in 1970, 32 million in 1990, 66 million in 2000, and then soaring to 
72 million in 2007—a sixfold increase in total (and a threefold increase in per 
capita terms) in 5 decades. The increase of the PRC’s potato production was 
the motor of world potato production growth: 70% of the world’s increase in 
potato output from the 1960s through the 2000s was because the PRC added 
50 million tons to its annual output of potato. 
In the PRC, only 11% of potatoes were consumed as processed (Scott and 
Suarez 2012), and merely 10% as feed, 4% as seed, and 6% as waste, so that 
fully 69% of potato output was consumed as fresh (not processed) potatoes. 
While potatoes are an important food and vitamin source, they constituted 
only 2.2% of calories consumed in the PRC, compared with 27% for rice and 
20% for wheat (Scott and Suarez 2012). Moreover, potatoes had an elasticity 
of demand with respect to total expenditure (as a proxy for income) of 0.2 
(higher than for sweet potatoes), using 2000 data (Wang and Zhang 2010). 
Thus, potatoes are a normal good, so that their consumption is slated to 
continue to increase as incomes continue to rise in the PRC (but at a slower 
rate than in Bangladesh).
In India, as in Bangladesh and the PRC, potatoes were the leading vegetable, at 
38.6 million tons (half the PRC figure) in 2010, compared with 35.0 million tons 
of green vegetables taken as a group (a quarter of the PRC figure), and 120.0 
million and 81.0 million for rice and wheat output, respectively. But the leading 
position of potatoes was very recent; potato output was only 2.7 million tons 
in 1961, 3.9 million tons in 1970, 8.0 million tons in 1980, 15.0 million tons 
in 1990, 25.0 million tons in 2000, and 38.6 million tons in 2010—a 14-fold 
increase in 5 decades (and a 5.6-fold increase in per capita terms). 
As with Bangladesh, in India the surge in potato’s position was recent—
potato became the leading vegetable only in the mid-2000s, and much of 
the growth was in the last 20 years (adding 4 million t/year to the average 
during 1961–1980, and then adding 29 million t/year to the average during 
1980–1961). Potatoes were a fifth of the tonnage of vegetables in 1961, 
and slightly more than that in 2010. In India, the increase of potato output 
and diversification of the diet roughly tracked income growth. Data from the 
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Household Income and Expenditure Surveys illustrate how per capita potato 
consumption was changing over time. During 1973/74–2004/05, the annual 
per capita consumption increased sixfold in rural areas, from 3.4 kg to 22.9 
kg, and fourfold in urban areas, from 6.5 kg to 24.8 kg. Apart from use as 
seed, almost all (95% of) potatoes were consumed fresh, and the remaining 
5% were processed (as chips, french fries, etc.). Potato consumption was 
ubiquitous in India—92% of people ate potatoes. During 1987/88–2004/05, 
per capita consumption rose by 7%, from 14 kg to 15 kg (Government of India 
1988, 2005). 
Potato Yields and Production Geography
First, yields showed very strong growth in all three zones studied, but the 
volumes varied greatly. Potato is a seasonal crop, with one growing season 
in all three zones. According to FAOSTAT,5 Bangladesh’s average yields were 
10 t/ha at the end of the 1980s and 15 t/ha by the end of the 2000s. During 
1982–2009, the PRC’s yields increased steadily, from 10 t/ha to 15 t/ha. In 
India, potato yields were 16 t/ha in 1989 and 19 t/ha in 2009 (CPRI Potato 
Statistics online).
Second, potato production varied significantly geographically across the three 
economies. In Bangladesh, potato production was distributed widely, but was 
concentrated in the northwest (including the area studied) and the center–
east around Dhaka and in Comilla (World Food Programme n.d.). In the PRC, 
potatoes were primarily grown in the cool mountains and high altitude areas 
in Gansu (the study province), Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, 
Shanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan. In India, 87% of potatoes were grown in the 
northern Indo-Gangetic Plain; two states in the Plain accounted for the lion’s 
share of India’s potatoes, 35% from just Uttar Pradesh (the study state), a huge 
state with roughly 180 million people, and 24% from West Bengal. 
Potato Value Chains and Markets
First, in general, four types of potato value chains were evident in the studied 
areas (from Bogra to Dhaka, Gansu to Beijing, and Agra to Delhi): 
5  The following FAOSTAT yield data are for a single season.
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(1) The most traditional potato value chain, which was “geographically 
short and intermediationally short,” was the local supply chain of 
potato from the farmer that was sold fresh at harvest or, within a 
few months and after traditional on-farm storage, to the local village 
market for local consumption. 
(2)  The rural–urban traditional potato value chain, which was 
“geographically long and intermediationally long,” included selling 
potatoes fresh at harvest or, after a few months of traditional on-farm 
storage, to local brokers (village traders) who then sold the potatoes 
to rural wholesale markets where wholesalers from cities bought the 
potatoes, then resold them to semi-wholesalers (who in turn sold to 
retailers) and/or traditional retailers.
(3)  The intermediate (or transitional) potato value chain, which was 
“geographically long,” featured the potato farmer selling both fresh 
at harvest and after storage in modern cold storage facilities (CSFs) 
directly to city wholesale market traders. 
(4)  The modern potato value chain, which was “geographically long and 
intermediationally short,” featured the potato farmer selling both 
fresh at harvest and after modern cold storage directly to processing 
firms or supermarkets. 
Part C of the book shows that, in the Bangladesh study (Bogra to Dhaka), the 
rural–urban traditional value chain still predominated, but the intermediate or 
transitional value chain was emerging quickly (due to the increase of modern 
CSFs) and was already important. In the Gansu study, the rural–urban traditional 
value chain still dominated, with little modern cold storage. In the Agra–Delhi 
study, the intermediate (or transitional) value chain strongly predominated, 
after the rapid development of modern CSFs in the last decade. The most 
traditional value chain no longer had a significant presence (in fact it was very 
minor) in any of the study areas, nor had the fully modern value chain emerged 
in a significant way. 
Second, in all the zones, potato was both a major food crop and a major cash 
crop. Potato farmers had a substantial marketed surplus rate (sales divided by 
output) in the study areas. In Bangladesh, this has been estimated at 85%–90% 
(in early studies, such as Scott 1988, and in later work, such as Huq, Alam, and 
Akhter 2005). In India, government statistics show the marketed surplus rate 
of potato was 78% in CY1988/89, averaged 72% during 1999–2002, and 
then rose to 82% in CY2008/09 (Government of India 1989, 2002, 2009a). 
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Third, cold storage had expanded in the last several decades in the study 
zones. In Bangladesh, CSFs had a total capacity of 3.6 million tons as of 2012 
(Financial Express 2012), which could handle roughly 30% of the country’s 
potato crop. Interestingly, this is the same share noted by Scott (1988) several 
decades earlier. Hence, cold storage capacity had kept pace with the rapid 
increase of potatoes grown. In India, CSFs had a capacity as of 2012 of 21 
million tons (Economics Times 2012). In 2009, 91% of the CSFs were in the 
private sector (and together had 96% of total capacity of storage in tonnage); 
7% of the CSFs were in the cooperative (government organized) sector (and 
these CSFs had 3% of the country’s total capacity in tonnage terms); and 2% of 
the CSFs were in the public sector (with 1% of the country’s total capacity). Of 
the country’s total CSFs, 75% stored potatoes (Government of India 2009b). 
Fourth, there is evidence of at least partial market integration in potato 
markets, although little research has been done on this in the zones studied 
for this book. For example in India, Basu and Dinda (2003) analyzed the market 
integration of wholesale and retail markets in a district in West Bengal during 
1998–2000 and found cointegration. Shivaraya and Hugar (2002) studied the 
integration of onion and potato markets in northern Karnataka and found 
market integration for potatoes. 
Direct and Indirect Government Roles in the Potato Value Chain
The governments in the three economies studied had not directly intervened 
in the domestic potato markets, or set or recommended prices, in general. 
Occasional exceptions to this generality have occurred, such as recently when 
the state government of West Bengal declared that potatoes should not be 
exported from the state to foreign countries (mainly to Bangladesh), to quell a 
price surge (Financial Express 2012). 
Governments were engaged indirectly through some direct subsidies and sale 
of subsidized inputs (as noted in the rice section), as well as partial subsidies 
for electricity and for cold storage construction. In India for example, during 
2008–2011, the government spent $124 million on cold storage subsidies to 
increase capacity (Economic Times 2012). 
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Study Areas, Survey Methods,  
and Sampling Framework
Study Areas
All but one of the six study zones were major rice or potato production areas 
that were the closest to and main suppliers of capital cities; they were thus 
representative of the commercial agriculture zones in the market catchment 
areas of the three economies’ large cities. Those catchment areas constitute 
an important share of the overall rural area; the authors estimate that share 
at roughly half of the rural areas in the study economies. Bogra and Noagoan 
districts in Bangladesh are both about 200 kilometers (km) from Dhaka and are 
major suppliers to Dhaka of potatoes (Bogra) and rice (Noagoan). Shahjahanpur 
District in central Uttar Pradesh, the rural starting point of a main rice value 
chain to Delhi, was a major supplier to Delhi and is among the closest rice 
areas (at 375 km from Delhi). Agra in western Uttar Pradesh was Delhi’s closest 
major potato supplier (at 200 km), and produced a quarter of India’s potatoes. 
In the PRC, Jiamusi in Heilongjiang was selected as the starting point for the 
rice value chain to Beijing. Jiamusi is 1,360 km from the capital. Heilongjiang 
is the closest and foremost supplier of rice to Beijing, and is representative of 
the northeast region, which supplies the great majority of rice to Beijing. The 
outlier among the six zones is Gansu, the potato production area studied in the 
PRC. Gansu is about 1,100 km from Beijing, which is further from Beijing than 
its other major potato-supplying areas (Hebei, Inner Mongolia, and Shanxi). 
Survey and Sampling Methods 
First, “rapid reconnaissance” studies were done for each of the six value chains 
(one for rice and one for potato in each economy). This consisted of interviews 
with representative types of actors in each segment of each value chain, 
plus academics, policy makers, and private sector associations. The literature 
pertaining to rice and potatoes in each economy was also reviewed.
Moreover, and importantly, the survey data eventually were found to contradict 
many of the assertions of the key informants, whom the authors found were 
repeating “conventional wisdom” and partial perceptions. A striking example 
is that, although many experts and key informants noted that “tied credit” 
(trader’s credit to farmers in return for a guarantee that the farmer would 
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provide the crop to the trader) was still very common, the surveys showed it 
was actually very uncommon in the zones studied. Thus, surveys are essential 
to provide a good base for policy-making information. 
Second, based on the broad picture emerging from the rapid reconnaissance, 
detailed structured questionnaires were formulated. These questionnaires 
were pretested and then modified about half a dozen times prior to the actual 
survey. They were then administered in surveys by enumerators who read the 
questions individually to respondents and noted the responses. No government 
officials or other people accompanied the interviewers, so no outside influence 
was introduced into the interviews.
Third, samples were tested in the rural and urban areas of each zone. This gave 
rise to a sample of about 3,500 farmers, traders, mills, CSFs, and traditional 
and modern retailers in the three economies on which this book focuses. The 
details of the sampling methods and samples are presented in the Appendix 
to this chapter. In general the study used a stratified random sampling method 
for every segment: the authors typically stratified by geographic area using 
reasoned sampling (based on the quantitative importance of the zone for 
supply to the capital cities, and then the choice of villages and markets in 
the zones based on their quantitative importance in supply). Then the authors 
generally sampled randomly within a given universe; in some cases, where there 
was a highly unequal set of actors, they were further stratified by category, 
such as smaller and larger farmers in the Indian and Bangladesh potato and 
rice areas; however, in the analysis, the shares of these groups were weighted 
in the population (as discerned by the study’s census of each area) so that the 
reported figures are unbiased and representative. 
The authors call the method used the “stacked survey method,” as it entails a full 
sample survey at every level of the value chain. Thus, the method can be used 
to statistically study differences across actor scales for each segment (each stage 
being represented by sets of actors, such as farmers, processors, and traders) of 
the value chain. Some of the surveys of specific segments are unique or have 
rarely been done, such as the surveys of postharvest segments, mills, CSFs, 
traders, and (especially) of traditional retailers and supermarkets. No comparable 
survey-based study of staples value chains in Asia is evident in the literature. 
In addition, the data were collected mainly in 2009 and the first half of 2010 
using questionnaires that asked the interviewees to recall information over the 
year before the survey. For several key variables, a 5- or 10-year recall was also 
requested, but in general the survey’s questions are for the year before the 
survey was administered. Thus the viewpoint is mainly a snapshot of short-
term change and cross-section comparisons.
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The survey questionnaires in general asked the actors four categories 
of questions: 
(1) characteristics of the actor, in particular, the types of assets held 
(human capital such as education; social and organizational capital 
such as membership in associations and cooperatives; and physical 
capital such as holdings of equipment, land, and vehicles); 
(2)  purchase of factor inputs (labor and external nonlabor inputs such as 
fertilizer and fuel) and intermediate inputs (such as the inventory bought 
by a trader), in terms of costs, geographic origins, supplier types, value-
chain finance, quality attributes, and any contractual relations; 
(3)  value addition using the inputs plus technology to produce outputs, 
such as production of rice and potatoes, delivery and marketing of 
products, cold storage, and so on; and
(4)  marketing of the outputs (in terms of prices received, geographic 
destinations, and buyer types, as well as value-chain finance, quality 
attributes, contractual relations, and labeling/branding). 
Appendix: Details of the Sampling Framework 
Rice in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh rice farmers and villages were surveyed 
in November–December 2009. Noagoan was selected for the survey in rural 
areas as it is an important rice-producing district. The district is about 200 
kilometers (km) north of Dhaka. 
The village and household survey was set up as follows. For rice farm households, 
the two most important rice-producing counties (thana) in Noagoan were 
selected. In each county, 5 villages were randomly selected from three village 
strata—2 from high-producing, 2 from medium-producing, and 1 from 
low-producing villages. In each selected village, a village questionnaire was 
implemented.
In each village, a census of households was conducted to enumerate the paddy 
producers. Using the census questionnaire, all the households in the village were 
listed. Each household was asked questions about its total land cultivated and 
about rice cultivation in particular. In each of 10 villages, 22 households were 
then randomly selected (for a total of 220), half from the largest farm group and 
half from the smallest, to reflect their relative importance in the rice value chain.
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To sample the rural rice mills, a list of all the millers in Noagoan District was 
obtained. A stratified random selection of 20 millers was done, consisting 
of 8 automatic, 5 semi-automatic, and 7 small mills. Small mills typically first 
parboil paddy and then spread it to dry in the open air. After drying, the paddy 
is transferred to be milled by small Engleberg friction dehullers that remove the 
husk and polish the rice, all in one unit (Chowdhury and Haggblade 2000). Semi-
automatic mills have larger huller and rubber rolls (Rahman 2004). Large-scale 
automatic mills emerged in the 1980s, financed largely by international financial 
institutions. These mills integrate steam-pressure parboiling, mechanical forced-
air dryers, rubber roller shellers, and polishing machines in a single conveyer-
driven, flow-through facility (Chowdhury and Haggblade 2000). In 2006/07, 
Bangladesh had 13,329 small, 109 semi-automatic, and 141 automatic rice 
mills, accounting for 550,204 tons, 8,595 tons, and 22,827 tons of milling 
capacity, respectively (FPMU 2009).
In the paddy and rice wholesaler survey, first the 17 village and other rural off-
wholesale market traders that the households in that village or other traders 
sold to were interviewed. Second, 43 traders were interviewed from the local 
rural wholesale market in the selected district. Third, 30 urban wholesale 
traders were interviewed in Dhaka, half each in Badamtoli and Krishi markets, 
the city’s two most important rice wholesale markets. 
A sample of traditional and modern rice retailers in urban Bangladesh (Dhaka) 
was surveyed in November–December 2009. First, 5 districts were randomly 
selected in different parts of Dhaka (north, east, west, south, and central). In 
each, a census was done of all markets, and two were randomly selected. At 
each market, a census of all rice retailers was taken, and 12 traders were then 
randomly selected and interviewed. A total of 120 traditional retailers were thus 
interviewed. Second, 20 modern retailers were surveyed. In each district selected 
for the traditional retail survey, a census of modern retail shops was conducted, 
and 4 were randomly selected and surveyed regarding their rice prices.
Potato in Bangladesh. Samples of potato farmers and traders in Bogra and 
of district retailers in Dhaka were used for the Bangladesh survey. Bogra district 
was selected for the rural areas as it is an important potato-producing district. 
Bogra is about 200 km north of Dhaka. 
The village and household survey for potato was conducted in the same way 
as the village and household survey for rice. For the rural sample of potato cold 
storages, 20 cold storage facilities (CSFs) were selected from a list of all CSFs 
in Bogra. 
For the wholesaler survey, first, 30 village traders and other rural off-wholesale 
market traders that the households in that village or other traders sold to were 
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interviewed. Second, 30 traders were interviewed from the rural wholesale 
market in Bogra. Third, 30 urban wholesale traders were interviewed in 
Dhaka—15 in Shyam Bazar and 15 in Kawran Bazar, the two most important 
potato wholesale markets in the city. 
The urban potato retail survey in Dhaka was conducted in the same manner as 
the urban rice retail survey. 
Rice in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC sample of rice 
farmers and villages was surveyed in May–June 2010. Heilongjiang was chosen 
as representative of the northeast provinces, which grow most of the rice that 
provisions Beijing. Jiamusi Prefecture in Heilongjiang was chosen because it 
is the largest japonica-producing district in the PRC (providing about 28% of 
the PRC’s japonica) and the dominant source of japonica to Beijing. Moreover, 
wholesalers in Beijing indicated that Jiamusi is one of the main areas supplying 
rice to Beijing. 
From Jiamusi Prefecture, a list of its 6 counties and their total rice area was 
obtained. From the 6 counties, 2 were randomly selected: Huachuan and 
Huanan. From the 12 townships in Huachuan and 19 in Huanan, 1 township 
was chosen randomly per county: Chuangye in Huachuan and Lishu in 
Huanan. From the 10 villages in Chuangye and 20 villages in Lishu, 5 were 
chosen at random in each township. With the help of each village government, 
all households in the village were listed. Then 25 households were randomly 
selected in each village, for a total sample of 250 households.
The village surveys indicated about 1–2 mills per village, and thus all 15 mills in 
the sampled villages were selected for the survey. They were small-scale mills. 
The 5 town or county mills chosen as representative were in the nearest town 
or county seat and were mainly medium- or large-scale mills.
As the village surveys indicated that there was about one trader per village, all 
10 village traders were selected. However, Jiamusi Prefecture no longer had 
a wholesale market for rice. A key informant said this was because the mills 
tended to sell directly to wholesale markets in other cities and to retailers in 
their city (the study could not test this hypothesis). As a substitute, three of the 
four wholesalers in the area where the market used to be were surveyed. 
For the Beijing trader survey, 30 traders were selected at the Shenghuahonglin 
and Jinxiudadi wholesale markets, the two largest rice wholesale markets in 
Beijing. Shenghuahonglin had about twice as many wholesalers as Jinxiudadi, 
so 20 wholesalers were chosen randomly from about 400 at Shenghuahonglin 
and 10 from about 200 at Jinxiudadi.
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For the urban rice supermarket survey in Beijing, modern retailers from four 
selected districts (Chaoyang, Fengtai, Haidian, and “central” district) were 
sampled. In each of the four districts, 15 supermarkets were selected. In 
total, 60 supermarkets were sampled: 35 from lists of stores in the PRC’s 20 
leading chains and 25 from among other (smaller) chains and independent 
supermarkets. The list of 803 supermarkets in the Beijing metropolitan area in 
2010 was supplied by the China Chain Store Association. 
Potato in the PRC. The PRC sample of potato farmers and villages was 
surveyed in July 2010. For the sample, Dingxi Prefecture was chosen in Gansu 
Province. Gansu was chosen because it is the largest potato-producing province 
in the PRC (growing about 15% of the PRC’s potatoes). Wholesalers in Beijing 
noted that Dingxi is a supplier to Beijing. The Dingxi government provided 
a list of the prefecture’s 7 counties and their total potato areas. From the 
7 counties, 2 were chosen at random: Anding and Weiyuan. Four townships 
were then randomly selected for the study: Chankou and Qinglanshanin 
from among Anding County’s 19 townships, and Beizhai and Da’anin from 
among Weiyuan’s 16 townships. Then, 2 villages were selected at random 
per township. Finally, based on a list of potato-growing households in each 
sample village, 40 households were chosen at random, giving a total of 
320 households selected and surveyed.
Rural cold storages were not covered separately in Gansu, as they were either 
owned by traders and thus formed part of the trader interviews, or by the farm 
households. 
As the village surveys showed that each village had about 2 traders, all 17 were 
selected for the survey. In addition, 10 traders on the Dingxi potato wholesale 
market were chosen from a list of the market’s wholesalers.
For Beijing, Xinfadi and Jinxiudadi—the two top wholesale markets—were 
surveyed. As the number of potato wholesalers at Xinfadi was about twice 
that at Jinxiudadi, 20 potato wholesalers were surveyed at random from about 
100 in Xinfadi and 10 wholesalers from about 50 in Jinxiudadi.
The PRC urban potato traditional and modern retail surveys used the same four 
districts as for rice. From district lists of wet markets, 22 were selected across 
the four districts. The number of wet markets varied among districts, so the 
number chosen was roughly proportional to wet markets in the district. In each 
wet market, five retailers, chosen randomly from the total, were surveyed. The 
modern retail outlets used in the potato retail survey were the same as those 
used in the rice survey. 
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Rice in India. The sample survey of Indian rice farmers and villages was 
conducted in September–October 2009. The state of Uttar Pradesh was 
chosen as a main rice-producing state supplying the Delhi market; the district 
of Shahjahanpur (in west–central Uttar Pradesh) was chosen because it was 
the nearest to Delhi and thus was comparable to the rice regions chosen in 
Bangladesh and the PRC in being a major rice-growing area near the capital 
city. The Uttar Pradesh Ministry of Agriculture provided a list of the four 
subdistricts (tehsils) and their total rice area. From the four subdistricts, the 
three with the largest rice area (Jalalabad, Powayan, and Tilhar) were chosen 
for the survey. The subdistricts’ offices provided, for all their villages, data on 
cropping patterns and land use in the main rice season, the rainy or kharif
season. On the basis of the data, the villages were categorized as high-, low-, 
and medium-density villages, depending on the share of area cultivated for 
rice in the subdistrict’s total farmland. A subdistrict with less than 10% of its 
total farmland under rice cultivation was categorized as low density, 10%–
20% as medium density, and more than 20% as high density. For each of the 
three subdistricts, 5 villages were chosen: 2 randomly from the high-density, 
2 from the medium-density, and 1 from the low-density villages, for a total of 
15 villages per subdistrict.
In each selected village, a census of households was conducted. Using the 
census questionnaire, all the farm households in the village were listed. Each 
household was questioned about its total land cultivated and land under rice 
cultivation. Eighteen households were selected in each village, giving a total 
of 270 households surveyed. To select households, first, they were ranked 
in descending order by their land size. Then, 7 households were randomly 
selected per village from farms that together cultivated more than 50% of the 
village’s total cultivated area, and 8 households were chosen from the rest. 
The statistical results report both sample averages and population-weighted 
results, using the population weights from the census.
In Shahjahanpur District, 25 mills were sampled randomly by size (milling 
capacity) strata. The sample was drawn from a list of 65 registered mills (the 
district total) provided by the Uttar Pradesh government. The list showed the 
milling capacity of each mill and whether it was automatic or semi-automatic. 
The mills were ranked for the study in descending order by milling capacity. 
Then 8 were randomly selected (with some attrition due to mills that were not 
traceable or willing to respond) from the mills that constituted less than 50% 
of the total milling capacity in the district and 17 from those constituting more 
than 50% of the total. It turned out that the 8 mills in the lower stratum were 
automatic, while the 17 in the upper stratum were semi-automatic.
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As the village surveys indicated that each village had about one paddy trader, 
all 15 villages’ paddy traders were surveyed. To survey the rural wholesalers in 
the subdistricts, a list of wholesale markets for grains was obtained through 
information from farmers, village traders, and the subdistrict offices. Then, 
the subdistrict government provided the list of rice traders in each wholesale 
market. All 42 rice traders in the rural wholesale markets were surveyed—
23 paddy and 19 milled-rice traders. Of the total, 13 paddy and 11 rice traders 
were in Shahjahanpur Mandi (the main wholesale market in Shahjahanpur 
District), 5 paddy and 4 rice traders were in Jalalabad Mandi, and the same 
numbers were in Tilhar Mandi.
For the rice traders in Delhi, the sample was taken in Naya Bazar wholesale 
market, the main rice market in Delhi. The sample included 23 wholesalers 
chosen randomly. (There was some attrition due to unwillingness to respond, 
but there was no discernible bias in trader size related to the unresponsiveness.) 
In addition, 10 semi-wholesalers (who bought rice from Naya Bazar wholesalers 
and sold to small shops elsewhere in Delhi) were surveyed. The names 
and addresses of the semi-wholesalers were collected from the traditional 
retailers surveyed.
For the India urban rice and potato traditional retail survey in Delhi, surveys 
were conducted in March 2009; the following distills the sampling method 
discussed in Minten, Reardon, and Sutradhar (2010). Delhi is divided into 
12 zones and a total of 272 wards. Each ward contains several colonies (the 
smallest urban geographical unit). For this study’s sample, one ward was 
randomly selected in each of Delhi’s 12 zones.
Two types of surveys were implemented in each selected ward. First, a census 
of food retail outlets was conducted. If a ward had fewer than 10 colonies, 
all were covered in the census exercise; if a ward had more than 10 colonies, 
10 were randomly selected within the chosen ward. A census was taken of all 
operating private modern retail outlets and wet markets where one of the two 
products was sold. Within the 10 colonies, 5 were then randomly selected. 
Within the 5, a census was conducted of all the other retail outlets—pushcarts, 
Safal outlets (a cooperative chain), Fair Price Shops, and small-scale (kirana) 
shops—that sold any of the two products covered. 
The retailers were then surveyed—focusing on their retailing practices for the 
selected products, the prices they charged, and relevant quality questions. The 
survey focused on the only two types of rice retailers: private modern retailers 
and small shops. All modern retail outlets in the 10 colonies were surveyed 
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for the two products. Four small shops and one retail outlet were randomly 
selected and interviewed in each of the five selected colonies. In all, per ward 
and per product, 20 traditional retailers, 10 consumers, 1 Safal outlet, and all 
private modern retailers were covered (for a maximum of 10 colonies). This 
survey was conducted from 16 February to 19 March 2009. At the end of 
March and the beginning of April, a second smaller survey was conducted in 
6 of the 12 selected wards, wherein randomly selected retailers in each 
category were asked about their turnover the day before. During this second 
round, all Fair Price Shops were visited in the five selected colonies of each ward 
during regular opening hours. Whether the shop was open was noted, and, 
if it was, rice qualities were recorded. Additional information on the structural 
characteristics of the modern retail stores was also collected during this survey.
In all, for the retail survey for rice and potatoes, 561 pushcart retailers, 518 wet 
market retailers, and 650 small-scale (kirana) shop owners were interviewed, 
and 674 consumer exit interviews were conducted.
Potato in India. The sample of Indian potato farmers and villages was selected 
for a survey in September–October 2009. Uttar Pradesh was chosen as the main 
potato-producing state supplying the Delhi market. Agra district was chosen 
because it was the major potato district nearest Delhi, and the largest potato-
producing district in India (supplying about 25% of the country’s potatoes). 
Wholesalers in Delhi noted that Agra was a main supplier to Delhi. The Uttar 
Pradesh government provided a list of Agra’s five subdistricts and their total 
potato-growing area. From the five, the three with the largest potato-growing 
area were selected—Etmadpur, Fatehabad, and Sadar. For each subdistrict, data 
for cropping patterns and land use for the winter–spring (rabi) season (when 
most of the potato crop is grown) were obtained from subdistrict offices for 
all their villages. Based on the data, villages were categorized as high, low, and 
medium density, depending on their share of potato-growing area in their total 
farmland (using the same area ratios as for the rice zone). From each of the 
3 subdistricts, 6 villages were chosen: 3 randomly from the high-density, 2 from 
the medium, and 1 from the low-density strata of villages, for a total of 18. 
In each selected village, a census of households was conducted. Using the 
census questionnaire, each household in the village was asked about its 
total land area under cultivation in general and under potato in particular. 
Then 15 households per village, for a total of 270 households, were selected 
and surveyed. To select households for the survey, they were first ranked in 
descending order by their land size. Then 7 households were randomly 
selected from farms that together cultivated more than 50% of the total area 
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cultivated in the village, and 8 households from the rest. This was done to 
assure a sufficient sample to compare the medium- and small-scale farmers, as 
the medium-scale farmers were few in number but they grew and marketed a 
large share of the potatoes. 
In the India potato zone, medium- to large-scale farms were disproportionately 
sampled to assure statistical significance in understanding their behavior in 
production and marketing in the potato value chain. Based on the study’s 
census, a random sample would result in only 28% of the sample being 
medium and large farms, although they dominated the value chain with 
65% of the farmland (correlated with their dominance in potato). Thus, 53% 
of the sample was selected to be medium or large farms (with more than 4 
hectares [ha]); 19% to be semi-medium (2 to less than 4 ha), versus 33% in 
the census; and 28% to be marginal or small (less than 2 ha), versus 39% in 
the census. From the perspective of farmland distribution and thus volume 
incidence in the value chain, medium–large, and semi-medium farmers are 
somewhat underrepresented and marginal–small farmers are overrepresented. 
In the tables in the book, the sample averages are provided; in the base 
report, the population-weighted averages are also presented, correcting for 
the overrepresentation of larger farms from the sampling by calculating the 
average with weights for the strata calculated from each stratum’s actual 
weights in the population. In the great majority of cases, the unweighted and 
weighted strata averages for the behaviors studied are very close; thus, for 
simplicity, the latter are not presented in addition to the former in this book. 
For the rural sample of potato CSFs, in Agra District, size (capacity) strata were 
sampled from a list of 182 registered CSFs (the district total) provided by the 
Government of Uttar Pradesh. For the survey, 9 were selected randomly from 
the high capacity (more than 10,000 tons), 11 from the medium capacity 
(7,000–10,000 tons), and 11 from the low or small capacity (less than 
7,000 tons) CSFs. 
For the wholesaler samples, first, as the village surveys indicated about 1 trader 
per village, all 18 villages’ traders were surveyed. For the 68 traders on the 
rural wholesale markets in the subdistricts, the list of wholesale markets was 
compiled from farmers, village traders, and the subdistrict offices. The governing 
body of the subdistrict provided the list of all traders, and potato sellers were 
selected from the list. As the number of traders in the rural wholesale markets 
was limited, they were all interviewed, for a total of 68 traders for the three 
subdistricts—37 in Sadar Bazar (the main wholesale market in Agra District, 
just outside Agra city), 4 in Fatehabad, 24 in Shamsabad, and 3 in Etmadpur 
wholesale markets. 
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In Delhi, 30 urban traders were sampled from the two top wholesale markets—
Azadpur and Okhla. This included 20 wholesalers chosen randomly from the 
50 at Azadpur and 10 wholesalers at Okhla.
The potato retail survey sample was discussed earlier, in the discussion of rice 
and potato retail sampling.
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PART B  
RICE VALUE CHAIN
Upstream—Rice Farm 
Transformation3|
In much of the policy discussion concerning food security in Asia, the reigning presumption is that, apart from a few dynamic pockets of rapid technology change and larger farms such as in the Punjab, staples farmers still essentially 
use traditional farming methods and are moving only gradually to modern 
methods. This assumes that the staples farm segment of value chains is barely 
engaged in factor markets, uses few inputs, sells a small portion of output, 
subsists on the rest, and makes few capital investments. Another assumption 
is that when the farmers turn to the market, they are facing at the farm gate a 
rapacious and exploitative rural broker—a “tied” output–credit market where 
the trader holds the farmers in thrall by providing credit at the start of the season 
and requiring that they sell their harvests to the trader at disadvantageous 
terms. This also assumes that the farmer sells the entire paddy crop at harvest 
without storing or “playing the market,” leaving the gains to the trader. 
In this chapter, the results of the farm household surveys of paddy in Bangladesh, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and India are assessed to ascertain the 
extent to which the rice farm segment still uses traditional methods, to what 
extent they have transformed to using new methods, and what are the key 
characteristics of that transformation.
Structure of the Rice Farm Segment
Rice Land Distribution
Regarding land size distribution, the study’s findings partly support the view 
extant in policy circles of farm size and its distribution in Asia: that most farms 
are small in scale and homogeneous. Indeed, most rice farms are marginal or 
small: the average land area operated in the study zones was 1.1 hectares (ha) 
in Bangladesh (or 2.4 ha when accounting for multiple cropping on the land); 
2.2 ha in the PRC (with only one season); and somewhat larger in India, at 
5.4 ha (with only one season). Table 3.1 shows land area operated, including 
for rice and other purposes, and both rented and owned land. 
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Table 3.1 Rice Farm Land: Distribution and Rental
Land Farm Size Strata (all arable land under any crop)
Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
All
Rice land (ha) 0.59 1.63 1.07
Rice land (% of all arable land under any 
crop)  
86 90 89
Land rented-out (ha) 0.06 0.24 0.14
Land rented-in (ha) 0.13 0.16 0.14
Land rented-in (% of all operational land) 19 9 12
All operational land (ha) 0.69 1.81 1.20
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal– 
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi- 
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium– 
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Rice land (ha) 0.87 1.51 1.59 1.20
Rice land (% of all operational land)  78 55 33 54
Land rented-out (ha) 0.07 0.01 0 0.04
Land rented-in (ha) 0.15 0.98 2.72 0.81
Land rented-in (% of operational land) 13 36 56 36
All operational land (ha) 1.12 2.73 4.85 2.23
India Marginal– 
Small  
(<2 ha)
Semi- 
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium– 
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Rice land (ha) 1.1 3.1 7.4 4.8
Rice land (% of all operational land)  92 89 88 89
Land rented-in (ha) 0.3 0.9 2.1 1.4
Land rented-in (% of operational land) 25 26 25 26
All operational land (ha) 1.2 3.5 8.4 5.4
ha = hectare.
However, several aspects of the current study’s findings contradict the extant 
view, and instead show farmland size inequality and even concentration. First, 
while the average farm size in the study zones was small, Table 3.1 shows 
significant farm size variation across the zones in the three economies. Second, 
while all three had many marginal–small farms with less than 2 ha, the PRC 
and India had substantial variation in farm size across the households in the 
samples. Two aspects of this variation deserve emphasis. 
On the one hand, there was an important jump in the farm size between 
the first and second strata. The second stratum was 2.3–2.9 times larger 
than the smallest stratum in all three economies. That means that there is 
substantial farm size heterogeneity among small-scale farmers, which may be 
underappreciated in the policy debate. In asset terms, in Bangladesh, marginal 
farmers (with less than 1 ha) were disadvantaged compared with even 
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small-scale farmers (with 1 ha or more); and similarly for marginal–small 
farmers relative to semi-medium farmers in the PRC and India. 
On the other hand, the farm size of the upper stratum in the PRC and India (at 
an average of 4.85 ha and 8.40 ha, respectively) exceeded the “small farm” 
image, especially given that they were irrigated farms. This shows that the 
general image of the study zones in those economies, as a set of “commercial 
small-scale farmers,” actually included a subset of medium- and large-scale 
farmers. The ratios of the average total operational land size of the largest 
stratum to the smallest were 3:1, 4:1, and 7:1 for Bangladesh, the PRC, and 
India, respectively. For rice land, the ratios were approximately 3:1, 2:1, and 
7:1, respectively. The rice land ratios are close to those of operational land for 
South Asia, because the surveyed farmers used, on average, 90% of the land 
for growing rice. In the PRC study zone, the inequality in land distribution was 
lower for rice land than for overall land, which implied that the rice land was 
more equally distributed than the land not used for rice. Indeed, in the PRC 
study zone, on average, farmers devoted only half their land area to rice—but 
the ratio descended steeply from 78% among the smallest to 33% in the large 
stratum, as larger farms were much more diversified than the smallest.
This inequality is even more interesting when viewed in output or land terms. 
For example, in central Uttar Pradesh, the marginal–small stratum had 49% of 
the farms, but generated only 25% of the paddy output. The semi-medium 
and medium–large strata strongly dominated paddy output, with 75% of the 
volume. While the zone studied had larger farms than the average in the state 
and in India overall (about 4 times larger, as in the PRC study zone), the same 
pattern of land concentration and output was seen in the rest of Uttar Pradesh 
(and perhaps in other rice-producing states in India). Across Uttar Pradesh, only 
25% of the farms were medium- and large-scale, but they had about 66% of 
the land. Given that the survey showed that large rice farms had higher yields 
than small farms, at least two-thirds of the state’s rice output came from the 
medium and large farms. The implication is that medium and large farms were 
important to urban food security and dominated food supply chains to Delhi and 
other cities in the catchment zone of these commercialized grain belts, although 
marginal–small farms were more numerous.
Moreover, although farm operational sizes differed by a factor of 4 across the 
strata, the number of plots rose only from an average of 1.66 to 2.89. This 
indicates larger plots among larger farmers, and may relate to the correlation 
of farm size and mechanization.
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Rental of Rice Land
Table 3.1 shows that a surprisingly large amount of rice land was rented and 
this had been increasing, especially in the PRC and India. In the PRC zone in 
2009, 36% of the average operational holding was rented-in (versus only 27% 
in 2004); in the Indian zone, it was 26% in 2009 (versus only 8% in 2004); 
and in Bangladesh, it was 12% in 2009. Clearly, in the areas studied, the land 
market was transforming, with an increasing rental market in the commercial 
zones. The rental market was growing fast: for example in the PRC, land rented 
increased 60% in 5 years. 
The relation between inequality in operational landholding and the rental 
market is interesting in the PRC. The PRC may lead the study cases in land 
rental development because land sales and purchases were not yet fully legal, 
although various forms of exchange were possible (Jin and Deininger 2009). In 
the PRC study zone, land rental differences explained about half of farm size 
inequality: while the ratio of land of the upper to lower stratum was 4:1 with 
rented-in land included, it was only 2:1 with rented-in land excluded. 
The average shares of rented land in total land mask substantial differences 
across the strata in the PRC and India (but not in Bangladesh). In India, the share 
of rented-in land in total operated land was about the same across strata (26%–
27%), but the absolute amount of rented-in land differed sevenfold between 
the smallest and largest land strata. In the PRC study zone, the share rose steeply 
with overall land size (from 13% to 36% to 56%), and the upper land stratum 
rented 18 times more land than in the lower stratum. These figures suggest that 
land rental markets were quite concentrated in the upper stratum.
Finally, in India, the average farm size in the study areas increased 32% in 
5 years, and in the PRC, 20%, with nearly all of the increase due to rented-in 
land. The key informants believed that the increase in land rental was due 
to the rapid increase in rural nonfarm employment (employment outside of 
the farm sector) in local areas as well as in migration activities, resulting in a 
labor shortage. 
Rice Farmers’ Nonland Assets
Table 3.2 indicates a lot of heterogeneity in small-scale farmers’ nonland assets 
(education, livestock, and farm equipment) in each study zone and across the 
three economies studied. Several points stand out.
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Table 3.2 Farm Size and Nonland Assets
Asset Farm Size Strata (all arable land under any crop)
Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
All
Age of head of household (years) 47 51 49
Head of household (% male) 99 100 100
Household size (number of adults  
and children)
4.1 5.0 4.5
Household heads with no schooling (%) 25 15 20
Livestock holdings in 2009 ($) 412 588 500
Farm assets other than livestock and 
land in 2009 ($)
118 324 221
Mean value of power tiller owned in 
2009 ($; parentheses show %  
of power tiller in total value of 
farm assets other than livestock 
and land)
 32 (28)  82 (25)  57 (26)
Mean value of tractors owned in 2009 
($; parentheses show % of tractor 
in total value of farm assets other 
than livestock and land)
0  65 (20)  33 (15)
Households owning power tillers (%) 2 4 3
Households owning tractors (%) 0 2 1
Households using machine traction 
(tractors/power tillers, %)
92 94 93
Households using animal traction (%) 7 5 6
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Age of head of household (years) 47 43 40 44
Head of household (% male) 80 75 83 79
Household size (adults plus children) 4 4 4 4
Household heads with 0–6 years  
of education
41 33 19 35
Livestock holdings in 2009 ($) 21.34 37.11 27.23 28.39
Farm assets other than livestock and 
land in 2009 ($)
2,330 4,330 5,650 3,560
Farm assets other than livestock and 
land in 2004 ($)
1,280 2,210 3,790 1,910
Mean value of tractors owned in 2009 
($; parentheses show % of tractor 
in total value of farm assets other 
than livestock and land)
 818 (35)  1,647 (38)  1,900 (34)  1,279 (36)
Mean value of animal traction owned 
in 2009 ($; parentheses show % 
of animal traction in total value of 
farm assets other than livestock 
and land)
0  8 (0.2) 0  3 (0.1)
continued on next page
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Asset Farm Size Strata (all arable land under any crop)
Households owning tractors  
in 2009 (%)
37 73 78 56
Households owning tractors  
in 2004 (%)
27 51 56 40
Households owning animal traction  
in 2009 (%)
0 1 0 0.4
Households owning animal traction  
in 2004 (%)
0 0 0 0
Households using machine traction 
(tractors) in 2009 (%)
100 100 100 100
India Marginal–
Small  
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Age of head of household (years) 57 54 55 55
Head of household (% male) 100 100 100 100
Household size (adults and children) 8 8 9 8
Household heads who are  
illiterate (%)
37 25 22 28
Livestock holdings in 2009 ($) 1,333 1,556 1,556 1,481
Farm assets other than livestock  
and land in 2009 ($)
222 667 889 592
Mean value of tractors/tillers owned in 
2009 ($; parentheses show  
% of tractor  in total value of farm 
assets other than livestock  
and land)
0  278 (42)  353 (40)  210 (36)
Households owning tractors (%) 0 45 55 50
Households using machine traction 
(tractors; %)
88 83 85 86
Households using animal traction (%) 12 16 15 14
ha = hectare.
First, the larger the farm, the greater the holdings of livestock, but the correlation 
was partial. Examining Bangladesh, the PRC, and India, in that order, the data 
show that, while the ratio of the average farm size of the largest to the small 
stratum was 2.6:1, 4.3:1, and 7.0:1, the ratio for livestock holdings was only 
1.4:1, 1.3:1, and 1.2:1. This implies that the livestock/land ratio declined with 
farm size. 
Moreover, livestock/land ratios were far higher on rice farms in South Asia than 
in the PRC. This reflected the greater use of animal traction and production 
of milk on rice farms in South Asia. Moreover, on Bangladesh rice farms, 
the livestock/land ratio for smaller farms was 2 times that of larger farmers, 
and in India, the ratio was 6:1—thus, small-scale South Asian rice farmers 
Table 3.2 continued
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depended more on dairy and on animal traction than did larger farmers. Also, 
the livestock/land ratio among the smallest farmers was 2 times higher in India 
than in Bangladesh.
Second, for farm assets (other than livestock), the ratios of asset holdings 
comparing the largest with the smallest farm strata were 2.7:1, 2.4:1, and 
4.0:1 for Bangladesh, the PRC, and India, respectively. For the subset of farm 
traction machine assets (tractors, power tillers, and animal traction equipment), 
the ratio (upper land stratum divided by lower) of machine holdings was 4.6:1 
for Bangladesh, 2.3:1 for the PRC, and very high for India (as no farms in 
the smallest stratum owned machines). This implies that the traction-machine/
landholding ratio increased with farm size in South Asia but not in the PRC, 
where it even slightly declined. The difference between the regions may result 
from smaller farms in the PRC having more access to nonfarm earnings to buy 
machines, and higher inducement to reduce farm labor, given farm labor costs 
that are much higher than for their South Asian counterparts.  
Moreover, the traction-machine/landholding ratios differed sharply across 
zones. With the caveat that nominal values for the assets were not strictly 
comparable across the study zones, rough ratios show that the traction machine/
land ratio in Bangladesh was about $90/2.4 ha, or $38/ha;1 and in India it 
was $210/5.4, or $39/ha; but in the PRC it was $1,279/2.2, or $581/ha. That 
is, by this very rough measure, comparing “commercial small holder” zones, 
the PRC rice farms were about 15 times more “traction-machine owning” in 
machine-traction/land terms than the South Asian rice farms. Moreover, farm 
equipment holdings nearly doubled (in all strata) in the PRC sample during 
2004–2009. This reflects the advancing shift to machine ownership in rice 
farming under pressure of rising labor costs from migration and rural nonfarm 
employment in the PRC. 
However, the differences across farm size strata in terms of traction-machine 
holdings mask an important point: while only a few farmers in the Bangladesh 
sample, and about half of the samples in the PRC and India owned tractors, 
power tillers, or animal traction equipment, nearly all farmers, regardless of 
size stratum, used farm traction machines. This points to a very well-developed 
market for farm machine rental in all three zones. The upshot is that the use 
rate of traction machines was actually similar across the average farms of the 
three zones, as will be shown in the subsection on farm technology. 
1 Table 3.1 shows 1.2 ha as land size, and given two seasons, this is equivalent to 2.4 ha.
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Third, some demographic differences were apparent across the study zones, 
but none were very striking. Households were larger and their heads older in 
the India rice zone, while PRC rice farms had more female heads (20%), due 
to migration. Most household heads were literate and had some education; 
education was moderately correlated with land size.
Rice Farmers and Nonfarm and Farm Labor Markets
Table 3.3 shows shares of rice farm households participating in off-farm 
employment. Several results are striking. 
Table 3.3 Rice Farmers and Nonfarm Labor (%)
Labor Farm Size
Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
All
Households with off-farm employment in 2009 12 18 15
Households that received remittances in 2009 5 9 7
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small  
(<2 ha)
Semi– 
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Households with member working off-farm 
in 2009
53 43 28 45
Households with member working off-farm 
in 2004
32 32 14 29
Local nonfarm workers in 2009 20 21 8 19
Local nonfarm workers in 2004 14 12 3 12
Local farm workers in 2009 8 14 8 10
Local farm workers in 2004 6 11 6 7
Migrants to other districts in HLJ Province 
in 2009
16 17 17 16
Migrants to other districts in HLJ Province 
in 2004
6 13 6 9
Migrants to other provinces in 2009 20 7 6 13
Migrants to other provinces in 2004 13 5 0 9
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi– 
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Households with nonfarm employment 2009 37 38 36 37
Households reporting received  
remittances 2009
5 7 8 7
ha = hectare, HLJ = Heilongjiang.
First, farm households were substantially engaged in rural nonfarm 
employment, including 45% of households in the PRC and 37% in the India 
zones, but only 15% in Bangladesh. These findings converge with a stream 
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of research on the importance of rural nonfarm employment and migration 
employment in Asia. Survey data for the PRC show a sharp jump in only 5 years 
in participating households—from 29% to 45%. The rapid increase in land 
rental and farm capital investment appears to be linked to this rise in nonfarm 
employment, per key local informants in the PRC and India study zones. This 
hypothesis requires further exploration; it has been investigated more broadly 
for farm capital investment in Davis et al. (2009).
Second, while public attention often focuses on migration to the cities for 
employment, the current study finds that, in the PRC study zone, local nonfarm 
employment was at least as important as migration for employment in cities, 
and was more important than migration to cities in the study zones in South 
Asia. The Bangladesh and India data showed few households receiving 
migrant remittances (although a third send out migrants); the great majority 
of the rural nonfarm employment was local. In the PRC study zone, about 
50% of the households engaged in nonfarm activity were engaged locally, 
and about 29% of the off-farm employment was in migration beyond the 
province. This converges with other PRC research showing the rise of local 
nonfarm employment (Mohapatra, Rozelle, and Goodhue 2007).
Moreover, while the recent debate on the PRC focuses on rural areas being 
depleted of male working age adults and left to farm with elderly and female-
headed households, the current study’s data do not fully support this view. 
Only about a quarter of households in the Heilongjiang study zone had 
members who had migrated elsewhere to work, and only about a fifth of the 
households were headed by females. Especially for smaller farmers, perhaps 
the importance of rural nonfarm employment opportunities and intensive 
rice farming competed with migration opportunities. This finding appears to 
corroborate a similar study by Huang, Wu, and Rozelle (2009) on fruit farming 
and migration in Shandong in the PRC. However, unlike Hunan and Sichuan, 
provinces such as Heilongjiang and Shandong are not considered to be major 
“migrant exporters.”
Third, interestingly, only about 10% of the PRC households engaged in farm 
wage labor, even in the study’s commercial agricultural zone. This is commonly 
noted in the literature about off-farm employment, which generally finds that 
rural nonfarm employment is much more important than farm wage labor and 
migration employment (Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007). 
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Conduct of the Rice Farm Segment
Farm Technology
Table 3.4 shows paddy production technology as an average farm budget 
derived from the survey data. The survey included detailed questions that were 
asked for all the rice fields and related to the level of output; input use (seeds, 
fertilizer, chemicals, irrigation, and manure); use of family and hired labor for 
farm activities (including preparing the soil, planting, weeding, and harvesting); 
farm machine use; and land rental. Inputs were divided by the rice field area 
to provide a measure of the intensity of input use per hectare. The costs are 
for the winter season (boro, the main rice season) in Bangladesh, and for the 
single rice season in the PRC and India study zones. The main results of the cost 
analysis are as follows, from the most to the least numerically important input 
cost component.
First, labor was by far the largest cost component. The total labor expenditure 
(on own labor imputed at the farm labor wage, plus hired labor) was much 
higher in the PRC ($679/ha) than in Bangladesh ($371/ha) or India ($333/ha). 
But the daily wage rates differed: in 2009, the hired labor wage was about 
$2.0/day in India, $2.2/day in Bangladesh, and $9.0/day in the PRC, with labor 
use in days at 75/ha in the PRC, 217/ha in Bangladesh, and 167/ha in India. 
These differences are roughly in line with the study’s finding that the PRC 
sample used more mechanization per hectare than the South Asian samples. 
Moreover, the share of hired labor in total labor differed sharply, with a high 
of 60% in Bangladesh, to 53% in India, and 40% in the PRC. Interestingly, this 
is the inverse of the rural nonfarm employment pattern and of mechanization, 
suggesting that nonfarm jobs were substitutes for farm wage labor, and that 
mechanization reduced the hired labor market.
Second, expenditures for own and rented machinery use were highest in the 
PRC (at 23% of total costs), dropping to 15%–17% in South Asia. The traction 
expenditure, however, was roughly similar, and the cost shares difference was 
partly because nontraction farm machine use is shown only for the PRC but 
not for the South Asian sites (due to data gap); however, farm asset data show 
that the PRC rice farms had larger holdings of nontraction machines (such as 
seeders and harvesters) than the South Asian farms.  
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Table 3.4 Composition of Rice Farmers’ Production Costs  
(value in $/ha and shares in % of total cost)
Input Bangladesh PRC India
$/ha % $/ha % $/ha %
Own seeds 15 2 17 1 3 0.003
Purchased seeds 5 1 59 3 11 1
Chemical fertilizer 124 16 288 14 83 11
Crop chemicals 53 7 109 5 21 3
Water total 30 4 134 7 126 17
Water (irrigation costs 
purchased)
30 4 134 7 76 10
Own irrigation imputed  
at market rate
… … … … 50 7
Manure 12 2 2 0.11
Labor total 371 47 679 33 333 45
Own labor imputed at 
wage rate
147 19 405 20 157 21
Hired labor 224 28 274 13 177 24
Animal traction 4 1 0 0 7 1
Machine use total 119 15 467 23 123 17
Hired tractor use 112 14 40 2 53 8
Own tractor use 7 1 54 3 70 9
Other hired farm  
machine use (hired 
harvester and hired 
paddy seeder)
… … 165 8 … …
Other own farm machine 
use (own harvester and 
own paddy seeder)
… … 208 10 … …
Land rental 61 8 279 14 32 4
Total (cash outlays plus 
imputed in-kind costs; 
100% and total value)
794 100 2,033 100 739 100
Total monetary cost (value 
and share of total cost)
625 79 1,350 66 428 58
Total imputed in kind costs 
(value and share of 
total cost)
169 21 683 34 311 42
… = no data available, ha = hectare, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Third, fertilizer costs were an interestingly consistent share of production costs 
across the sites—averaging about 15%—despite sharply different outlays. 
The most striking point is the much lower cost of fertilizer in India—where it 
is heavily subsidized (subsidies were 16% of the agricultural gross domestic 
product in India in 2008/09 [Grossman and Carlson 2011]). Behind the United 
States dollar totals in Table 3.4 are widely differing rice prices ($170/ton in 
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India, $400 in the PRC, and $500 in Bangladesh) and use rates (340 kilograms/
ha in Bangladesh, 488 in India, and 720 in the PRC). 
Fourth, land rental costs were about 14% in the PRC, compared with 4%–8% 
in South Asia, findings that corroborate the rented-in land shares noted above. 
Water costs were similar, but with a higher share (17%) in India, where many 
small farmers buy water from larger farmers who own the bulk of the tube 
wells; this is discussed further below. 
Fifth, seeds and crop chemicals, while important for productivity, were a minor 
share of costs, about 4%–10%. The PRC farms’ use of crop chemicals was 
2 times that in Bangladesh and 5 times that in India (measured in value terms, 
which is a rough measure). This higher use of chemicals, especially herbicides, 
appears correlated with the higher opportunity cost of time because of the 
much greater participation in the nonfarm labor market in the PRC than in the 
South Asian zones. 
The overall technology picture that emerges is that rice production in the PRC 
zone used more machines, fertilizer, and chemicals than the Bangladesh and 
India zones, which used much more labor, but still used substantial amounts of 
purchased seeds, fertilizer, and chemicals. Hence, Lele and Stone (1989) would 
term the PRC’s production “capital-led intensification.”
But this is a static picture. There is evidence (such as in Business Standard
2011) that as wages rise in India, mechanization is increasing rapidly (with 
the leading edge in Haryana and the Punjab, but it is also increasing in 
Uttar Pradesh). 
Access to Water
Table 3.5 shows farm households’ access to agricultural water. Several points 
stand out. 
First, despite a history of government programs subsidizing tube well irrigation 
in Bangladesh and India, only a third of the farms had their own wells. By 
contrast, fully two-thirds of the PRC farms owned tube wells. Moreover, while 
ownership was only slightly correlated with farm size in Bangladesh, it was 
highly related with farm size in India: about 20% of marginal–small and semi-
medium farms had tube wells, but 71% of the medium–large farms had them. 
Given that the wells were subsidized, this means that the distribution of the 
tube well subsidy was highly skewed toward larger farmers in India. 
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Table 3.5 Rice Farms’ Access to Water (% of farms)
Water Source Farm Size
Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
All
Own irrigation pump  25 37 31
Bought from other farmers 80 76 77
Sold to other farmers 10 16 13
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Own irrigation pump 52 70 75 62
Bought irrigation water from 
government 86 71 69 78
Bought irrigation water from 
other farmers 0 0 0 0
Sold irrigation water 0 0 0 0
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Own irrigation pump 20 18 71 36
Bought irrigation water from 
other farmers 66 62 20 49
Sold irrigation water to other 
farmers 15 21 51 29
ha = hectare.
Second, most PRC farmers bought water from the government canal scheme. 
In Bangladesh and India, farmers did not purchase water from the government, 
but there was a well-developed private agricultural water market. In India, 
two-thirds of the small-scale and semi-medium farmers bought water, and half 
of the large farmers sold it; in Bangladesh, three-quarters of all farmers bought 
water, as their own irrigation was not enough for their needs, and only 13% 
sold water. 
Access to Seed
Several key findings concerning access to seed emerge from Table 3.6.
First, rice seed markets were widely and well developed: 91% of farmers 
in the India and 94% in the PRC samples reported purchasing rice seed in the 
12 months prior to the survey. Bangladesh rice farmers relied the least on seed
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Table 3.6 Farmers’ Acquisition of Rice Seed  
(% of households declaring their main seed sources)
Seed Source Farm Size
 Lowest Middle Highest All 
Bangladesh  1999  2009  1999  2009  1999  2009
Government 19 29 24 21  21 25
Farmers association 10 6 9 6  10 6
Wholesale market trader 19 24 14 27  17 26
Small private seed retailer 17 17 16 18  16 17
Other farmers 8 0 6 2  7 1
Own seeds 24 23 30 25  27 24
Other 3 1 1 1  2 1
Total (with rounding error) 100 100 100 100  100 100
China, People’s Rep. of 2004  2009 2004  2009 2004  2009 2004  2009
Government (rice institute) 38 37 41 42 42 42 39 40
Private input market 10 7 14 14 6 8 11 10
Traditional private retailers 20 18 15 12 22 22 18 16
Other farmers 9 10 5 6 3 3 7 7
Seed company distributor 5 6 3 4 3 3 4 5
Own seed 3 4 1 2 3 0 2 3
Others 16 18 20 19 22 22 18 18
Total (with rounding error) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
India  1999  2009  1999  2009  1999  2009  1999  2009
Government cooperatives 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0
Government seed store 0 0 0 0 3 10 1 5
Traditional private retailers 73 98 96 97 90 82 87 90
Modern private sector 
rural business hubs
0 2 0 3 0 8 0 5
Other farmers 27 0 4 0 3 0 10 0
Total (with rounding error) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: “Lowest” = “marginal” for Bangladesh and “marginal–small” for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India; 
“Middle” = “small” for Bangladesh and “semi-medium” for the PRC and India; “Highest” = “medium–large” for the PRC and 
India. See Table 3.1 for the equivalent hectare sizes.
markets, as only 48% of farm households purchased seeds in the 12 months 
before the survey; however, farmers in the lowest stratum bought seed an 
average of 5 times in the 5 years prior to the survey. Most farmers who did not 
buy seed in the year before the survey said that they did not need to do so (that 
is, they did not say they could not access seed on the market).
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Second, Table 3.6 shows the main sources for seed as reported by farmers. When 
farmers evaluated their main seed sources, “own seed” was important only in 
Bangladesh, where it declined from 27% of farmers declaring it so for 1999 to 
24% in 2009. In the PRC and India, own seed comprised only a few percent of 
the total. Table 3.4 examines own seed use from another angle—showing the 
share of “own seed” in total seed used in the average farm budget. This share 
was 75% in Bangladesh, but only 21%–22% in the PRC and India. 
Third, “other farmers” were very minor as the local seed source by 2009 (at 1% 
in Bangladesh, 7% in the PRC, and 0% in India). In the PRC, this small share was 
mainly among smaller farmers; in India, the share of farmers reporting “other 
farmers” as a main source dropped from 10% in 1999 to 0% in 2009, including a 
sharp drop among the smallest farmers, from 27% to 0% during the same period. 
Fourth, in all three economies, the state subsidized seed sales via government 
shops, but the incidence of those sales in farmers’ purchase of seeds was very 
different: the government (and government cooperatives) were very minor 
“main sources” in India (at only 5%), but were more important in Bangladesh 
(at 25%, with the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation as a main 
player) and the PRC (at 40% for state seed stores selling from Heilongjiang’s 
rice research institute). In Bangladesh, the increase during 1999–2009 of 
the smallest farmers’ access to seeds from the Bangladesh Agricultural 
Development Corporation is noteworthy. The governments’ role in distributing 
rice in Bangladesh and the PRC had waned greatly, but had been maintained in 
seed provision, while the converse was true in India, where the government’s 
role in seeds had waned but remained significant in rice distribution. 
Fifth, traditional private seed suppliers had a predominant role as “main seed 
sources” in South Asia, and an important role in the PRC. In India, fully 90% 
of the farmers reported small private seed shops as their primary source; in 
the PRC, 26% of farmers mainly relied on traditional private retailers and the 
private input market. In Bangladesh, while private suppliers served 16% of 
farmers during 1999–2009, the role of wholesale market traders as main seed 
sources rose sharply, from supplying 17% of farms in 1999 to 26% in 2009. 
Finally, in India, Table 3.6 shows that “modern seed channels” increased their 
share from nil to about 5% of farms during 1999–2009, and for the PRC the 
change was from 4% to 5%. The main source was the seed companies through 
direct retailing in the PRC and rural business hub companies in India (for the 
latter, see Reardon et al. 2012).
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In the PRC sample, “Others” adds 18% of the total, with nearly twice the use 
rate among the highest farm stratum than in the lowest one. The “other” 
category comprises nontraditional sources of seed such as rice mills, seed 
stations, producer organizations, state input stores, paddy wholesalers, and 
provincial input stores. In fact, the PRC case is especially interesting as the 
sources of seed were very diversified, ranging from public to private to private 
cooperative, from traditional to modern, and from wholesalers to retailers to 
research field stations. 
Table 3.7 shows shares of sample rice farmers planting traditional rice varieties, 
high-yielding rice such as semi-dwarf, and hybrid varieties. Three sets of 
points emerge. 
First, in South Asia, use of traditional varieties dropped fast during 1999–2009. 
In the PRC, traditional varieties had been mostly replaced by high-yielding 
varieties (HYVs) in the 1970s and 1980s (Li, Xin, and Yuan 2009). 
Table 3.7 Shift to High-Yielding and Hybrid Varieties (% of households)
Type of Rice Farm Size
 Lowest Middle Highest  All 
Bangladesh 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
Local traditional 53 14 59 15   56 14
Local HYV 37 18 31 25   34 21
National HYV 10 68 10 60   10 64
Total 100 100 100 100   100 100
China, People’s 
Rep. of
2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009
Hybrid  38 45  38 52  47 53 39 49
Other 62 55 62 48 53 47 61 51
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
India 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
Traditional 44 0 39 0 39 0 41 0
HYV 54 80 61 78 61 86 59 83
Hybrid 2 20 0 23 0 14 1 18
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HYV = high-yielding variety.
Note: “Lowest” = “marginal” for Bangladesh and “marginal–small” for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India; 
“Middle” = “small” for Bangladesh and “semi-medium” for the PRC and India; “Highest” = “medium–large” for the PRC and 
India. See Table 3.1 for the equivalent hectare sizes.
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Second, the importance of HYVs shot up in South Asia. In the PRC study zone, 
the share of farms growing HYVs edged down in the 5 years before the survey. 
Third, hybrid rice was important in the PRC study zone but not in the South 
Asian cases. Hybrid rice was introduced in 1994 in India (Virmani 2003) and in 
1998 in Bangladesh (Husain, Hossain, and Janaiah 2001); but at the national 
level, hybrids had reached only 4% of the rice area by 2011 in Bangladesh 
(Bhandari, Mohanty, and Hossain 2011) and 3% in India by 2007 (Tripp, Hu, 
and Pal 2010). This is compared with 53% by 2007 in the PRC (Tripp, Hu, and 
Pal 2010) or another estimate of 63% by 2008 (Li, Xin, and Yuan 2009). The 
table shows that hybrid rice did not have a foothold in the Bangladesh study 
zone by 2009. However, in contrast with India’s 3% national rate of adoption, 
18% of the Indian rice farms in the study zone had adopted hybrids by 2009, 
which is consistent with the study area being a commercial rice zone. The 
northeast PRC lagged behind the south in adopting hybrid rice, as hybridization 
spread from indica to japonica, with indica grown in the south and japonica 
grown in the northeast. Thus, during the 5 years before the survey, the share 
of farms using hybrids grew by 10 percentage points, converging toward the 
national average of 50%–60%.
In summary, the adoption of new varieties in the study areas during 1999–2009 
ranged from a major shift toward HYVs in South Asia to incipient diffusion of 
hybrids in India and to a shift from HYVs to hybrids in the northeast PRC. 
Purchase of Fertilizer and Crop Chemicals
Table 3.8 shows widespread and substantial development of markets for 
fertilizer and crop chemicals (insecticides, fungicides, and herbicides), and 
even very small-scale farmers participated in them very actively. In all the study 
zones, 89% or more of the farmers purchased these inputs, except that only 
69% of marginal and small-scale farmers in the India study zone purchased 
crop chemicals. 
Of particular note is the rapid uptake of herbicides in the PRC, where 96% of 
the farmers used them, and the rest weeded by hand or mechanically. The 
adoption of herbicides may partly have been related to the rapid rise of off-farm 
employment, which competed for labor. By contrast, only 9% of rice farms in 
the India study zone used herbicides—a much lower share than among potato 
growers in the same state (see Chapter 7).  
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Table 3.8 Share of Farms Buying Chemical Fertilizers  
and Crop Chemicals (%)
Input Farm Size
Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
  All
Fertilizer 100 100 100
Crop chemicalsa 98 98 98
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi- 
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Fertilizer 98 95 92 96
Crop chemicalsa 98 95 94 96
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi- 
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Fertilizer 100 100 100 100
Crop chemicalsa 69 90 97 89
ha = hectare.
a Insecticides, fungicides, and herbicides.
Finally, the survey showed some important surprises concerning farmers’ 
sources of fertilizer and chemicals. In all three study zones, the government 
had only a minor role in selling fertilizer, and nearly no role in selling crop 
chemicals. The government share was very low in Bangladesh (in contrast 
with the finding for seeds): only 3% of the farmers bought fertilizer and only 
1% bought chemicals from the state (Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Corporation). In the PRC, the figures were 9% for fertilizer and 8% for crop 
chemicals. India is the most interesting case: About 28% bought fertilizer from 
the primary agricultural credit societies (the state-organized cooperatives)—
but the purchasers were mainly the larger and semi-medium farmers, while 
very few were small or marginal farmers. This finding runs contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that small-scale farmers rely on the primary agricultural 
credit societies and are their main customers. Thus (as with the finding for tube 
wells), the input subsidy actually assists the larger, not the smaller, farmers. This 
is contrary to the purpose of the subsidies. 
By contrast, the great bulk of fertilizer and crop chemicals was purchased from 
small private input retailers or wholesale market input traders in all three zones. 
However, where modern input retailers had arisen in India, their market shares 
were still small: Less than 1% of the farmers in the study area bought fertilizer, 
and only 10% bought crop chemicals from these hubs. 
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Finally, while few farmers bought crop chemicals directly from the manufacturers, 
the companies promoted their products through their extension activities. For 
example, in India, the study found that 33% of all rice farmers received some 
extension services in the year before the survey—but 85% of this was from 
input companies, only 14% was from government extension, and only 5% of 
farmers saw a state extension agent. This implies a very minor presence of the 
government extension services.
Marketing
Table 3.9 shows farmers’ marketed surplus rates (sales divided by output). The 
zones studied were highly commercialized, with high marketed surplus rates 
among both small and medium farms. The marginal and small farmers in these 
zones were really small-scale commercial farmers—with staples as cash crops. 
Only the marginal farmers in Bangladesh had a substantial home consumption 
rate (43%), and thus could be termed semi-subsistence. 
The study areas tended to be more commercialized than the national averages. 
For example, in India, the Ministry of Agriculture, in its Agricultural Statistics 
at a Glance, 2009, estimated that the marketed surplus rate in Uttar Pradesh 
was 63.0% in 1988/89 and 1999/2000, and 78.7% in 2008/09, close to
Table 3.9 Rice Farmers’ Marketed Surplus Rates
Production and Surplus Farm Size
Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
  All
Production  (tons/farm) 7 17 11
Marketed surplus rate (%) 57 71 68
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Production (tons/farm) 7 17 25 13
Marketed surplus rate (%) 100 94 92 95
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Production (in tons/farm) 4.8 10.8 28.1 18.1
Marketed surplus rate (%) 77 89 94 92
ha = hectare.
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India’s overall rates of 62.0% in 1999/2000 and 75.5% in 2008/09 (Ministry 
of Agriculture 2010). 
Table 3.10 shows shares of farmers selling to the various buyers, and Table 
3.11 shows the shares of sales to the types of buyers. The overall picture that 
emerges is that the role of the traditional village broker was much diminished, 
and shorter value chains (from farmer to rural wholesale market and farmer to 
mill) were evolving. Several specific items are noteworthy.
Table 3.10 Composition of Rice Farmers’ Clients  
(% of farmers selling to buyer types; totals do not have to equal 100%)
Buyer Farm Size
Bangladesh Marginal 
(>1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
  All
Village trader 6 19 7
Wholesaler on wholesale market 34 38 35
Miller 33 24 32
Wholesaler at mill 33 29 32
Other 1 0  1
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi- 
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Village trader 32 24 31 28
Wholesaler on wholesale market 0.83 2 3 2
Miller 63 67 60 64
Government buyer 0.83 0 0 0.41
Cooperative association 0 0 0 0
Private grain warehouse 0 1 0 0.41
Village government paddy 
purchasing center
0 2 0 0.81
Seed company 2 0 3 1
Traders from outside the farmer’s 
village
0.83 1 3 1
Heilongjiang rice research institute 0 0 0 0
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Village traders 34 33 46 38
Wholesaler on wholesale market 59 65 67 64
Wholesaler at mill 8 9 12 9
Government agency 4 4 9 6
Miller 4 7 3 5
Other farmer 6 0 3 3
ha = hectare.
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First, current conventional wisdom sees rice supply chains as “long,” with 
“many hands,” starting usually from the village trader–broker as an oligopsonist 
or even local monopsonist. However, the current study found that the role 
of the village trader had become minor, with only 7% of farms and sales in 
Bangladesh, 29% of farms and 28% of sales in the PRC, and 38% of farms and 
18% of sales in India (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). The marked difference between 
shares of farms and sales in India is because smaller farmers tended to use 
village traders much more than did the larger farmers. (Due to their small lots, 
the small-scale farmers sold to local traders who collected the produce, rather 
than having to deliver to the larger traders.) 
Second, by contrast, in South Asia, the wholesaler’s role (mainly at the 
wholesale market but also, in a minor way, at the mill) was far greater, buying 
directly from the farmer. In both Bangladesh and India, farmers sold about 
two-thirds of their paddy to wholesalers whether at the wholesale market or 
the mill. However, in the PRC, the role of the rural wholesale market was a tiny 
2%. Subsequent text shows what has displaced it (Table 3.11).
Third, especially in the PRC, incipiently in Bangladesh, but not yet in India, 
farmers were bypassing middlemen and selling directly to mills. Of all paddy 
sold, 63% was sold directly to mills in the PRC, 30% in Bangladesh, and 5% 
in India. 
Fourth, the government was nearly absent as a direct buyer of paddy from 
farmers. It had no role in Bangladesh and bought only 1% of the produce in the 
PRC and 14% in India. Yet the government has had an important indirect role 
in providing the infrastructure improvements that appear to have facilitated 
restructuring the market. 
The picture that emerges is one of “disintermediation.” That term is usually 
reserved for modern supply chains, such as where large-scale retailers buy 
directly from producers through a collection center. But the rice value chains 
showed similar disintermediation. In South Asia, the disintermediation mainly 
entailed substituting a larger and more distant trader for the village broker. In 
the PRC, disintermediation entailed a nearby mill buying directly from the farmer 
rather than through a village trader or rural wholesale market. This appears 
to be a development continuum—from long value chains, to wholesaler-
dominated chains, to processor-dominated chains in the rural areas—in the 
rural equivalent of a more macro trend where supermarket chains and large 
processors gradually buy increasingly directly from processors and farmers. 
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Table 3.11 Composition of Rice Farmers’ Sales to their Clients  
(% of farmers’ total sales by type of buyer)
Buyer Farm Size
Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(>1 ha)
  All
Village trader 5.5 19  7
Wholesaler on wholesale market 32 36  33
Miller 31 24  30
Trader at mill 31 21  30
Other 0.3 0  0.3
Total (tons in parenthesis)  100 (3.34)  100 (11.17)   100 (6.94)
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Village trader 33  27  24 29 
Wholesaler on wholesale market  0.86 2 1  2
Miller 61 65 64  63
Private grain warehouses ... 1 ... 1 
Cooperative associations ... ... ... 0
Paddy rice retailers ... ... ... 0
Heilongjiang rice research 
institute
... ... ... 0
Government 1 2  ... 1.13 
Relatives/acquaintances 0.72 ...  ... 0.72 
Traders from other villages  0.74 1 5  0.91
Seed company  2 ...  6 2.32 
Others  0.86 2 ... 1.08 
Total (with rounding error; tons 
in parenthesis)
 100 (7.01)  100 (16.33)  100 (22.68)  100 (12.63)
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Village trader 26 27 15 18
Trader on wholesale market 41 59 64 61
Trader at mill 7 3 1 2
Government agency 14 7 15 14
Miller 6 5 5 5
Other farmers 6 0 0 1
Total (with rounding error; tons 
in parenthesis) 
 100 (3.7)  100 (9.6)  100 (26.5)  100 (16.7)
... = no data available, ha = hectare.
Three developments have been important for this change in the market structure 
in the study areas: the proliferation of rural wholesale markets; better road links 
to cities; and the spread of mobile (cellular) phones, giving farmers information 
about options (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 2000; Fan and Hazell 2001; ADB 2012; 
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Reardon and Minten 2012). Moreover, as Table 3.12 shows, most paddy was 
still sold in the farmers’ villages or nearby. Mills and wholesale market traders 
had made major investments in buying or renting trucks, third party logistics 
companies had emerged, and these trends had helped the wholesaler and mill 
cut out the village traders. The result was that the farmers could choose among 
several types of traders apparently competing for their products—which is a 
far cry from the traditional image of farmers waiting passively on their farms, 
bereft of intermediation choice, while traders prey on them.
Table 3.12 Paddy Sales: Time and Location (% of farmers)
Sales Time and Location Farm Size
Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
All
Time to, at, and from sales location (hours) 1.7 3.0 2.5
Called the buyer before the transaction (%) 36 53 47
If called, made the price deal on phone (%) 24 39 34
Sales location
Same village (%) 38 43 41
Wholesale market/mill within the district (%) 53 52 53
Local retail market (%) 10 5 8
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Time to, at, and from sales location (hours) 5.3 7.0 4.4 5.8
Sales location 
Own field or own village (%) 80 74 81 78
Wholesale market in this village (%) 0 1 0 0.4
Wholesale market in other villages in the 
county (%)
0.80 4 0 2
Wholesale market in other counties in the 
district (%)
0 0 0 0
Wholesale markets in other districts (%) 0 0 3 0.4
Local retail market for paddy rice (%) 0 0 0 0
Purchasing center for retailers (%) 0 1 0 0.4
Others (%) 14 14 11 14
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Time to, at, and from sales location (hours) 8 8 8 8
Sales location
Own field or village (%) 42 48 34 41
Wholesale market in district (%) 19 12 20 17
Wholesale market elsewhere in  
Uttar Pradesh (%)
0 0 5 2
Wholesale market in Delhi (%) 0 0 0 0
Wholesale market at block level (%) 59 64 74 66
ha = hectare.
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Table 3.12 shows shares of farmers selling to various locations. The great 
majority of sales were made in the villages or (except in the PRC) at a wholesale 
market in the block or district. The transaction times were just a morning to a 
full day, once or twice per season. Very little was sold on the local retail market, 
in contrast with the importance given to these local retail markets in the 1960s 
and 1970s literature (Lele 1971). 
The role of the mobile phone is assessed through the survey data and 
discussions with key informants in the field. Most of the farmers had acquired 
their mobile phone in the 5 years before the survey. Table 3.13 shows their 
cellular phone use. Most of them owned a cellular phone, and many used it 
to contact traders before a transaction and agree to the price on the phone. 
The farmers’ ownership and use of cellular phones in the rice area was most 
widespread in Bangladesh, followed by the PRC, and then (in a somewhat 
distant third) India. 
Marketing costs differed somewhat across the study sites, but, as the 
transactions were local, the costs were small (compared with traders’ costs, as 
discussed in Chapter 4). In the PRC, the marketing cost was $3.07/ton. About 
half of the cost was for bags and a quarter was for the milling. In India, total 
marketing costs were just $1.55/ton.  
Table 3.13 Rice Farmers’ Ownership and Use of Cellular Phones
Ownership and Use Bangladesh PRC India
Share
Share of farmers owning a cell phone (%) 80 97 73
Year phone first owned
2008 or later (%) 18 21 16
2006 or 2007 (%) 37 21 38
2004 or 2005 (%) 29 36 32
Before 2004 (%) 16 22 14
Share of all calls made related to rice business (%)  …  … 6
Use of phone in last transaction 
Farmers who used their phone to contact the buyer (%) 71 47 19
If used, …
Farmers agreed upon price on the phone (%) 58 34 51
Other buyers contacted (%) 90 95 50
Calls concerning this transaction (no.) 2.5 2.5 2.5
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Rice Farmers’ Accessing Value Chain Credit
Table 3.14 shows credit transactions in terms of shares of farmers getting 
advances from buyers, or de facto giving credit to buyers (by the buyers paying 
with a delay after receiving the paddy). Two surprising conclusions emerge 
from the data.
Table 3.14 Credit from and to Buyers (% of farmers)
Payment Terms Farm Size
 Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
All
Buyer paid cash  100 100  100
Buyer provided advance 0 0  0
Buyer payment delayed  
(de facto credit)
0 0 0
China, People’s Rep. of Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Buyer paid cash  96 96 97 96
Buyer provided advance 0 0 0 0
Buyer payment delayed  
(de facto credit)
4 4 3 4
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Buyer paid cash  96 89 93 92
Buyer provided advance 0 5 3 3
Buyer payment delayed  
(de facto credit)
15 11 10 12
ha = hectare.
First, the traditional image is of farmers as creditors through advances from 
traders. Key informants surveyed indicated that these relations are nearly 
universal and represent an exploitation of the farmer by the trader. In sharp 
contrast, however, the survey data showed that traders provided very little 
credit to rice farmers—none in Bangladesh and the PRC and a mere 3% in 
India, mainly to larger farmers.
Second, in Bangladesh and the PRC, farmers were paid immediately at delivery. 
But in India, 12% (with a slight inverse correlation with farm size) were paid 
later—and thus essentially gave credit to traders. The delay was often not long, 
usually a week to a few weeks while the trader sold the crop and returned to 
pay the farmer. Nearly all the transactions in all three zones were paid in cash, 
not check or barter.
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Performance of the Rice Farm Segment
Farm Productivity
Table 3.15 shows yields of “common” grade rice, a group of rice varieties whose 
shape (length and width) correspond to the medium grade. (Finer grades are 
longer and narrower; coarser grades are stubbier. Other characteristics of 
quality, such as degree of whiteness or taste or smell, are not considered here.) 
Despite the changes in input use and capital intensity previously noted, there 
were no striking changes during 1999–2009 in Bangladesh or 2004–2009 in 
the PRC. Most of the farmers reported increased yields, of 5%–17%. Some, 
however, reported declines, which seem often related to climate problems (for 
example, cold in the PRC).
Table 3.15 Rice Farm Productivity, Main Rice Season (tons/hectare)
Economy and Rice Type Farm Size and Year
 Lowest Middle Highest All
Bangladesh 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
Medium/common 6.7 6.7 5.2 5.9 6.0 6.3
China, People’s Rep. of 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009
Regular-common 10 8 8 7 8 7 9 7
India 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
Common … 4.4 … 3.5 … 3.8 … 3.8
… = no data available.
Note: “Lowest” = “marginal” for Bangladesh and “marginal–small” for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India; 
“Middle” = “small” for Bangladesh and “semi-medium” for the PRC and India; “Highest” = “medium–large” for the PRC and 
India. See Table 3.1 for the equivalent hectare sizes.
Controlling for quality, yields in Bangladesh (6.3 tons/ha) and the PRC 
(7.0 tons/ha) were close despite the differences between the capital versus 
labor intensity. By contrast, India’s yield of 3.8 tons/ha (the study zone had 
a higher yield than the Indian overall average of only 2.2 tons/ha) was only 
about 50%–60% of the Bangladesh and PRC averages. Interestingly, these yield 
differences line up with the technology differences: the PRC had a high capital/
land and capital/labor ratio; Bangladesh had a very high labor/land ratio; 
and India was in between, with lower capital use than the PRC, and lower 
labor use than Bangladesh. Hence, the PRC and Bangladesh had somewhat 
more intensified rice systems, in terms of use of machines (the PRC) or labor 
(Bangladesh), and external inputs (in particular in the PRC) compared with 
India, and this contributed to the differences in yields. 
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In India, yields had declined slightly in the shift between common and fine 
grades, but yields of medium and fine grades were similar in Bangladesh. In 
Bangladesh, coarse rice had a modestly lower yield than common and fine 
grades. As the technologies used (in terms of input ratios) were similar in all 
the grades of rice, the yield gains in medium rice may have been because 
government rice research had concentrated on introducing new varieties in 
the medium (rather than the coarse) quality category during the last decade. 
Finally, in Bangladesh and India (but not in the PRC), the yields of the smallest 
farms were about 15% above those of the larger farms. This small advantage 
coincided with the slightly more intense use of labor and fertilizer per hectare. 
However, the yields across farm strata were not very different in any of the three 
economies; this appears to be because fertilizer and crop chemicals were easily 
accessible across the strata and, to a certain extent, the larger farms compensated 
for less labor intensity with more capital intensity. But the technology differences 
were greater between zones than between the strata within them. 
Quality Differentiation and Evolution among Rice Farmers
Table 3.16 shows the differentiation of paddy at the South Asian sites. 
Rather than major growth in yield, the study found growth in the quality of 
output (proxied by the shape of the grain). This is part of a broader quality 
differentiation story of the staples value chains throughout this book.
Table 3.16 Shift to Higher Quality Rice (% of average output)
Rice Quality Year and Farm Size
1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
 Bangladesh Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
All
Fine 20 23 19 20   19 22
Medium/common 44 63 46 62   45 62
Coarse 37 15 36 19   36 17
Total 100 100 100 100   100 100
India  Marginal–Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–Large 
(≥4 ha)
All
Common 96 85 96 86 96 80 96 83
Fine 4 15 4 14 5 20 4 17
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ha = hectare.
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Varieties were changed and quality was upgraded, such as the shift into 
fine rice and partly away from common rice in India, and the rapid shift to 
medium from coarse grade rice in Bangladesh. Interestingly, the study found 
no significant technology (or farm gate price) difference between coarse and 
common rice production in Bangladesh; this suggests there may be no capital 
or scale entry barrier for the production of medium and fine rice. The study 
also found that the production costs of the grades did not differ much, nor 
did the farm gate prices. Minten, Murshid, and Reardon (2012) argue that this 
quality change at the farm level has been driven by national and international 
agriculture centers’ introduction of varieties (for agronomic reasons) that 
happen to be the higher (market) grades of rice.  
Farmers’ Total Costs
Table 3.17 reproduces the last three rows of Table 3.4, to bring out the 
performance-related points in this section. The costs in Table 3.17, divided 
by average yields from the second to the last column of Table 3.15, can be 
compared with the prices per ton of common paddy ($175, $317, and $169 
in Bangladesh, the PRC, and India, respectively) and are $126, $209, and $294 
per ton. Thus, only in the India case did prices not cover total costs. Monetary 
costs per ton were $99 for Bangladesh, $192 for the PRC, and $112 for India—
well above inputed in-kind costs in all three cases.
Table 3.17 Farmers’ Production Cost  
(total from Table 3.4 on technology/cost composition)
Cost Bangladesh PRC India
 $/ha % $/ha % $/ha %
Total cost (cash outlays plus imputed in-kind 
costs, 100% and total value)
794 100 2,033 100 739 100
Total monetary cost (value and share) 625 79 1,350 66 428 58
Total imputed in-kind costs (value and share 
of total cost)
169 21 683 34 311 42
ha = hectare, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Price Rice Farmers Received
Table 3.18 shows prices farmers received for their paddy: about $170/ton 
in Bangladesh and India but $371 in the PRC. Several factors may explain 
the difference: (1) the “official” (in reality, benchmark, price, given no strict 
enforcement mechanisms) was about 30% higher in the PRC than in India in 
2009; (2) farm costs per hectare were about twice as high in the PRC, and in
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Table 3.18 Farm Size and Paddy Prices ($/ton)
Economy Farm Size
Lowest Middle Highest All
Bangladesh 174 175 175
China, People’s Rep. of  356 398 364  371
India  163 165 173 169 
Note: “Lowest” = “marginal” for Bangladesh and “marginal–small” for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India; “Middle” 
= “small” for Bangladesh and “semi-medium” for the PRC and India; “Highest” = “medium–large” for the PRC and India. 
See Table 3.1 for the equivalent hectare sizes.
per ton terms, 1.3 times that in India and 1.6 times that in Bangladesh; and 
(3) the northeast PRC produces japonica, which in Beijing fetched twice the retail 
price of indica, the rice type produced in the southern PRC and South Asia.
Conclusions Regarding the Rice Farm Segment
The study’s key findings punch significant holes in the general view of Asia’s staple 
farmers as “traditional,” and of input and output markets as underdeveloped 
and static. Instead, the findings paint a picture of change and development in 
rice farming and the input and output markets that serve it. The key points are 
as follows:
(1) Contrary to the extant image of Asian farmers on millions of tiny farms, 
farm land sizes varied substantially, and there was evidence of land 
concentration (that is, in the larger farms) in a number of the study 
zones. Moreover, land rental markets were developing rapidly in all 
three economies, but were most advanced in the PRC and India zones.
(2) Within and across zones, farmers’ possession of nonland assets (livestock, 
farm equipment, and irrigation) was substantially heterogeneous. Larger 
farms typically had more farm equipment (a substitute for labor), but 
somewhat less livestock (which is closely related to the livelihoods of the 
smaller, poor farmers, who rely somewhat more on dairy). Farmers in 
the PRC study zone were investing rapidly in farm equipment, resulting 
in an eightfold difference with the South Asian sites in capital intensity 
(perhaps compensating for a fivefold greater rural wage in the PRC).
(3) A surprising finding is that, in Bangladesh and India, tube well owners 
(larger farmers) sold a lot of water to small farmers who did not 
own tube wells. Tube well ownership was especially skewed toward 
medium and large farmers in India, and thus so is the distribution of 
subsidies supporting that ownership.
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(4) The farmers were engaged in substantial amounts of rural nonfarm 
employment. In the South Asian study zones, local employment 
was far more common than migration for employment. In the PRC, 
local employment was also evident, but migration for employment 
dominated. That rural nonfarm employment was a major source of 
cash may help to explain why credit and output markets were no longer 
“tied” in these areas. 
(5) The study found very broad participation in seed, fertilizer, and 
pesticide and herbicide markets among the farmers in all the zones. In 
nearly all cases, the smallest farmers were participating as fully as, and 
sometimes more than, the larger farmers. The state played a minor 
role in these markets in terms of direct sale of inputs. The new modern 
outlets, the rural business hubs in India, were currently a minor but 
emerging player. 
(6) The input market stories for rice farming showed increased capital 
infusion in the PRC and greater use of labor in Bangladesh. However, 
the study did not find evidence of rapid yield growth, which was quite 
variable over study sites. 
(7) Rather than major yield growth, the study found an increased quality 
of output, with variety change and quality upgrading, such as the 
rapid shift to medium from coarse grade rice in Bangladesh. 
(8) Rice value chains in most of the study zones appeared to be shifting 
from traditional to an intermediate stage, with a decline in the role 
of the traditional rural middleman or village trader and the rise of 
direct sales from farmers to mills and wholesale markets. This means 
an incipient disintermediation of the value chain.
(9) Whereas the traditional literature on grain markets in Asia emphasizes 
(rightly, in a historical context) the linkage between credit and output 
markets, in which traders “tie” output transactions to their advancing 
credit to farmers, the study found this is currently rare. Nonfarm 
income, mobile phones, multiple trading sites, better roads, and other 
forms of credit had undermined this tie over time. 
 (10) While the authors expected small-scale farmers to receive lower prices 
than medium and larger farmers, the study found this to be rare. 
The hypothesized superior bargaining and social capital power of 
medium and larger farmers was not evident, at least not in the prices 
they received.
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The “conventional wisdom” in policy circles is that staples value chains are still essentially dominated by “traditional” players and structures, except for a few modernizing pockets of changing  technology and  marketing 
practices with the advent of a small number of modern mills, cold storage 
companies, and logistics firms. That view appears to carry with it assumptions 
of characteristics of the midstream segment of staples value chains. These 
assumptions, as voiced by many of the study’s key informants and in many 
policy forums, are as follows: 
(1) Rice mills are still mainly small in scale and village based. 
(2) The government plays a major role in the midstream of the value chain 
by procuring and distributing rice. 
(3) The wholesale system has remained a “long chain of many hands”—
where urban wholesalers buy from traders who bring rice from rural 
wholesale markets, which in turn depend on a web of rural brokers or 
village traders who are the main interface between the farmer and the 
market. (The off-market local traders are mostly based in villages or 
rural towns, and henceforth are referred to in this chapter as “village 
traders” for simplicity.)
The idea that the midstream is or could be a motor for capital investment and 
labor employment in the staples food economy has not arisen in the policy 
debate; nor has the idea that transformation is occurring in the midstream 
and can drive lower costs, better quality, and even improved “traceability” 
(the ability to trace a given bag of rice back through the value chain to its 
source in the production area). Where the midstream does enter the policy 
debate, it tends to pertain to fears of speculation, such as during India’s recent 
onion crisis, or discussions termed the “traditional trader role” whereby traders 
capture farmers’ profits by providing them with credit tied to the harvest. Yet 
few hard data are brought to the debate.  
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This chapter marshals the evidence from the midstream surveys in Bangladesh, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and India to assess the extent to which the 
staples midstream segment had retained the traditional trader–farmer role, the 
extent that this segment had changed, and the key characteristics of the change. 
The chapter first previews the main findings and then provides the details. 
Structure, Conduct, and Performance of Rice Mills
Structure of the Rice Mill Segment of the Value Chain
Characteristics of Rice Mills. Table 4.1 shows characteristics of the rice mills. 
Several points stand out. The Bangladesh and PRC rice mills sampled started 
operating about a decade prior to the study, while the Indian mills started in 
the mid-1990s. Moreover, within each economy, the difference between the 
sizes of the large and small mills varied widely. In Bangladesh, large mills were 
twice as large as small ones, and in the PRC, the large mills were 10 times larger 
than the small ones.
Table 4.1 Structure of the Rice Mill Segment  
(all figures are means unless otherwise stated)
Mill Characteristics Mill Type/Size
 Small Semi-
Automatic/
Medium
Automatic/
Large
All 
Bangladesh
Average start-up year 1998 2000 1998 1999
Capacity in 2009 (tons/day) 33 42 73 51
Capacity at start-up (tons/day) 22 21 34 26
Mill value (2009, $ ’000) 10 650 1,710 840
China, People’s Rep. of
Average start-up year 1999 2001 2001 2001
Capacity in 2009 (tons/day) 32 133 350 94
Capacity at start-up (tons/day) 18 76 170 50
Mill value (2009, $ ‘000) 94 744 3,692 649
India
Average start-up year 1995 1995 1995
Capacity (high season) (tons/day) 100 68 92
Milling capacity (off-season) 40 27 37
Capacity (high season)  
at start-up
84 64 78
Mill value (2009, $ ‘000) 169 127 149
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Also, the PRC mills were larger (measured by capacity or worth) than the South 
Asian mills, whether on average or comparing the largest mills. Mills in the 
PRC’s “large” category were 3–4 times larger than the large mills in the South 
Asian sample. But in all three economies, the investment required for the large 
and medium mills was very large, averaging $1.7 million for a large mill in 
Bangladesh and $3.6 million in the PRC. Even the small mills (in the villages) 
were not cheap relative to villagers’ incomes: A small mill in a PRC village 
cost nearly $100,000; in Bangladesh, the cost was about $10,000. The large 
and medium mills are major business sector investments. Interestingly, major 
investment in rice by multinationals (such as Wilmar of Singapore) or large 
state-owned enterprises (such as the PRC’s Zhong Liang) was evident only in 
the PRC.
Furthermore, the Bangladesh and PRC mills doubled in capacity from the 
start of their operations through 2009, while the Indian mills expanded only 
modestly. Interestingly, in Bangladesh and the PRC, the largest mill category 
added capacity (adding machines and/or time using the machines) fastest. 
Controlling for the number of mills, the survey data appear to suggest 
concentration in the mill sector (with the share of larger mills increasing).   
Scale differences also show in the mills’ storage of paddy before milling and 
rice after. In Bangladesh, an average mill owned about 2,000 tons of storage 
capacity, but the difference between automatic and small mills was a huge 36-
fold: 3,165 tons for the automatic versus 86 tons for the small mills. In the PRC 
study zone (in Heilongjiang), the largest mill category could store 40,000 tons 
(much more than could the largest Bangladesh mill) and the smallest, 400 tons 
(versus 86 tons for the village mill in Bangladesh). In India, the two medium–
large mill types surveyed stored 1,400–2,200 tons, similar to the Bangladesh 
sample, but smaller than in the PRC. 
The study’s evidence of concentration in the mill sector is corroborated by 
some descriptive literature concerning concentration and technological change 
in the mill sector in the countries, as follows: 
In the PRC, most paddy was processed in town- or county-level mills (as 
opposed to village-level mills), of which there were an estimated 100,000 
(McKee 2010). During 1999–2009, corporations with large-scale mills (about 
25 firms) invested heavily and appear to have milled 20%–25% of the PRC’s rice 
in 2009. Among them are large agribusiness firms in the  PRC—Zhong Liang 
and Singapore’s Wilmar (“Jia Li” in the PRC). He and Wen (2009) reported that 
the large mills in which large agribusiness firms invest in the PRC had capacities 
of 88–1,200 tons/day (the latter being three times the size of the large mills in 
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the current study). He and Wen also noted that village mills with 5–10 tons/day 
capacities mostly disappeared in the second half of the 2000s. The remaining 
mills had capacities of 50–200 tons/day (roughly the range of the small to 
medium mills in the sample used for this book). In 2007, the PRC had about 
7,600 milling companies; this had decreased 5% to 7,220 by 2008, and the 
number of mills with capacities of more than 400 tons/day had increased 42%, 
from 81 in 2007 to 115 in 2008. All these patterns point to an overall trend of 
concentration of milling in medium and larger mills.
The South Asian story further illuminates the tendency toward concentration 
in the milling segment, showing its link with technological change. In India, 
during the 1960s through the 1980s, huller mills gradually displaced manual 
milling. The first modernization initiative started in the early 1970s with policies 
promoting the adoption of shellers and hullers with shellers by subsidizing 
the existing mills’ purchase of mechanical dryers, silos, mechanical handling, 
and conveyors. That meant the mills were being converted from “hullers” to 
“modern” mills. This first modernization drive had partial results: by the 1980s, 
only 1% of the mills in Bihar, 9% in West Bengal, 16%–60% in the rice zones 
of South India, 30% in Punjab, and 55% in Haryana had converted to modern 
mills (Harris-White 2005). 
A second modernization initiative began in the early 1980s with a quest 
for modernization of metallic hullers (only those built after July 1984) by adding 
rubber rollers, shellers, centrifugal dehuskers, paddy cleaners, and separators. 
A central sector huller subsidy scheme was launched in the early 1990s, paying 
for half the conversion cost. The mills emerging from this second wave are 
called  “modern mini mills” locally. The policy had some impact: by 1987 India 
had 124,347 registered rice mills: 63% were single hullers; 4%, shellers; 8%, 
hullers with shellers disk sellers; and 25%, modern mini mills (Nayak 1996). But 
scale was still limited, due to the “reservation” policy that kept large-scale mills 
out by reserving the processing section in general to small-scale firms.
A third initiative was launched in India in 1997 with the “dereservation” of rice 
milling, thus allowing large-scale plants to be established such as mills with 
hourly capacities of 3 tons or more. At the same time, major investments in 
mills were made, often exceeding $1 million per mill, with the introduction of 
fully automatic milling equipment such as automatic cleaners, graders, dryers, 
separators, destoners, and computerized packaging and sorting units. These 
are the fully and semi-automatic one-line processing units that figured in the 
current survey results (the survey did not cover the mini mills or the remaining 
few small hullers in the villages). From 1987 to 1999, the number of mills 
increased by 12% to 138,898. Of these, 25% were modern mills; 6% were 
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huller-cum-disk shellers, or rubber rollers; 3% were shellers; and 66% were 
single hullers (Government of India 2003). While the number of single hullers 
and modern mills increased by 17% and 12%, respectively, from 1987 to 1999, 
the hullers-cum-disk shellers decreased by almost 19%. 
Capacity Utilization and Seasonality in Rice Mills. Table 4.2 shows the 
seasonality of the mills’ capacity utilization in the PRC and India. Seasonality 
was very pronounced and the utilization rate was rather low even in the peak 
seasons, at only 30% in the PRC and 42% in India. Storage was sharply seasonal. 
In India, the mills essentially did not store and release in the months far from 
the harvest season. During and right after the main harvest months (October 
to December), the mills’ average storage was about 1,700 tons/month; it 
dropped to 1,000 tons in January and then waned to very low amounts until 
the next harvest. The rice storage mirrored seasonal harvest patterns.
Moreover, the smaller the mill, the lower was the capacity utilization rate. 
This factor could have been driving concentration of the mill sector into larger 
strata if smaller mills were less competitive.
Also, the mills worked much longer periods each year in the PRC (102, 198, 
and 332 days for small, medium, and large mills) than in India, where they ran 
for about 3 months straight (96 days) during the harvest season, and then only 
25 days in the rest of the year. During the off-season, the mills were cleaned 
and repaired and then lay idle until the next harvest season. Figure 4.1 shows 
the seasonality of milling in Bangladesh. As with the PRC case, the utilization 
rate dropped sharply between harvest seasons. 
Table 4.2 Capacity Utilization Rate of Rice Mills by Season 
(sample-weighted averages, %)
Zone and Season Mill Type/Size
Small Semi-
Automatic/
Medium 
 Automatic/
Large
 All
China, People’s Rep. of
Harvest  season 27 27 58 30
Slack time 3 37 38 17
India 
Harvest season 35 61 42
Slack time  6 0 4
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Rice Mill Segment: Procurement, Sales, Finance, and Other Services
Paddy Procurement. Table 4.3 shows the mills’ paddy sources. The patterns 
differed sharply between Bangladesh and the PRC on the one hand and India 
on the other. The PRC’s medium mills at the township level and small mills at 
the village level acquired nearly all their paddy directly from farmers, eschewing 
village traders, and the large mills sourced from traders who collected in the 
local villages and delivered to the county-level mill. Only in the PRC were 
farmers contracted by large and medium mills to sell their rice, and contracting 
was still uncommon. Bangladesh’s small village mills directly purchased 63% 
of their paddy from farmers, and the medium mills directly purchased 38% of 
their paddy. The district-level traders (bepari) acted primarily as collectors for 
the large district-level mills, as in the PRC.
Thus, Bangladesh and PRC mills can be said to have disintermediated paddy 
acquisition by mainly buying directly from the farmers. However, as the largest 
mills must depend on a large catchment area to fill their huge capacities, 
they relied more on collectors. As milling is increasingly concentrated in the 
larger scale operators in the sector, the long-term trend may be greater use of 
traders serving the increasingly important large mills, with perhaps an eventual 
concentration in the trader segment, or direct purchase programs put in place 
by the larger mills.  
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Table 4.3 Rice Mills’ Procurement of Paddy (%)
Procurement Channel Mill Type/Size
 Small Semi-
Automatic/
Medium
Automatic/
Large
All
Bangladesh
Directly from farmers 63 38 15 38
Traders (district-level only) 37 62 85 62
Total 100 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of
Directly from farmers 98 78 0 83
Farmers (contracted) 0 8 13 4
Traders 2 10 70 11
Government 0 3 0 1
Cooperative 0 0 18 2
Total 100 100 100 100
India
Directly from farmers 26 21 25
Traders on wholesale market 21 24 22
Village traders 10 11 10
PACS 44 43 43
Total 100 100 100
PACS = primary agricultural credit societies.
By contrast, India’s mills procured paddy from a wider array of sources, including 
25% from farmers directly, but the mills’ main source (43%) was the government. 
The mills purchased paddy through the government cooperatives—primary 
agricultural cooperative societies—and/or Food Corporation of India (FCI) stalls 
at wholesale markets. In some years, FCI used mills for custom milling, but 
in the survey year in the study zone, the mills interviewed did not custom 
mill for the government; rather, the portion of paddy they acquired from the 
government was bought from the primary agricultural credit societies and/or 
FCI stalls in the wholesale market. The mills noted that this share (43%) was 
roughly the magnitude of paddy they had sourced from the government over 
the years, whether by buying, custom milling, or both. The magnitude of the 
Indian government engagement in the paddy market was unique in most of 
Asia (Rashid, Cummings, and Gulati 2007). 
Rice Mills’ Sales. Table 4.4 shows rice mills’ sales to types of buyers. Several 
points stand out. 
First, as with paddy sourcing, the importance of the government as a rice 
buyer from Indian mills was sharply different from the Bangladesh and PRC
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Table 4.4 Rice Mills’ Sales by Source and Mill Size  
(averages of mills in each stratum of shares of all rice sold by the mills, %)
Buyer Mill Type/Size
Small Semi-
Automatic/
Medium
Automatic/
Large
All
Bangladesh
Government 11 7 3 7
Village traders 0 16 6 7
Traders on rural wholesale markets 77 44 36 53
Traders on wholesale markets in Dhaka 0 17 15 10
Traders on urban wholesale markets 
other than Dhaka
11 12 33 20
Traditional retailers 0 4 6 3
Modern retailers 0 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of
Government 0 3 0 1
Village traders 11 17 4 12
Other mills in rural district 23 22 0 21
Rural wholesale markets in production 
area 
10 3 1 7
Wholesale market in Beijing 15 2 5 10
Wholesale markets in other cities 39 47 90 46
Directly to traditional retailers in  Beijing 0 0 0 0
Directly  to traditional retailers  
in other places
2 7 0 3
Directly to supermarkets 0 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100
India
Government  58 60 59
Village traders  17 14 16
Traders on wholesale markets   24 24 24
Traditional retailers  1 2 1
Supermarkets  0 0 0
Directly to consumers  0 0 0
Total  100 100 100
cases. Mills in Shahjahanpur sold fully 59% of their rice to the government; 
this is close to the 60% of the official requirement, with the rice moving into 
the Public Distribution System managed by the parastatal, FCI. The share 
to the government (7%) reported by the mill sample in Bangladesh can be 
compared with the government’s nationwide target in the survey year, which 
was to procure 1% of rice output (Mondal 2010). In the PRC, the share was 
even smaller; the mills reported that only 1% of their rice was sold to the 
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government. While the PRC government nationwide intervened much less in 
the rice market as a buyer than did the Indian government, its purchases were 
primarily of indica in the southern PRC in the early spring, to release stocks later 
in the year to smooth prices. 
Second, large mills in Bangladesh and the PRC tended to sell directly to urban 
wholesale markets, as did (to a lesser degree) small mills in the PRC. The urban 
rice wholesale section showed that an important part of the mills’ rice was sold 
via agents representing one or two mills. 
Third, small mills in Bangladesh tended to sell to rural wholesale markets. 
Interestingly, small mills in the PRC also sold to large mills, presumably to allow 
them to complete orders and further polish the husked rice. 
Fourth, in all the study zones, only a very small share of the mills’ rice was 
sold directly to traditional retailers, and none to supermarkets. In the Beijing 
rice retail study, retailers noted that they sourced from both urban wholesale 
markets and from mills, but mainly from the very large mills. 
The overall picture in the three economies is of a tight relation among farmers, 
mills, and wholesale markets—with a very minor role for traditional rural 
brokers among these segments. This could be part of shortening the value 
chains, of disintermediation. 
Rice Mills and Value-Chain Finance. Table 4.5 shows how rice mills received 
value-chain finance from clients and suppliers and provided it to them. The 
following points show active value-chain financing in various directions. 
First, mills provided value-chain finance in two ways. On the one hand, mills 
provided finance to paddy suppliers and rice buyers. Bangladesh and PRC mills 
were more apt to make advances to paddy suppliers (at 34% and 45% of their 
mills, respectively) than were Indian mills (at 13%). In Bangladesh, 18%1 of the 
paddy suppliers received advances, while only 13% did so in India. Moreover, 
mills provided de facto credit to rice clients by allowing them to pay with a 
delay after receiving the rice shipment: this was most common in South Asia 
(with 41% of Bangladesh and 48% of Indian mills allowing delayed payment), 
but less so in the PRC (with 17% of mills).  
On the other hand, mills received finance from suppliers and buyers. They got 
de facto credit from farmers and other suppliers by paying them with a delay
1 The share is derived from the share of mills giving advances times the average share of sup-
pliers given advances by mills that give advances.
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Table 4.5 Rice Mills: Timing and Source of Payments (%)
Credit Flow Mill Type/Size
Small Semi- 
Automatic/ 
Medium
Automatic/
Large
All
Bangladesh
Mills that paid advances to suppliers 43 43 25 34
Mills’ suppliers paid with delay 34 40 31 34
Mill clients that paid with delay to mills 40 33 47 41
Mills that got advances from clients 0 40 25 20
Clients of all mills that gave advances to mills 0 14 10 7
China, People’s Rep. of
Mills that paid advances to suppliers 50 33 50 45
Mills that paid with delay to suppliers 58 67 0 55
Mills’ suppliers paid with delay 14 22 0 13
Clients that paid with delay to mills 22 11 0 17
Mills that got advances from clients 50 83 50 60
Clients of all mills that gave advances to mills 17 17 25 18
India
Mills that paid advances to suppliers 14 10 13
Mills’ suppliers paid with delay 19 23 20
Clients that paid with delay to mills 41 67 48
Mills that got advances from clients 6 14 8
Clients of all mills that gave advances to mills 10 10 10
after receiving the paddy. This was most common in the PRC (55% of the mills) 
and least common in India (only 20% of the mills). Moreover, mills received 
advances from the clients (20% of mills in Bangladesh, 60% in the PRC, and 
8% in India). However, the share of the clients providing this credit was small—
only 7%–18%.2 
To get a rough idea of the importance of mill credit relations in the value chain, 
add the shares in the last column in Table 4.5. The result is that the PRC scores 
higher than the South Asian sites. For the four kinds of value-chain finance 
relations, the PRC averaged 44% of mills, versus 32% for Bangladesh and 22% 
for India. The reasons for the pattern require further investigation. 
Finally, value-chain finance had limited reach. Only 18% of the paddy suppliers 
in Bangladesh and 13% in India actually had advances from the mills, and only 
7%–18% of mills received credit from their clients across the three economies.
2 Further exploration is needed as to what types of clients interact with the mills in value-chain 
finance relations. 
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Other Services. Table 4.6 shows services other than value-chain finance that 
the mills provided to suppliers and clients. Mills rarely provided farm production 
support. Only a few larger mills in the PRC sold seed or chemicals or provided 
extension services to farmers. However, most of the Bangladesh mills, the large 
PRC mills, and a few Indian mills provided bags to their suppliers. 
Table 4.6 Rice Mills’ Provision of Services Other than Credit (% of farmers)
Service Mill Type/Size
Small Semi-
Automatic/
Medium
Automatic/
Large
All
Bangladesh
Arranged farmers’ access to seed 0 0 0 0
Share of farmers who got seed  
via mills
0 0 0 0
Arranged farmers’ access  
to crop chemicals
0 0 0 0
Share of farmers who got crop 
chemicals via mills
0 0 0 0
Agricultural extension to farmers 0 0 0 0
Provided bags to suppliers 85 80 75 80
Provided bags to clients 85 60 62 70
Transport from farm to mill 100 100 62 85
Transport from mill to buyer 100 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of
Arranged farmers’ access to seed 8 33 50 20
Share of farmers who got seed 
 via mills
2 17 10 8
Arranged farmers access to crop 
chemicals
0 0 50 5
Share of farmers who got crop 
chemicals via mills
0 0 10 1
Agricultural extension to farmers 25 17 100 30
Provided bags to their suppliers 33 66 100 40
Provided bags to their clients 100 100 50 95
Transport from farm to mill 100 83 100 85
Transport from mill to buyer 67 100 50 75
India
Arranged farmers’ access to seed 0 0 0
Share of farmers who got seed  
via mills
0 0 0
Arranged farmers access to crop 
chemicals
0 0 0
Farmers who got chemicals via mills 0 0 0
Agricultural extension to farmers 6 14 8
Provided bags to  suppliers 17 0 12
Provided bags to clients 83 100 88
Transport from farm to mill 56 100 68
Transport from mill to buyer 83 100 88
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Mills were increasingly bagging and packaging the rice they sold. In Bangladesh, 
in 1999, 5% of all rice sold by the mills was bagged,  but by 2009 this had risen 
to 36%. In the PRC, this trend had gone much further, with mills increasingly 
packaging and branding their rice, not just niche rice but the broad range of 
rice types as well. 
Finally, in all the economies, mills commonly provided transport for the paddy 
to the mills and the rice to the clients. This was important for the mills to 
sidestep intermediaries. 
Performance of the Rice Mill Segment: Quality, Costs, and Profits
Rice Quality and Rice Mill. Table 4.7 shows changes in quality over time 
and differences across mill sizes. Quality is defined by the size and shape of 
the grain (usually a longer, thinner grain is considered higher quality); other 
attributes that factor into quality include the degree of polishing (whiteness), 
taste, cleanliness (degree of foreign matter), amount of broken rice, and age 
of the grain. Quality can be conferred by the variety of rice, when and where it 
is harvested, and how it is milled (including degree of polishing and shaping, 
for example, to upgrade the rice’s appearance by thinning it). For simplicity, the 
mills were surveyed about quality using only the three general categories used 
in trading, which relate mainly to the shape of the kernel—coarse, common, 
and fine. Several points emerged from the data. 
Table 4.7 Rice Quality and Rice Mills (% of types)
Rice Quality Mill Type/Size
Small Semi-
Automatic/ 
Medium
Automatic/ 
Large
All
Bangladesh 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
Coarse 52 33 30 25 55 42 49 34
Medium 34 59 20 33 25 29 27 40
Fine 14 9 50 42 20 29 24 25
Total 100 101 100 100 100 100 100 99
China, People’s Rep. of 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009
Common regular 7 9 38 19 50 20 21 13
Fine regular 57 45 62 81 50 80 58 59
Sticky 36 46 0 0 0 0 21 28
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
India 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
Common 86 87 99 95 89 90
Fine 14 13 1 5 11 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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The amount of coarse rice produced in Bangladesh had decreased by 
15 percentage points from 1999 to 2009. Concurrently, the share of medium 
(common) quality rice increased by 13 percentage points, and of fine rice, by 
1 percentage point. The larger mills made a greater shift in quality than the 
smallest mills. In the PRC, the mills made smaller shifts (and the period of recall 
was shorter—2004–2009). During that period, the share of common rice in 
the study zone’s mills declined by 8 percentage points, and the share of fine 
edged up by 1 percentage point. There were pronounced differences between 
the mill scales: the larger mills made a major shift from common to fine, while 
the small mills made little shift between these types, but moved more into 
sticky rice (which is their niche, as the larger mills did not deal in sticky rice). 
India showed the least change in quality, with common rice remaining at about 
89% of their volume, and fine at about 11%.  
In summary, the fastest shift in quality was in Bangladesh, followed by the PRC, 
with little shift at the mill level in India. The shift was much greater, controlling 
for economy, among larger mills, which could be fueling the observed 
concentration in the mill segment.
Rice Mill Costs.  Table 4.8 details milling costs. As expected, due to the scale 
difference, yearly costs of PRC mills were roughly double those of the South 
Asia sample. However, on a daily basis, the PRC costs were a third higher than 
India’s (measured in the same year and hence with no inflation effect). This 
could be due to the substantially higher labor wage in the PRC than in India. 
Interestingly, there was some evidence of economies of scale in the PRC: While 
capacity increased 10-fold between the smallest and largest mill strata, costs 
increased only 6.5 times. 
The labor share was important for all, forming more than 40% of the costs for 
the Bangladesh and PRC mills and 33% for the India mills; while modern mills 
are by definition more capital intensive than the manual milling they displaced, 
they nevertheless were important employment sources. Electricity was a 
substantial item, at 11% in Bangladesh and 13% in the PRC, but was only 1% 
in India. However, in India the diesel that the mills used to generate their own 
electricity consumed 51% of their costs. Costs of mills are thus sensitive to 
energy costs, both directly in electricity costs and indirectly in fuel costs. Finally, 
most mills transported paddy to the mill and rice to the client; transport costs 
are especially high in Bangladesh at 45%, versus 14% in the PRC and India. 
Fuel is a major part of mills’ costs, and thus is indirectly an important element 
in consumer rice prices.
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Table 4.8 Average Annual Costs per Mill  
($ ’000; figures in parentheses are % of total costs)
Cost Component Mill Type/Size
Small Semi-
Automatic/ 
Medium
Automatic/
Large
All
Bangladesh
Labor (permanent plus casual)  8 (57)  82 (47)  204 (39)  105 (41)
Electricity  1.5 (11)  19 (11)  56 (11)  28 (11)
Own truck operation  0 (0)  13 (7)  15 (3)  9 (3)
Rental truck operation  2.6 (19)  55 (31)  235 (44)  109 (42)
Taxes  0.2 (1)  3 (2)  3 (1)  2 (1)
Other costs  1.4 (10)  3 (2)  12 (2)  6 (2)
Total yearly operating costs  14 (100)  175 (100)   524 (100)  258 (100)
China, People’s Rep. of
Labor (permanent plus casual)  12 (23)  184 (28)  494 (44)  224 (43)
Electricity  11 (21)  76 (12)  360 (32)  65 (13)
Warehouse rental  0.15 (.2)  185 (28)  31 (3)  57 (11)
Own truck operation  6 (14)  23 (4)  0 (0)  11 (2)
Rental truck operation  23 (43)  162 (25)  31 (3)  64 (12)
Taxes  1 (2)  27 (4)  14 (1)  10 (2)
Other costs  0 (0)  0 (0)  185 (17)  91 (17)
Total  yearly cost  53 (100)  656 (100)  1,114 (100)  521 (100)
Total days in operation during year 102 198 332 154
Daily costs ($ ‘000) 0.51 3.31 3.35 3.38
India    
Labor (permanent plus casual)  85 (31)   85 (36)  85 (33)
Electricity  2 (1)  2 (1)  2 (1)
Diesel  142 (51)  120 (51)  133 (51)
Rental truck operation  44 (16)  27 (11)  36 (14)
Taxes  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)
Others  4 (1)  3 (1)  4 (2)
Total  yearly cost  278 (100)  237 (100)  259 (100)
Total days in operation during year 119  124 121
Daily cost ($ ‘000) 2.34 1.90 2.14
Note: Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
Rice Mill Profits. Table 4.9 shows that the mills’ profit rates and internal 
rates of return were appreciable but varied across mill strata. The rates are 
gross of amortization of capital, due to the difficulties of costing out capital 
and its rate of being used up and replaced. The profit rates shown do not 
differ much from the few other studies on mill profits examined; for example, 
Chowdhury (1992), using mill survey data collected by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute in 1989/90, found mill profit rates of 24%–42%, 
depending on the type of mill. 
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Table 4.9 Rice Mill Profit Rates and Internal Rates of Return (%) 
Zone Profit Rates by Mill Type/Size Internal 
Rates of 
ReturnSmall Semi-
Automatic/ 
Medium
Automatic/
Large
All
Bangladesh 32 56 -0.5 28 10
China, People’s Rep. of 34 34 7
India 32 13 24 13
Structure, Conduct, and Performance of Rice Traders
Structure: Characteristics and Seasonality in Paddy and Rice Trading 
Table 4.10 shows characteristics of rural traders based off-market (outside the 
rural wholesale market, with a base in either a rural town or a village), of 
traders in rural wholesale markets, and of traders in Dhaka and Delhi wholesale 
markets. The traders were middle-aged, male, and fairly educated: 64% in 
Bangladesh and 89% in India had more than 9th grade education. Most had 
started their trade in the early 1990s.
Trading requires substantial capital. Traders in Bangladesh commanded assets 
valued at $15,000 and those in India averaged $7,000 (with more assets being 
positively correlated with trading in urban areas). However, there was striking 
concentration in the assets. In Bangladesh, while the average was $15,000, the 
median was only $715, showing the skewed distribution that was common 
internationally in the wholesale sector. The upper end of the distribution was 
mainly traders in urban areas who owned several trucks. Working capital was 
also substantial (more than $35,000 in Bangladesh and $11,000 in India, 
again, increasing from village trader to rural wholesaler to urban wholesaler). 
In India, about 69% of traders owned or rented a warehouse, averaging 
2 tons, a modest storage.
Table 4.11 shows characteristics of Beijing rice wholesalers. Of great interest 
is the finding that 37% of the wholesalers were actually agents of single mills; 
84% of the mills they represented were large mills, and 16% were medium 
scale; no agent represented a small mill. One example is the son of a family 
that owned a mill in Heilongjiang. He set up shop in the wholesale market in 
Beijing and had posters of the family mill and the branded bags in his stall. 
Another is a woman who had one of the largest stalls in Jinxiadadi and was 
the mother of a man who ran a mill in Heilongjiang. In the markets surveyed, 
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agents displayed their brand as a poster, and their bags were all branded. 
Indeed, most rice was sold bagged and branded, usually with a colorful and 
distinctive label that provided information on the type, quality, and geographic 
origin of the rice, plus the name and brand of the mill. 
Table 4.10 Characteristics of Paddy and Rice Traders in Bangladesh and India
Characteristics Type/Location of Trader
Village  
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market 
All
Bangladesh
Age (years) 45 44 44 44
Gender (% male) 100 100 100 100
Education (%):
6–9 years 24 27 17 23
10 or more years 58 57 76 64
Current working capital ($ '000) 6.8 47.5 35.7 35.8
Share from own funds (%) 92 97 100 97
Value of food trade assets owned ($ ‘000) 2.81 3.21 39.00 15.19
Year started trading 1992 1990 1988 1990
Trades rice seed (% yes) 0 7 3 4
India
Age (years) 49 45 43 47
Gender (% male) 100 100 100 100
Education (%)      
6–9 years 34 9 3 11
10–12 years 52 76 64 69
Postsecondary 14 15 33 20
Retailers (%) who trade in     
Paddy only 100 55 0 42
Rice only 0 45 100 58
Year started trading 2000 1993 1990 1993
Traders who also sold other products (%) 87 100 36 74
Rice in total volume of sales  
per trader (%)
37 43 72 50
Traders (%) with     
Own warehouses 40 48 45 45
Rented warehouses 7 29 27 24
Average warehouse capacity (tons) 0.4 1.0 3.1 1.7
Average number of trucks owned per 
trader
1 1 1 1
Working capital and business assets     
Current working capital per trader ($) 6,667 11,110 15,556 11,111
Share of own funds in current working 
capital (%)
66 72 59 69
Food trade business assets owned 
($’000)
1.3 4.4 8.9 6.7
Staff members per trader 3 4 7 6
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Table 4.11 Characteristics of Rice Traders and Wholesalers in Beijing 
Characteristic Share or Amount
Type of trader/wholesalers (one trader can have multiple answers, %)
Wholesaler at wholesale market 87
Broker based in Beijing, selling on commission for rice mills 0
Agent/representative based in Beijing, working with/for one rice mill 37
Wholesaler based in production area bringing rice to Beijing 7
Type of mill wholesaler-traders bought from (one wholesaler can have multiple answers, %)
Small mill 0
Semi-automatic mill 16
Automatic mill 84
Paddy and rice in wholesaler’s total volume traded (%) 97
Wholesalers who also owned rice mills (%) 13
Traders’ warehouses (%)
Traders who owned no warehouse 80
Traders who owned 1 warehouse 13
Traders who owned more than 1 warehouse 7
Traders who only rented warehousing 100
Average warehouse capacity (tons; simple average over traders) 176
Traders’ use of trucks or vans (%)
No truck or van 27
1 truck or van 47
More than 1 truck or van 27
Of traders operating van/truck, share that only rented 82
The majority of the traders rented warehouses, and about 20% owned them. 
The average warehouse could contain 176 tons, and was thus much larger 
than the average warehouse in urban South Asia (at 3 tons). About 74% of the 
traders operated trucks, but only 18% of them owned their vehicles; the others 
rented. About 20%–25% of the Beijing traders had more assets and scale than 
the other traders, as in the South Asia case.
Table 4.12 shows the seasonality of the traders’ sales. In urban wholesale 
markets, seasonality was low, as they were working from reserves and sourcing 
from diverse production zones. In the peak season, sales per trader per day in 
urban wholesale markets were about twice as high in Delhi and Beijing (about 
14 tons) as in Dhaka (7 tons), showing sharply different operational scales. 
Sales per trader in India’s rural wholesale markets were smaller (about 7 tons 
of paddy and 9 tons of rice at peak times) than in the urban markets, but in 
Bangladesh the rural wholesaler sold more than double his urban counterpart 
in peak season. In fact, the rural wholesale market trader in Bangladesh moved 
twice the volume per day that the Indian counterpart did. But for all rural 
traders in both countries, seasonality was pronounced, with the peak season’s 
volume roughly double that in the slack season. 
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Table 4.12 Rice Traders’ Seasonality (average tons/day)
Season Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesha
Aman (Dec/Jan 2009) 7 12 6 9
Boro harvest (Apr–May 2009) 10 19 6 13
Aus harvest (Aug–Sep 2009) 10 13 6 11
Slack season (Oct–Dec 2009) 11 9 6 8
China, People’s Rep. of
Start of harvest Aug–Oct 2009 12 11
End of harvest plus  main sales  
Nov 2009–Jan 2010
13 13
Feb–Apr 2010 8 8
May–Jul 2010 8 8
India
Paddy, tons sold per day     
Jan–Mar 2009 2 2 2
Apr–Jun 2009 3 5 5
Jul–Sep 2009 2 3 3
Oct–Dec 2009 3 7 5
Rice, tons sold per day     
Jan–Mar 2009 4 14 10
Apr–Jun 2009 5 16 13
Jul–Sep 2009 6 15 13
Jan–Mar 2010 9 15 13
a Aman, aus, and boro are the three seasons of rice production in Bangladesh.
Conduct: Procurement and Sales, Value-Chain Financing,  
and Other Services of the Rice and Paddy Traders
Procurement and Sales. Table 4.13 shows the traders’ sources. The village 
traders procured nearly all their paddy directly from farmers. 
Rural wholesale market traders in the South Asian sites procured a surprising 
amount directly from farmers rather than from village traders; this contradicts 
the historical information noted in the next paragraph, and is thus evidence 
of transformation of markets in these zones. In the Bangladesh study zone, 
village traders had no role in supplying the rural wholesale markets directly 
with paddy; the rural wholesale markets procured all their paddy from the 
farmers (and that is all of the farmers’ paddy) and their rice from small mills. 
In India, the rural wholesale markets bought 83% of their paddy from farmers. 
Table 4.11 continued
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Of that, the markets bought half from the farms and transported it to the 
market and the farmers brought the other half to the market for sale. Only the 
remaining 15% was procured from village traders. 
The authors did not collect historic information from the study district about the 
share of rural brokers in distribution. But other studies in like places point to a 
preponderance of the rural broker’s role (and of direct sale to consumers). The
Table 4.13  Rice and Paddy Traders’ Sources  
(% of volumes traders bought)
Source Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh (paddy and rice)
Farmers 71 47 0 39
Village and town traders 11 3 0 3
Small mills 0 49 38 36
Semi-automatic mills 2 0 0 0
Automatic mills 2 0 0 0
Wholesale markets 0 1 60 20
Other sources 0 0 3 1
Total 100 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of (rice only)
Farmers … … 2 2
Wholesalers in production area … … 10 10
Mill … … 87 87
Broker from production area … … 0 0
Other wholesalers in Beijing … … 0 0
Other sources … … 2 2
Total … … 100 100
India (paddy only)
Farmers  in villages 100 38 na 61
Village traders 0 14 na 9
Farmers in wholesale markets 0 45 na 29
Wholesale market traders 0 2 na 2
Total 100 100 na 100
India (rice only)
Government 0 0 0 0
Small mills 0 0 0 0
Semi-automatic mills 0 0 16 9
Automatic mills 0 0 49 30
Village traders 0 0 0 0
Wholesale market traders 0 100 35 61
Total 0 100 100 100
… = no data collected due to small sample, as mills bought mainly directly from farmers; na = not applicable.
Table 4.12 continued
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reliance on local traders was correlated with small- and medium-scale farmers 
(see, for example, Sarkar [1981] using a large data set collected by Rudra and 
Bardhan in West Bengal). Lele (1971) cites evidence of the  preponderance of 
village traders in the rice trade in Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh during 
the late 1960s, while Maharashtra wholesalers from the wholesale markets 
were buying rice directly from the villages. 
The current study results for rural markets in South Asia are similar to those 
found in the PRC—that the mills sourced the great majority of their paddy 
directly from farmers (except for the largest mills, which still relied to some 
extent on local traders).
Regarding urban wholesale traders’ procurement of rice, the surprising  findings 
are that the survey data overturn the presumption of extensive intermediation 
from the mills to the urban markets. In the PRC, urban wholesalers sourced 87% 
of the rice they sold directly from rural mills, with only 10% coming from rural-
based wholesalers. In India, 65% was sourced direct from medium and large 
rural mills (not small mills); only 35% was from rurally based wholesalers. While 
Bangladesh presented the most traditional case, a substantial share (38%) of 
its rice went directly from small mills to Dhaka markets, with the rest coming 
from rural wholesalers moving the rice to the urban markets. These findings 
show substantial disintermediation of the rural–urban rice supply chain. 
Table 4.14 shows sales destinations of traders. Village traders in Bangladesh 
sold only 28% of their paddy to rural wholesale markets; the great majority 
(63%) was sold directly to large and medium—not small—mills. The small mills 
were buying directly from farmers; as in the PRC, the larger mills combined 
sourcing from village traders and directly from farmers. In India, village traders 
sold 53% of their paddy to mills—again, large and medium, not small, mills. 
Key informants emphasized that the remaining small village mills mainly did 
custom milling for farm households’ home consumption. 
Traders on rural wholesale markets sold most of their paddy to mills—in 
particular large and medium mills: In Bangladesh, wholesalers sold 29% of 
their paddy to large and medium mills, and only 14% to small mills; in India, 
fully 84% was sold to large and medium mills, and none to small mills. In 
Bangladesh, rural wholesalers’ sold their rice to wholesale markets in Dhaka 
and other districts’ cities, not directly to urban retailers. In India, by contrast, 
rural wholesalers sold 72% of their rice directly to local traditional retailers. 
Another 2% was sold to government (as traders were not under the levy 
system). The rest was sold to other traders, but mainly within the study zone; 
they sold only 2% of their rice to Delhi, 1% to other states, and all the rest to 
Uttar Pradesh. 
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Table 4.14 Rice and Paddy Traders’ Sales Destinations  
(% of volumes of traders’ sales)
Direct Clients Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh (paddy and rice)
Traders in rural wholesale market 
in same district
28 13 2 12
Traders in Dhaka 2 13 6 13
Traders in other districts 6 22 0 12
Small mills 1 14 0 7
Semi-automatic mills 31 11 1 11
Automatic mills 32 18 0.5 15
Traditional retailers outside Dhaka 0 0 6 2
Traditional retailers in Dhaka 0 0 85 29
Supermarkets 0.25 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of (rice only)
Other wholesalers 24 24
Government buyers 1 1
Traditional retailers 62 62
Modern retailers 3 3
Restaurants, hotels, hospitals 10 10
Total 100 100
India (paddy only)
Government 4 2 1
Other wholesalers 43 8 22
Small mills 0 0 0
Semi-automatic mills 19 52 39
Automatic mills 34 32 33
Traditional retailers 0 4 2
Modern retailers 0 0 0
Others 0 2 1
Total 100 100 100
India (rice only)
Government 2 0 1
Other wholesalers/traders 25 17 21
Traditional retailers 72 78 75
Modern retailers 0 5 3
Other destinations 1 0 0.5
Total 100 100 100
Traders on urban wholesale markets sold the great majority of their rice directly 
to traditional retailers. Only in the PRC and India did the traders sell a small 
share (at most 5%) to supermarkets and, in the PRC, 10% went to institutional 
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buyers such as restaurants, hotels, and hospitals. The Indian result for the sales 
to supermarkets is similar to the finding in Chapter 5 on the retail segment, on 
the share of rice in Delhi that was sold via supermarkets. But in Beijing, a much 
larger share of rice was sold via supermarkets. Interviews with 10 supermarket 
chains in the PRC showed that most of them sourced rice mainly directly from 
large mills, rather than from urban wholesale markets. 
Moreover, about 88% of Beijing wholesalers sourced rice from the northeast (of 
which 50% is from Heilongjiang and 39% from other northeast areas). Only 8% 
of the wholesalers sourced rice from other provinces in the north, and only 4% 
from the south. This reflected the preference for japonica rice for consumption 
in Beijing. By contrast, the Delhi traders procured 14% of their product from 
Shahjahanpur, showing its importance, and 3% more from elsewhere in Uttar 
Pradesh. The rest was from other states. This means  that the sourcing of rice 
for Delhi was less geographically concentrated than in the case of Beijing. Also, 
Delhi traders sold 86% of their rice in Delhi, and 12% of it to other states. Thus, 
Delhi was somewhat of a distribution hub for rice to other states, collected from 
a number of states. This was not the case for Beijing traders, who sold all their 
rice in Beijing. 
Rice and Paddy Traders and Value-Chain Finance. Table 4.15 shows value-
chain finance in which the traders participated. As with mills, the findings 
point to active value-chain finance in the midstream segment, but not in the 
way that conventional wisdom emphasizes. The main results follow. 
First, historical studies such as Lele (1971) show that the traditional rice supply 
chain had interlinkages between credit and output markets. But the present 
surveys indicate that the traditional system had nearly disappeared by 2010. In 
Bangladesh, while 24% of traders still provided advances to farmers and other 
suppliers, the actual share of suppliers of all traders that received such credit was 
only 9% overall, with the share being somewhat more but still minor in rural areas 
(10% of village traders’ and 16% of rural wholesalers’ suppliers provided credit). In 
the PRC, only 7% of the urban wholesalers gave advances to clients. In India, none 
of the traders gave advances to their suppliers. 
After calculating the results from the survey data, the authors asked a number 
of traders in India about the finding. They said that 10–20 years ago, they 
used to provide advances to many of their suppliers, but that this practice had 
indeed disappeared. The traders no longer found it profitable to offer advances 
to farmers, as they no longer had sufficient bargaining power or could control 
the product. They said this is due to better roads; mobile phones; more traders
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Table 4.15 Rice and Paddy Traders and Credit (%)
Credit Flows Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh
Traders who paid advances to suppliers 23 43 6 24
Suppliers of traders who received 
advances
10 16 2 9
Traders’ suppliers paid with delay 6 17 65 29
Clients who paid with delay to traders 12 34 30 37
Traders who received advances  
from clients
13 30 0 14
China, People’s Rep. of
Traders who paid advances to suppliers … … 7 7
Traders’ suppliers paid with delay … … 20 20
Clients who paid with delay to traders … … 30 30
Traders who received advances  
from clients
… … 17 17
India
Traders who paid advances to suppliers … 0 0 0
Traders’ suppliers paid with delay … 29 66 52
Clients who paid with delay to traders … 45 83 67
Traders who received advances  
from clients
… 0 6 3
… = no data available.
competing and providing more options to farmers; and more sources of cash 
for farmers (off-farm employment, employment schemes, and other sources 
of credit),
Second, traders did, however, commonly provide value-chain finance to the 
clients who bought from them, by allowing such clients to pay at a later date. 
This consignment practice was common—it occurred among 37% of traders in 
Bangladesh, 30% in the PRC, and 67% in India; however, it was more common 
among urban wholesalers working with retailers as clients than among rural 
traders. The delayed payment was not long, usually about a week, according 
to the client’s transaction cycle.
Third, traders also received value-chain finance from their own suppliers, 
by paying them at a later date. For example, an urban wholesaler may take 
a shipment of rice from a mill and then sell that to retailers, await their 
payment, and then pay the mill, typically after several weeks. This practice was 
documented among 29% of the traders in Bangladesh, 20% in the PRC, and 
52% in India.  
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Finally, some traders received advances from clients—but only 14% of them 
did so in Bangladesh, 17% in the PRC, and 3% in India. 
Traders’ Other Services. Table 4.16 shows other services that traders provided, 
beyond intermediating exchanges and providing value-chain finance. There 
was great variation in these services across trader types and zones studied, but 
a few general patterns emerge. 
Table 4.16 Rice and Paddy Traders’ Provision of Other Services (% of traders)
Service Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh     
Product picked up and delivered in 
own truck 6 9 0 6
Product labeled 53 65 0 41
Provided packing boxes/crates/bags 
to suppliers 82 86 0 57
Delivered products to buyers’ 
location 65 35 0 29
Graded and sorted to sell to clients 35 37 27 33
Product weighed when bought 76 100 87 91
If weighed, by electronic scale 6 0 3 2
Sampled rice for quality when 
bought 100 100 97 99
Rice weighed when sold 94 42 97 70
If yes, weighed by electronic scale 12 0 0 3
Sampled rice for quality by clients 
when bought 100 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of     
Product picked up and delivered in 
own truck
 ir ir 10
Product labeled ir ir 97
Provided packing boxes/crates/bags 
to suppliers
ir ir 90
Delivered products to buyers’ 
location
ir ir 10
Graded and sorted to sell to clients ir ir 100
Product weighed when bought ir ir 30
If weighed when bought, by 
electronic scale
ir ir 100
Sampled rice for quality  
when bought
ir ir 67
Rice weighed when sold ir ir 47
If weighed when sold,  
by electronic scale
ir ir 100
Sampled rice for quality by clients 
when bought
ir ir 97
continued on next page
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Service Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
India     
Product picked up and delivered in 
own truck 0 0 3 1
Product labeled 0 0 21 9
Provided packing boxes/crates/bags 
to suppliers 0 0 12 6
Delivered  paddy/rice to buyers’ 
locations 24 0 12 15
Graded and sorted product to sell 
to clients 17 0 9 5
Product weighed when bought 48 13 88 59
If weighed when bought, by 
electronic scale 5 0 100 52
Sampled product for quality  
while buying 48 13 82 59
Weighed  paddy/rice  when selling 48 13 88 59
If weighed when sold, used 
electronic scale 5 0 100 52
Allowed clients to sample product 
for quality 43 13 88 59
Sold rice seeds 100 93 91 93
If sold rice seeds, share of traders 
with certificate of authenticity 
from the government 95 0 98 74
Traders who exported rice 0 0 3 1
Had registered company and  
rice brand 0 0 18 9
ir =  insufficient rural trader sample.
First, traders in Bangladesh and the PRC commonly labeled the bags they 
delivered to wholesalers with the name of the mill, but traders in India did not. 
Labeling with the mill’s name and brand was very common in the PRC’s urban 
wholesale markets but was far less common in South Asia. 
Second, across all the zones and whether in rural or urban areas, suppliers were 
expected to deliver the product at their expense. Mainly in rural Bangladesh 
and rarely in the other zones, traders sometimes delivered to their buyers. 
Third, traders in South Asia did not usually grade the paddy and rice, but all 
the traders in the PRC did so. Usually the grade and type were identified on the 
Table 4.16 continued
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bags. In all the zones, customers commonly sampled the product to determine 
its quality before buying. In South Asia, customers checked the bags’ weight, 
but not in the PRC, where bag weights were considered standard. Few South 
Asian traders had electronic scales, but nearly all the PRC traders did. 
Performance of the Trader Segment
Quality Differentiation and the Rise of Rice Branding. Table 4.17 shows 
the shares of the qualities of rice handled by types of traders. In both Bangladesh 
and India, the share of higher quality rice being traded increased, with fine 
quality rice being traded predominantly in urban rice wholesale markets. As 
noted in the milling section, this could be due to a difference in (1) varieties 
(as the urban traders may have drawn rice from areas with higher shares of 
fine rice varieties); and (2) quality. Some informants contended that mills also 
altered the shape of kernels by polishing, so that the rice was a given a higher 
grade, but the study did not test this hypothesis. For example, rice handled 
by traders in Delhi was about half common and half fine rice (with about 
2% of the rice being “superfine”). In contrast, the rural rice traders reported 
handling only common rice. This could have been because Delhi traders drew 
from across states, and may have received fine rice that was not destined for 
the local rural market.
Not shown in the table, but evident in the survey data, is a sharp change in rice 
quality over time in the study countries. In Bangladesh, the share of coarse rice 
in total trader turnover was declining. Traders estimated that coarse rice was 
50% of their turnover 11 years earlier, but only 31% by 2009. The composition 
of sales had shifted toward common and fine rice. Traders also reported that 
the share of rice handled by small mills declined during 1999–2009. The 
milling especially of fine rice was increasingly the purview of the large mills. 
Two-thirds of rice was processed in small mills in 1999, and this had fallen to 
40% of coarse rice and 26% of fine rice by 2009. The same degree of quality 
change was not evident in the PRC during 2004–2009. The shift from indica 
to japonica had taken place in the previous decade and japonica’s quality had 
not changed much since. 
However, the PRC case stood out in that all the rice sold in wholesale markets 
surveyed was labeled and branded. The survey showed that 13% of the traders 
sold fine japonica: 10% of it came from Heilongjiang, all with mill brands and 
labels. And 17% of traders were selling fine rice labeled with a rice company 
name. Moreover, fully 77% were selling common grade japonica, and at prices
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Table 4.17 Quality of Rice Traders’ Supply  (% of sales)
Type/Quality Type/Location of Trader
Village  
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh     
Coarse 34 36 28 33
Medium 52 39 44 43
Fine 15 26 29 24
Total 100 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of   
Regular common ... ... 80 80
Regular fine ... ... 11 11
Sticky ... ... 5 5
Fragrant ... ... 0 0
Indica ... ... 3 3
Total ... ... 100 100
India     
Common ... 100  48 74
Fine ... 0 50 25
Superfine ... 0 2 1
Total ... 100 100 100
... = data not available. In the People’s Republic of China case, the rural sample of traders was insufficient because mills mainly 
buy rice directly from farmers. In the India case, the village traders did not report grading of rice.
28% below that of fine rice. Even common grade rice was sold branded: 90% 
of traders sold common rice in bags with the label and brand of the miller (rice 
company). This is important for communicating rice origins and quality to the 
consumer, and thus the advent of traceability in the rice market. 
Traders’ Costs. Table 4.18 shows yearly “fixed” costs (not varying with the 
transaction) for labor (permanent and casual laborers) and nonlabor (trucks, 
fuel, stall, and so on) categories. The South Asian costs were somewhat 
clustered, with the only striking difference being significantly higher outlays 
in Dhaka. By contrast, and as expected from higher labor, transport, and real 
estate costs (reflected in various costs), the Beijing costs were about twice as 
high as those in South Asia. 
Table 4.19 shows variable costs in the last transaction. The most striking 
difference is that the traders were buying and selling locally (within a 10–15 
kilometer radius) in the South Asian cases, whereas in the PRC case, transaction 
distances averaged 1,351 kilometers. That difference is reflected in the variable 
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cost per ton, which was only about $2–$3 for Bangladesh and India versus 
$127 for the PRC and factors into the latter’s higher consumer prices for rice. 
Transport plus loading and unloading was, as expected, a large share of the 
costs—as much as 99% in the PRC, 87% in India, and 72% in Bangladesh. 
While market fees were a major part of the debate in South Asia concerning 
the price of rice to the consumer, the survey shows that the market fees were 
only 1% of the consumer’s total cost. 
Table 4.18 Traders’ Yearly Operating Costs ($)
Economy Village 
Traders
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market 
Traders
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market 
Traders
All
Bangladesh 2,347 2,780 7,900 4,405
China, People’s Rep. of 13,939 13,939
India 3,192 3,732 3,996 3,732
Table 4.19 Variable Costs of Rice and Paddy Wholesalers in the Last Transaction 
($/ton; % in parentheses)
Variable Cost Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural  
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh
Distance between sales and 
purchase (km)
4 19 14 15
Cost composition (%)
Bagging 24 17 0 9
Loading and unloading 29 33 57 36
Transport of rice 41 33 36 36
Payments at checkpoints 0 0 0 0
Personal transport 6 0 7 9
Fee at market 6 17 0
Weighing fees 6 0 0
Total (in $/ton; share in paretheses)  2.50 (100)  0.88 (100)  2.06 (100)  1.62 (100)
China, People’s Rep. of
Distance between sales and 
purchase (km) 
1,351 
Size of lot (kg) 1,290
Cost composition (%)
Bagging and stitching 0.4
Loading and unloading 0.6
continued on next page
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Variable Cost Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural  
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Transport 95
Personal transport 4
Milling 0
Fee for this transaction at the 
market
0
Other expenses 0
Total ($/ton; share in parentheses)  127 (100)
India
Variable costs in last paddy transaction 
Distance from trader to supplier (km) 10 9 9
Cost composition (%)
Bagging 0 0 0
Loading and unloading 7 6 7
Transport 80 88 82
Personal transport 4 0 3
Fee at market 1 0 1
Milling 0 0 0
Weighing fees 7 6 7
Other expenses 1 0 0
Total variable cost ($/ton; share in 
parentheses)
3.07 (100) 3.78 (100) 3.27 (100)
Variable costs in last rice transaction
Distance for last transaction (km) 18 5 11
Cost composition (%)
Bagging 0 0 0
Loading and unloading 6 7 7
Transport 88 73 80
Personal transport 0 7 3
Fee at market 1 1 1
Milling 0 0 0
Weighing fees 6 7 7
Other expenses 0 7 3
Total variable cost ($/ton; share in 
parentheses)
3.80 (100)  3.36 (100) 3.33 (100)
kg = kilogram, km = kilometer. 
Rice and Paddy Traders’ Profits. Table 4.20 shows traders’ profit rates. 
The discussion focuses on the common grade of rice as it provides the most 
comparable case. 
Table 4.19 continued
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Table 4.20 Rice and Paddy Traders’ Profits (%)
Variety and Season Village Traders Rural Wholesalers Urban 
Wholesalers
Bangladesh    
Coarse    
On-season 56 55 5
Off-season 69 5 16
Common    
On-season 59 78 17
Off-season 35 76 26
Fine    
On-season 51 72 28
Off-season 37 73 25
Total on-season 55 68 17
Total off-season 47 51 22
China, People’s Rep. of   
Common 24
Fine 50
Total 37
India    
Common    
On-season 40 55 72
Off-season 10 55 66
Fine    
On-season 50 25 81
Off-season 45 20 83
Total on-season 45 40 77
Total off-season 28 38 75
The urban wholesale market profit rates were 17%–26% in Dhaka, 24% in the 
PRC, and 66%–72% in Delhi, with the range showing peak and low seasons. 
The rural profit rates in Bangladesh were 2–3 times higher than those in Dhaka; 
in India the rural rates were about half the urban ones. Several caveats should 
be noted. The rates were gross of amortization of capital (as with the mill profit 
rates presented earlier), and thus were overstatements of the long-term profit 
rate that traders earned. Moreover, they are static measures, and profit rates 
may vary considerably over years. With those caveats in mind, the profit rates 
shown do not differ much from rates shown in other studies. For example, 
Chowdhury (1992), using mill survey data collected by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute in 1989/90, found trader profit rates of 35%–61%, 
depending on the type of zone. The lower profit rates were for the more 
dynamic commercial zones, and the higher rates were for the hinterlands. 
This fits the findings in the present survey, with the Dhaka wholesale profit 
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rates lower than those in the rural areas, and comparable to the competitive 
Beijing case. The anomaly is the Indian case, where the rural trader’s profit 
rates averaged somewhat less than those in Bangladesh, but the profit rates in 
Delhi were higher than those in Beijing and Dhaka. India’s market regulations 
(requiring traders to have licenses and limiting the number of licenses) might 
have facilitated the especially high profit rates; this hypothesis is commonly 
proposed in the Indian literature, and the current survey’s data appear to 
support the hypothesis, which requires further exploration.
Summary
First, there had been significant structural and organizational changes in the 
mill and trader segments. Rice milling was becoming more concentrated in the 
medium and large mills, and the technology was changing in the three study 
zones—with the fastest and greatest change in the PRC. The use of the mills 
was highly seasonal. 
There was evidence of disintermediation upstream, with the traditional 
role of the village trader being reduced, wholesale markets sourcing paddy 
directly from farmers, and increased direct sourcing by the mills from farmers. 
Disintermediation was also evident downstream, especially in Bangladesh and 
the PRC, with mills selling directly to wholesale markets and retailers in big 
cities. In the PRC, a third of wholesalers were agents representing single large 
mills. Mills were also selling directly to supermarket chains. 
Second, the conduct of the rice value chain was changing quickly, especially in 
Bangladesh and the PRC, where mills and wholesalers representing them were 
selling branded, labeled bags to retailers. This was introducing traceability in 
the rice value chain. 
Whereas in South Asia the traders used to provide advances to farmers in the 
form of “tied credit,” this practice had nearly disappeared in all three zones. 
The change appears to be due to farmers’ improved options for selecting 
buyers, taking credit, and accessing other forms of cash. 
Third, the government played only a small direct role as supplier to or buyer from 
mills, except in India, where it remained a major player. The government was not 
a significant client of the trader sector in any of the zones. The improvements 
in the midstream segments of the rice value chain were largely private sector 
initiatives. Private milling and trading firms had made large investments in 
capacity expansion, new technology, logistics, and services to farmers. 
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Yet the findings and the reasons behind them suggest that the government had 
played an important enabling role. Some of the measures included removing 
impediments to change, such as when the Indian government deregulated 
the mill sector in 1998, allowing investments by large- and medium-scale 
mills, or when the PRC government relaxed restrictions on foreign companies 
investing in mills. Other measures directly facilitated change, such as the major 
improvements in roads and other infrastructure in all three economies during 
the last 10–15 years. 
Finally, profits were found to be fairly high, although in line with some prior 
research findings. The high profit rates can reflect the risky nature of the trading 
enterprise, and possibly some local market power. An outlier was the case of 
rice trading in Delhi, with especially high profits. The high profits in general 
may have been related to the high investment required to be in rice milling and 
trading. In particular instances, the profits may have been related to policies 
such as the market licensing and entry restrictions in India.
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For the very little that retailing is discussed in the Asian policy debate on food security in staples, the conventional image of the retail sector for staples is that it is fully dominated by traditional shops or by government 
“fair price stores.” That is, it is seen as mainly in the “early stage” of retail 
evolution, as discussed in the next section, and somewhat in the “intermediate 
stage,” where the public sector is directly involved. As a group, retailers and 
traders are often accused of price gouging, that is, charging higher prices to 
consumers than costs warrant, and retailing is often seen as offering little 
quality differentiation among staple products. 
The food retail sector is certainly not held up as a champion of food security 
by finding ways to cut costs in the supply chain through inducing supply chain 
modernization. For example, in the Indian debate, while retailing is accused 
of being inefficient and “traditional” and adding costs to food consumers, 
it is nevertheless seen as a key source of employment and slow to change 
its performance or its importance. On the very edge of the debate is the 
recognition of the emergence of supermarkets, but these appear to be seen 
as marginal both in terms of importance to retail per se and to food security 
in particular. 
Results of this study’s survey indicate that the conventional images are 
outmoded, and point to the transformation of the downstream segment of 
the food value chain, as is the case for the upstream and midstream segments 
of the rice value chain. The transformation was taking place in two ways: an 
intermediate stage, where the traditional shops adjusted their behavior such 
as by differentiating rice quality and selling packaged and branded rather 
than just loose rice; and an advanced stage where supermarket chains are 
arising. The study shows the two stages coexisted and competed. This chapter 
discusses in detail the survey findings regarding the nature and evolution of 
rice retail in the study locations in Asia. 
Downstream—Rice Retail  
Transformation5|
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Structure of Rice Retail
Structure of Traditional Rice Retail
Table 5.1 shows characteristics of traditional retailers in the study. They were 
nearly all owned by middle-aged males, and started business on average only 
about a decade ago (about 6–12 years prior to the study in 2009–2010). They 
did not appear to be long-standing family businesses such as small grocery 
stores. Moreover, when compared with wholesalers, the retailers had relatively 
little education (across the three study zones, retailers were generally less 
educated in South Asia and more educated in the People’s Republic of China 
[PRC]). In the PRC, only about 50% of the retailers’ sales, and in India only 10%, 
came from rice; only in Bangladesh were the shops specialized in rice. Some of 
the PRC retailers also acted as “semi-wholesalers,” who bought rice from the 
wholesale market and wholesaled it to other retailers. 
Table 5.1 Characteristics of Traditional Rice Retailers
Characteristic Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing,  
the PRC 
Delhi, 
India
Gender (% male) 100 … 95
Age (mean years) 41 … 40
Education 11 years
No schooling (%) 7 … …
Grade 5 or less (%) 18 … …
Grade 6–9 (%) 54 … …
More than grade 9 (%) 21 … …
Year started retailing food products 1999 2003 1998
Year started retailing rice 1999 2003 1998
Also sell other food products (%) 7 100 98
Share of rice in total retail sales (%) 97 51 10
Also wholesale to other retailers (%) … 30 …
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 5.2 shows rice sales transactions. Daily sales were limited but differed 
widely between the three zones, due to the modest differences in the average 
scale of the small- and medium-size retailers and the major differences in the 
degree of product specialization between study zones. In Beijing, rice shops 
averaged daily sales of 344 kilograms (kg) of rice. In Delhi, the kirana shops 
(small-scale retailers that sell numerous products) averaged only 36 kg, but 
the Indian government’s Fair Price Shops sold about 100 kg/day. Dhaka rice 
shops sold only 18 kg/day, despite specializing in rice—they were very small 
operations selling small bags of rice from small stalls. The South Asian stores 
served about 40–50 clients, most of them regular customers.
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Table 5.2 Transactions of Traditional Rice Retailers (averages)
Transaction Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing, 
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Sales per day (kg) 18 344 36
Last transaction (full lot bought and then retailed, kg) 994 1,795 247
Number of buyers sold to per day 53 … 40
Number of regular customers 37 … 45
…  = no data available, kg = kilogram, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Moreover, traditional rice retailers appeared to be in close competition with 
each other (thus apparently not in a situation of monopolistic competition 
by dominating a neighborhood). In Beijing, an average rice retailer competed 
with 6.0 others in the same market, up from 5.8 five years ago; rice-selling 
kirana shops in Delhi reported competing with 6.0 other small shops nearby.
Table 5.3 shows measures of retail scale in labor used, working capital, and 
value of retail assets. The interzone differences in these scale measures roughly 
correlate with the rice turnover differences. The PRC and India operations 
averaged two people (such as in the traditional “mom and pop stores” in the 
United States), while the Dhaka rice shops were operated by a single person, 
again reflecting their very small scale. The Beijing and Delhi retail operations 
had more assets and working capital than did the retailers in Dhaka. Retailers 
in Beijing spent about twice as much for hired labor as retailers in Delhi; this 
again aligns with the turnover differences noted above.
Table 5.3 Labor and Capital per Traditional Rice Retailer
Labor and Capital Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing, 
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Average number of people working in the business 1.30 2.02 2.00
Average spent on hired labor (mean $/per month) 10.91 156.92 66.67
Current working capital ($) 2,291 3,444 4,444
Retail assets ($) 1,179 1,555 8,876
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
However, all the measures of scale for traditional retailers were well below 
those of urban rice traders and even further below those of rice mills. The 
traditional value chain in rice is thus configured as many small- and medium-
scale farmers on one end, larger (than farmers) wholesalers and millers in the 
midstream, and many small retailers at the other end. Presumably, barriers for 
new entrants roughly reflect scale in each segment. 
116 The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains 
Background: The Rise of Modern Retailers in Asia
Before examining the survey’s findings concerning modern retail sales of rice 
in the three cities studied, the rapid growth in modern food retail in Asia is 
discussed. The term “modern retail” is applied to supermarkets, hypermarkets, 
convenience store chains, neighborhood chain stores, and discount and club 
stores. Table 5.4 is drawn from Reardon, Timmer, and Minten (2012) and presents 
data for 2001, 2005, and 2009 from Planet Retail.1 The table tracks in each 
economy the leading retailers at a national level (and is thus an underestimate 
of the overall modern retail sector). The table is based on Planet Retail’s set of 
195 chains in nine economies.2 The Republic of Korea and Taipei,China represent 
the “first wave,” as the earliest adopters of modern retail, in the 1980s and 
1990s (Reardon et al. 2003). Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
represent the second wave; and the PRC, India, and Viet Nam represent the third 
wave, as the most recent adopters of modern food retail. 
1 Planet Retail is one of the world’s leading retail data services, tracking 7,000 retail companies 
in 211 countries. 
2 The 195 chains comprise part of the data set of chains that sell food. 
Table 5.4 Sales of Leading Modern Retail Chains that Sell Food and Growth of  
Gross Domestic Product (selected Asian economies, 2001–2009)
Wave, Economy 2001 
Sales 
($ billion)
2005 
Sales 
($ billion)
2001–2005 
Annual 
Compound 
Growth (%)
2009 
Sales 
($ billion)
2005-2009 
Annual 
Compound 
Growth (%)
2001-2009 
Annual 
Compound 
Sales 
Growth 
Rate (%)
2000–2008 
Real GDP 
Compound 
Growth 
Rate (%)
Leading 
Chains 
Followed 
(No.)
First wave
Korea, Rep. of 19.1 38.5 19.2 41.7 2.0 10.3 4.5 18.0 
Taipei,China 7.1 13.9 18.3 17.6 6.1 12.0 … 17.0 
Second wave
Indonesia 1.8 4.0 22.1 7.3 16.2 19.1 5.2 14.0 
Malaysia 2.0 3.6 15.8 7.1 18.5 17.2 5.5 16.0 
Philippines 1.9 3.5 16.5 6.8 18.1 17.3 5.1 13.0 
Thailand 5.4 10.9 19.2 17.7 12.9 16.0 5.2 21.0 
Third wave
China, People’s 
Rep. of
13.1 40.2 32.4 91.5 22.8 27.5 10.4 47.0 
India 0.2 0.9 45.6 5.1 54.3 49.9 7.5 33.0 
Viet Nam 0.1 0.7 62.7 2.0 30.0 45.4 7.7 16.0 
… = data not available, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Reardon, Timmer, and Minten (2012).
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Table 5.4 shows two key results, as noted in Reardon, Timmer, and Minten (2012). 
First, during 2001–2009, the chains’ sales quadrupled, from $50 billion to $200 
billion. The third-wave economies (including, two of this study’s survey zones) 
had the highest modern retail growth rate (40.9% annual compound growth 
rate), because the most recent starters advanced fastest, and the earliest were 
relatively saturated. Growth of modern retailers in the third-wave economies 
varied, with a sevenfold growth in sales in the PRC and 25-fold in India. The 
sales growth, particularly in India and Viet Nam, rose quickly from about 2005. 
For India, 22 of the 33 chains followed had not yet started business in 2001, 
and 17 of the 22 had still not started in 2005. Planet Retail data show that 
chains formed only during 2007–2010 had 75% of modern retail sales in India; 
this is corroborated by the current survey’s findings for Delhi and Dhaka. The 
sales growth comprised an increased number of chains and expansion of the 
individual chains. Individual chains grew very rapidly; for example, the sales of 
the top five PRC chains grew more than 10-fold during 2001–2009. 
Second, although gross domestic products in Asia grew fast and those in the 
third-wave economies grew the fastest in the world, the growth rates in the 
sales of the modern retail chains were much more rapid, as shown in Table 5.4. 
Thus, modern retail continued to gain share in overall retail, displacing 
traditional retail.
The Rise of Modern Food Retail in Beijing, Delhi, and Dhaka
Modern retailing had started in the 2000s and grown quickly in Bangladesh, 
the PRC, and India. Similar to other commercial transformations discussed in the 
book, Bangladesh was just starting its transformation to modern retailing (Bayes 
2007). India had reached a point where supermarket development had begun in 
a significant way (Reardon and Minten 2011), but was intermediate between the 
PRC and Bangladesh, and the PRC was the first to start the transformation and 
had proceeded furthest (Hu et al. 2004; Reardon, Timmer, and Minten 2012). 
Figure 5.1 shows the study’s census of supermarkets in Dhaka at the end of 
2009, with the net of modern retail stores opening, existent, and closing during 
the 2001–2009 period. Growth rates in stores were high but started from 
a low base. At the end of 2009, an estimated 80 supermarkets were active 
in Bangladesh, concentrated in Dhaka, from only four of them in 2001. For 
comparison, the population of Dhaka proper and that of Beijing inside its 5th 
ring road were each approximately 7 million, but that part of Beijing had about 
800 supermarkets in 2009—or about 10 times more than in Dhaka. Most of 
Dhaka’s modern outlets were of recent origin—85% had started operating in 
the 3 years prior to the survey (similar to Delhi, see Figure 5.2), and 50% of 
Dhaka’s supermarkets had started operating only in 2009. 
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Figure 5.1 Number of Supermarket Stores in Dhaka
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Figure 5.1  Number of Supermarket in Dhaka 
The rise of modern food retailers in Delhi has been a leading edge in the general 
rapid growth of modern retailing in India since 2001. The rise of modern private 
retailing from 2005 through 2009 has been among the fastest in the world, 
increasing at 54% a year on average during that period, and bouncing back 
to growth after a dip from the recent recession (Reardon and Minten 2011) .
Figure 5.2, which is adapted from Minten, Reardon, and Sutradhar (2010), 
provides data from the census of modern retail outlets in the study districts 
in Delhi in 2009. The start-up dates of the private modern retail outlets in 
the sample illustrate the extent to which modern retailing was a recent 
phenomenon in Delhi: 83% of the functioning outlets were started in the 
2 years before the survey, and almost 50% began operations within 18 months 
before the survey. These results demonstrate the speed at which modern retail 
had obtained market share, as the number of modern food retail outlets had 
on average more than doubled annually during 2007–2009, though from a 
low base. The speed of the rollout in Delhi even came down significantly in 
the months prior to the survey due to the closure of Subhiksha shops, which 
was one of the biggest modern retailers in Delhi. Delhi might also have shown 
high growth rates because its move to modern retailing was later than that in 
some major southern Indian cities such as Bangalore and Hyderabad, where 
the diffusion of modern retailing had started in India. 
Reardon and Minten (2011) discuss the following reasons for the sudden take-
off of modern retailing in India: (1) Incomes grew quickly and the middle class 
emergence accelerated in the 2000s. (2) India’s urbanization continued but there
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Figure 5.2 Start-up Years of Modern Retail in DelhiFigure 5.2   Starting Year of Modern Retailers Operating in Delhi
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Source: Adapted from Minten, Reardon, and Sutradhar (2010).
was an especially fast growth below the top tier of cities.3 (3) Public investment 
in infrastructure (especially roads and airports) increased in the 2000s in urban 
and rural areas. (4) Interest rates fell and conglomerates (such as Reliance) arose, 
fueling retail investment funds; and remittances increased, fueling demand. Due 
to continued restrictions on foreign direct investment in multibrand retailing, 
large and medium Indian companies were responsible for the great majority 
of modern retail investment until the restrictions were lifted in September 
2012. This investment appears to have been spurred by domestic companies’ 
expectations that foreign direct investment was likely to be liberalized and the 
domestic firms must invest fast to compete with domestic rivals, and either to 
prepare to compete with multinationals or to be attractive to them as partners 
for joint ventures or as acquisitions. To that inducement was added the intense 
competition among chains jockeying for position in the retail real estate market, 
3 There is no standard categorization of Indian cities and towns, but they are typically di-
vided into four tiers. Ablett et al. (2007) use a classification with a cutoff of 4 million 
population for tier 1 cities (Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, 
Mumbai, and Pune); less than 4 million but up to and including 1 million for tier 2 cities 
(26 cities, such as Agra, Indore, Lucknow, Meerut, Nagpur, Patna, and Surat); less than 
1 million but more than 500,000 for tier 3 cities (such as Amritsar, Faridabad, Goa, and 
Mangalore); and tier 4, or smaller cities.
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to get “first-mover” advantages. The recession in 2008/09 temporarily reduced 
sales and forced some weaker chains out of business, but also dampened real 
estate prices and spurred some chains to increase the number of their outlets (AT 
Kearney 2009); however, sales data show that modern retail bounced back after 
the recession and resumed its growth path. 
Moreover, the locational distribution of modern retail in Delhi is surprising 
(Minten et al. 2010, reporting results for the retail segment of the current value 
chain study). In other developing countries, modern retail outlets opened mainly 
in the richer neighborhoods during the early stage of modernization (Reardon 
et al. 2003). However, no significant relationship was apparent between the 
number of modern retail outlets and a measure of the value of nearby real 
estate in Delhi (Minten, Reardon, and Sutradhar 2010): None of the coefficients 
come out as significant in a tobit regression where the dependent variable is the 
number of modern retail outlets in the area (colony).4 This appears to indicate 
that, in Delhi, modern retail stores had spread in this initial phase equally in rich 
and poor neighborhoods. The spread seems driven by four factors: 
•	 First, both rich and poor residents lived in downtown Delhi, and 
modern retail had worked to penetrate the dense city with chains of 
small stores mixed with occasional larger ones. 
•	 Second, in many richer residential areas, stringent laws regulated 
the operation of businesses, slowing the spread of modern retail to 
these areas. 
•	 Third, modern retailers sold as cheaply as or more cheaply than 
traditional outlets (as shown in this chapter, and a common finding in 
developing countries, see Minten and Reardon 2008), and thus might 
already have sold to some poorer consumers. 
•	 Fourth, given higher population densities and lower rental rates (a major 
operating cost in modern retail outlets in Delhi), and given that the 
modern retailers were already selling at relatively lower prices, modern 
retailing had profit incentives to focus not only on richer areas but to 
seek to capture economies of scale by expanding as much as possible. 
4 The real estate value was estimated for the colony in which the chain outlet was located. The 
colony is the smallest urban geographical unit in India, a subdivision of a ward.
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In Beijing, as noted in the background section (pp. 116–7), modern retailing 
expanded very rapidly during 2001–2009. Table 5.4 shows that sales of the 
leading 50 chains alone (of about 200 main chains) had risen from $13 billion 
in 2001 to $92 billion in 2009. Supermarkets in Beijing had spread rapidly—
with 803 inventoried (by the PRC’s China Chain Store and Franchise Association) 
inside the 5th ring road by 2009. Of the 60 retailers sampled for the study, 
most had started operating just 7 years earlier. 
Modern Retail Penetration of Urban Rice Markets
Modern retail had started to enter the rice markets in the cities, and was 
expanding its rice sales quickly. Modern retailing is likely to continue to gain 
market share (from traditional retailers) in rice during the next decade in the 
study economies and the region. Such a trend would follow a longer historical 
trend internationally wherein supermarkets dominated processed food markets 
well before they dominated fresh produce markets, as modern retailers can use 
economies of scale in procurement and marketing to reduce costs of staples to 
consumers, and can use economies of scope to differentiate quality and thus 
appeal to different segments of consumers. 
In Delhi, even after just a few years of growth, modern retail had a 6.5% 
share of the rice market. Reardon and Minten (2011) argue that government 
food retail chains are a type of modern retail, as they are chain stores and 
a precursor to modern private retail in India (as in several other developing 
economies, including the PRC). Among the economies studied, only in India 
was the government maintaining retail chains selling rice as a subsidized public 
distribution service. The government retailers in Delhi had about twice the 
urban market share that modern retail had in rice (15% versus 6.5%). In India, 
the efficiency of the public distribution system of Fair Price Shops was being 
questioned. During the March 2009 survey for this study, fully two-thirds of 
the Fair Price Shops visited were not open during regular store hours, and 
those found open reported being open only half of the days of the preceding 
month, and half of the hours per day.
Table 5.5 shows supermarket sales of rice in Beijing in 2010. Compared with 
the findings for traditional rice retailers, the daily sales of an average Beijing 
leading chain (whether domestic or foreign) modern retail store were about 
3.5 tons—about 10 times larger than a wet market rice shop. As there were 
about six rice stalls in a wet market, this means that one large supermarket or 
hypermarket sold as much rice as several wet markets. 
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Table 5.5 Characteristics of Beijing Supermarket Chains that Sell Rice
Store Characteristic Leading Chains Local Chains All
Years in operation 8.1 8.6 8.4
Distance to nearest wet market (km) 1.28 1.31 1.30
Rice sales per day (kg, Sep–Aug 2010) 3,380 826 2,310
kg = kilogram, km = kilometer.
Data on the number of stores in Beijing from the PRC’s China Chain Store and 
Franchise Association and from the current survey, along with consumption 
figures for rice, indicate that roughly 50% of the rice retailed in Beijing was sold 
through supermarkets. This was approximately the situation of Hong Kong, 
China in the early 1990s, about a decade after its supermarkets had started 
selling rice (Ho 2005)—so the paths appear similar. The rice sales share was 
still lower than the 78% of all processed food that supermarkets sold, as found 
in an extensive survey of consumers in major PRC cities in 2006 (Goldman 
and Vanhonacker 2006), but one can expect the supermarkets’ penetration 
of rice markets to lag somewhat behind that of other processed food markets 
as consumers had traditionally purchased their rice from small rice shops. 
Ho (2005) tells a similar story of gradual habit change in the late 1970s and 
especially the 1980s and early 1990s in Hong Kong, China. 
Conduct of Rice Retail
Procurement Methods of Traditional Rice Retailers
Table 5.6 shows procurement practices of traditional rice retailers. In all study 
cities, the traditional retailers sourced from the local wholesale market nearly 
exclusively, whether by going to the market themselves (as in Beijing and 
Dhaka, with very little use of traders) or from traders (as in Delhi). 
Table 5.6 Procurement by Traditional Rice Retailers: Source
Source Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing,  
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Wholesale market (%) 100 99 5
Traders operating between retailers and 
wholesalers or other retailers (%)
0 1 95
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Table 5.7 Procurement by Traditional Rice Retailers: Time and Transport
Time and Transport Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing,  
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Total time at place of purchase (minutes) 62 165 62
Transport (%)
Motorized 3-wheeler 6 0 56
Bus 0 1 0
Car 0 74 0
Motorbike 0 3 0
Animal-drawn cart 0 0 0
Rickshaw or bicycle 63 0 16
Walk (with cart) 31 0 28
Other 0 22 0
Days between buying and selling 1 … 7
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 5.7 shows the transport traditional retailers used and the time they spent at 
the wholesale market. The time was brief, but repeated each day in Dhaka and 
each week in Delhi: relatively short transaction cycles minimize working capital 
and waste. With transport time plus time at the market, an average retailer used 
about a day each week to buy inventory. The stages of transport evolution were 
striking across the cities. In Dhaka, very small-scale rice retailers bought their 
inventory in the most traditional way, using a bicycle or cart or by walking; in 
Delhi, they mainly used motorized three-wheeled bicycles; but in Beijing, most 
used a car. A decade or so previously, the Beijing situation was more similar to 
the Dhaka and Delhi cases, but it had changed quickly.
Table 5.8 shows whether retailers were in contact with wholesalers before 
the transaction, as a rough measure of potential price arbitrage and price 
discovery, and of the importance of cell phones. The first row shows that 
Beijing was the most advanced (along the commercial modernization 
continuum), Delhi second, and Dhaka third. As casual observation indicates 
that most retailers had a cell phone, the question that arises is: Why was 
the use of cell phones so low for arranging the price for rice? Reasons may 
include the following: As retailers bought frequently, negotiating price and 
delivery each time would be costly; rice prices varied little (compared with 
perishables) within a month or even over the year in the cities; retailers 
frequently went to the market, and they talked with each other and thus had 
a continuous sense of prices; and (as Table 5.9 shows), retailers often dealt 
with the same wholesaler over time. 
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Table 5.8 Cellular Phone Use by Traditional Rice Retailers (%)
Cellular Phone Use Bangladesh PRC India
Arranged by cell phone for price and quantity 3 48 26
If in contact, discussed prices? (yes) 100 100 97
If in contact, was this done by cell phone? (yes) 100 100 100
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 5.9 Frequency that Traditional Retailers Bought from a Seller  
and Reasons for the Choice (%)
Frequency and Reason Beijing, 
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Share of retailers who “always” or “regularly” bought from one seller 74 …
Years selling to supplier: 2009 minus the year started buying  
from this seller
4 …
Retailer’s reason for buying from this seller: share citing this reason as “very important”
Always had large quantities 51 55
Offered better prices 98 82
Offered higher quality 89 64
Allowed retailer to buy on credit (pay supplier later) 2 52
Offered loans in case of need (marriage, sickness) 8 …
Habit 29 …
Organized transactions quickly and retailer lost little time 9 …
Retailers who bought rice through auction in the last transaction … 2
… = data not available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 5.9 shows retailers’ reasons for choosing their rice supplier (in the last 
transaction they did before the interview). The decisions were based largely on 
market fundamentals. By far the main reasons were prices and quality, as well 
as, to a certain extent, volume available. Only in the Delhi case did value-chain 
finance figure (see the next subsection). 
Table 5.10 shows retailers’ assessments of quantity information that was 
available during the last time they bought rice from the wholesaler. Most of 
the retailers in Delhi and Dhaka reported getting enough information, but few 
in Beijing did. Only in Dhaka was the lot weighed in front of the retailers nearly 
all the time. The disparity between the data on weighing and the retailers’ 
reporting on knowing the weights is explained by the fact that the rice was 
usually sold in sealed bags with standard weights. While key informants in 
Delhi and Dhaka said that wholesalers often tricked retailers with a “rounding 
off” tactic, the retailers did not believe the wholesalers do this. Only in Beijing 
did retailers report this tactic by wholesalers.
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Table 5.10 Traditional Rice Retailers’ Information on Quantity of Rice  
(last transaction, % of retailers)
Information on Quantity Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing, 
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Reported sufficient quantity information 
before the transaction
90 10 72
Knew the exact weight of the lot 98 74 72
Lot weighed in front of them 83 57 38
Bought from seller using electronic/
mechanical scale
100 60 38
Seller used “rounding off” tactic to charge for 
higher amount than in the bag
0 41 2
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 5.11 Traditional Rice Retailers’ Information on Quality of Rice  
(last transaction, % of retailers)
Quality Assessment Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Delhi, 
India
Reported sufficient quality information before the transaction 80 76
Checked quality 95 71
Checked part of the lot 100 71
Checked part of the lot, believed it represented the whole 99 74
Table 5.11 shows that most retailers felt they had sufficient information on rice 
quality before the transaction. The data show that most of the time the retailers 
checked part of the lot, such as with a piercing instrument that withdraws 
some grains to inspect. 
Traditional Rice Retailers and Value-Chain Finance
Table 5.12 shows the extent to which traditional rice retailers engaged in 
value-chain finance. A widely held belief is that traditional retailers hold an 
advantage over modern retailers by providing consumer credit to the majority 
of their clients. This assumption is seldom tested empirically, and the present 
survey shows that it is simply wrong. The last two rows of the table show 
that the majority of the stores provided some credit, but only to a small share 
of their clients. Multiplying the share of retailers giving credit (row 1 of the 
table) by the share of their clients getting credit (not on the table) yields 
the bottom row of the table, which tells the key story: only 12%–13% of 
customers in Dhaka and Delhi, and only 17% in Beijing, received credit from
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Table 5.12 Traditional Rice Retailers’ Credit with Suppliers and Customers (%)
Credit Flows Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing, 
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Suppliers paid by retailer with delay (on credit) 85 28 49
Retailers that paid suppliers late (on credit) … 14 50
If credit was given, share of payment on credit 39 56 …
Share of retailers giving credit to consumers  
(for delayed payment)
69 59 77
Share of customers that bought rice on credit  
(paid later)
12 17 13
…  = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 5.13 Traditional Rice Retailers’ Home Delivery (%)
Home Delivery Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing, 
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Retailers that home-deliver 8 92 40
Consumers with home delivery from traditional 
rice retailers 
… 61 10
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
rice shops, a simple average of 14% of all the consumers buying rice from 
the hundreds of retailers sampled. Key informants noted that some decades 
ago the small shops commonly provided credit, but the practice had become 
quite limited.
The top two rows show that many retailers received value-chain finance—de 
facto receiving credit from their suppliers by paying them with a delay. Retailers 
commonly got the bags of rice from the wholesaler, retailed them, and paid 
for them when they got a new lot from the wholesaler. This practice allows 
wholesalers to build long-term relationships with retailers.
Another traditional view that is at least partly undermined by the findings 
shown in Table 5.13 is that small shops typically deliver products to consumers’ 
homes. But data from the South Asia sites indicate that only 8% of retailers 
home-delivered rice in Dhaka. In Delhi, only 10% of consumers had rice home-
delivered by kirana stores (40% of which made deliveries, but only for 25% of 
their clients). By contrast, in Beijing, most rice shops home-delivered. 
Supermarkets’ Procurement of Rice—the PRC Case
Given the degree that the supermarket chains had penetrated the urban 
rice market, the study undertook a unique supplementary survey of 10 
chains operating in Beijing, comprising (1) Chinese chains, large and smaller 
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(Chaoshifa, Wumart, Lianhua, and Huapu); and (2) foreign chains, large and 
smaller (Carrefour [France], Walmart [United States], Tesco [United Kingdom], 
Lotus [Thailand], Lotte [Republic of Korea], and Ito-Yokado [Japan]). The 
procurement officers responsible for rice in each chain were interviewed in 
2010. They were asked (1) whether the chain had a center in which rice was 
stored and distributed; (2) whether and to what extent, in 2006 and in 2010, 
the chain sourced rice from large mills, medium mills, wholesale markets in the 
production areas, Beijing-based wholesale markets, rice-specialized wholesale 
companies, farmers, and cooperatives; and (3) whether they procured from 
these suppliers under contracts or in spot relations. Several key points emerged. 
First, in sharp contrast with small traditional retailers, the chains did not rely on 
the wholesale markets in production areas or in Beijing. The exception was one 
large foreign chain that combined sourcing half from large and medium mills in 
direct contract relations, and half from wholesale markets in production areas. 
Second, 7 of the 10 chains (and, surprisingly, without distinction by size or 
whether domestic or foreign) sourced most of their rice from large and medium 
mills in a direct contract relation. On average, they sourced 24% from large mills 
in 2006, and 51% in 2010; and from medium-scale mills, 16% in 2006, and 
23% in 2010.
Third, 8 of the 10 chains purchased from another major source—rice-
specialized wholesale companies.5 These are an example of the specialized 
dedicated wholesalers that have arisen in many developing countries to 
specialize in a product line, and dedicate themselves to servicing modern food 
industry clients (Reardon et al. 2003). In 2006, the eight chains sourced 60% 
of their rice from such companies; by 2010 this had actually fallen to 52% as 
direct relations with larger mills emerged. Again, as with the mills, the chains 
had a contract relation with wholesale companies. That is not surprising, given 
that chains need stable relations, long-term prices, and volume planning for 
basic staples. 
Fourth, none of the chains sourced from cooperatives or individual farmers. 
This is because sourcing rice directly from the farmers involves coursing it 
through a mill and increased transaction costs. 
In summary, the survey of supermarkets shows that they procured rice using 
two main strategies: (1) direct sourcing from large and medium mills under 
contract, and/or (2) sourcing from specialized dedicated rice wholesale 
companies that procured rice from the regions and met the chain’s needs. 
5 The eight included some that did not source their rice directly from mills as well as many that did.
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That the model’s center of gravity was gradually shifting toward sourcing from 
large mills coincides with points made in Chapter 4 about the consolidation of 
the mill sector. 
Performance of Traditional Rice Retail
Costs and Wastage of Traditional Rice Retailers
Table 5.14 shows operating costs that were “fixed” over the year (excluding 
amortization of capital) and variable costs for the last transaction. The total 
operating costs for the year varied across the zones in rough proportion to 
the turnover figures provided. The retailers’ costs were strikingly lower than 
the costs of the midstream actors (mills and traders) noted in Chapter 4. This 
further illustrates the differences in scale across the value-chain segments, with 
mills handling large volumes of rice, traders generally handling medium-size 
volumes, and traditional retailers handling small volumes. 
Table 5.14 Costs of Traditional Rice Retailers
Cost Component Dhaka, 
Bangladesh
Beijing, 
the PRC
Delhi, 
India
Operating costs per year ($) 252 3,252 660
Variable costs in last transactions (%)
Labor costs to load 18 …  17
Transport costs from supplier to retailer 41 14 46
Personal transport from place of purchase 
to retailer
12 28 14
Fee at wholesaler in market or to broker 
that brought from source
16 28 2
Commission to wholesaler 12 0 4
Fee at retail place 0 0  1
Weighing fees 0 0 3
Transformation fees, bagging/packaging 0 0 12
Miscellaneous 0 27 1
Total variable costs 100 100 100
Variable cost ($/ton) 7.2 39 52
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Moreover, the variable cost composition was roughly similar across the zones: 
the share of transport was 42% in Beijing, 60% in Delhi, and 53% in Dhaka. 
Casual labor costs in Dhaka and Delhi, and brokerage fees in Beijing, were other 
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key elements. Market fees were minor in all three cases. Given that distances 
and transaction waiting times were roughly similar in all the cities, and traffic 
in all three was congested, it appears that the differences in cost were primarily 
due to the costs of transport. Transport costs (including fuel) were the most 
important in the midstream and downstream food value chains. Fuel costs 
directly link to the food security component and may be an important area for 
policy analysis in the future. 
Finally, while high rates of wastage are generally assumed in the traditional 
supply chain, the survey data show quite limited wastage in rice retailing. 
Retailers in Delhi and Dhaka reported low to no waste over the short transaction 
cycle—they just repacked the sacks of rice bought from the market into small 
plastic bags, with little chance for exposure to the elements or pests. In Beijing, 
the retailers reported figures that imply wastage of only 0.5%. 
Rice Quality Differentiation and Dynamics among Traditional Retailers
Table 5.15 shows the composition and evolution of rice quality, packaging, and 
labeling in 1999 and 2009 for the South Asian sites and in 2004 and 2009 for 
the PRC. Several points stand out across zones and time.
First, in all zones, traditional rice retailers had increased the share of fine rice 
in their total sales, and differentiated the quality of their rice from the starting 
to ending year covered in the survey for each zone. Part of the increase of fine 
rice in Delhi was the shift toward the Indian equivalent of Southeast Asia’s 
fragrant rice—basmati. In total rice turnover, basmati’s share increased from 
31% in 1999 to 43% in 2009, and the share of superfine rice rose from 5% 
to 9%. In Dhaka the shift occurred with a small displacement of coarse rice, 
and in Beijing and Delhi, with modest displacements of common rice. These 
shifts roughly mirror similar shifts in quality in the midstream and upstream. 
However, it is difficult to compare across zones and say that the share of fine 
rice was higher in India, as the classifications are local, somewhat subjective, 
and not strictly comparable. 
Second, the shift from loose to packaged rice is an objective, observable fact, 
and it occurred mainly in the PRC—where it was happening quickly. In only 6 
years, the share of rice sold loose, even by traditional retailers, dropped from 
32% to only 24%, so that by 2009, 76% of the rice was sold packaged—that 
is even higher than what the supermarket chains reported. Moreover, all the 
packaged rice had the mill brand on the package. 
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Table 5.15 Quality and Packaging in Traditional Rice Retail  
(% of type of rice in all rice sold)
City; Type of Rice Starting Year Ending Year
Dhaka, Bangladesh 1999 2009
Coarse 34 28
Medium 35 36
Fine 31 36
Unpackaged 93 91
Packaged 7 9
Parboiled 96 97
Not parboiled 4 3
Beijing, the PRC 2004 2009
Regular, common 62 57
Regular, fine 26 29
Unpackaged 32 24
Packaged, with miller’s name 68 76
Packaged, with retailer’s name 0 0
Delhi, India 1999 2009
Common 45 37
Fine 50 54
Unpackaged 99 98
Packaged, no company name 0.5 1
Packaged, with company name 0.5 1
Raw 69 70
Parboiled 31 30
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Thus, in sharp contrast to the traditional image of grain stores with open sacks 
of rice, little ability to trace the rice to millers, and little branding, the surprising 
point in the PRC data is that modern and traditional retailers in Beijing had 
shifted to selling rice that was packaged and branded with the mill logo.6 
While the survey results imply a deep shift in retail practice in the PRC, the 
change appears to be driven by a shift in the mill sector: it was the large 
and medium mills that had brands and logos, not the small village mills. The 
restructuring of the mill sector had as a counterpart the transformation of rice 
retail. With branding comes traceability (at least to the mill level), competition 
on the bases of quality and geographic origin, and bargaining power of mills 
whose brands gain wide consumer attraction. The change could be occurring 
first in the PRC because the restructuring of their mill sector had proceeded the 
furthest, as indicated in Chapter 4.
6 But this was unique to the PRC data, as, apart from quality changes, South Asian traditional 
rice retailing had not changed much.
Table 5.15 continued
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Third, the combinations of retailers’ costs (and the supply chains leading to 
them), different quality compositions, and different demand profiles, led to 
different distributions of retail prices, with the PRC’s greater than India’s, 
which was greater than that of Bangladesh. 
Figure 5.3 shows the cumulative density function for retail rice prices in each 
zone. Price levels and variation were lowest in the Dhaka case, and its price 
distribution was generally higher than those of Beijing and Delhi. In Dhaka, 
88% of the rice prices fell below $650/ton. While low rice prices could also be 
found in Delhi, only 64% of the price observations were below $650/ton in 
the traditional markets. The cumulative density function curve in Delhi might 
thus indicate the wider variety of rice available in the market, presumably also 
reflecting the larger share of higher-income consumers willing to pay higher 
prices for rice. In Beijing, the lowest prices started at a higher level than in 
the two other cities, at about $550/ton, a level that was higher than three-
quarters of the prices observed in Dhaka. As in Delhi, prices in Beijing varied 
significantly, reflecting the large variety of rice in the markets, which ranged 
from common, to fine, to sticky, and to fragrant rice. 
Figure 5.3 Cumulative Density Functions of the Price of Rice  
at Traditional Retailers
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Table 5.16 shows margins differentiated by quality and season. Price and 
margin differentiation roughly followed quality differentiation. 
For Dhaka, margins did not vary much seasonally. As prices for fine rice were 
significantly higher, relative margins were smaller than for common rice. The 
relative margin for fine rice was 6.9%, but for common rice it was 10.5%. This 
unexpected result may be due to fine rice being a substitute for medium rice, 
and thus the retailers could not permit themselves high margins on fine rice as 
it was not a segmented market where only the richer consumers buy fine rice. 
Table 5.16 Margins and Profits of Rice Retailers
City, Time Sales Price – Purchase Price ($/ton) Sales Price/Purchase Price (%)
Common Rice Fine Rice Common Rice Fine Rice
Dhaka, Bangladesh     
Oct–Nov 2008 34.69 37.35 8.40 7.20
Dec 2008–Jan 2009 29.35 29.35 7.70 6.20
Feb–Mar 2009 29.35 29.35 8.60 6.60
Apr–May 2009 30.68 28.02 12.50 6.60
Jun–Jul 2009 28.02 29.35 12.00 7.70
Aug–Sep 2009 28.02 28.02 12.00 7.10
Oct–Nov 2009 29.35 29.35 12.10 6.80
Average 29.35 30.68 10.50 6.90
Beijing, the PRC     
Jun–Jul 2010 55.82 65.60 10.18 9.98
Apr–May 2010 55.82 66.99 10.28 10.32
Feb–Mar 2010 60.02 58.62 11.32 9.25
Dec 2009–Jan 2010 58.62 68.39 11.32 11.14
Nov 2009 55.83 62.81 10.96 10.32
Oct 2009 61.41 54.43 12.43 9.37
Aug–Sep 2009 54.43 51.64 10.95 8.94
Average 57.23 61.41 10.99 9.95
Delhi, India     
Jan–Feb 2009 34.27 54.43 12.30 13.20
Mar–Apr 2009 32.26 54.43 11.30 12.90
May–Jun 2009 32.26 50.40 10.80 11.40
Jul–Aug 2009 34.27 50.40 11.20 11.20
Sep–Oct 2009 34.27 48.38 10.80 10.40
Nov–Dec 2009 34.27 50.40 10.40 10.50
Jan–Feb 2010 34.27 54.43 10.00 11.20
Average 34.27 54.43 11.00 12.10
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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In Beijing, price differentiation among qualities and types of rice was significant, 
with about the same rankings as in Dhaka. Interestingly, the margins for four 
types of rice (including sticky and fragrant rice) were around 10%. While this 
was somewhat lower than the margins wholesalers charged, the latter multiply 
those times far larger volumes. The margin of the Beijing rice retailer appeared 
quite modest (as in Bangladesh and India)—in line with what appeared to be a 
competitive market. Moreover, the interseasonal fluctuations among traditional 
retailers were even lower than among wholesalers—with the change between 
the lowest and highest price seasons only 11% for fine, 8% for common, 10% 
for sticky, and 7% for fragrant rice. Traditional retailers may have adjusted their 
margins to reduce even further the price fluctuations from wholesale, in order 
to keep their clientele.
For Delhi, although the sales price of common rice varied by 28% from peak 
to trough during the year, the absolute margin across months was very steady. 
The sales price of fine rice varied 17% from peak to trough, but the gross 
margin per ton fluctuated only between $55.56 and $60.00, about 8%. This 
suggests a relatively competitive pricing situation. Recall that Delhi wholesalers 
got $14.44 as a gross margin, so the retail margin was about 2.5 times higher 
for common and 5.0 times higher for fine rice. However, Delhi wholesalers 
traded about 15 tons a day—400 times more than a kirana store traded—and 
thus spread smaller margins over far more volume. Striking facts are (1) the 
difference in the average margin between common and fine rice, with fine 
rice being about $20/ton higher than common rice, which was the greatest 
difference among the three zones studied; and (2) the margin for common 
and fine rice in Delhi was the highest among the three zones, although it was 
not very significant. 
Rice Quality Differentiation by Modern Retailers in Beijing
Table 5.17 shows the shares of stores selling types of rice in Beijing. There was 
significant quality and price differentiation in modern retail, and substantial 
differences between the large or leading chains and the small local chains of 
supermarkets in both the quality profile and the price levels. The key points are 
as follows.
First, almost all stores (97% of both types of chain) sold loose (unpackaged) 
common rice. Half (50%) of modern stores sold some loose fine rice, but this 
was more prevalent among local rather than leading (large) chains. The same is 
seen in sticky rice: 83% of the chains sold loose sticky rice, but more of the local 
chains sold it loose. By contrast, about 42% of the stores sold loose fragrant 
rice, in leading and local chains alike. 
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 Table 5.17 Beijing Supermarket Chains’ Rice Sales  
(inventory during the survey, September 2010)
Rice Inventory Leading 
Chains
Local 
Chains
All
Loose rice sales
Stores selling at least some fine rice
Loose (%) 41 62 50
Price ($/ton) 886 984 941
Japonica (%) 100 100 100
From the northeast (the survey region, %) 100 100 100
Stores selling at least some common rice
Loose (%) 97 96 97
Price ($/ton) 645 699 666
Japonica (%) 100 100 100
From the northeast (%) 94 100 96
Stores selling at least some sticky rice loose (%) 77 92 83
Stores selling at least some fragrant rice loose (%) 41 42 42
Packaged rice sales
Stores selling at least some fine rice
Packaged (%) 100 100 100
Price ($/ton) 1,639 2,241 1,897
Japonica (%) 100 100 100
From the northeast (%) 100 100 100
Labeled with rice company name (%) 100 100 100
Stores selling at least some common rice
Packaged (%) 100 100 100
Price ($/ton) 967 974 970
Japonica (%) 100 100 100
From the northeast (%) 100 100 100
Labeled with retailer company name (%) 9 4 7
Labeled with the mill brand/name (%) 100 100 100
Stores selling at least some sticky rice packaged (%) 71 19 48
Stores selling at least some fragrant rice packaged (%) 100 100 100
The foregoing points about the prevalence of stores selling at least some 
common grade of rice loose give the impression at first glance that the 
selling of loose rice is commonplace, especially as PRC consumers were 
traditionally used to buying loose rice in rice shops. But, that supermarkets 
were offering loose rice is a surprise—and a strategic action. In a number of 
countries, supermarkets (in their early stages) focused on packaged rice, and 
thus presented an image of catering to the elite consumer. By selling at least 
some loose rice, the PRC supermarket chain was consciously (according to key 
informants) projecting the image of being like a wet market to some extent, 
and appealing to the broad mass of limited income consumers. At the same 
time, most of the chains were also offering an array of higher-quality rice, loose 
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and packaged. In fact, the larger, leading chains (compared with local, smaller 
chains) actually sold a greater range of qualities and types of rice than other 
retailers, while also selling basic common loose rice. This dual strategy is what 
Levy et al. (2005) call the strategy of the “big middle” to capture the broadest 
spectrum of consumers possible. Gorton, Sauer, and Supatpongkul (2011) first 
linked Levy’s idea with the strategy of Asian supermarket chains. 
Second, quality differentiation among Beijing supermarkets was linked to 
geographic source differentiation. In the source and type of common and fine 
rice that Beijing supermarkets carried, a predominant amount was from the 
northeast (including Heilongjiang) and was japonica. But sticky rice from the 
northeast was available in only 48% of the stores, while sticky rice from other 
provinces (not in the south), such as Anhui, Hebei, and Hubei, was available 
in 59% of the stores selling it. For fragrant rice, 24% was from the northeast 
and 14% from the east, Jiangsu. Interestingly, no indica rice was picked up 
in the traditional retail survey, but a small amount of it was present in the 
supermarket and wholesale market surveys, as part of the diverse offering.
Third, in Beijing supermarkets, prices followed quality differentials, but did so 
differently between leading and local chains. Fine loose rice averaged CNY6.74/
kg in the supermarkets, somewhat above the price in the traditional retail stalls; 
however, as in Delhi, the price of fine loose rice was higher in the local than 
in the leading chains. The price for common loose rice averaged CNY4.77/kg 
in supermarkets, closer to the traditional shop’s price. Again, the local chains’ 
price was significantly above the lead chains’ price. The sticky loose rice was 
costly, at CNY11.00/kg, and the fragrant rice costlier yet, at CNY12.70/kg (with 
substantial price difference between the leading and local chains, being more 
expensive at the latter). The leading chains may have had lower prices because 
of more efficient procurement systems and bulk buying. 
Fourth, in Beijing supermarkets, all the stores sold packaged rice, and had a 
greater diversity of qualities and types than did the traditional stores. All stores 
sold fine packaged rice. Fine packaged rice was costly in the supermarkets, at 
CNY13.6/kg, but the difference between the local (at CNY16.0/kg) and the 
leading chains (at CNY11.7/kg) was large. All this rice came from the northeast. 
Nearly all the stores sold “green food” (low pesticide) fine rice, and 55% of them 
(more among leading chains) sold organic fine rice. All fine rice was labeled 
with the mill company’s brand. All the stores sold common packaged rice, again 
with the mill brand. The 2009 price was CNY6.95/kg, and was similar in leading 
and local chains. All was from the northeast. Interestingly, 7% was sold with 
the supermarket chain’s private label (9% of leading chains and 4% of local 
chains did so; this excludes the mill brands). Only 2% of the stores sold packaged 
common rice without labels.
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The stores sold quite a diversity of rice beyond the conventional common and 
fine types. Two-thirds of stores (67%) sold “green food” rice, with more of 
the local chain stores selling it than did the major chains. Only 3% of the 
stores sold organic common rice. Interestingly, while 48% of the stores sold 
packaged sticky rice, the share was far higher among leading chains, at 71% 
versus only 19% of local chain stores. Moreover, all of the stores sold fragrant 
rice, with all the stores selling fragrant rice from the south, all labeled with the 
rice company’s name. And 87% sold “green food” fragrant rice (more among 
the lead chains). None sold it with a retailers’ private label.
Finally, the supplementary survey of 10 supermarket chains provided 
corroborative evidence of the packaging of rice, and indicated that 59% of the 
rice the chains sold in 2006 was packaged; the share rose to 66% in 2010. Of 
that, 96% had been packed by the mill. Moreover, 93% of the packed rice was 
sold with the mill label on it; only 2% was sold with the chain’s private label. 
Rice Quality in Traditional versus Modern South Asian Retailers
Table 5.18 compares the shares of rice types sold in traditional and modern 
retail outlets in Dhaka. As opposed to the “big middle” strategy that Beijing 
supermarkets followed, Dhaka supermarkets were in the earlier stage of 
focusing on the elite consumer market. Dhaka supermarkets sold no coarse 
rice: 2% of the rice offered was medium rice and 98% was considered fine 
rice. For traditional retailers, fine rice made up only 50% of all the rice they 
offered; 28% was coarse and 23% was medium rice. While almost 90% of the 
traditional rice retailers sold was parboiled, only 54% was parboiled in modern 
retail stores. Almost half of the rice in modern retail stores was sold packaged, 
but in traditional retailing only 8% of the rice was packaged. 
In Delhi, supermarkets in their early stages also focused on the elite consumers. 
As reported in Minten, Reardon, and Sutradhar (2010), intraproduct diversity
Table 5.18 Rice Quality in Traditional versus Modern Retailers in Bangladesh  
(% of rice type)
Rice Quality and Preparation Traditional Retail Modern Retail
Coarse 28 0
Medium 23 2
Fine 50 98
Total 100 100
Parboiled 89 54
Bagged 8 45
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is much higher in modern retail than in traditional outlets. The number of rice 
varieties for sale in modern retailing averaged 9.15 versus only 4.12 in traditional 
retail outlets. Modern retailing focused almost exclusively (93% of rice products 
on offer) on the higher-quality basmati rice. In the traditional markets, basmati 
comprised less than 50% of the rice on offer; 19% was parmal rice (a long-
grained rice, second in quality after basmati); and the remaining 33% was other 
rice. While 88% of the rice sold in modern retailing was branded, only 31% was 
branded in traditional outlets. 
Rice Price Comparisons between Traditional  
and Modern Retailers in South Asia
Table 5.19 compares rice prices between modern and traditional retailers in 
Dhaka. The upper part of the table compares them with a t-test; whether 
measured at the mean or median, the modern retail price was well above that 
of the traditional shop. The lower part of the table reports the intercept prices 
for modern versus traditional retailers from a hedonic price regression, hence 
this time controlling for the packaging and rice type, and again finds prices 
were much higher in modern retailing. 
Table 5.20 and the subsequent tables focus on comparing traditional versus 
modern retail prices in Delhi, drawing on Minten, Reardon, and Sutradhar 
(2010). The table shows a simple pair-wise comparison using a t-test of rice 
prices in supermarkets compared with traditional retail (kirana shops). To 
improve comparability, branded and nonbranded rice are treated as separate 
products in the analysis below. Branded rice is found to have been less expensive 
in modern retail outlets than in traditional retailing, but unbranded loose rice 
was more expensive. 
Table 5.19 Rice Price Comparisons between  
Traditional and Modern Retail in Bangladesh
Average Price Traditional Retail Modern Retail
Mean ($/ton) 480.27 733.75
Median ($/ton) 426.91 587
 t-value Pr (T>t)
T-test (modern-traditional) 16.39 0
 Coefficient t-value
Hedonic pricinga (modern=1) 2.76 7.95
a Controlling for packaging, variety, parboiled dummy, type of rice. 
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Table 5.20 Rice Price Difference between  
Traditional and Modern Retailers in Delhi
Variable Observations Mean  
($/ton)
Std.  
Error
Price Difference with Modern Retail
Mean 
(Rs/kg)
Std.  
Error
t-Value Pr 
(|T|>|t|)
Unbranded rice
Modern retail 59 707 1.85
Traditional retail 566 538 0.29 -7.63 1.09 -7.028 0.000
Branded rice
Modern retail 489 1,438 1.18
Traditional retail 291 1,543 1.72 4.71 2.03 2.322 0.021
Pr = probability, Rs = Indian rupees, Std. = standard.
A large part of the difference in the pair-wise comparisons may be explained by 
other factors as well as the type of outlet. The following text reports on empirical 
analyses of the modern versus traditional price comparison, using a battery of 
controls related to the quality of the product and the location. 
Table 5.21 reports hedonic price regressions for traditional versus modern retail 
in Delhi. The methodology regresses the retail price per kilogram on categorical 
variables for the type of retail outlet; the quality of the product (grain length, 
grain color, shape, degree of brokenness, and impurities due to rock particles 
and remaining bran or husk); the ward (the location, which controls for both 
location and time, as the survey was rolled out over a month in different 
wards); a wealth indicator of the colony to control for local potential demand 
factors; and a dummy for whether the rice was labeled with a brand.
The hedonic price regression shows that private-sector modern retail was 
cheaper than the traditional shops. The difference amounted to Rs5.81/kg 
(12%) for rice. Similar results were found for edible oil and wheat flour, two 
other main processed staples (Minten, Reardon, and Sutradhar 2010). 
Table 5.21 Hedonic Price Regression Results: Rice in Delhi
Dependent Variable (Rs/kg)
Modern retail dummy
 Coefficient -5.81
t-value -3.34
Number of observations 1,368
R2  0.56
kg = kilogram, Rs = Indian rupees.
Notes: Modern retailers versus kirana shops (small-scale retailers that sell numerous products)
F-test: Modern retail versus kirana shops, 11.15, probability > F = 0.00
* P in Rs/kg = f (retail outlets, quality/branded indicators, ward dummy, wealth colony dummy)
Only retail outlet coefficients are reported.
Kirana shop prices are the default. The colony is the smallest Indian urban geographical unit, a subdivision of a ward.
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Table 5.22 Propensity Score Matching: Results Comparing Prices  
at Traditional and Modern Retailers in Delhi
Sample Treated 
(modern)
Controls 
(traditional)
Difference Std. Error t-Statistic
Unmatched 61.28 39.69 21.59 1.55 13.89
ATT 61.28 69.12 -7.84 2.40 -3.27
Number of 
observations
532 813
ATT = average treatment effect for the treated, Std. = standard.
Table 5.22 further explores the price differences using Propensity Score 
Matching probit regressions; these were run with dummy variables of rice 
sold in supermarkets coded as 1, and rice sold in traditional retail outlets 
coded as 0, as dependent variables. The controls include measures for quality, 
labeling, quantities sold, ward dummy variables, wealth dummy variables per 
colony, and an intercept. Using the results of these regressions to construct 
a propensity score, the table shows the Propensity Score Matching impact 
estimates on prices for rice comparing modern retail (treated) with traditional 
markets (control). The results are of the unmatched sample and the average 
treatment effect for the treated (ATT). 
The finding is that rice was more expensive in modern retail in unmatched 
samples. However, modern retail was significantly less expensive for similar 
products, i.e., the matched samples, as shown by the large t-values for the 
average treatment effect for the modern retailers. For rice, the price differences 
of similar processed products in modern compared with traditional retail was 
11% (shown in the table as the t-statistic with difference). 
In summary, after controlling for confounding factors, rice was significantly 
cheaper in modern retail no matter which method is used. 
Comparison of Rice Prices between Traditional  
and Modern Retail in Beijing
Comparing prices in Beijing shows differences between the leading and local 
modern chains. Loose fine rice with a low share of broken grains was sold at 
CNY5.9/kg in the leading chain stores in November 2009, and CNY6.9/kg in 
the local chains. Loose common rice was CNY4.3/kg in both types of chains in 
November 2009, which is close to prices in traditional retail outlets at that time. 
In November 2009, packaged fine rice was CNY11.0/kg in the modern stores, 
and packaged common rice was CNY5.5. Hence, the packaged common rice 
price was close to the price in the traditional stores, while the fine rice price 
was somewhat higher, presumably in each case in view of the competitive 
situation per target consumer group.
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Profit Rates of Traditional Rice Retailers
Table 5.23 shows profit rates for traditional 
retailers. As in the calculations of profit in 
Chapter 4, these are gross of amortization, 
and so somewhat understate profit rates; 
however, that bias is smaller for the small 
retailers than for traders and mills with 
a much higher capital/labor ratio. The 
profit rate in Dhaka averaged 30%; this 
is somewhat lower than trader profit 
rates, and much lower than the rice retail 
profit rates calculated by Chowdhury 
(1992) from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute survey data in 1989/90. 
The rates for the PRC averaged about 20% 
(weighted by the importance of the rice 
types), and were the same in India. 
Conclusions
First, traditional rice retail, as revealed by the detailed survey, was significantly 
different from the images and assumptions normally associated with it. 
Traditional rice retail was evolving in ways that pointed toward greater quality 
differentiation, packaging, and brand development. In the PRC, this was 
proceeding fastest for packaging and branding, and traditional retailing was 
moving rapidly in quality differentiation in all three study zones. Over time, 
the branding and the resulting traceability will be important factors in the 
development of rice markets in urban Asia, and will probably also encourage 
continued consolidation in the mill and trader sector. Further, traditional 
retailers provided very little value-chain finance (by letting customers buy on 
credit), and they tended to do little home delivery (except in Beijing). 
Second, modern retailing had already penetrated deeply into urban rice 
markets in Beijing, and was starting to penetrate them in South Asia. While 
supermarkets still charged more for rice in Dhaka, already in Delhi, controlling 
for the type of rice, supermarkets charged less than did traditional retailers, 
and prices were about the same in both types of retailing in Beijing. Moreover, 
supermarkets sold a greater variety of rice to appeal to quality differentiation 
Table 5.23 Traditional Rice 
Retailers’ Profit Rates
City 
Rice Quality
Profit Margin 
(%)
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Coarse 28
Medium 31
Fine rice 34
Beijing, the PRC
Common 24
Fine 16
Sticky 7
Fragrant 2
Delhi, India
Common 10
Fine 26
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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needs and desires of consumers with increasing incomes, but also, especially 
in Beijing, the supermarkets sold cheap loose rice to target the broad group of 
limited-income consumers. 
Third, the government had little direct role in rice retailing in the study zones, 
except in India, where it had about 15% of urban rice retail (about twice that of 
modern private retail). The government did not appear to have a comparative 
advantage in retailing rice. A large share of Indian public system shops was 
not open during store hours, corroborating the findings in the literature of 
inefficiency and low access by consumers to the subsidized retail. 
However, the indirect role of government appears to have been appreciable in 
developing the retail sector. The authors especially saw this in the PRC, where 
liberalization of the retail sector had attracted substantial foreign and domestic 
investment that had brought “the supermarket revolution” to rice.
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This chapter presents findings concerning the distribution of costs, rewards, and overall margins across the value-chain segments, and the composition of value-chain costs in terms of functional categories (such 
as labor, transport, and wastage). 
Costs, Rewards, and Overall Margins  
in the Rice Value Chain
Tables 6.1–6.3, for Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and 
India, show the shares by segment in the rice value chain’s total costs, rewards, 
and margins. The rewards are calculated as the difference between costs 
and revenues per unit sold. To convert prices per ton of paddy to the rice 
equivalents, the paddy costs, prices, and margin were divided by 0.65 (where 
0.65 is assumed to be the paddy-to-rice conversion ratio). Total gross income 
per ton of the segment actor is calculated as the sum of rewards (profits) 
plus costs.
For farmers, the “total margin” (the gross income of the whole value chain) is 
the urban retail price, which in turn is the rice equivalent paddy price received 
per ton of paddy, and costs are the sum of the rice equivalent monetary 
costs of cultivating a ton of paddy and the rice equivalent marketing costs 
per ton of paddy. The farmers’ share of total value added was higher than is 
typically assumed, partly because of disintermediation in the rice value chain, 
with (1) the role of village brokers decreasing and the farmers increasingly 
selling directly to mills (rather than through village traders), and (2) mills selling 
directly to city wholesale markets (rather than through rural wholesalers). 
However, the farmers’ rewards were somewhat offset by the share taken by 
mills, village traders, rural wholesalers, urban wholesalers, and urban retailers. 
This change was occurring in the value chains’ transformation from the most 
traditional local value chains (see Chapter 2), wherein farmers sold into local, 
rural consumer markets.
Performance of the  
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For millers and rural paddy wholesalers, margins and costs reported are the rice 
equivalent margins and costs for handling one ton of paddy. For wholesalers 
(rural and urban, paddy and rice) and retailers, margins are the difference 
between the sale price and the purchase price of rice and/or paddy. 
Bangladesh. Rice farmers in Noagoan received $198/ton for common and 
$218/ton for fine rice, a small premium. However, midstream and downstream 
sellers received a substantial premium for fine rice. Thus, the farmers were not 
capturing the quality differential, as they had 79% of the urban retail price of 
common rice but only 52% of the urban retail price of fine rice (see Chapters 
4 and 5, and Minten, Murshid, and Reardon 2012). The share of total margins 
(the urban retail price) of rural and urban wholesalers combined in the value 
chain jumped from 7% to 16% between the rice qualities. The gain for the miller 
was more modest, from 5% to 8%. The most spectacular gain was enjoyed 
by the urban traditional retailer, whose share in the total margins jumped 
from 8% to 24%. Given that the trend was toward higher quality rice, the 
postharvest segments’ shares in the value chain are thus likely to rise over time. 
Table 6.1 Shares of Rewards, Costs, and Total Margins in the Rice Value Chain 
from Noagoan District to Dhaka
Item Common Rice Fine Rice 
Average retail price of rice 
in Dhaka ($/ton)
 444.23 634.60
Share of rewards, costs, 
and total margins 
accruing to (%)
Rewards Costs Total 
Margins
Rewards Costs Total 
Margins
Farmers (rice equivalent)   69  87 79  38  86  52
Rural paddy wholesalers 
(rice equivalent) 
 4 1 2 17 1  12
Millers  8  3 5  10  3  8
Urban rice wholesalers  10 1 5  5  1  4
Urban traditional retailers  9  8 8  30  8 24
Total rewards, costs,  
and total margins in 
the value chain (figures 
in parentheses show 
the share of the Dhaka 
retail price)
 100 (47)   100  (53)   100  (100)   100  (70)   100  (30)   100  (100)
Notes: Rewards are calculated as the difference between costs and margins:
1. For farmers, the total margin is the rice equivalent paddy price received per kilogram of paddy, while costs are the sum of 
the rice equivalent monetary costs of cultivating per kilogram of paddy and the rice equivalent marketing costs per kilogram 
of paddy.
2. For millers, wholesalers (rural and urban, paddy and rice), and retailers, margins are the difference between the sale price 
and the purchase price of rice/paddy.
3. For millers and rural paddy wholesalers, margins and costs reported are the rice equivalent margins and costs for handling 
per kilogram of paddy.
4. To convert prices per kilogram of paddy costs and margins to the rice equivalent prices costs and margins, the paddy costs, 
prices, and margin were divided by 0.65 (where 0.65 is assumed to be the paddy-to-rice conversion ratio).
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The PRC. The Heilongjiang farmers’ case was similar to that in Bogra, but 
less pronounced. The farmers’ share in the urban retail price was lower for 
fine than for common rice, implying that the midstream and downstream 
segments captured (slightly) more the gains from quality differentiation. 
The PRC millers’ share of the value chain was larger than that of the South 
Asian millers, possibly because PRC millers tended to sell directly to large urban 
wholesale markets and buy directly from farmers.  
India. Table 6.3 shows that the Shahjahanpur farmers’ share of the total margins 
of the value chain averaged 65% across rice qualities. But in sharp contract to 
Bangladesh, the Indian farmers’ share in the urban retail price did not differ 
between the rice qualities, and thus the farmers were capturing the quality 
differential in price. As in Bangladesh, the Indian miller’s share was modest 
(averaging 9%) and rose slightly from common to fine rice. The share of the 
wholesalers was small—about 10% for common rice. The urban retailers, by 
contrast, commanded about 15% of the total margins, but their costs were
Table 6.2 Shares of Rewards, Costs, and Total Margins in the Rice Value Chain 
from Heilongjiang to Beijing
Item Common Rice Fine Rice
Average retail price of loose rice 
in Beijing ($/ton)
646 866
Share of rewards, costs, and 
total margins accruing to (%)
Rewards Costs Total 
Margins
Rewards Costs Total 
Margins
Farmers  60  44  54  41  44 42
Millers 33 36  35 25 36 29
Urban rice wholesalers/ 
traders in Beijing
6 11  8 22 11 19
Traditional urban rice retailers 
in Beijing
1 7  4 13 7 11
Total rewards, costs, and 
margins in the value chain 
(parentheses show share of 
the Beijing retail price)
  100 (58)  100 (42)  100 (100) 100 (69)  100 (31)  100 (100)
Notes: Rewards are calculated as the difference between costs and margins:
1. For farmers, the total margin is the rice equivalent paddy price received per kilogram of paddy, while costs are the sum of the 
rice equivalent monetary costs of cultivating per kilogram of paddy and the rice equivalent marketing costs for per kilogram 
of paddy.
2. For millers, wholesalers (rural and urban, paddy and rice), and retailers, margins are the difference between the sale price 
and the purchase price of rice/paddy.
3. For millers and rural paddy wholesalers, margins and costs reported are the rice equivalent margins and costs for handling 
per kilogram of paddy.
4. To convert prices per kilogram of paddy costs and margins to the rice equivalent prices costs and margins, the paddy costs, 
prices, and margin were divided by 0.65 (where 0.65 is assumed to be the paddy-to-rice conversion ratio).
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Table 6.3 Shares of Rewards, Costs, and Total Margins  
in the Rice Value Chain from Shahjahanpur in Uttar Pradesh to Delhi
 Common Rice Fine Rice
Average retail price of rice in 
Delhi ($/ton)
433.33 593.33
Share of rewards, costs, and 
total margins accruing to (%)
Rewards Costs Total 
Margins
Rewards Costs Total 
Margins
Farmers (rice equivalent) 69 63 66 65 61 64
Rural paddy wholesalers (rice 
equivalent) 
6 2 4 6 4 5
Millers 6 7 7 13 9 11
Rural rice wholesalers 4 2 3 0 0 0
Urban rice wholesalers 3 3 3 7 5 6
Urban traditional retailers 13 22 18 9 22 15
Total (figures in parentheses 
show the share of Delhi  
retail price)
 100 (46)  100 (54)  100 (100)  100  (55)  100 (45)  100 (100)
Notes: Rewards are calculated as the difference between costs and margins.
1.  For farmers, the total margin is the rice equivalent paddy price received on selling per kilogram of paddy, while costs are 
the sum of the rice equivalent monetary costs of cultivating per kilogram of paddy and the rice equivalent marketing costs 
for per kilogram of paddy.
2.  For millers, wholesalers (rural and urban, paddy and rice), and retailers, margins are the difference between the sale price 
and the purchase price of rice/paddy.
3.  For millers and rural paddy wholesalers, margins and costs reported are the rice equivalent margins and costs for handling 
per kilogram of paddy.
4.  To convert per kilogram of paddy prices, costs and margins to the rice equivalent prices costs and margins, the paddy costs, 
prices, and margin was divided by 0.65 (where 0.65 is assumed to be the paddy-to-rice conversion ratio).
especially high, as they had about a fifth of the costs of the whole value chain—
the great majority of postharvest costs. This may imply an inefficient small shop 
sector in staples.
The Three Zones. In general, the South Asian farmers’ share in the rice value 
chain was greater than conventional wisdom would have it; however, the 
share of off-farm segments of the value chain was still significant, at 35% on 
average. In the PRC, the postharvest segments’ share of margins was 52%. 
Regarding farmers’ shares of the price differential between common and fine 
rice,  Bangladesh farmers captured the least share of that quality differential 
(and thus their share in the value chain for fine rice was much less than in 
the chain for common rice); the PRC farmers had only a modest share in the 
differential; and Indian farmers’ share of the differential was the greatest.
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The small Indian shops had an especially high share of costs, and the 
Bangladesh and PRC wholesalers had high shares of the margins. In the PRC, 
this apparently reflected the high costs of transport over a long distance (plus 
apparent market power—that is, the wholesalers’ ability to influence the price 
of rice due to their control over its supply). The high share of costs borne by 
Bangladesh shops mainly reflected what appeared to be wholesalers’ market 
power to capture margins of fine rice. The profit rates for wholesalers and 
retailers were not significantly correlated with their shares in total margins. 
Rice traders’ profit rates were similar across zones studied, except for relatively 
high profits for rural rice wholesalers in Bangladesh (especially for fine rice) and 
urban rice traders in India.  
Cost Items in the Rice Value Chain
Tables 6.4–6.6 show cost items in the rice value chain in the three zones.
Bangladesh. As the share of costs in total margins averaged approximately 
40% (as a simple average of the share of costs in the value chain for common 
rice, 53%, and for fine, 30%) in Bangladesh (Table 6.1), the share of a particular 
cost item in Table 6.4, multiplied by 40%, gives a rough idea of the impact 
that item had on the cost to the rice consumer. In the following discussion, 
an average of rice qualities is used unless a distinction is particularly merited.
Farmers’ external inputs were the most important single cost item in 
Bangladesh—about 36% of value-chain costs (thus, with an impact factor 
of roughly 14% on the consumer price). Hired farm labor ranked second, at 
33% of costs—an item that is likely to increase over time as nonfarm labor 
markets develop. If the wholesalers’ and retailers’ operational and transport 
costs and market fees are considered as one item, then they would rank third, 
and together they formed a scant 10% of total costs. The fourth-ranked item 
was the mill, at 4% of costs. Taken together, post farm-gate services of milling 
and trading formed 14% of rice value-chain costs, and thus only about 6% of 
the rice price. 
The PRC. As the share of costs in total margins was 42% in the PRC for 
common rice (Table 6.2), the share of a particular cost item in Table 6.5, 
multiplied by 42%, can be used to approximate the impact that item had on 
the rice consumer. 
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Table 6.4  Shares of Cost Items in the Rice Value Chain in Bangladesh
Item Common 
Rice
Fine Rice
Total cost in the rice value chain ($/ton) 200 190
Share of items in the total cost of  rice per ton (%)
Farmers
Rented-in land 17 17
Inputs (for all purchased inputs [other than land and labor], which 
include purchased seeds, fertilizers, crop chemicals, purchased 
irrigation, and purchased animal and machine traction)
36 36
Hired labor 33 33
Mills
Operating costs (electricity, diesel, water, telephone and fax use, 
rents for stalls and warehouse)
1 1
Transport (rents for trucks and costs for transport for transactions) 2 2
Wages (hired casual and permanent laborers) 1 1
Traders: wholesalers and retailers
Operating costs (for electricity, telephone and fax use, and rents for 
stalls and warehouses)
3 3
Wages (for casual and permanent laborers) 2 2
Fees (marketing and weighing fees for the entire value chain) 1 1
Transport (hired transport for transactions, rents of trucks, expenses 
for personal transport for transactions, wholesalers and retailers)
3 3
Other (bagging, stitching, grading, loading and unloading, payments 
at check points/road toll taxes incurred by trader during 
transactions)
1 1
Total 100 100
Note: For farmers, all costs are calculated in “rice equivalent” terms. For this purpose, the cost per unit of paddy was divided 
by 0.65, where 0.65 is assumed to be the paddy-to-rice conversion ratio.
The largest category of costs in the PRC rice value chain was farmers’ costs, 
at 44% of the total. Thus the impact on consumers was 42% times 44%, or 
18%. Two-thirds of the farmers’ costs (hence 29% of the costs in the system) 
were for farm inputs. Thus, farm inputs had a 12% impact on the price of rice 
to consumers. 
The second largest cost was milling, at 36% of the overall costs of the rice value 
chain—nearly equal to overall farm costs and more than farm input costs. Rice 
milling costs translated into a 15% impact on rice prices—even higher than the 
impact of farm nonlabor input costs.  
Third, total transport costs per ton were substantial, at 28% of the value chain 
costs in the PRC, for an impact of 12% on retail rice prices. 
Fourth,  energy costs in  postharvest activities were a substantial cost in the 
chain. Energy costs (fuel and electricity in the mills and in transport to and
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Table 6.5 Shares of Cost Items in the Rice Value Chain  
in the People’s Republic of China 
Item Common  
Unpackaged 
Rice
Total cost of rice per ton ($/ton)  268
Share of items in the total cost of rice per ton (%)
Farmers
Rented-in land 8
Inputs (for all purchased inputs [other than land and labor],which include 
purchased seeds, fertilizers, crop chemicals, and purchased irrigation)
 29
Hired labor  7
Mills
Operating costs (electricity, diesel, water, telephone and fax use, rents for 
stalls and warehouse)
9
Transport (rents, diesel, and insurance for trucks and diesel and insurance for  
own truck)
18
Wages (hired casual and permanent laborers) 9
Traders: wholesalers and retailers
Operating costs (for electricity, telephone and fax use, and rents for stalls  
and warehouses)
3
Wages (for casual and permanent laborers) 4
Fees (marketing and weighing fees for the entire value chain) and insurance 1
Transport (costs of hired transport for transactions, rents of trucks, expenses  
for personal transport used for transactions)
10
Total 100
Note: For farmers, all costs are calculated in “rice equivalent” terms. For this purpose, the cost per unit of paddy was divided 
by 0.65, where 0.65 is assumed to be the paddy-to-rice conversion ratio.
from the mills) comprised roughly 40% of milling costs, or 15% of the costs in 
the whole system. An additional 5% came from energy in the wholesale and 
retail segments (operational costs and transport). Thus, postharvest energy 
costs were a substantial 20% of all costs in the rice value chain, and had an 8% 
impact on consumer prices. 
India. Table 6.3 shows that average costs in the Indian common rice value chain 
were roughly 54% of total margins, which can be thought of as the approximate 
impact of a cost item on consumer costs. The following discussion assumes an 
average across rice qualities unless a distinction is particularly needed.
The first ranked item in India was farmer’s costs, at about 62% of costs in the 
value chain, for a 38% impact on consumers. Half of the farmers’ costs were 
nonland, nonlabor external inputs, which thus were about 32% of total costs 
(Table 6.6). With a weighting of 54%, this means that external input costs had 
about a 17% impact on consumer rice costs. 
150 The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains 
Table 6.6 Shares of Cost Items in the Rice Value Chain in India
Item Common Rice Fine Rice
Total cost in the rice value chain ($/ton)  234  266
Share of items in the total cost of rice per ton (%)
Farmers
Rented-in land  4  4
Inputs (for all purchased inputs [other than land and labor], 
which include purchased seeds, fertilizers, crop chemicals, 
and purchased irrigation)
32  31
Hired labor  27  26
Transport (for hired transport used in transaction) 1 1
Mills
Operating costs (for electricity, diesel, water, telephone and fax 
use, rents for stalls and warehouse)
4  4
Transport (rents on trucks and costs for transport for 
transactions) 
1 1
Wages (hired casual and permanent laborers) 2  2
Traders: wholesalers and retailers
Operating costs (for electricity, telephone and fax use, and rents 
for stalls and warehouses)
5  4
Wages (for casual and permanent laborers 6 5
Fees (marketing and weighing fees for the entire value chain)  2  1
Transport (costs of hired transport for transactions, rents of 
trucks, expenses for personal transport used for transactions)
12  11
Other 3 3
Total 100 100
Note: For farmers, to convert the per unit paddy costs to the rice equivalent costs, the per unit paddy cost was divided by 
0.65, where 0.65 is assumed to be the paddy-to-rice conversion ratio.
Hired labor costs were another 42% of farm costs in India and 35% in the 
entire rice value chain. As noted in Chapter 3, own labor costs (valued at the 
imputed wage rate) were about the same as hired labor costs, so that the 
overall labor component in the farm sector was a major determinant of rice 
costs to consumers. Demand for nonfarm labor was pressuring farm wages to 
increase, which suggests that, over time, farms will become more mechanized, 
a trend the study observed in Indian paddy production.
Ranking third was the combined costs of the mill plus the trader (wholesale 
and retail), at about 30% of all costs. Transport costs were 13% of the value 
chains’ costs—thus with an impact factor of about 7% on rice prices. The 
authors estimated that roughly 10% of the total costs in the value chain (from 
both transport and milling) were for energy (electricity and fuel-related) costs. 
Although the public debate attached great importance to market fees in 
driving food price inflation, the data show that the impact of market fees was 
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minimal, at 1.5% of the costs of the entire value chain and with less than a 1% 
impact on rice prices in Delhi. 
All Three Zones. Comparing across the zones, several points stand out. Two 
items that “conventional wisdom” blames for high rice prices are market fees 
and transport costs. However, market fees were small and had an insignificant 
impact (less than 1%) on the retail price of rice. 
Transport costs were significant, although their impact on retail rice prices was 
less than 4% in Bangladesh, less than 7% in India, and under 12% in the PRC. 
However, the Indian rice zone studied is 200 kilometers (km)–400 km from 
Delhi, about a quarter of the distance that the PRC rice zone is from Beijing. The 
cost in India was about $34/ton, and that in the PRC was $77/ton. Thus, the 
Indian costs were about twice the PRC costs measured per ton per kilometer. 
Farm inputs had a large impact on the price of rice to the consumer—17% 
in Delhi, 14% in Dhaka, and 12% in Beijing. Therefore, efficient input supply 
chains to farmers and correct use of inputs are important to reduce value chain 
costs. Reducing farm input and machine costs would have a significant effect 
on rice prices. 
Energy costs also had a significant effect on the rice price via the costs of the 
postharvest segments (in addition to the direct and indirect effects they have 
on the farm segment’s costs).
Rice Markets
While the markets appeared to be changing, transforming, and restructuring, 
they did not seem to be well integrated yet, with arbitrage complete. Prices 
varied substantially even at a single point in time in a given segment of the rice 
value chain, and over seasons. The variations were generally greater in midstream 
and downstream segments than in the farm segment (Figures 6.1–6.3). 
Figure 6.1 shows the density function of the variation of prices at the beginning 
and end stages of the Bangladesh value chain—rice farmers in Noagoan and 
rice retailers in Dhaka. Retail prices showed a much larger variation than 
was seen at the farmer level, even though farm prices were collected for the 
year and retail prices were only those asked for on the day of the survey. The 
differences between the two price distributions reflected the costs and benefits 
of delivering different types of services. 
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Figure 6.2 shows the density function of sales price variation by segment for 
rice prices in Bangladesh. While prices were asked at the time of the survey for 
all segments, the price at the farm level reflects the variation during the last 
marketing period, because farmers had few transactions during the year. The 
figure shows an expected right shift for each segment, reflecting the marketing 
between the segments. However, the figure also illustrates the large variation 
within each segment, often reflecting differences in quality and location.
Furthermore, there was significant price variation at any point in time, especially 
at the retail level (Figure 6.3). Retail prices varied widely, primarily depending 
on quality. While the average prices of coarse and medium rice were $0.38 per 
kilogram (kg) and $0.44/kg, respectively, the average price for fine rice was as 
high as $0.69/kg and the median was $0.60/kg. However, the variation for fine 
rice was significantly higher than that for the other types of rice—from $0.35/
kg to more than $1.17/kg. This larger variability is shown in Figure 6.3, where 
the peaks of the density distribution for coarse and medium rice are much 
more tightly centered than those for fine rice.
Figure 6.1 Producer and Retail Price Variation of Rice in Bangladesh
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Figure 6.1  Rice Price Variation at Farm Gate and Retail, Bangladesh
0.05
0.15
kg = kilogram, Tk = taka.
 Performance of the Rice Value Chain—Rewards, Costs, and Margins 153
Figure 6.2 Price Variation by Segment during the Survey in BangladeshFigure 6.2   Rice Variation by Se m nt, Bangladesh
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Table 6.7 Prices Received by Players in the Value Chain in India  
during September–February
Item Sep–Oct 
2009
Nov–Dec 
2009
Jan–Feb 
2010
Average
Common rice     
Average sales price received ($/ton)     
Farmers 180.00 184.44 186.67 184.44
Shahjahanpur paddy wholesalers 188.89 188.89 188.89 188.89
Millers 346.67 357.78 337.78 346.67
Shahjahanpur rice wholesalers 333.33 342.22 344.44 340.00
Delhi rice wholesalers 346.67 362.22 364.44 357.78
Delhi retailers (traditional) 388.89 402.22 431.11 406.67
Share in final retail price of (%)
Farmers’ sale price 46 46 43 45
Shahjahanpur paddy wholesalers’ sale price 49 47 44 46
Millers’ sale price 89 89 78 85
Shahjahanpur rice wholesalers’ sale price 86 85 80 84
Delhi wholesalers’ sale price 89 90 84 88
Fine rice
Average sales price received ($/ton) 
Farmers 204.44 204.44 244.44 208.89
Shahjahanpur paddy wholesalers 291.11 291.11 288.89 291.11
Millers 382.22 384.44 386.67 384.44
Shahjahanpur rice wholesalers     
Delhi rice wholesalers 513.33 531.11 533.33 526.67
Delhi retailers (traditional) 564.44 584.44 593.33 580.00
Share in final retail price of (%)     
Farmers’ sale price 40 38 46 40
Shahjahanpur paddy wholesalers’ sale price 52 50 49 50
Millers’ sale price 68 66 65 66
Delhi wholesalers’ sale price 91 91 90 91
Moreover, as shown in Table 6.7 there was some, but not much, variation 
across seasons in the farmer’s share in the value chain. This point is illustrated 
by the survey evidence from India. 
In India, for common rice, the farmers’ share in the final traditional retail 
price declined only slightly from harvest to mid off-season, from 46% to 43%. 
The millers’ share went from 43% to 35% of the retail price, and the Delhi 
wholesalers’ share went from nearly none to 6%. The retailers’ share went 
from 11% to 16% between those two periods. The two main price capturers 
in the common rice chain were thus the farmers and millers.
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For fine rice, the Indian farmers’ share of the final retail price rose somewhat 
from harvest to mid off-season, from 40% to 46%. In the same period, the 
millers’ share went from 28% to 19% of the retail price; the Delhi wholesalers’ 
share, from 23% to 25%; and the retailers’ share, from 9% to 10%. The 
two main sets of price capturers in the fine rice chain were thus the farmers 
and, with smaller shares, the millers and Delhi wholesalers. This result was 
somewhat attenuated when using the rice-equivalent price for the farmers, 
and the mills’ margin was reduced. However, common paddy and rice prices 
varied little over the seasons. 
During recent years in India there has been an important debate on food 
price inflation. Therefore, the study looked at the extent that price inflation 
was linked to agents’ increasing margins in the value chain. The analysis 
centered on the time series of price data only at the wholesale and retail levels 
in Delhi, taken from government sources (the survey for the study did not 
collect price series over the decade). Thus, the discussion on rice price inflation 
will be limited to the relative impact of retail margins and wholesale prices. 
Figure 6.4 plots the monthly nominal wholesale and retail prices for 2000–
2010.1 The figure highlights how the nominal prices of both indicators had 
“blipped up” since 2008, thus indicating nominal inflation in rice prices at 
both levels. To ascertain to what extent middlemen between wholesale and 
retail were benefiting from or causing this upward trend, the ratio and the 
difference between the two series are examined. Figure 6.5 plots the share of 
the wholesale price in the retail price during 2000–2010, showing significant 
variability in this ratio over time but no clear upward or downward trend. 
Figure 6.6 plots nominal and real rice retail margins.2 While the nominal price 
rose over time, and with significant variability, there seems to be no evidence 
of increasing real retail margins over time.
1 From the Price Monitoring Cell, Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution, Govern-
ment of India’s Fcaininfoweb website. 
2 The margins were obtained by dividing the prices with the consumer price index for industrial 
workers, where the index in 2009 is equated to retail margins, defined as the absolute dif-
ference between wholesale and retail prices, over time.
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Figure 6.4 Wholesale and Retail Rice Prices in Delhi Figure 6.4  Wholesale and Retail Prices of Rice, Delhi
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To statistically test how nominal rice prices had changed over time and what 
the contributing factors had been to that inflation, the authors ran several 
regressions of the form where the price of rice (expressed in Rs/kg) is linked 
with quarterly dummies, to capture the seasonal variation in prices, and yearly 
dummies, to capture nominal inflation in prices (Table 6.8). Several important 
insights emerge:
(1) There were seasonal movements in the prices and margins, and both 
were significantly higher during the 4 months prior to the harvest period. 
(2) The coefficients of the yearly dummies indicate how prices had 
changed over time, on average. Rice retail prices were estimated to 
be Rs7/kg in 2008 and Rs8.6/kg in 2009 higher than in 2000. About 
17%–18% of that increase was explained by higher nominal retail 
Table 6.8 Rice Regressions: Nominal Wholesale and Retail Prices,  
and Nominal and Real Retail Margins
Explanatory 
Variables
Dependent Variables
Nominal Wholesale 
Price (Rs/kg)
Nominal Retail Price 
(Rs/kg)
Nominal Retail Margin 
(Rs/kg)
Real Retail Margin 
(Rs/kg)
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Intercept 9.55 35.94 12.49 47.04 2.94 14.30 5.44 19.64
Mar–Apr 0.002 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 -0.30
May–Jun 0.30 1.32 -0.45 -0.20 -0.35 -1.96 -0.59 -2.47
Jul–Aug 0.38 1.64 0.26 1.14 -0.12 -0.65 -0.37 -1.54
Sep–Oct 0.80 3.39 0.63 2.66 -0.17 -0.94 -0.44 -1.80
Nov–Dec 0.91 3.83 0.71 2.98 -0.20 -1.10 -0.49 -2.00
2001 -0.54 -1.75 -0.75 -2.41 -0.205 -0.85 -0.53 -1.64
2002 -0.64 -2.08 -0.75 -2.41 -0.104 -0.43 -0.54 -1.67
2003 -0.53 -1.73 -0.83 -2.68 -0.29 -1.23 -1.04 -3.21
2004 0.81 2.61 -0.42 -0.13 -0.85 -3.55 -2.05 -6.32
2005 0.77 2.49 0.33 1.07 -0.44 -1.82 -1.57 -4.83
2006 1.69 5.46 0.96 3.08 -0.74 -3.06 -2.16 -6.65
2007 3.02 9.73 2.50 8.04 -0.52 -2.18 -2.06 -6.34
2008 5.73 18.44 7.00 22.52 1.27 5.26 -0.15 -0.46
2009 7.10 22.84 8.58 27.62 1.48 6.16 -0.31 -0.95
2010  
(till July)
9.81 26.81 10.06 27.49 0.24 0.39 -2.10 -5.50
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margins and 82%–83% by higher wholesale prices. As the coefficients 
on the yearly dummies in the retail margin regression were always 
smaller than in the wholesale price regression, increases in retail 
margins always contributed less to retail price inflation than wholesale 
price inflation.
(3) The last two columns of Table 6.8 present the results of a regression 
of the real retail margin on time dummies. Compared with the year 
2000, the time dummies are insignificant or significantly negative, 
suggesting that margins in the food retail sector had not increased 
in real terms during this period. Thus, the study found that rice price 
inflation was not being driven by traditional retail margins, but rather 
mainly by changes in wholesale prices.
Conclusions
This overview of the distribution of costs and rewards in the rice value chains 
in Bangladesh, the PRC, and India, and the composition of the costs, gave rise 
to several salient points. 
First, rice farmers in Bangladesh and India captured roughly two-thirds of 
the final price, and in the PRC, half of the final price, in the rice value chain. 
That share varied by quality of rice. Farmers in Bangladesh captured least the 
differential between fine and common rice (and had a higher share in the 
value chain for common rice than for fine rice), and the PRC farmers captured 
a moderate share. By contrast in India, the share of the quality premium 
captured by farmers was similar to that of the other segments, and thus the 
gains from quality differentiation were shared fairly equally across the value-
chain segments. 
Second, the largest single component of rice value-chain costs was farm-
level external inputs (other than labor), at roughly a third in all three zones. 
Therefore, improving the efficiency with which inputs are delivered and used 
could have a significant effect on the rice value chain. 
Hired labor was about a third of value-chain costs in Bangladesh and India. 
Developments in the nonfarm labor market could put upward pressure on 
rice prices over time unless both countries continue to mechanize their farms. 
Mechanization has already advanced well in PRC rice farms, which used little 
hired labor.  
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Third, the share of the off-farm components in total margins of the value chain 
was greatest in the PRC (at half of the costs of the food system), followed by 
an average of 35% in India and Bangladesh. The PRC’s higher share was partly 
because of the long distance between the farms and retailers, and thus higher 
transport costs. In addition, the mills were capturing a larger share of the value 
chain because of branding and disintermediation. 
While market fees have figured mightily in food security debates, in particular 
in India, their impact in the rice value chains was slight.
Fourth, energy costs were important in the rice value chain, at the farm level in 
mechanization, and intensively so in the mill and trading segments of the three 
zones. Thus, energy shocks can translate into higher rice prices. 
Finally, transport costs as a share of rice prices were modest in Bangladesh and 
India, mainly because the chains were relatively short, but were significant in 
the PRC because of the long distance traveled. However, transport costs per 
ton per kilometer in India were twice as high as in the PRC. 
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PART C  
POTATO VALUE CHAIN
Chapters 7–10 focus on the potato value chains in Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and India. The structure, conduct, and performance of each value chain segment are traced, from farm to cold 
storage to wholesale to retail. As in the rice market, the conventional wisdom is 
that, apart from a few dynamic pockets of rapid technology change and larger 
farms as in the Indian Punjab, the potato economy is essentially “traditional” 
and is transforming only gradually.
This chapter looks at the farm segment of the potato value chain. It starts with 
the conventional views regarding the characteristics of the staples farm segment 
of value chains: (1) that the staples farmers are barely engaged in factor markets, 
use few inputs, sell a small portion of output, and subsist on the rest, making 
few capital investments; and (2) that when the farmers turn to the market, they 
are facing at the farm gate a rapacious and exploitative village trader, a “tied” 
output–credit market where the trader holds the farmers in thrall by providing 
credit at the start of the season and requiring them to sell to the trader at 
disadvantageous terms, and where the farmers sell their entire harvest without 
storing or “playing the market,” leaving the harvest and its gains to the trader. 
The chapter marshals the evidence from the farm household surveys on potato 
in the three study zones—Bogra in Bangladesh, Gansu in the PRC, and Agra 
in India—to assess the extent to which the “traditional” staples farm segment 
persists, to what extent the segment has transformed, and what are the key 
characteristics of that transformation. 
Structure of the Potato Farm Segment 
Potato Farmland Distribution and Land Rental
Table 7.1 shows land operated, including potato and other land, that was rented 
or owned. The Bangladesh and PRC potato areas come closest to the “traditional 
Upstream—Potato Farm  
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image” of Asian rural areas as having a rather flat distribution of farm sizes, 
averaging small to quite small. The average of total operated land in the study 
zones was 1.26 hectares (ha) in Bogra, Bangladesh and 1.19 ha in Gansu, the 
PRC. This is smaller than the rice farms in the Heilongjiang study area, where 
farms were larger than the average rice farms in the PRC; the Gansu potato farms 
were closer to the national average. The Bogra potato farms were semispecialized 
in potato (70% of their farm areas were under potato); the Gansu sample farms 
were even less specialized (with only 30% of their area used for potato as the 
main cash crop).1
Table 7.1 Potato Farmland Distribution and Rental
Zone and Land Type
Farm Size Strata (measured in all operational land, 
owned plus rented-in minus rented-out,  
under any crop)
Bangladesh
 
Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
 Total
 
Potato land 0.53 1.39 0.90
Potato land (share of all land) 61 % 50 % 70%
Land rented-out 0.08 0.46 0.24
Land rented-in 0.18 0.26 0.21
Share of land rented-in (of all operational land) 25 % 13% 17%
All operational land 0.70 2.00 1.26
China, People’s Rep. of    
Potato land 0.26 0.44 0.36
Potato land (share of all land) 36 % 29 % 30%
Land rented-out 0.0067 0.0046 0.0054
Land rented-in 0.026 0.047 0.038
Share of land rented-in (in all operational land) 4 % 3 % 3%
All operational land 0.73 1.51 1.19
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
Total 
Potato land 1.1 2.5 8.3 4.3
Potato land (share of all land) 92 % 93 % 82% 91%
Land rented-out 0 0.2 0.01 0.05
Land rented-in in all operational land 0.1 0.2 1.4 0.6
Share of land rented-in in all operational land 8 % 7% 15% 13%
All operational land 1.2 2.7 9.1 4.7
ha = hectare.
1 The Gansu farmers produced other vegetables, grains, fruit, and pulses, with several as cash 
crops in addition to potato, chiefly maize and ginger.
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However, the small average size masks heterogeneity in the farm population 
in the Bangladesh and PRC study zones: there was an important jump in 
average size between the marginal and small potato farm strata. This 
heterogeneity is underappreciated  in the policy debate, where it seems 
that the perception is of a homogeneously small farm population. Moreover 
marginal farmers are, in asset terms (and as shown later, also in behavioral 
terms), disadvantaged compared with even small-scale farmers.
Moreover, concentration was modest but present even in areas of small farms, 
such as the Bangladesh potato study zone. In Bogra, half of the potato land 
was cultivated on farms smaller than 0.6 ha. The biggest potato farm in the 
10 villages that were part of the study’s census was 3.8 ha. But even the low 
average farm size in the Bangladesh sample masks variation in farm size. Based 
on the data gathered in the sample villages and from farmers interviewed in 
the survey, 20% of the potato area in these villages was cultivated by 50% 
of the potato farmers, and 32% of the potato area was cultivated by the top 
10% of the potato farmers. The distribution of the sample closely followed 
the distribution of the census. 
By contrast, the farms in Agra were somewhat larger, with an average 
operational land size for potato farms of 4.7 ha—somewhat smaller than 
the 5.4 ha average of the rice farms in the Indian rice study area, the nearby 
district of Shahjahanpur in Uttar Pradesh. The average area in Agra was 
several times larger than the average potato farm in the state.2 The ratio of 
the size of land dedicated to potato in the largest farm stratum compared 
with the smallest was 7.5:1, close to the ratio of average operated land, 
because 91% of the Agra potato farm areas were used for potato.
Again the average masks substantial heterogeneity: the total operational 
land area of the medium–large potato farm stratum in Agra has an average 
7.6 times that of the marginal–small stratum.
2 It is commonly held that western and central-western Uttar Pradesh have larger farms because 
Punjabi Sikh farmers had migrated into the area. However, in the study’s potato farm sample, 
only 8% of farmers were from that origin (none in the marginal–small category, and 10%–13% of 
the semi-medium and medium–large categories); the Punjabi Sikh farmers’ land was on average 
larger than the others. The farms in the sampled area may have been larger for the following 
reasons: (1) there was a more active rental market in the area (although renting accounted for 
only 13% of the operational farm size); (2) the former landlord (zamindar) system may have had 
secondary effects in land concentration; and (3) the proximity of Delhi and the intensity of rural 
nonfarm employment, as well as the introduction and commercialization of potato in the 1990s 
and 2000s, may have driven land acquisition over time, leading to higher concentration.
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Moreover, in the India potato study zone, the degree of concentration was 
much greater than in the Bangladesh and PRC study zones. The shares of the 
strata in all 1,251 potato farmers in all the villages surveyed were as follows: 
39% marginal–small (less than 2 ha), 33% semi-medium (2 to less than 4 ha), 
and 28% medium–large (a category combining medium farms of 4 to less 
than 10 ha and large farms of 10 ha and over. Therefore, this commercialized 
potato district was more concentrated (had larger farm sizes) than the rest of 
the state, which predominantly has small grain farms. Government data on the 
23 million farms in Uttar Pradesh show that 92% of the farms were marginal–
small, 6% semi-medium, and 2% medium–large (Government of India 2010). 
The Agra zone’s farmers were larger: the average farm size owned in the 
census of all potato growers in the study villages was 3.3 ha—compared 
with 0.8 ha in the state for all farms. Key informants explained that the 
Agra area had larger farm sizes because of land consolidation during the 
1990s–2000s, when horticultural farmers bought grain land while the grain 
farmers moved into the periurban and urban economies nearby. 
Importantly, while the marginal–small stratum in the Agra census had 39% 
of the farms, it only had 7% of the farmland. Medium–large farms, with a 
mere 28% of farms in Agra, occupied 65% of the land. The average farm size 
in the study area and the shares of the farm strata were similar to those in 
Punjab’s potato area (Jalandhar), as noted by Singh (2008a). In contrast, for 
Uttar Pradesh as a whole, marginal–small farmers had 92% of farms versus 
63% of farmland. This dichotomy is more striking among the marginal farms 
(less than 1 ha)—at the state level, where the census indicated that they had 
78% of the holdings but only 39% of the land. 
Thus, in Uttar Pradesh, the smallest farmers were overwhelmingly the most 
numerous and comprised the largest share of the population. But, in the 
study area and statewide, they had only a minor share of the land and 
thus of the market and the volumes marketed in value chains. This general 
phenomenon was accentuated in important commercial potato areas such 
as Agra (which supplied the bulk of potatoes to Delhi), where the medium–
large farms were a minority, with a quarter of the farms, but produced two-
thirds of the potato. Thus, the medium–large farms quantitatively dominated 
output, the market, and the potato value chain to Delhi. This runs counter to 
the saying heard in India that “only small farms feed the great cities.”
Table 7.1 shows a substantial land rental market. The average share of 
rented-in land (in total operated land) was 17% in the Bangladesh potato 
study area (versus only 12% in the rice study area), only 3% in the Gansu 
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area (compared with 37% in the Heilongjiang rice area), and 13% in India 
(compared with 27% in the nearby rice area). 
The rice areas, rather than the horticultural crop potato areas, had taken 
the lead in land rental market development. This could be due to economies 
of scale in rice and the quest for mechanization, a hypothesis that merits 
further exploration. The differences between rice and potato areas in land 
rental markets were modest in Bangladesh and India but striking in the 
PRC. But the PRC comparison is between a dynamic eastern rice area and a 
hinterland western mountainous potato area. Moreover, while rice farmers 
in Heilongjiang invested their nonfarm incomes in land rental and machines, 
Gansu potato farmers were also investing in equipment, but much more in 
livestock (rather than renting land from each other). 
In Bangladesh, the marginal stratum’s share of rented-in land in total land 
was twice that of the small stratum, while in India, the opposite held, with 
the larger farmers renting a much higher share of land per farm. The lower 
rental share by the smaller Indian farms could be due, as key informants 
suggested, to the larger farmers renting land from poorer households that 
work off-farm in this zone, which is periurban and a few hours from Delhi. 
These findings about interstrata rental mean that the land rental market 
was highly concentrated in the medium–large farms in India, exacerbating 
inequality in land ownership, while in Bangladesh it smoothed inequality in 
land access by compensating for inequality in land ownership. 
Potato Farmers’ Nonland Assets
Table 7.2 shows a lot of heterogeneity in nonland assets such as education, 
livestock, and farm equipment across farmers in each study zone. The findings 
again belied the common belief that small-scale farmers have similar nonland 
assets. Several points stand out.
First, demographics and human capital differed across the study zones: 
•	 India’s farm households, when compared with those in Bangladesh 
and the PRC, even in Agra, a commercialized zone near Delhi, had on 
average larger families and were headed by older males who were 
less educated on average than in the study zones in Bangladesh and 
the PRC. 
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Table 7.2 Potato Farmers and Nonland Assets
Asset Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
Total
Bangladesh
Age of household head (years) 47 47 47
Gender of household head  
(share male)
99% 100% 99%
Household size 4.6 4.9 4.7
Share of household heads who never 
went to school
19% 13% 16%
Value of livestock assets in 2009 ($) 618 941 765
Value of farm assets in 2009 ($) 147 441 279
Mean value of tractors owned in 2009 
($; parentheses show the share of 
tractors in total value farm assets) 
 0 (0%)  70 (16%)  35 (12%)
Mean value of power tillers owned 
in 2009 ($; parentheses show the 
share of power tillers in total value 
of farm assets) 
 34 (23%)  155 (35%)  95 (34%)
Share of households owning tractors 
in 2009
0% 4% 2%
Share of households owning power 
tillers in 2009
6% 12% 9%
Share of households using machine 
traction (tractors/power tillers)  
in 2009
82% 96% 89%
China, People’s Rep. of
Age of household head (years) 34 37 36
Gender of household head  
(share male)
64% 74% 71%
Household size 5 5 5
Share of household heads with high 
school education
38% 37% 37%
Livestock in 2009 ($) 578 884 760
Livestock in 2005 ($) 434 688 585
Nonland nonlivestock farm assets 
2009 ($)
978 1,770 1,448
Nonland nonlivestock farm assets  
in 2005 ($)
436 1,028 788
Mean value of tractors owned in 2009 
($; parentheses show the share of 
tractors in total value farm assets) 
 145 (15%)  145 (8%)  145 (10%)
Mean value of power tillers owned 
in 2009 ($; parentheses show the 
share of power tillers in total value 
of farm assets) 
 27 (3%)  53 (3%)  43 (3%)
Share of households owning tractors 
in 2009
15% 15% 15%
Share of households owning power 
tillers in 2009
5% 11% 8%
continued on next page
168 The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains 
Asset Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha))
Total
Share of households owning tractors 
in 2005
11% 9% 10%
Share of households owning power 
tillers in 2005
1% 3% 2%
Share of households using machine 
traction (tractors/power tillers)  
in 2009
29% 27% 28%
India Marginal–
Small 
(<2 ha)
Semi- 
Medium 
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large 
(≥4 ha)
Total
Age of household head 57 54 55 55
Gender of household head  
(share male)
100% 100% 100% 100%
Household size 8 8 9 8
Share of household heads who were 
literate
63% 75% 78% 72%
Livestock in 2009 ($) 2,000 2,000 2,667 2,444
Nonlivestock, nonland farm asset in 
2009 ($)
889 1,333 8,222  3,481
Mean value of tractors owned in 2009 
($; parentheses show the share 
of tractors in total value of non-
livestock, nonland farm assets) 
 124 (14%)  558 (42%)  2,851 (35%)  1,178 (34%)
Share of households owning tractors 
in 2009
5% 22% 67% 41%
Share of households using machine 
traction (tractors) in 2009
23% 59% 87% 63%
ha = hectare.
•	 In Bangladesh, household heads of commercial potato area farms 
were somewhat more educated than their Indian counterparts, 
somewhat younger, but still all male. The Bangladesh households had 
40% fewer members than the Indian households, and their farmlands 
were roughly 25% of the Indian farm sizes, thus having roughly half 
the land per person compared with the Indian potato farm.
•	 Heads of potato farm households in the PRC study zone had more 
education than the South Asian counterparts, and fewer were male 
(70%, because of migration). Farms were the same size as those in 
Bangladesh, and the land/person ratio was the same.
Second, the farm capital/land, labor/land, and labor/capital ratios differed 
sharply across study zones; hence, so did the technologies used for potato 
Table 7.2 continued
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production. Abstracting from differences in prices for like equipment, the 
rough ratios tell an important story: 
•	 The ratio of farm capital3 (in dollars) to land was 221:1 in Bangladesh; 
1,216:1 in the PRC; and 1,134:1 in India.
•	 The ratio of traction machinery (tractors and power tillers) in dollars 
of machinery to land was 103:1 in Bangladesh, 157:1 in the PRC, 
and 250:1 in India. The Agra potato area had larger landholdings 
than the other two study zones, and the medium–large farm stratum 
in Agra had particularly high tractor ownership. 
•	 In all the study zones, the share of farms using traction machines 
was higher than the share of farms owning these machines. The 
difference between the share of farmers using and owning machines 
(few owning and many using) was especially large in Bangladesh. 
The difference is explained by the active market for renting machines 
plus labor services, which appears most developed in Bangladesh, 
where the gap between use and ownership was highest, and least 
developed in Gansu Province, with the Agra situation in the middle. 
•	 The ratio of labor holdings (proxied by family size) to land was 
3.7/ha in Bangladesh, 4.2/ha in the PRC, and only 1.7/ha in India.
•	 The farm traction-machine capital to labor holdings ratio in the study 
zones was $147/ha in India, $38/ha in the PRC, and only $26/ha in 
Bangladesh. The traction-machine ratio is used because of the labor 
intensity of land preparation. By this measure, the Indian operation 
in Agra was much more capital intensive than that in the PRC, where 
the study zone was a relatively poor, small-farm, hinterland area, 
and than in Bangladesh, where farms were highly labor intensive 
and poorly endowed in farm capital.
The ratio of machine-traction owned capital to land differed across the farm 
size strata, and that difference varied across the zones. That ratio for the 
highest compared with the lowest farm size stratum was 2.3 for Bangladesh, 
0.5 for the PRC, and 1.2 for India. Compared with the small farms, the 
3 Farm capital includes a range of assets from farm traction machinery to other farm machinery 
and vehicles.
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larger ones were nearly twice as capital intensive in Bangladesh, marginally 
more so in India, but actually less capital intensive in the PRC. That is, large 
farms used twice as much machine traction per land area as small farms in 
Bangladesh, marginally more in India, and the situation was the opposite in 
the PRC, where large-scale farmers used less machine traction than small-
scale ones. This suggests that, compared with larger farmers, the opportunity 
cost of labor was much lower among the marginal farmers in Bangladesh 
and somewhat lower among marginal/small farmers in India, implying that 
the small-scale farmers faced greater constraints to getting off-farm jobs 
than did the larger-scale farmers. These results correlate closely with the 
survey findings regarding the participation rates in the off-farm employment 
market, which were the highest in the PRC study zone, medium in India, and 
lowest in Bangladesh. 
Third, there was not a sharp difference in the livestock/land ratio across the 
three zones: it was 607:1 for Bangladesh, 638:1 for the PRC, and 520:1 for 
India. Ownership of dairy animals was particularly important for the Bangladesh 
and India farmers. 
Fourth, the data for the PRC indicate a stunning boom in farm capital and 
livestock investment in only 5 years: livestock holdings leapt by 30% and farm 
capital by 80%. The rice farm chapter (Chapter 3) showed a near doubling of 
farm capital in 5 years in the northeast PRC. The combination of nonfarm income 
and equipment subsidies was spurring heavy farm investments in the PRC. 
Potato Farmers and Labor Markets
Table 7.3 shows off-farm employment (in manufactures and services, wage or 
self-employment, and locally or in migration) and migration remittances.
Most of the PRC’s potato farm households engaged in some off-farm 
employment, much of it locally, in the villages and towns of Gansu Province. 
Off-farm employment was more common among Gansu households than 
among those in the Bangladesh and India samples. Only 13% of the Gansu 
households received remittances from migration, contrary to the popular 
conception that rural PRC households working off their farms are mainly 
migrants. Moreover, the share of families doing off-farm work leapt from 
55% to 76% in the 5-year recall period. This increase in turn links with the 
farm capital and livestock holdings investment noted above. 
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Table 7.3 Potato Farmers and Nonfarm Labor (%)
Zone and Assets Farm Size
 Marginal  
(<1 ha)
Small  
(≥1 ha)
Total
Bangladesh
With off-farm jobs in 2009 15 25 20
Received remittances in 2009 3 7 5
China, People’s Rep. of
With off-farm jobs in 2009 79 74 76
Received remittances in 2009 16 12 13
With off-farm jobs in 2005 57 53 55
India Marginal–
Small  
(<2 ha)
Semi- 
Medium  
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium–
Large  
(≥4 ha)
Total 
With off-farm jobs in 2009 46 38 35 40
Received remittances in 2009 7 5 1 4
ha = hectare.
By contrast, the South Asian potato farmers were less engaged in off-
farm employment (40% of the farm households in India and 20% in 
Bangladesh), and were far less engaged in migration. Yet the combination 
of cash cropping, government subsidies for equipment, and substantial 
off-farm employment had been able to fuel a major investment in farm 
capital. This had allowed India’s commercial potato area to increase 
the capital intensity of its production. Government subsidies for farm 
mechanization were a factor in the commercialization of India’s potato farms.
Conduct of the Potato Farm Segment
Potato Farm Technology 
Table 7.4 shows potato production technologies measured as the flow 
of expenditures in kind and in cash on farm inputs. Several key findings 
emerge. First, potato farmers’ costs in the Bangladesh zone were 50% higher 
than the costs of their counterparts in the PRC and India. That difference can 
be accounted for by three factors: (1) the costs were net of amortization of 
capital—because the PRC and India potato farms had a higher capital/land 
ratio than the Bangladesh farms, the amortization costs could be substantial; 
(2) fertilizer was highly subsidized in India; and (3) Bangladesh farms used 
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Table 7.4 Composition of Potato Farmers’ Production Costs
Input Bangladesh China, People’s Rep. of India
$/ha % of Total 
Costs
$/ha % of Total 
Costs
$/ha % of Total 
Costs
Seed
Own 398  19 196 13 48 4
Purchased 47 2 78 5 152  12
Chemical fertilizer 573  27 268 17 38 3
kg/ha 1,119 1,206 238
$/kg 0.50 0.22 0.16
Crop chemicals 176 8 7 1 170 13
Irrigation costs 43 2 0 0 41 3
Manure 67 3 134 9 35 3
Labor, total 623  30 764 50 403  31
Own labor imputed at 
the wage labor rate
256  12 … 274  21
Hired labor 368  18 … 129  10
Animal traction  0  0 14 1  0 0
Machine traction 52 3 79 5 85 7
Hired tractor 49 2 13 1 32 2
Own tractor 3 1 66 4 53 4
Land rental 122  6 0 0 320 25
Total cost (cash outlays + 
imputed in-kind costs)
2,101 100  1,540 100  1,292 100
Total monetary cost  1,447  69 …  917  71
Total imputed in-kind 
costs
653  31 …  375 29
… = no data available, ha = hectare, kg = kilogram.
more farm labor, possibly because of inadequate off-farm employment 
opportunities, than did the PRC and India farms.
Second, the largest single item in all three budgets was the outlay on labor, 
controlling for the fact that the budgets did not show capital amortization 
costs. Labor cost in Bangladesh and the PRC was about 50% greater than 
in India, which accords with the finding that potato producers in Agra used 
more capital (and thus less labor) than the producers in Bogra and Gansu. 
Moreover, the hired labor component of the Bangladesh labor outlay was 
three times that in India. (There was little hired labor in the PRC study area.) 
Farm labor markets were thus far more important in the potato areas of 
Bangladesh. Farm labor markets are typically the refuge of the poorest 
people, who have little access to nonagricultural labor markets and own 
farming opportunities (Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007). The relative 
dearth of capital, lower use of herbicides, less nonfarm employment, and 
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very small farm size explain why the farm wage labor market was far more 
important in the Bogra than in the Agra potato zone. 
Third, fertilizer was a very large expenditure in Bangladesh compared with India 
and, to a lesser extent, the PRC, for two reasons—price and quantity. The price 
per kilogram of fertilizer in Bangladesh was $0.50, versus only $0.16 in the 
highly subsidized Indian setting and $0.22 in the subsidized PRC setting. The 
Indian farmer had to spend very little indeed on fertilizer. Also, the Bangladesh 
and PRC farmers were using 1,100–1,200 kilograms (kg)/ha of fertilizer, 
compared with the Agra use rate of 238 kg/ha, which was still high by all-India 
standards but close to the recommended fertilizer use rate of approximately 
250–300 kg/ha on Bangladesh and Indian potato plots. This nearly fivefold 
difference is at first puzzling; however, the Indian households had 1.7 times 
more members but 4 times more land than the Bangladesh households, so the 
population pressure on the land in the Bangladesh study zone was well above 
that in the Indian study zone; thus, the Bangladesh farmers used more fertilizer 
to intensify their production in response to population pressure on the land. 
Fourth, interestingly, farms in both South Asian countries averaged the same 
outlay on farm chemicals other than fertilizer, but they spent much more 
than the farmers in the PRC study zone. These outlays were not directly 
subsidized in any of the zones. The outlay may correspond to the similarity 
of climate and pests in the South Asian production zones, which are fairly 
close geographically. 
Finally, the share of the farm budget for machine use measured as outlay 
on equipment use (own and hired) was highest in India, followed by the 
PRC and Bangladesh. This conforms to the above results concerning machine 
ownership and the presence of active machine rental markets. Effective 
outlays on equipment were undercounted in India because amortization was 
not costed. 
In summary, the technology and cost picture that emerges is roughly 
consonant with the differences in factor endowments among the study areas. 
Bangladesh and PRC (Gansu) farmers conducted more labor- and fertilizer- 
intensive farming on very small farms, while Agra farmers used labor-saving, 
capital-intensive farming. Both South Asian sites used substantial farm 
chemicals in a setting where intensive farming and warm wet conditions are 
conducive to pest attacks. The Indian system delivered a hectare of potato 
production at substantially less private cost and substantially more social cost 
(through fertilizer subsidies) than the system in Bangladesh. 
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Potato Farmers’ Accessing Water
Table 7.5 shows potato farmers’ ownership of irrigation pumps, and 
purchases and sales of water. There was great variation across sites in 
the development of water markets, but in some zones the market was 
substantially well developed. 
Table 7.5 Potato Farmers’ Access to Irrigation Water (% of farmers)
Water Source Farm Size
Marginal 
(<1 ha)
Small 
(≥1 ha)
All
Bangladesh    
Own irrigation pump 14 23 18
Bought water from other farmers 89 86 88
Sold water to other farmers 7 13 10
China, People’s Rep. of
Own pump irrigation 39 36 37
India Marginal–
Small  
(<2 ha)
Semi-
Medium  
(≥2 ha <4)
Medium– 
Large  
(≥4 ha)
All
Own pump irrigation 8 31 80 50
Bought water from other farmers 91 71 46 64
Sold water to other farmers 8 29 61 40
ha = hectare.
In India, potato farmers engaged in a very active private irrigation water 
market, as in the rice zone. Half of the farmers owned the main irrigation 
mechanism—tube well pump irrigation—but the distribution of the pumps 
was extremely skewed, as only 8% of small–marginal farmers owned them 
compared with 31% of semi-medium and 80% of medium–large farmers. 
In addition, 40% of potato farmers sold water. Nearly all the farmers who 
owned irrigation pumps sold water to other farmers. Nearly two-thirds of 
farmers bought water from others. This was skewed in the opposite direction 
to ownership of pumps and sales of water. The smaller farmers had a much 
greater probability of buying water from the larger farmers; 91% of marginal–
small and 71% of semi-medium farmers bought water from other farmers, 
versus 46% of the medium–large. In short, large potato farmers accessed the 
government-subsidized water pumps, and sold water to the small farmers 
who did not own pumps. 
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The Bangladesh water market was similar in function to the Indian one: 88% 
of farmers reported buying irrigation water from other farmers, 10% reported 
selling it, and 18% owned irrigation pumps. However, in the Bangladesh case, 
as land ownership in the potato zone was not so concentrated, ownership 
of irrigation pumps and selling of water were less correlated with farm size 
than in India.
By contrast, the private water market was not developed in the Gansu case. 
Only 33% of farms had a water well in 2009 and none had water towers; only 
18% had a water pump in 2009, up from 11% in 2005; the incidence was 
slightly higher for the medium farmers (from 12% in 2005 to 21% in 2009). 
But only 1% of the farmers bought irrigation water; 37% of the farmers 
reported using some irrigation, nearly all from on-farm sources. 
Potato Farmers’ Accessing Seeds
Table 7.6 shows how farmers acquired seed potato. Overall, potato farmers 
relied less on seed markets than did rice farmers. In Bangladesh, 89% of 
potato farmers used their own stored seed potato, and in the PRC, 72% of 
farmers did so; however, in Agra, only 24% of farmers used their own. The 
India case appears to be linked to the rise of cold storage facilities (CSFs), 
which also provided access to seed potato. 
In Bangladesh, 18% of the seed bought was acquired at the CSFs, versus 
64% in Agra. Moreover, in India, the share of farmers reporting CSFs as their 
main potato seed supplier had been rising greatly—from 22% in 1999 to 
64% in 2009. The jump was fastest and the current reliance on CSFs for seed 
highest among medium–large farmers. Only in Bangladesh did the wholesale 
market play a potato seed supply role, at 64% of seed purchases by the 
sample farmers. 
The more traditional source of seeds—buying from other farmers—was minor 
in both South Asian study zones, at about 20% of seed bought. However, 
in the South Asian cases there was a strong negative correlation with farm 
size in buying seed from other farmers. In the PRC, farmers bought very little 
from other farmers, and they noted in the survey that they felt this was a 
poor quality source. 
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Table 7.6 Seed Potato Acquisition: Shares of Households  
Declaring their Main Sources (%)
Seed Source Farm Size
 Marginal Small All
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh    
Average share of own seed in total seed use 82 96 89
Other seed source
Wholesale market trader 65 64 64
Cold storage 15 27 18
Other farm 21 9 18
Total (with rounding error) 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of    
Average share of own seed in total seed use 71 72 72
Share of purchased seed on any potato plots 39 41 40
India Marginal–
Small
Semi-
Medium
Medium–
Large
All
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
Average share of own seed in total seed use 23 21 26 24
Cold storage facilities as main seed supplier 49 73 69 64
Other farms as main seed supplier 37 20 15 22
ha = hectare.
The governments had only a small or no role in the sale of seed potato. Of the 
little seed that was purchased in Gansu, some came from the state-owned 
seed stores and some from the Gansu Potato Research Institute, but most was 
bought from private retailers. None of the Bangladesh farmers reported buying 
seed from the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation in 2009. This 
seems in strong contrast with the reported situation in the 1990s (Ilangantileke 
et al. 2000). In India, the state did not sell potato seed in the study zone.
Potato Farmers’ Accessing Fertilizer and Crop Chemicals
Table 7.7 shows widespread and substantial development of the fertilizer and 
pesticide markets; even very small-scale farmers participated in them very 
actively. All three zones presented a picture of intensive use of fertilizers and 
crop chemicals (pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides). 
In Bangladesh in 2009, 98% of the potato farmers bought chemical fertilizer 
and 99% bought crop chemicals. They obtained most of their inputs from 
wholesale market traders, specific dealers, or private shops. Farmers very 
seldom bought inputs on credit from suppliers.
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Table 7.7 Shares of Potato Farmers Buying Chemical Fertilizers  
and Crop Chemicals (insecticides, fungicides, and herbicides; % of farmers)
Chemical Type Farm Size
 Marginal Small All
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh    
Chemical fertilizer 98 97 98
Crop chemicals 99 98 99
China, People’s Rep. of
Chemical fertilizer 99 98 99
Crop chemicals 100 100 100
India Marginal–
Small
Semi- 
Medium
Medium– 
Large
All
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
Chemical fertilizer 100 98 100 100
Crop chemicals 99 94 99 98
ha = hectare.
In the PRC study zone, fully 99% of the farmers bought chemical fertilizers. 
Of the fertilizer purchases, 81% were from private shops; the balance was 
bought from marketing cooperatives, wholesale markets, state-owned seed 
stores, and other farmers. Only 5% of the transactions were on credit. Nearly 
all the potato farmers bought crop chemicals. Their foremost source was the 
private retailers; a distant second was the supply and marketing cooperatives; 
and only a small amount was from the state-owned seed stores, the wholesale 
markets, and the Gansu Potato Research Institute. Fully 99% of the purchases 
were made without credit from suppliers.
In the India study zone, nearly all of the potato farmers used both chemical 
fertilizers and crop chemicals. By far the main source was small private shops, 
from which 59% of the farmers bought their fertilizer and 90% bought their 
farm chemicals.
In Agra, only 37% of the farmers bought subsidized fertilizers from the 
primary agricultural cooperative societies (PACS, state-sponsored cooperatives). 
Interestingly, there was a strong correlation between farm size and buying 
fertilizer from the PACS: The great bulk of the PACS’ sales were in fact to the 
medium–large farmers; thus the subsidies were regressively distributed.
About 12% of the farmers bought chemicals from the modern input retailers 
(the rural business hubs that had emerged in the last decade). Their customers 
were mainly the semi-medium and medium–large farmers.
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Of particular note regarding farm chemicals is the strikingly high rate of 
herbicide use among potato farmers: 65% of the farmers used herbicides, with 
a steep bias toward medium–larger farmers, as only 40% of the marginal–
small farmers used herbicides but 81% of the medium–large farmers used 
them. Herbicides are substitutes for mechanical and hand weeding. Herbicide 
use tends to increase with the opportunity cost of time, which is influenced 
by the growth of the off-farm labor market. Herbicide use was also spurred by 
being widely available in the study areas through distribution campaigns and 
networks by multinational and domestic companies. 
Potato Farmers’ Marketing 
Table 7.8 shows that the small potato farms studied were small businesses—
small commercial farms that were highly engaged in food markets, supplying 
vast cities. Potato is farmed as a cash crop: the marketed surplus rates (sales 
divided by output) were 79% for the Bangladesh study zone and 89% for the 
India study zone. The rest was used for seed and home consumption. Even 
in the more hinterland Gansu, almost 70% of the crop was sold. Moreover, 
in both the PRC and India, the marketed surplus rates were similar across 
farm size strata; only in Bangladesh did marginal farms sell a bit less of their 
output than did small farms. In short, as farmers in the study zones adopted 
and planted potatoes in the study zones during the last 2 decades, displacing 
grains, they oriented their production overwhelmingly to the market, and 
mainly to supply the great cities.
In terms of output across zones and strata, the average Indian (Agra) farm 
grew about 10 times more potatoes than the farms in the other zones. Output 
was heterogeneous across farms: a large farm in Agra produced 5 times more 
potatoes than a small Agra farm, and a small Bangladesh (Bogra) farm grew 
3 times more than a marginal farm. 
Table 7.9 shows farmers’ use of cold storage. Potato production is a seasonal 
activity, with only one crop per year in all three study zones. To spread out sales 
and to store seed potatoes, CSFs had arisen. The alternative storage is on the 
farm in cellars. Major differences in farmers’ use of cold storage were apparent 
between the zones, with Agra having the most advanced diffusion of CSFs, 
Bogra being intermediate, and Gansu being the least developed. 
Nearly all the Indian farmers stored potatoes; this is useful, given that potatoes 
are produced in one season a year.4 There had been rapid and widespread 
4 Potatoes are rabi crops, which are sown in winter and harvested in summer.
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Table 7.8 Potato Farmers’ Marketed Surplus Rates, 2009
Potato Production and Use Farm Size
Marginal Small All
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh    
Production (tons/farm) 7 23 14
Marketed surplus rate (sales/output) 71% 83% 79%
Retention from output of seed 8% 8% 8%
China, People’s Rep. of    
Total (in tons) of potato per farm 5 7 6
Market surplus rate 69% 70% 69%
Home consumption rate 15% 15% 15%
Retention from output of seed 8% 11% 10%
India Marginal–
Small
Semi-
Medium
Medium–
Large
All
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
Production (tons/farm) 31.3 67.8 167.8 109.5
Marketed surplus rate 89% 85% 89% 89%
Retention from output of seed 13% 13% 16% 14%
ha = hectare.
change in the technology of storage in Agra, and traditional methods of 
on- farm storage had mostly been abandoned, from being nearly ubiquitous 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Fuglie et al. 1997). The share of farmers 
using traditional storage for at least part of their potato storage had dropped 
from 23% in 1999 to 18% in 2009, and the drop had been most rapid 
among larger farmers. In 2009, only 1% of farmers stored potato in the 
traditional way. 
Modernization of potato storage had gone far in the India study zone. This 
trend arose from the massive investment in CSFs in the 1990s and 2000s 
(see Chapter 8). By 2009, the survey shows that two-thirds to three-quarters 
of potatoes were cold stored in Agra, and 78% of the Agra farmers used 
only CSFs—surprisingly, with little difference across farm size strata. Most 
farmers (62%) had used CSFs for some part of the last 10 years; only 38%had 
used them for longer than 10 years, and that tended to be correlated with 
current farm size. Most farmers used just one CSF, generally starting to 
store their potatoes in March (right after harvest) and taking them out in 
October, compared with traditional storage methods, which kept potatoes 
for only 2–3 months. Most farmers reported using CSFs for a combination of 
potatoes for seed, sale, and home consumption.
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Table 7.9 Potato Farmers and Cold Storage (%)
Potato Storage and Sales Farm Size
 Marginal Small All
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh    
Share of production stored 36 42 41
Sales composition share 
Fresh 52 58 55
Without cold storage, after drying 21 21 21
After traditional storage 2 2 2
In or after cold storage 25 19 22
Total 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of
Sales composition share
Without storage 95 95 95
After traditional storage at home 5 5 5
In or after storage in cellar (cold 
store) 
0 0 0
Total 100 100 100
India Marginal–
Small
Semi-
Medium
Medium–
Large
All
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
Share of production cold stored 67 76 64 65
Sales composition share
Fresh from field without drying 16 13 17 15
Without storage but after drying for 
couple of weeks
8 6 8 8
After traditional storage 7 6 0.25 4
In or after cold storage 70 75 75 73
Total 100 100 100 100
ha = hectare.
All respondents felt that cold storage was highly accessible in Agra, implying 
that barriers to adoption were low. Much of the adoption was in the 1990s. 
By 2009, 98% of farmers used CSFs for some portion of their crop, up from 
an already high 95% 10 years earlier. Even though most farmers used some 
cold storage, the share of potatoes they put in CSFs had risen quickly in the 
5 years before the survey. Confirming the importance of cold storage, 65% 
of potatoes were put into CSFs in 2009, compared with a finding of 40% in 
western Uttar Pradesh in 2004 (Singh 2008b) and 1996 (Fuglie et al. 1997). 
In Agra, for marginal–small farms, the share was 67%, similar to the 64% 
for medium–large farms. The finding runs counter to the conventional image 
that small farmers stick to traditional on-farm storage and eschew modern 
cold storage.
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The potato survey data showed that larger farmers typically sold quite late, 
when prices were best, in the quarters starting in July and October; smaller 
farmers sold a third of their potatoes at harvest when the prices were lowest, 
and the rest throughout the year. The data for the whole sample show 
that only 20% of Agra’s marketed potato harvest was sold in the first 
2 quarters (the harvest is in the first quarter), and 80% was marketed in the 
second 2 quarters. 
By using cold storage and selling later, Agra farmers received higher prices, 
avoiding the big rush of potatoes coming in from Punjab early in the year. A 
positive externality is that this helps to smooth across seasons the availability 
of potatoes to consumers in Delhi. The many Agra farmers who used CSFs 
cited as their main reason that they expected prices to rise later in the year, 
and their secondary reason (mainly cited by the small-scale farmers) was for 
storing seed potatoes. The few farmers who did not store reported their 
main reason as needing money urgently after harvest (also mainly cited by 
the smaller farmers). 
Farmers in Agra reported that they used a particular CSF for a range of 
reasons. All cited quality of storage. Interestingly, 80% (rising slightly with 
farm size) used a CSF that had contacts with “buyers who offer good prices.” 
The third-ranked reason (cited by nearly 50% of respondents) was access to 
advances/credit—contrary to expectations, the share of respondents citing 
credit as the motivation rose with farm size. The fourth-ranked (by nearly 
40%) reason cited was low cost and proximity. Farmers noted unanimously 
that if the potatoes were damaged during storage, they alone would bear 
the cost; but that did not dissuade them from using the storage.
By constrast, the CSF use rate was somewhat lower in the Bangladesh study 
zone: 41% of potato output was stored (with marginal farms storing 36% 
of the crop and small farms storing 42%). Of the 84% of Bogra farmers 
who stored some potatoes in 2009 (79% of marginal farmers and 91% of 
small farmers), 95% used CSFs. It is surprising that small farmers used CSFs 
so much, and were willing to forego cash at harvest. Part of the reason was 
that small farmers relied more on the cold storage for seed than did the large 
farmers, who used the storage more for output market sales. That explains 
why marginal farmers stored 36% of their potatoes but sold only 19% after 
cold storage; the other 17% was stored for seed. For small farms, of the 42% 
of their potatoes that were stored: 21% was for seed and 21% for sale. 
The above is corroborated with Bogra farmers’ declarations of their reasons 
for storage. Only 16% of the Bangladesh farmers did not store potatoes, 
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and 80% of them said the reason was that they needed cash right after 
harvest. Of the farmers who stored potatoes, 50% reported they did so 
mainly for seed potatoes. Significantly more marginal farmers (64%) than 
small farmers (33%) stored potatoes for seed purposes. The two other 
reasons given for storage—expectation of a rise in prices and a need for 
money later in the year—were both mentioned to the same extent.
Most of the Bogra farmers had used CSFs for more than a decade. Their 
major reasons for choosing a particular CSF were related to quality of the 
storage (60% of the answers) and the distance to it (33% of the answers). 
Unlike in Agra, few Bogra farmers mentioned access to input advances/credit 
from CSFs as a reason to store there. The storage period was also somewhat 
shorter than in the Agra case: in Bogra, farmers cold-stored potatoes for 
about 4 months, from March to July. 
In Gansu, very little of the potato crop was stored: 85% of the harvest was 
sold during September–November—at harvest. Only about 3% was sold in 
the following quarter, 1.6% in the next, and 0.5% in the last quarter before 
the following harvest. Hence, Gansu farmers did not store and then “play 
the market” later. The 15% not sold at harvest was stored and sold or home-
consumed gradually over the seasons. However, 95% of the farms stored 
some potatoes after the harvest, for one or more reasons: 80% said they did 
so for their own consumption, 59% for seed potato, only 6% to sell later 
when prices were higher, and just 2% to supply cash later in the year. 
Almost all of the Gansu farms (97%) had some potato storage facility, 
averaging 1.7 storages per farm. The storage on average held 8.6 tons, and 
was thus a relatively small on-farm storage. Of the farm storage facilities, 
80% were cellars without air circulation, the most traditional type in the 
hillside or ground; 17% were cellars with air circulation; a small group—2.5% 
overall (3% of medium farms and 1.5% of small farms) had above-ground 
storage; and only 2% had refrigeration-controlled (constant temperature) 
storage facilities.
While the PRC government had a program to finance and encourage 
building of storage, the program had very little impact, given that most 
of the farmers who built storage did so without subsidy. The mainly on-
farm or near-farm Gansu storages were built in the early 1990s. Only 5% 
of the farmers reported getting subsidies to build storage facilities (at a 
potential subsidy rate of 20%). Only 2.8% of the farmers got a loan and 
extension advice on storage from the government to build their storage 
unit. One may well ask why the Gansu farmers did not build many modern 
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storage facilities, given the government subsidy and the sharp seasonality of 
their production. Hypotheses include that (1) because few farmers reported 
getting the subsidies, this may indicate limited implementation of the 
program and farmer access to it; (2) Beijing potato traders sourced from a 
number of provinces and thereby reduced the seasonality of their supplies, 
thus reducing price seasonality and the potential gain from storage; and 
(3) whereas the Bangladesh and Indian potato production zones specialized 
mainly in potato, potatoes were only one of several cash crops for the Gansu 
area farmers, and this may reduce the incentive to store. Finally, the current 
study did not ascertain if there was substantial cold storage of potatoes in 
other provinces, so the Gansu cold storage findings cannot be extrapolated 
to all of the PRC. 
Tables 7.10 and 7.11 show to whom and where farmers sold potatoes in 
2009 in shares of farmers and of sales. Several points stand out. 
First, there was a stark contrast in the importance of the rural wholesale 
market for farmers’ sales of potatoes between Bangladesh and the PRC on 
the one hand and India on the other. In Bangladesh and the PRC, wholesalers 
accounted for 85% of sales volume. By contrast, in Agra, the wholesale 
market had only 7% of potato farm sales.
Second, the inverse was seen for sales to traders at the CSFs (as the 
intermediation venue). Sales to traders at the CSFs were 8% of sales in 
Bangladesh, none in the PRC, and a stunning 80% in India. The India totals 
varied from 64% for marginal–small farmers to 93% for semi-medium farmers 
to 83% for medium–large farmers. Thus, the marginal–small farmers were 
somewhat less apt to sell at the CSFs, but not by much. The sales volumes 
were larger at the CSFs than at the rural wholesale market. This important 
result indicates that farmers had sidestepped the rural wholesale market to 
sell directly to traders at the place chosen by the farmers and traders. Thus, 
although the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Act (known as the
APMC Act) mandated that farmers must sell at the wholesale market in Agra, 
farmers and traders had chosen to ignore the APMC Act, because it was, as 
farmers and traders explained to the authors in supplementary interviews, 
more convenient in terms of transaction costs and intermediation information 
services for farmers to sell at the CSFs. The cold storage was displacing the 
wholesale market. CSFs in Agra had taken on a major role of facilitating 
trade, and thus they brought rural traders, Agra-based wholesalers, Delhi 
wholesalers, and traders from other states to compete at the CSFs as the 
venue for most trade. 
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Table 7.10 Composition of Potato Farmers’ Clients  
(% of farmers selling to buyer types: totals do not have to equal 100%)
Buyer Farm Size
 Marginal Small All
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh     
Village trader 4 8 6
Wholesaler in wholesale market 79 83 81
Trader at cold storage 17 9 13
Total 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of    
Did not sell 8 9 8
Broker 2 2 2
Wholesaler 62 64 63
Collection center belonging to company 0.77 0.53 0.63
Processing company 7 6 6
Government 0.77 0 0.31
Wholesaler of potato association 11 16 14
Farmer cooperative 8 2 4
Consumer 0.77 0.53 0.63
Total 100 100 100
India Marginal–
Small
Semi-
Medium
Medium–
Large
All
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
Village trader 23 25 25 23
Wholesaler on wholesale market 2 3 3 3
Cold storage owner 6 5 6 6
Trader at cold store 59 72 63 64
Supermarket 0 0 0.3 0.1
Others 8 4 4 5
Total 97 109 101 101
ha = hectare.
Third, by contrast, the share of the village trader intermediating at the farm 
or in the village was minor everywhere. The village traders had been cut 
out of intermediation at the farms and in the villages to a great extent in 
Bangladesh (where they had only 7% of farmers’ sales), the PRC (2%), and 
India (10%, although this involved 23% of the Indian farmers, showing that 
small volumes per farm were still sold to the local traders). 
The results show that intermediationally shorter value chains were emerging 
and CSFs were proliferating in rural areas, providing a convenient local venue
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Table 7.11 Composition of Potato Farmers’ Sales to their Clients 
(% of farmers’ total sales by type of buyer)
Buyer Farm Size
Marginal Small All
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh     
Village trader 4 11 7
Wholesaler in wholesale market 87 82 85
Trader at cold storage 9 7 8
Total 100 100 100
China, People’s Rep. of    
Share of farmers not selling 8 11 10
Broker (for commission) 2 1 2
Wholesaler 61 68 65
Company collection center 0 0.52 0.31
Processing company 2 3 3
Government sector 0.12 0 0.05
Wholesale arm of potato association 19 20 20
Farmer cooperative 16 6 10
Consumer 0.12 0.23 0.18
Total (with rounding error) 100 100 100
India Marginal–
Small
Semi-
Medium
Medium–
Large
All
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
Village trader 19 3 6 10
Wholesaler on wholesale market 11 1 8 7
Cold storage owner 1.0 0 0.2 0.4
Trader at cold storage 64 93 83 80
Supermarket 0 0 0.3 0.2
Other 5 3 3 3
Total (with rounding error) 100 100 100 100 
ha = hectare.
where farmers could find a plethora of traders and could take their potatoes 
directly from cold storage to traders’ or transporters’ trucks. In Bangladesh, 
the cold storage had not yet taken on this role, but the wholesale market 
traders had sidelined the traditional village traders by directly purchasing 
from farmers. 
Fourth, only in the PRC did potato cooperatives have a role, especially for 
the smaller farmers, who sold 16% of their volumes to cooperatives. The 
cooperatives’ market share was 10% overall. 
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Fifth, in Gansu, despite the relatively high share of processing potato varieties 
in total production, farmers sold very little directly to processors: only 2.6%. 
However, wholesalers who bought from the farmers then sold part to 
processors (see Chapter 8).
Sixth, conforming to a general finding of the whole study, few contracts 
were part of the potato value chains: Only 2.5% of Gansu potato farmers 
said they had contracts with a buyer, and the contracts were with processing 
or seed companies. None of the Indian or Bangladesh sample farmers had a 
contract with a buyer.
Finally, but not shown in the table, the use of mobile phones was an 
important part of farmers’ marketing behavior. Mobiles were widely available 
in the study’s rural areas. A large share (73%–97%) of the potato farmers in 
the supply areas owned mobile phones at the time of the survey. Except in 
Gansu, the farmers used the mobile phones extensively to set up deals with 
traders or receive information from CSFs (especially in India, where most 
of the trade took place “off-market”). This was a recent phenomenon, as a 
majority of the farmers had acquired their phones in the 4 years prior to the 
survey; less than a quarter of the farmers had a mobile phone before 2004. 
Potato Farmers’ Accessing or Providing Value-Chain Finance
Table 7.12 shows transactions involving credit in terms of shares of potato 
farmers getting advances from buyers or credit from CSFs, or de facto giving 
credit to buyers (by the buyers’ paying with a delay after receiving the 
potatoes). Three conclusions emerge from the data.
First, the traditional image is of farmers having relationships with traders wherein 
their receiving advances from the traders is “tied” to their committing to sell 
their harvests to those traders; this constitutes interlinkages between output 
and credit markets. During preparation for the survey, key informants said that 
they believed that these relationships were nearly universal, and represented 
an exploitation of the potato farmer by the trader; the extant literature gave 
the same information. In sharp contrast, the survey data showed that traders 
provided very little credit to potato farmers—the share of potato farmers getting 
advances was 1% in Bangladesh, 3% in the PRC, and 11% in India.
Second, by contrast, potato farmers de facto provided credit to traders, as 
farmers were in many cases paid by the traders only after a delay; this was 
the case for 24% of potato farmers in the Bangladesh study zone (with a
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Table 7.12 Potato Farmers and Credit (% of farms)
Credit Farm Size
 Marginal Small Total
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh     
Farmers getting advance 1 0 1
Farmers paid with delay 34 17 24
China, People’s Rep. of    
Farmers getting advance 4 2 3
Farmers paid with delay 14 11 12
India Marginal–
Small
Semi-
Medium
Medium–
Large
Total
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
Farmers receiving advances from buyer 12 8 13 11
Farmers paid with delay 45 46 47 46
Farmers using cold storage because it 
gives credit (against stored potatoes)
38 42 53 47
Share of farmers receiving (non-down-
payment) loans from cold storages
4 3 2 3
ha = hectare.
higher share among the smallest farms, at 34%); 12% in the PRC; and fully 
46% in India. These delays were much more common than in the case of rice, 
where nearly all the farmers were paid on the spot. The delay was usually a 
week to a few weeks while the trader sold the crop and then was able to pay 
the farmer.
Third, in India, 47% of the farmers received advances (which thus constitute 
value-chain finance) from the CSFs; this was biased toward the larger farmers, 
as only 38% of the smallest stratum versus 53% of the largest stratum 
got credit. By contrast, in Bangladesh, few farmers reported receiving credit 
from CSFs, or extension advice, potato seeds, or bags.
The share of Agra farmers getting credit from the CSFs rose by 50% during 
the decade. The farmers and the CSF respondents noted that this practice had 
spread as CSFs competed for farmers and traders as clients, and to induce 
farmers to forego immediate cash from selling at harvest and instead to store 
their crop and await higher prices. This is the first time the credit-providing 
role of CSFs has been brought out in the potato supply chain literature in 
general, or in the agricultural economics literature in India. 
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Performance of the Potato Farm Segment
Farm Yields
Table 7.13 shows yields of the main potato types in the study zones. The Agra 
zone had by far the highest yields of white potato of all the study zones—
averaging 25 tons/hectare (t/ha); this was 56% above the 16 t/ha yield in the 
study zones in Bangladesh and the PRC. Agra’s yields were also above the 
all-India average of 18 t/ha in 2004/05 (CPRI online n.d.), which would be 
expected, given that Agra is a commercialized and technologically intensive 
zone. Agra’s 25 t/ha yield is similar to that in other Indian commercial potato 
zones, such as Gujarat and Punjab. 
Interestingly, in Agra, the medium–small farmers’ yields were a third higher 
than those of the larger farmers. This is a common finding in the international 
literature, as the small-scale farmers apply labor more intensively, and all the 
farmers in the zone intensively used external inputs such as fertilizers and 
chemicals. Smaller farmers also had higher yields in Gansu. By contrast, in 
Bangladesh, small farms’ yields were 20% higher on average than marginal 
farms’ yields. This could be because the two farm strata were close in size 
but the small-scale farmers used more inputs than did the marginal farmers.
Table 7.13 Potato Farm Yields (tons/hectare)
Type of Potato, Year Farm Size
 Marginal Small Total
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh    
White potato, 2009 15 18 16
White potato, 1999 14 13 14
Red potato, 2009 13 13 13
Red potato, 1999 12 13 12
China, People’s Rep. of    
White potato, 2009 17 15 16
India Marginal–
Small
Semi- 
Medium
Medium–
Large
Total
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
White potato, 2009 29 27 20 25
ha = hectare, t = ton.
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Quality and Varietal Differentiation and Evolution  
among Potato Farmers
Table 7.14 shows the evolution of varietal change in the study zones. The 
most striking changes occurred in Bangladesh and the PRC. Much less change 
occurred in India, mainly because, as key informants noted, most of the big 
shift in varieties had occurred in the 1990s when the Indian government’s 
potato research system introduced new varieties at the same time as potato 
production spread across Agra’s farms. 
The table shows a rapid shift from red to white potatoes in the 2000s in 
the Bangladesh study zone. Beginning in the 1970s, several high-yielding 
varieties had been introduced in Bangladesh by the national agricultural 
research system (NARS) (CIP 2009). Most of them were white varieties, while 
traditional varieties were mostly red. Thus, the new white varieties appear to 
have been heavily adopted in the district studied in the last decade. A major 
advantage of the new white potato is its much higher yield: farmers reported 
the average yield of white potato was nearly 40% higher than that of the red 
potato (Table 7.13). Ilangantileke et al. (2000) reported that the lower yields 
of the traditional, mostly red, varieties were primarily due to degeneration of 
the seed stock and suboptimal production practices. 
Moreover, Bogra potato farm yields were increasing over the years. Key 
informants noted that the white potato stored better than traditional 
varieties, better varieties of white potatoes were available, and the seed stock 
of the traditional red potatoes had degenerated.
In Gansu, during the 5 years before the survey, production of processing 
varieties of potato dropped slightly (measured as share of farms or of output), 
with a marked shift especially by the smaller farmers from processing to table 
potato varieties (explained mainly by the latter commanding a better price).
Table 7.14 shows that, within the table and processing potato categories, 
there was a major “churning” of variety change, with experimentation by the 
farmers, extension agents, and the NARSs. 
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Table 7.14 Potato Farmers and Varietal Change (%)
Variety Farm Size Strata, Year
 Smaller Middle Upper Total
Bangladesh 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
Share of white potato  
in output
33 84 23 86 29 85
China, People’s Rep. of 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009
Share of farms growing 
processing variety
46 37 0 0 41 44 43 41
Share of potato 
production in 
processing variety
18 13 0 0 15 16 16 15
Share of farms growing 
table varieties 
62 78 … … 66 73 64 75
Share of potato 
production in  
table variety
89 85 … … 88 81 89 83
India (average shares of 
farms’ potato land)
1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009
Share of seed potato … 6 … 13 … 18 … 12
Share of nonseed potato … 94 … 87 … 82 … 88
White 3797 (kufri bahar) 
variety
89 82 96 96 94 89 93 88
White hybrids (satlej  
and pukhraj )
12 18 4 4 6 11 7 12
… = no data available.
In India, of the nearly 100 tons of potato the average farmer in the study 
zone sold, about 13% was seed potato, and the rest was table potato. 
No processing potatoes were sold. The varietal change story in the last 
decade in Agra was not dramatic; the share of the variety 3797 (kufri 
bahar) dropped slightly, from 93% to 88%, in favor of its rivals, 5857 (kufri 
satlej) and C-166 (kufri pukhraj). While larger farms relied a little more on 
3797, the difference was not striking—again contradicting expected large 
differences in behavior between small and large farmers. Key informants 
noted that the main varietal change had already occurred in the 1990s, 
when there was a big shift toward 3797, which had been developed by the 
NARS (the government’s Central Potato Research Institute). Characteristics 
informants attributed to the new white varieties include white flesh, good 
taste, strong skin (for long distance transport), and good yields (see also 
Pal, Singh, and Mathur 2006). The increased use of 3797 coincided with 
west Uttar Pradesh rising to become a main potato area in India (in 2009, it 
supplied 25% of India’s potatoes), and thus characteristics such as resilience 
to storage and shipping became important. 
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Potato Farmers’ Wastage in Transactions
Table 7.15 shows farmers’ reports of physical wastage from harvest to sale of 
the potato, and during storage, based on data on the last transaction (from 
sale at harvest or from storage). The concept of wastage as used here is from 
the perspective of the value-chain actors who, because they aim to maximize 
returns, will minimize wastage as much as possible. 
The survey data show that wastage rates in potato farm production, 
handling, and storage are much lower than conventionally asserted: only 
0.13%–0.51% in Agra and Bogra and 2.23% in Gansu.
However, value-chain analysis also discusses (1) wastage as the difference 
between optimal and actual performance, e.g., optimal versus actual yields 
achieved; and (2) wastage due to spoilage because of lack of CSFs, proper 
warehousing, and roads and trucking. To fully assess changes in wastage over 
time because of investments in the value chain such as the advent of cold 
storage and improved roads would require time series data that this study 
does not have. However, given the widespread adoption of cold storage in 
South Asia and investment in improved storage in the PRC, as well as major 
improvements in roads during the decade in all study zones, technological 
and infrastructural change are likely to have reduced the wastage over time. 
Table 7.15 Potato Farmers and Wastage (potatoes discarded, %)
Wastage Farm Size
 Marginal Small Total
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh 
Percent wasted 0.62 0.47 0.51
China, People’s Rep. of
Percent wasted, of which: 2.20 2.25 2.23
Harvesting to storage/market 0.16 0.21 0.19
In storage 2.00 2.00 2.00
After storage 0.04 0.04 0.04
India Marginal–
Small
Semi-
Medium
Medium–
Large
Total
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
Percent wasted 0.00 0.15 0.19 0.13
ha = hectare.
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Table 7.16 Potato Price at the Farm Gate ($ per ton)
Study Zone Farm Size
 Marginal Small Total
(<1 ha) (≥1 ha)
Bangladesh 179 214 202
China, People’s Rep. of  125 123 124
Marginal–
Small
Semi-
Medium
Medium–
Large
(<2 ha) (≥2 ha <4) (≥4 ha)
India  143 167 165 159
ha = hectare.
Prices Received by Potato Farmers
Table 7.16 shows that producer prices tended to diverge markedly between 
smaller and larger farmers in Bangladesh and India. But if sales timing 
(whether at harvest or from cold storage) is controlled for, the interstrata 
differences become insignificant. Prices were similar between the PRC and 
India, but Bangladesh’s farm price was much higher than the others. This 
difference roughly tracks the different costs of production. 
Conclusions
Most of the chapter’s key messages punch significant holes in the general 
views of Asia’s potato farmers as traditional, and of input and output markets 
as underdeveloped and static, and instead paint a picture of a ferment of 
change and development in this segment and the input and output markets 
that serve it. 
Two messages about farm assets are as follows: 
•	 Contrary to the “default” image of Asian farmers as operating millions 
of tiny farms, there was substantial heterogeneity in farm sizes, and 
some evidence of land concentration at least in the India study zone. 
The upshot of this is what the authors call in India the “30/70 rule”—
that 30% of the farms, especially the medium farms, occupied 70% 
of the area under potatoes, and thus in a sense dominated 70% of 
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the food supply chains to the major cities—even though the small 
and marginal farms predominated numerically. Moreover, land rental 
markets were developing rapidly, especially in the India study zone 
and to a certain extent in Bangladesh. 
•	 There was substantial heterogeneity among potato farmers within 
and across zones in nonland assets—livestock, farm equipment, and 
irrigation. This variation often tracked, rather than compensated for, 
farm size variation. Thus, the capital/land ratio was similar across 
farm strata, implying that labor scarcity may be increasing even for 
smaller farms.
There were vibrant land, labor, capital, and inputs markets. Four messages 
about the rapid development of input markets serving farmers are as follows: 
•	 In Bangladesh and India, tube well owners (larger potato farmers) 
were selling a lot of water to smaller farms bereft of tube wells. 
Moreover, private water markets in Bangladesh and India were a 
major development, spurred by the fact that larger farmers captured 
the great majority of the subsidies for tube wells for irrigation in 
India and then sold water to the small farmers without wells.
•	 Farmers were substantially engaged in rural nonfarm employment, 
especially in the PRC and India. This was by far dominated by local—not 
migratory—employment in the South Asian study zones. Local nonfarm 
employment was a major source of cash, which may help to explain 
why credit and output markets were no longer “tied” in these areas. 
•	 Farmers in all the study zones participated extremely broadly in seed, 
fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide markets; and in nearly all cases the 
smallest farmers were as fully engaged as, sometimes more than, 
the larger farmers. The state played a minor role in these markets in 
terms of direct sale of inputs.
•	 While the foregoing input market stories point to substantial 
“capital-led intensification” (in the words of Lele and Stone [1989]), 
the study found evidence of modest yield growth, especially from 
variety change. 
Finally, a set of messages, some surprising, about the rapidly transforming 
output market, follow. 
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•	 Small- and medium-scale potato farms were commercial businesses, 
selling to those who offered the best price, focused on supplying the 
cities, and responsive to technology and the market. 
•	 In most of the study zones, potato value chains were apparently 
shifting from traditional to an intermediate stage of transformation. 
The traditional rural middleman or village trader role was in decline, 
and farmers were increasingly selling directly to wholesale markets, 
with CSFs as new intermediation venues. 
•	 The rapid rise of modern CSFs, particularly in the South Asia sites, is an 
extremely important phenomenon. Storage resulted in higher prices 
for farmers, lower wastage in the system, new venues of facilitated 
intermediation as an option to the old wholesale market system, 
and access to new sources of extension and seed. The rise of cold 
storage technology had changed the market behavior of key actors 
in the chain—all of whom were responding to increasing incomes 
while providing stable prices for potatoes, year-round supply of the 
highly seasonal crop, and change in the type of potatoes (abetted 
by the NARS introducing new varieties). Farmers’ access to CSFs had 
few barriers, so their use was very widespread. 
•	 The specter of massive wastage in food supply chains in Asia is 
often evoked but seldom empirically tested with detailed data from 
sample surveys. This study found the wastage to be very modest. 
Investments in CSFs and roads appear to have helped keep the 
wastage low in the system.
•	 Whereas the traditional literature on food markets in Asia emphasizes 
(rightly, in the historical context) the linkage between credit and 
output markets—where traders “tie” output transactions to credit 
for the coming harvest—the study found this now to be rare in 
potato production. Nonfarm income, mobile phones, multiple 
trading sites, better roads, and other forms of credit seem to have 
undermined the old tie over time. However, CSFs (especially in India) 
had become major purveyors of value-chain finance to farmers. 
•	 While the authors expected small-scale farmers to receive lower 
prices than medium and larger farmers, this was rarely the case. The 
hypothesized bargaining and social capital power of medium and 
larger farmers was not observed via differential prices. 
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•	 Mobile phones were important in facilitating change in the farmers’ 
interface with the potato market. Mobile phones are cheap and 
versatile, assisting farmers to overcome asymmetries of market 
information, and ensuring connectivity.
•	 Technological change in the form of new seed varieties was an 
important driver of farm-level transformation. Regardless of farm 
size, the adoption of new varieties was rapid. This showed the 
strategic role of the NARS in disseminating new varieties and the 
farmers’ rapid response to and uptake of the new varieties when 
spurred on by output market incentives. 
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Much of the policy discussion concerning food security in Asia assumes that the value chains of basic produce staples such as potatoes are still essentially dominated by “traditional” players and structures. That 
view appears to carry with it the following assumptions about the midstream 
segment of potato value chains, as expressed by many key informants and in 
policy discussions. First, potato cold storage is very underdeveloped. Second, 
the potato wholesale system remains as it was decades ago: a long chain 
wherein urban wholesalers buy from traders who bring the product from rural 
wholesale markets. Third, the wholesale markets in turn depend on a web 
of rural brokers or village traders who are the main interface between the 
farmer and the market, an interface characterized by exploitative “tied output–
credit markets.”
Where the midstream segments of the potato value chain do enter the policy 
debate, they tend to evoke fears of speculation, as recently occurred in the 
Indian onion crisis. Yet few hard data are used in the debate. 
To assess the extent to which “traditional” potato midstream segments 
(wholesale, storage, and processing) persist or have transformed, and the key 
characteristics of any transformation, this chapter marshals evidence from 
the midstream surveys of potato cold storage and traders in Bangladesh, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and India, The new findings presented show 
that the structure of the midstream segments of the potato value chains has 
transformed markedly in the areas under study; the findings indicate that the 
current value chaims no longer conform to the traditional image of the chain 
presented above. 
Midstream—Transformation  
of the Potato Cold Storage  
and Trading Segments
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Structure of the Cold Storage Segment
Because potato farming in the study zones takes place primarily in one season, 
storage is needed. Three storage methods were used in the study zones.
The first was traditional or “rustic” storage on farm. In India, this involved 
storing potatoes in a field in a shaded spot; in a storehouse at ambient 
temperature, covered with straw or stalks; or in a farmhouse, in a bag or 
earthen pot. The storage typically entailed a few kilograms to a few tons. These 
methods are good for 2–3 months, after which heat, humidity, and heavy rains 
create problems (Fuglie et al. 1997, Khatana et al. 1997). The second method 
was an improved version of the first, using, for example, reinforced tunnels on 
or near the farm, as in Gansu.
The third method was the modern refrigerated warehouse, or cold storage 
facility (CSF).  Lowering the temperature during storage allows potatoes to be 
stored for longer periods than with the first two methods, and to be marketed 
later in the year when no production is possible. Table and seed potatoes are 
usually cold stored at 2–4°C. Most of the CSFs in the South Asian region are 
used for potatoes.
During the 1980s and 1990s, potato storage in South Asia was shifting from 
traditional to modern storage. Heavy investment in storage continued into 
the 2000s as potato production soared. For example, by the mid-1990s, India 
had about 7 million tons of cold storage capacity. The great majority of this 
was in the private sector, which had expanded both because of the rapid 
growth in potato production and because of government subsidies for private 
investments and government investments in the local electricity grid (Fuglie et 
al. 1997). The potato sector in both Bangladesh and India then grew faster 
than the population, an expansion made possible because the availability of 
improved storage allowed for increased consumption of potatoes year-round.
In Gansu in the PRC, the traditional in-field storage methods had been displaced 
by improved on-farm and near-farm storage by farmers, and by traders’ cold 
storage cellars. Of the traders’ storage facilities, only 30% were the traditional 
variety (caves dug into the mountain)—68% were large tunnels with air 
circulation, and 1.4% were refrigerated modern cold storage facilities such as 
in the India and Bangladesh study zones. Key informants in Gansu noted that 
refrigeration was not needed due to the cold climate. However, the authors 
noted that as spring starts, about 5 months before the coming harvest, the 
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weather warms and cellars are less effective than refrigerated cold storage. 
Most (81%) of the traders’ cellars and tunnels were built during 2005–2010; 
only 11% had been constructed during 2000–2004, 7% in the 1990s, and 
1% in the 1980s. Traders’ use of cellars was partly subsidized indirectly by the 
government: 25% of the cellars were on land the government provided to 
traders. Among traders with cellars, the average cellar capacity had increased 
from 180 tons in 2000 to 3,000 tons (large cellars) by 2009. The average 
capacity of the cellars was 991 tons (about 15 times smaller than those in the 
Bangladesh and India study zones). As the median in Gansu was only 120 
tons, the great majority of traders owned small storage facilities and only a 
few owned large ones.
Several factors may explain why modern potato cold storage was less developed 
among farmers and traders in the PRC study zone than in the study zones 
in India and Bangladesh. All three sites had conditions in the cold or cooler 
period when storage in cellars or caves constituted “improved” storage and 
thus was a partial substitute for modern cold storage. But improved storage 
may have been cheaper in Gansu than in the warmer study zones in South 
Asia. Moreover, Beijing potato wholesalers procured from a variety of zones 
and so had a less sharply seasonal supply of fresh potatoes than was observed 
in Bangladesh and India. This may account for the observed low rate of storage 
in Gansu, regardless of storage method. Finally, the Indian state governments 
(e.g., in the commercial potato zones of Gujarat, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh) 
had subsidized the construction of CSFs, unlike in Gansu, and had invested 
heavily in power grids. For these reasons, the following discussion focuses on 
the cold storage segment in the South Asian sites.
Table 8.1 shows the development and capacities of cold storage in the 
Bangladesh and India rural study areas. Several points are salient.
First, in both areas, the average start-up was in the mid-1990s. In India, 74% 
of the CSFs started operating in the 1990s, and most of the rest in the 2000s. 
In both countries, the (currently) smaller CSFs were started in the 1980s or 
1990s, and the larger ones in the 2000s. 
Key informants noted several reasons for the rapid spread of the CSFs. (1) There 
was rapid growth in demand for potatoes in the off-season near the production 
areas in Dhaka and Delhi as those cities grew and incomes rose. (2) Potato 
production in the study zones grew rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s. (3) CSF 
establishment was encouraged and enabled by an increase in the availability of 
electricity as the government made major investments in the electricity grid in
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Table 8.1 Cold Storage Capacity and Diffusion: Bangladesh and India
Storage Capacity
 All
Bangladesh  
Year of start-up 1996
Storage capacity at start-up, if started before 2000 (tons) 5,825
Storage capacity at start-up, if started after 2000 (tons) 7,668
Storage capacity, 2001 (tons) 9,240
Storage capacity at start-up (tons) 6,468
Capacity increase (2009/start-up) 43%
Current value of cold storage (self-reported, $ million) 2.9
Capacity utilization in 2009 (average) 84%
CSFs operating at 100% capacity (share) 70%
CSFs operating at 65%–99% capacity (share) 15%
CSFs operating at less than 65% capacity (share) 15%
Potato type in total potato storage
Seed potato (share in 2009) 37%
Seed potato (share in 1999) 61%
Table varieties, for sale (share in 2009) 43%
Table varieties, for sale (share in 1999) 22%
Processing varieties (share in 2009) 20%
Processing varieties (share in 1999) 17%
India Small 
(<7,000 
tons)
Medium 
(7,000–
10,000 
tons)
Large 
(>10,000 
tons)
All
Share of CSFs starting before 1990s 18% 0 0 6%
Share of CSFs starting in 1990s 64% 82% 78% 74%
Share of CSFs starting in 2000 and after 18% 18% 22% 19%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Average start-up year 1989 1998 1997 1994
Average storage capacity at start-up (1,000 tons) 4.4 7.8 12.8 8.1
Average storage capacity, 2009 (1,000 tons) 7.7 12.7 23.9 14.2
Growth in capacity (2009/start-up) 75%
Current value of CSF (self-reported, $ million) 0.6 0.9 1.3 0.9
CSF capacity utilization (share of capacity in tons) 
October–December 5% 3% 2% 3%
January–March (harvest) 73% 58% 26% 45%
April–June 100% 95% 46% 76%
July–September 42% 39% 19% 33%
Average capacity utilization over the year 73% 65% 31% 51%
CSFs storing (share, multiple answers possible)     
Table potato 100% 100% 100% 100%
Seed potato 64% 64% 78% 68%
Processing variety 9% 9% 0 7%
CSF = cold storage facility.
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the zones. (4) Government provided subsidies to establish and expand CSFs in 
the 1990s and the 2000s. (5) In the Agra case, regulations regarding pollution 
near the Taj Mahal limited industrial investment and served to funnel business 
investment toward CSFs in the 2000s.
Second, the capacity of the average CSF in both zones was large (in comparison 
with the PRC study zone). In 2009 in Bangladesh, the CSFs averaged 9,240 tons, 
and in India, 14,200 tons. However, the utilization rate was higher in Bangladesh, 
so that the average utilized capacity was about 7,000 tons in each country. 
Yet the India data show substantial differentiation of capacities among CSFs. 
An inventory of CSFs obtained from the government in Agra shows that in 
2009, the study zone had 182 registered CSFs—25% in the large category, 
34% medium, and 41% small. Thus, there was only modest concentration: 
the large and medium categories had 59% of the units, but 75% of the total 
volume stored (about 1.5 million tons). The sample for the current study’s 
survey had only slightly higher representation of large and medium CSFs 
(29% and 35%, respectively), so the figures presented here are essentially 
representative of the zone.
The large cold storage stratum averaged three times the capacity of the small 
stratum. The capacity utilization rate fell as the size increased. Multiplying the 
capacity utilization rates times the capacities of the strata gives the utilized 
capacity, which differed by a factor of 1.25 between the small and large 
Indian CSFs.
Third, CSFs entail major investments (compared with farm-level investments 
in irrigation or vehicles, or with rural traders’ investments in small warehouses 
or trucks). The CSFs reported that their worth in 2009 was about $3 million 
in Bangladesh and nearly $1 million in India. In India, the investment cost per 
ton of potato sold was $64 ($890,000/14,000 tons)—somewhat below the 
$100/ton reported in the authors’ recent study in Bihar (Minten et al. 2010). 
Moreover, the investment included both establishment and expansion of the 
CSFs. In Bangladesh, the average capacity was increased by 43% (during the 
roughly 12 years since start-up), and in India, by 75%. The increase entailed 
adding capacity to existing CSFs (such as additional buildings), and a shift 
toward starting up larger CSFs over the years.
Clearly, such large investments in CSFs were not feasible for small and medium 
farmers;  key informants said that the large and medium CSFs were typically 
set up by industrialists or larger farmers in the area. But not all the Indian 
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cold storage owners were from the nonfarm business sector. Interestingly, 
about a quarter of cold storage owners (with a similar share across cold storage 
size  strata) were also potato farmers, but none were wholesalers (unlike in 
the PRC study sample, where the wholesalers owned the off-farm tunnel 
storages) or processors (possibly because the share of potatoes going to 
processing was small). 
Fourth, the combination of factors driving the rapid expansion of cold storage 
also led to overexpansion. The capacity utilization rates averaged only 51% 
in Agra—the rates were as low as 31% for the large CSFs and a healthy 73% 
for the smaller ones. In Bangladesh, the rates averaged 70% (at full capacity), 
although 15% of the CSFs were operating at below 65% capacity. This indicates 
that some attrition and consolidation may occur in the segment in both study 
areas, and further investment is likely in areas such as Bihar and eastern Uttar 
Pradesh that are currently underserved by cold storage but where potato 
production is expanding rapidly.
Fifth, all the CSFs dealt in table potatoes. Most also dealt in seed potatoes, 
although farmers’ storage of their own seed potatoes was declining, as 
farmers relied increasingly on the seed market. In Bangladesh, for example, 
seed potatoes comprised 61% of all potatoes stored in 1999; by 2009 that 
share was 37%. In India, only 9% of the potatoes farmers put in cold storage 
were for their own use as seed (see Chapter 7). Few CSFs dealt in the varieties 
of potato used for processing; as noted in Chapter 2, processing was a very 
minor use of potatoes in Bangladesh and India.
Conduct of the Potato Cold Storage Segment
Seasonality of Supply from Cold Storage to Cities
Figure 8.1 shows the total supply from the Bangladesh potato study area 
to Dhaka, and uses the cold store data to estimate the share of cold stored 
potatoes in the total supply. During the harvest period, when potato volumes 
traded are high, almost all potatoes in the market were fresh potatoes. Hence, 
in January–March the share of stored potatoes in the total supply was about 
15%; by April–June, the share was 57%. During July–November, essentially the 
entire potato supply in Dhaka had been stored. Overall, an estimated 65% of 
potatoes consumed in Dhaka had been in cold storage (projecting from the 
supply from the study zone, which is a major supplier).
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Figure 8.1 Share of Potatoes from Cold Storage Facilities  
in Dhaka’s Potato Supply 
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Figure 9.1  Share of Cold Stored Potato in Dhaka’s Potato Supply
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Figure 8.2 is the counterpart for Delhi of Figure 8.1 for Dhaka. The importance 
of cold-storage in the supply of potato to Delhi is estimated by examining the 
share of cold stored potatoes in the Agra supply of potatoes to Delhi by season 
and overall. Agra and the rest of western Uttar Pradesh supplied 66% of the 
potatoes to Delhi, so the approximation may be close. In January–March (the 
Agra harvest season), only 10% of the potato supply to Delhi was from cold 
storage; by April–June this rose to 83%. In July–September, the share was 93%, 
and it then declined to 86% in October–December as the early harvest came in.
Thus, 68% of all potatoes sent from Agra to Delhi had been cold stored, which 
may approximate the share in Delhi’s total consumption.
In summary, CSFs are important for urban food security by extending the 
seasons during which potatoes are available. At the same time, the growing 
demand for potatoes from Delhi was a key driver of the rise of the cold storage 
segment, the development of which is a virtuous cycle for food security. 
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Figure 8.2 Share of Cold-Stored Potatoes in Delhi’s Total
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Seasonality of Storage Activity
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show the seasonality of cold storage in the Bangladesh and 
India study zones. The similarity of the patterns is striking. The CSFs in both 
zones shut down around November–January for cleaning and maintenance. 
The potato harvest starts arriving in January–February, and the stored bags 
have all been added by the end of March. From April to November–December, 
stocks are released fairly smoothly onto the market (by the owners of the 
stocks, mainly farmers and traders). Waiting longer gets a better price, but 
selling earlier generates needed cash income. 
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Figure 8.3 Monthly Potato Storage per Cold Storage Facility: Bangladesh  
(October 2008–October 2009)
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Figure 9.3  Monthly Potato Volume per Cold Stor ge 
(84 kg bags, Oct 2008–Oct 2009) 
Figure 8.4 Monthly Potato Storage per Cold Storage Facility: Agra  
(80-kg bags, October 2008–September 2009)
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Figure 9.4  Monthly Potato Volume per Cold Storage in Agra 
(80 kg bags,  Oct 2008–Sep 2009)
kg = kilogram.
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Cold Storage Clients: Composition, Procurement, and Sales
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the composition of cold storage clients—the sources 
of the potatoes stored. The total number of clients in Bangladesh was 554, 
versus 315 in India. However, the average Bangladesh CSF stored 9,000 tons, 
at an average of 16 tons per client (although each trader client owned 8 times 
as many bags as each farmer client). In India, the CSFs averaged 14,000 tons, 
at 44 tons per client. This reflects the differences in farm size and trader scale 
between the two study zones.
Moreover, in both countries, farmers formed the great majority of the CSFs’ 
clienteles—81% in Bangladesh and 91% in India. Yet in Bangladesh, farmers 
had a mere 40% of the stored volume and traders, each of which had a 
larger volume  of stored potatoes than the average farmer, took 56% of the 
stored volume. The traders’ share of the stored volume had grown steadily in 
Table 8.2 Bangladesh: Cold Storage Clients 
Client Number or Share
Farmers who used cold storage 451
Traders who used cold storage 103
Share of stored volume owned by farmers, 2009 40%
Share of stored volume owned by farmers, 1999 60%
Share of stored volume owned by traders, 2009 56%
Share of stored volume owned by traders, 1999 35%
Share of stored volume owned by cold storage owners, 2009 4%
Share of stored volume owned by cold storage owners, 1999 5%
Table 8.3 India: Cold Storage Clients and Procurement Sources
Item Storage Size
 Small 
(<7,000 
tons)
Medium 
(7,000–
10,000 
tons)
Large 
(>10,000 
tons)
All
Number of farmers storing potatoes per CSF 178 301 399 286
Number of traders storing potatoes per CSF 17 40 31 29
Procurement sources (shares of volume)
Brought directly by farmers for storage 74% 70% 75% 73%
Brought by rural brokers to store for themselves 17% 18% 15% 16%
Brought by traders from wholesale markets to store 
for themselves
0 1% 3% 1%
Brought by the CSF itself 9% 11% 7% 10%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
CSF = cold storage facility.
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Bangladesh, from only 35% in 1999. Cold storage owners owned only 4% of 
the volume. Farmers and traders had been attracted to cold storage as a way of 
extending their sales seasons and thus raising the average price they secured, 
but Bangladesh potato traders had captured an increasing share of the “pie” 
of storage gains. 
The situation was different in India. Farmers owned 73% of the stocks (similarly 
across CSF strata), nearly twice the share as in Bangladesh, and traders 
controlled only 17% (this was mainly the village traders, with only 1% from 
rural wholesale market traders). The lower share of traders in India could result 
from the average farm being larger in the potato zone in western Uttar Pradesh 
than in the Bangladesh study zone, or from the declining role of village traders 
over time. The declining role is partly due to the rising importance of the CSF 
as a point of intermediation (discussed further below).
The India finding that farmers were an important share of the CSF clients is 
significant from the perspective of the debate on CSF development in the 
1990s and early 2000s. As recently as the mid-1990s, conventional wisdom 
was that larger farmers would use modern CSFs while the small-scale farmers 
would not be able to afford them (Fuglie et al. 1997). The authors think that 
this assumption induced the International Potato Center and others, even 
in the India study area, to emphasize improving on-farm traditional storage 
(which had nearly disappeared from use in the study zone a decade later). 
Indeed, the study found that all farm strata were generally using cold storage 
by the end of the 2000s.
Table 8.4 reports the responses of Agra cold storage managers to the question 
of where they sold the potatoes that they purchased. Their potato purchases 
comprised only a small share (10%) of all the potatoes they stored, as the great 
majority of their storage was a service for a fee. But it is interesting to examine 
what they did with the potatoes purchased, as in future they may increase their 
potato purchase to take over trading per se, just as they captured from the 
wholesale markets the provision of an exchange venue. Most (64%) of the CSFs’ 
own (purchased) stock was sold other than to Uttar Pradesh or Delhi, and mainly 
to the south Indian states. This makes sense, as traders from the south directly 
sourced from the main northern production zone (Agra and other western Uttar 
Pradesh areas) rather than from Delhi, where they would have had to incur 
further intermediation costs. The finding was corroborated by the traders and 
cold storage key informants, who noted that interregional trade had increased 
in the last decade, with increasing amounts of their potatoes heading to the 
south in the off-season. This underscores what appears to be the emergence 
of a national potato market. Equally surprising is the composition of buyers of 
potatoes stored by the CSFs for their own sales. The stored potatoes were not 
mainly going first to the local 
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Table 8.4 India: Cold Storage Facilities’ Sales from Own (purchased) Stocks: 
Destinations (%) 
Item Capacity Storage
 Small 
(<7,000 
tons)
Medium 
(7,000–
10,000 
tons)
Large 
(>10,000 
tons)
All
Where sold (shares of sales from own stocks) 
Agra (same district) 14 13 16 15
Uttar Pradesh outside Agra 15 14 18 16
Delhi 8 3 6 5
North and West Indian states 9 8 3 7
South Indian states 53 52 52 53
Eastern Indian states 2 10 5 4
Total 100 100 100 100
To whom sold (shares of sales from own stocks)
At wholesale market in Agra  
(own district)
8 8 10 9
Delhi-based trader 6 3 1 3
Local rural broker 0 0 2 1
Brokers/wholesalers from outside Agra 
and Delhi
86 88 85 86
Traditional retailers in Agra directly 1 1 2 1
Total 100 100 100 100
rural wholesale market, to be channeled on to other markets; rather, there was a 
disintermediation, with about 86% of the potatoes bought directly from the CSFs 
by brokers and wholesalers from other districts and states. Only 9% went. Only 9% 
went to the rural wholesale market in Agra. Traders at the CSFs noted that the rise 
of cold storage had meant side-stepping the local wholesale market. This is made 
even more interesting, given that the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee
Act (known as the APMC Act) required trade to go via the wholesale 
market—clearly the forces of the market were shaping the realities. Also, 
only 1% of the stored potatoes went to local retail—another indication that 
this was a commercial farming area with all of India as its main market. 
Cold Storage Facilities’ Provision of Value-Chain Finance
Table 8.5 shows that CSFs were substantially engaged in providing value-
chain finance to their clients. Surprisingly high shares of CSFs—large and small 
alike—provided advances to their clientele in both Bangladesh and India. In 
India, 84% of the CSFs provided credit to farmers before they stored potatoes, 
and 97% did so after they stored; in Bangladesh, the shares were 15% and 
55%, respectively. The impact on farmers’ credit access was broad: in India, 
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57% of potato farmers (large and small) using CSFs took credit (in the form 
of advance payments using the stored or to-be-stored potato as collateral) 
from the CSFs. In Bangladesh, 30% of the CSF users got such credit and 39% 
of the bags in storage were used as collateral to guarantee the loans to the 
farmers. Typical advances were as high as $7.20 on a bag valued at $23.70 
when sold off-season. This seems better than using land as collateral, as required 
by some other credit mechanisms. In Bangladesh, the interest rates the CSFs 
charged were low, averaging 8% for the duration of storage (averaging roughly 
6 months), and in line with or even lower than formal sector interest rates. 
The Indian CSFs charged 12% interest (also for the duration of storage) on the 
advances. For another study the authors have done in western Uttar Pradesh, 
farmers reported 9% yearly interest on bank credit via Kisaan Credit Cards. As the 
cold storage advance was for half a year, the credit was fairly costly; however, 
only a third of farmers were getting credit of any kind, and the 12% rate was 
probably below the village moneylender’s rate (see Reardon et al. 2011 for a 
farm survey on rural business hubs catchment areas in Uttar Pradesh).
Table 8.5 Cold Storage Facilities’ Provision of Value-Chain Finance 
Item Cold Storage Size
 
Small 
(<7,000 
tons)
Medium 
(7,000–
10,000 
tons)
Large 
(>10,000 
tons) All
Bangladesh
Share of CSFs that provided advance payments 
before storage
15%
Share of CSFs that provided advance payments 
after storage
55%
If yes, share of users that cold storages gave 
advances to 
30%
If yes, advance given per bag ($/kg) 0.08
Share of bags that credit was given for (% using 
bags as collateral) 
39%
India
Share of CSFs that provided advance payments to 
farmers before storage
73% 91% 89% 84%
Share of farmers per CSF, who got advance from 
CSF before storage
22% 29% 31% 27%
Share of CSFs that provided advance payments 
after start of storage
91% 100% 100% 97%
Share of users per CSF who got advances from 
CSF after start of storage
35% 26% 31% 30%
Rs/kg as advance given per CSF 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9
Share of tons stored per CSF, on which the CSF 
provided advances (using bags as collateral)
4% 4% 4% 4%
CSF = cold storage facility, kg = kilogram, Rs = Indian rupees.
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While formal channels in Bangladesh and India had made significant efforts to 
launch warehouse receipt systems, action by CSFs seems to have outpaced these 
efforts at least in the study area. CSFs were active in credit markets, and they 
increasingly competed among each other to attract customers based on the 
advances given (as indicated by storage owners during interviews). The farmer 
surveys (reported in Chapter 7) also confirmed CSFs as important providers of 
credit. This is interesting, especially from the perspective of the recent debate. 
In the 1990s, the debate concerned farmers not wanting to use cold storage 
because they would forego the cash at harvest. Clearly, the CSFs anticipated this 
problem, and addressed it in the 2000s by releasing cash as credit during the 
cropping season.
Other Services of Cold Storage Facilities
Table 8.6 shows services other than storage and finance that CSFs provided 
to clients. The most important finding is that CSFs had started to engage in 
facilitating or intermediating transactions. In Bangladesh, 55% of the CSFs 
reported putting clients in contact with potential buyers, and the CSFs that 
did this, did so for fully 62% of their users—thus, roughly a third of all their 
clients received this intermediation service. India’s CSFs lagged somewhat 
behind those of Bangladesh in this practice, as only a third of them provided 
such intermediation and they did it only for a small share (5%) of their clients. 
For the South Asian sites, this appeared to be a part of the general shift of the 
locus of potato trade to the CSFs (as noted in Chapter 7). As the data show 
and local key informants in the wholesale markets noted, the CSF had largely 
displaced the wholesale market as the venue for potato exchanges.
Moreover, in Bangladesh, all the CSFs reported that they arranged farmers’ 
access to seed, if needed. In India, 61% of the CSFs (especially the larger ones) 
arranged access to seed. However, few farmers actually accessed seed via the 
CSFs—as proved both by the CSFs’ reports and the data in Chapter 7. The CSFs 
provided little by way of chemicals and extension. In Bangladesh, 80% of the 
CSFs provided grading and sorting services, but in India, only 10% of them 
(and mainly the large ones) provided these services.
Finally, the CSFs in Bangladesh were not much involved in transport: 5% 
of them provided transport from farm to cold storage and none provided 
transport to the buyer.
In summary, the CSFs had branched out from providing storage and finance 
to intermediating (facilitating transactions by informing clients about potential 
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buyers for their potatoes); facilitating the transactions taking place at their 
site; and providing inputs and services (seed; information; grading and sorting; 
and, in India, transport). This made CSFs both competitive and complementary 
with the trader community they served, as well as a major alternative for credit 
and for an exchange venue. Consequently, farmers and traders were attracted 
to the CSFs.
Table 8.6 Other Services of Cold Storage Facilities (%)
Service Share Provided by Cold Storage
 Small 
(<7,000 
tons)
Medium 
(7,000–
10,000 
tons)
Large 
(>10,000 
tons)
All
Bangladesh
Arranged farmers’ access to seed potato 100
If yes, share of farmers that got access 
through CSFs 
52
Arranged farmers’ access to chemicals/
pesticides 
0
Provided agricultural extension services to 
farmers 
10
Contacted buyers and arranged transactions 
for storers
55
If yes, share of users put in contact  
with buyers 
62
Provided grading and sorting services 80
Provided transport from farm to CSF 5
Provided transport from CSF to buyer 0
India
Arranged farmers’ access to seed potato 55 55 78 61
Farmers per CSF, who accessed seed potato 
through the CSF
11 9 13 11
Contacted farmers on request of traders and 
arranged transactions 
46 22 44 36
Contacted traders on request of farmers and 
arranged transactions 
18 18 22 19
Users per CSF put in contact with buyers  
by the CSF 
6 5 5 5
Provided grading and sorting services 9 0 22 10
Provided transport from farm to CSF 100 100 100 100
Provided transport from CSF to buyer 100 100 100 100
CSF = cold storage facility.
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Performance of the Cold Storage Segment 
Evolution of the Variety of Potatoes Stored
Table 8.7 focuses on Bangladesh, where there was a large shift in the last 
decade from red to white potato varieties, and out of the granola variety, partly 
into white diamond, in the storage patterns of the cold storages. (There was no 
significant shift in potato variety or in the composition of cold-stored potatoes 
during the same decade in India.) This reflected the same shift in production in 
the study zone—farmers shifted to white potato because of yield advantages, 
and to white diamond because of disease problems with granola. 
Table 8.7 Type of Potato Stored in Bangladesh, 1999 and 2009 (%)
Type of Potato 1999 2009
White versus red potato
White 31 72
Red 69 28
Total 100 100
Type of white potato 
Diamond 17 48
Granola 68 1
Other 15 51
Total 100 100
Cold Storage Costs
Table 8.8 shows the CSFs’ yearly operating costs. Several interesting points 
emerge from the table and other findings in the survey. 
First, although (in terms of utilized capacity, not capacity per se) the Bangladesh 
and India CSFs were about the same scale, the total operating cost of $340,000 
per year for the Bangladesh CSFs was far above the $262,000 in India. Most of 
the difference was due to higher costs for energy used by CSFs in Bangladesh. 
Energy costs formed fully 63% of total CSFs’ costs in Bangladesh and 71% of 
costs in India. About 80% of the energy cost was for electricity. This shows 
the important link between energy costs and food security, and is a concern 
given the increasing costs of energy and the implications for carbon emissions. 
Moreover, while the utilized capacity averages were the same in both countries, 
the yearly energy outlay in India
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Table 8.8 Average Annual Operating Costs per Cold Storage  
(in $’000; figures in parentheses are in % of cost)
Item Storage Capacity
Small 
(<7,000 
 tons)
Medium 
(7,000–
10,000 tons)
Large 
 (>10,000  
tons)
All
Bangladesh
Yearly costs of permanent 
employees 
 12 (3.5)
Yearly costs of temporary 
employees 
 34 (10)
Electricity  177 (52)
Diesel  38 (11) 
Other  79 (23)
Total  340 (100)
India
Permanent employees  10 (6)  16 (7)  34 (8)  19 (7)
Temporary employees  1.8 (1)  1.1 (0.4) 0.2  1.1 (0.4)
Electricity  100 (60)  149 (64)  198 (49)  149 (57)
Diesel  16 (10)  29 (12)  67 (17)  36 (14)
Ammonia gas  4 (3)  4 (2)  16 (4)  9 (3)
Compression oil  7 (4)  9 (4)  13 (3)  9 (3)
Telephone/mobile bills  0.9 (1)  1.3 (0.6)  1.8 (0.4)  1.3 (1)
Fees and taxes  1 (0.5)  1 (0.3)  22 (5)  1 (0.4)
Other  27 (16)  22 (9)  51 (13)  36 (14)
Total operating costs (summing to 
100% with rounding error)
 168 (100)  233 (100)  403 (100)  262 (100)
was $185,000 but in Bangladesh it was about 16% higher, at $215,000. This 
could be from higher unit costs of energy, use of more energy to achieve the 
same degree of cooling, or both. Interestingly, there was a twofold difference 
in energy expenditures between large and small CSFs in India, although there 
was only a 1.25-fold difference in utilized capacity. Thus, the large CSFs were 
especially energy-intensive (and perhaps energy inefficient), given that all the 
CSFs faced about the same energy prices in the same area of India.
Second, after energy, labor was the next highest single cost, although it formed 
only 13.5% of total costs in Bangladesh and 7.4% in India. This cost share is very 
small relative to that in farming. Cold storage is capital-intensive, rather than 
labor-intensive. However, the CSFs’ labor outlay in Bangladesh was more than 
twice that in India, despite similar utilized capacities, roughly similar mechanical 
technologies, and similar labor wages (at least for day labor) in the two countries. 
Thus, it appears that the Bangladesh CSFs overspent on labor. While this may 
have spurred rural employment, it may also have entailed a cost to consumers.
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Third, in India, as just noted, the large cold storage stratum had a utilized 
capacity of 7,400 tons, which was 1.25 times that of the small one, at 5,900 
tons. But the cost ratio was 2.5. Thus, rather than having economies of scale, 
the large strata in India had twice the cost per ton stored of the small cold 
storages. By contrast, the ratio of utilized capacity and the ratio of costs 
between the medium and small strata were 1.4:1 each. Hence, inefficiencies 
are apparent in the large CSFs. This may be linked to the substantial electricity 
costs for cooling large storage areas.
Cold Storage Facilities’ Profit Rates and Internal Rates of Return
Table 8.9 shows profit rates and internal rates of return of CSFs. The rates are 
gross of amortization, and thus overstate profit. Even so, they are quite modest 
relative to profit rates that the study found for the trader and retail segments. 
The Indian profit rates are somewhat above the Bangladesh rate. 
Given the relatively large fixed costs for this type of operation, the internal 
rates of return are quite sensitive to the capacity of the CSF that is used in 
the calculation. Using simplified assumptions for costs and benefits (uniform 
prices charged at the median; no costs imposed for services delivered in input, 
output, and financial markets), the internal rate of return at the average 
capacity in 2009 was evaluated at 7.4% for Bangladesh and 5.0% for large 
and 2.0% for small CSFs in India. For Bangladesh, financial internal rates of
Table 8.9 Profit Rates and Internal Rates of Return  
for Cold Storage Facilities (%)
Rate Cold Storage Size
Small 
(<7,000  
tons)
Medium 
(7,000–
10,000 tons)
Large  
(>10,000  
tons)
All
Bangladesh
Profit rate 9
Internal rate of return at
Current capacity (81%) 7
Full capacity (100%) 42
90% of capacity 23
78% of capacity 2
India
Profit rate 3 17 28 16
Internal rate of return at
Current capacity (51%) 2 4 5 4
100% of capacity 6 10 12 9
80% of capacity 5 6 8 6
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return decline quickly from a high 42.0% at full capacity to 23.0% at 90% use 
of capacity, to 1.8% at 78% use of capacity. Below this capacity, CSFs would 
not be able to repay investments. Using the distribution of used capacity, this 
finding implies that 25% of the CSFs were running losses in Bangladesh (as 
their capacity was significantly below 78%), while the others showed healthy 
profits. Thus, over time, there may be a trend of consolidation and exit of the 
least efficient firms, likely in both Bangladesh and India. If this transpires, over 
time the average efficiency of CSFs will rise. All else being equal, such a rise 
could reduce consumer prices of potatoes.
Structure of the Potato Trader Segment 
Characteristics of Potato Traders
Tables 8.10–8.13 show characteristics of potato traders in the three zones. 
As with rice, the types of traders included village traders, traders on the rural 
wholesale market, and urban wholesale market traders. While there was 
substantial diversity across subsegments and zones, several similarities emerge. 
Table 8.10 Characteristics of Potato Traders in Bangladesh
Characteristic Type/Location of Trader
 Village Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Overall background 
Age (years) 40 45 43 43
Gender (male) 100% 100% 100% 100%
Education (share) 
None 23% 37% 20% 27%
Primary (year 5) or less 20% 13% 50% 37%
Primary but not more than year 9 30% 23% 13% 22%
Beyond year 9 27% 27% 17% 14%
Wholesalers who also sold other 
products 
100% 100% 100% 100%
Share of potato in total sales 68% 45% 74% 62%
Working capital and business assets
Current working capital ($) 4,147 16,147 12,588 10,956
Share from own funds 79% 91% 93% 88%
Fixed monthly operating costs ($, 
excluding labor and stall rental)
463 451 201 372
Value of food trade business assets 
owned ($)
5,044 35,705 8,382 24,647
 Midstream—Transformation of the Potato Cold Storage and Trading Segments 217216 The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains 
Table 8.11 Characteristics of Potato Traders and Wholesalers in Delhi and Agra 
(October 2009)
Characteristic Type/Location of Trader
 Agra Delhi 
Wholesale 
Market 
Traders
All
Off-
Market 
(village 
traders)
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market 
Traders
Average age of trader (years, simple average) 33 39 30 35
Share of wholesalers that are male 100% 100% 100% 100%
Education (share) 
No schooling 0 0 10 3.3%
Primary (year 5) or less 0 0 10 3.3%
Primary but not more than year 9 16.3% 15.8% 6.7% 12.9%
Beyond year 9 83.7% 84.2% 73.3% 80.5%
Year started potato trading (average) 1991 1979 1979 1981
Year started potato wholesaling (average) 1997 1980 1980 1983
Share of traders who also sold other products 6.9% 36.8% 10.0% 22.9%
Share of potato in total sales per trader 97.3% 88.4% 95.8% 92.4%
Share of traders trading in (multiple answers possible)
Table varieties 100% 100% 100% 100%
Processing varieties 2.3% 10.5% 50 22.3%
Seed potato 39.5% 5.3% 0 9.2%
Working capital ($’000, 2009) 10 11 19 15
Share of working capital from own funds 50% 63% 95% 76%
Table 8.12 Characteristics of Potato Traders in the PRC
Characteristic Value
Years as potato trader (2010 minus year started) 10
Initial funding (at start of business) $7,453
Share of initial funding from household/family 41%
Share of traders in the Potato Marketing Association 93%
Shares of traders in the following categories (can be multiple roles)
Broker charging commission 33%
Wholesaler (took possession) from farmer to local wholesale market 67%
Wholesale from farmer to wholesalers from elsewhere (not local wholesale 
market)
63%
Wholesaler or broker selling/bringing potato to potato processing plants 56%
Share of potatoes in trader’s total sales 82%
Shares of traders that (can be multiple per trader)  
Market in local wholesale market 78%
Transport to nonlocal wholesale market 59%
Market in stall in nonlocal wholesale market 15%
Share of traders with storage cellar in 2009 78%
Share of traders with storage cellar in 2005 48%
Storage capacity in 2009 of traders who have cellar (average tons) 3,061
Storage capacity in 2005 of traders who have cellar (average tons) 458
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 8.11 continued
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Table 8.13 Characteristics of Potato Wholesalers in Beijing
Characteristic Value
Share of wholesalers by role (%)
Fixed wholesaler at wholesale market (buys, also trades for a fee) 60
Broker fixed/based in Beijing, selling on commission 0
“Semi-wholesaler” buying from other wholesalers in Beijing 20
Wholesaler based in production area bringing potato to Beijing 80
Agent/representative for supermarket chain buying from other wholesalers 0
Years in business 
Trading potato 6.13
In wholesale market 5.73
Base before being wholesaler (%)
Beijing 16
Gansu 0
Other province 83
Total 100
Share of types (varieties or uses) of potato in wholesalers’ deals in 2010 (%; does not 
= 100% 
Table, fine quality 93
Table, common (middle) quality 76
Table, poor (low) quality 66
Processing potato (variety) 0
Seed potato 0
Specialty potato (“low pollution” or “Green Food,”  both labels used in the PRC only) 0
Share of wholesalers who traded in products other than potato (%) 30
Share of wholesalers who owned a cold storage (%) 0
Stall sections the average wholesaler operated in wholesale market
Average number operated 0.9
Share of wholesalers who only owned stalls 3
Share of wholesalers who only rented stalls 60
Share of wholesalers who owned and rented stalls 0
Share of traders who owned or rented warehouse (%) 3
Share of traders who operated a van or truck (%) 80
Share of traders who rented a van or truck among all traders with vehicles (%) 20
Working capital
Working capital at survey in 2010 $7,487
Average share of working capital that was own funds 94
Working capital at start of trading business $4,533
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
First, the traders tended to be in their 30s–50s. They were all male. The PRC and 
Indian traders were somewhat more educated than the Bangladesh traders. 
The South Asian wholesale market traders started business in the 1980s (soon 
after or during the formation of the produce markets, and when they got their 
licenses), and the village traders started in the 1990s, on average. By contrast, 
the PRC traders started in the 2000s, reflecting the rapid development of PRC 
produce wholesale markets starting in the 1990s. 
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Second, potato traders tended to be relatively specialized; few sold seed or 
processing potatoes, and all focused mainly on table potatoes. They had to 
muster substantial working capital to finance the inventory cycle. India’s potato 
traders tended to be the largest, and Bangladesh traders second, with working 
capital of $12,000–$15,000 in the South Asia cases (and as much as $18,000 
for the Delhi traders) versus about $8,000 in the PRC case. Bangladesh traders’ 
business assets varied widely, from urban wholesalers (some owned several 
trucks and had assets running upward of $20,000) to village traders (with 
assets of only about $760). Clearly, the entry requirement was substantial in 
all cases, relative to traditional retailing or farming. As expected, the averages 
showed a steep rise in working capital requirements between village traders 
and rural and urban wholesale market traders.
Finally, while the working capital requirements were steep and the business 
assets could be substantial, especially in urban areas, the operating costs (fixed 
costs not related to variable costs of the transactions) were modest, about 
$4,800 per year in Bangladesh; $7,680 in India; and $8,900 in the PRC. Outlays 
on labor were additional, and were roughly the same as the operating costs. 
These costs were modest because the main activity was loading, unloading, 
and transporting, with a low capital base except for the vehicles.
Seasonal Turnover of Potato Traders
Tables 8.14 and 8.15 show volumes that potato traders procured by season 
in the South Asia sites. The two sites are discussed together because of the 
importance of cold storage in these markets. Thus, potato availability in the 
urban areas is not expected to be seasonal but it is expected to be highly seasonal 
in rural areas. The study confirmed the expected seasonality in rural areas—and 
found that, in each of the cities, traders’ turnover of potatoes dipped in the 
season just before harvest, when stocks, and thus stock drawdowns from CSFs, 
were lowest. This seems at odds with the study’s finding that a number of 
CSFs were operating under capacity; it suggests that there was still a residual 
constraint of farms supplying the potatoes needed for the CSFs to supply the 
big cities year-round. Thus, the potato supply period could be extended with 
better storage technology or greater integration of markets spatially (such as 
greater sourcing from south India) to fill the gap in the year. Potato supply also 
might be augmented and stabilized if contractual arrangements are developed 
with farmers to supply fresh potatoes (as is common with growers in the much 
smaller segment of processing potatoes in other areas of India). 
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Table 8.14 Potato Traders’ Seasonality in Bangladesh: Quantities Procured  
per Day per Season (tons) 
Season Village Trader Rural Wholesale 
Market
Urban Wholesale 
Market
All 
(average)
Jan–Mar 2009 8.0 6.7 6.9 7.2
Apr–Jun 2009 2.3 4.8 10.8 6.0
Jul–Sep 2009 1.6 3.7 12.1 5.8
Oct–Dec 2009 1.6 3.1 11.0 5.2
Table 8.15 Potato Traders’ Seasonality in India: Quantities Procured  
per Day per Season (tons; mean values)
Season and Year Village  
Trader
Rural Wholesale 
Market
Urban Wholesale 
Market
All  
(average)
Oct–Dec 2008 11.5 9.3 12.4 11.4
Jan–Mar 2009 34.6 28.1 27.9 29.6
Apr–Jun 2009 38.7 47.9 41.2 42.3
Jul–Sep 2009 34.1 42.7 46.3 42.3
Tables 8.16 and 8.17 show traders’ volumes of potatoes across seasons in 
Gansu and Beijing. The seasonal patterns were broadly similar to those in South 
Asia, but for different reasons. Whereas the rural traders in Gansu had sharp 
seasonality (with most activity in October–December, and then a rapid fall-off 
given the dearth of cold storage in Gansu), the Beijing potato trading activity was 
much smoother seasonally, except for a trough of about the same length as in 
Dhaka and Delhi. But the trough was differently timed, being in February–April. 
Rather than rely on cold store drawdowns from a few main areas of production 
(as in South Asia), the Beijing traders drew on Gansu and Inner Mongolia heavily 
at one time, and then other provinces (such as nearby Hebei) at other times. Still, 
Beijing did not yet source much from the south (just as Delhi did not); doing so 
might have closed the temporal gap, as would increasing cold storage. 
Table 8.16 Potato Traders’ Monthly Volume in the Rural PRC (tons per day)
Item 2009 2010
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Purchase 
(tons)
1.3 4.0 7.7 53.2 26.3 20.2 8.3 6.6 5.5 4.8 2.2 1.3
Price  
($/ton)
190 160 160 190 240 260 280 310 320 340 340 360
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Table 8.17 Seasonal and Geographic Procurement Patterns  
of Potato Wholesalers in Beijing 
Quantity Procured Aug–Oct 
2009
 Nov 2009– 
Jan 2010
Feb–April 
2010
May–July 
2010
Year:  
Aug 2009–
July 2010
Total (tons) 986 792 532 1,023 3,337
Average volume/day (tons) 10.95 8.80 5.92 11.37 9.26
Shares by sources (%):
Gansu 21 30 29 31 28
Inner Mongolia 36 40 30 15 30
Main southern (Yunnan, 
Guizhou, Sichuan)
1.67 0 0 0.17 0.46
Hebei 40 29 40 52 40
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Conduct of the Potato Trader Segment
Procurement 
Table 8.18 shows traders’ sources of potatoes, and tells a fascinating story 
of change. In South Asia, the traditional role of the village trader in sourcing 
potatoes had been greatly reduced (as in rice, but the disintermediation was even 
more extreme in potato). By 2009, the village trader was the source of only 2% 
of the potatoes entering the Agra–Delhi value chain and 16% of the Bogra–
Dhaka chain. The rural wholesale market maintained a role, but it was limited, 
at about 20% in the two South Asian countries. The cold storage as a source of 
potatoes for traders in the value chain had emerged and become preponderant, 
providing 35% of the traders’ potatoes in Bangladesh and 61% in India. Traders 
met farmers at the CSF and bought potatoes there. The CSFs had often facilitated 
the deals, and the rural wholesale market appeared to be marginalized.
In the Uttar Pradesh case, the shift was even more interesting. Because the 
APMC Act had not yet been repealed or amended in that state, in theory, all 
trade should have taken place at the licensed wholesale market. But traders in 
the area explained that the logic of the market had simply and quietly sidelined 
the regulation.
By contrast, in Gansu, the traders still mainly bought directly from farmers or 
other brokers. Direct purchase by brokers and wholesalers was moving 63% 
of the potatoes in the system. In provinces near Beijing, such as Hebei and 
Inner Mongolia, the Beijing wholesalers bought directly from farmers, using a 
transporter as a go-between. 
Table 8.16 continued
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Table 8.18 Potato Traders’ Suppliers (share of volumes by source)
Source Percent
Bangladesh  
Directly from farmers in villages 19
Traders in villages 16
Farmers, but picked up from cold store 18
Other traders, picked up from cold store 17
Cold storage owners 2
Traders in wholesale market 27
Other sources 1
Total 100
China, People’s Rep. of  
Directly from farmers in villages, then sold fresh (no storage) 63
Farmers, then put in own cold storage 0
Farmers, then put in other cold storage 0
Wholesalers in wholesale market in production area 2
Directly from other cold storage of traders in production area 0
Brokers/wholesalers coming from production area 11
Other wholesalers in Beijing 20
Other sources 5
Total 100
India  
Directly from farmers in Agra 20
Farmers, but deal arranged and potatoes picked up by CSF in Agra 35
Other traders, but deal arranged and potatoes picked up by CSF in Agra 26
Agra traders in wholesale market 1
Rural field brokers in Agra 2
Directly from farmers in Punjab 4
Other sources 12
Total 100
CSF = cold storage facility.
Table 8.19 shows where the potatoes the traders sold were headed and 
the types of buyers. The patterns differed sharply across study zones. The 
salient points are as follows. In Bangladesh, traders sold about a third of 
their potatoes to other traders in Bogra, 40% to traders from other districts 
and Dhaka, and 25% directly to traditional retailers. They sold very little to 
processors or supermarkets, as expected. In the PRC, traders sold fully two- 
thirds of their volume directly to traditional retailers and only 3% to processors 
(only about 10% of potato in the PRC was processed). The PRC’s food sector 
was modernizing, and the traders sold 22% of their potatoes to the modern 
food industry—8% to supermarkets and the rest to food services such as hotels 
and restaurants. In India, half of the traders’ sales were to the urban wholesale 
market and 40% was sold to traders coming from other parts of Uttar Pradesh 
and other Indian states. 
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Table 8.19 Potato Traders’ Sales Destinations, with Shares of Volumes  
by Buyer Type and Destination
Zone and Destination Percent
Bangladesh  
Wholesalers/traders in Bogra 32
Wholesalers/traders in Dhaka 17
Wholesalers/traders in other districts 22
Cold storage owners 0
Directly to traditional retailers outside Dhaka 2
Directly to traditional retailers in Dhaka 25
Directly to modern retailers 1
Processors 0
Total (with rounding error) 100
China, People’s Rep. of  
Other wholesalers 11
Government buyers 0.05
Traditional retailers 64
Processors 3
Modern retailers 8
Restaurants, hotels, hospitals, etc. 14
Total 100
India  
Via Delhi wholesale market commission agent 49
To traditional retailer in Agra, directly 9
To modern retailers anywhere, directly 1
To processors 1
To brokers and wholesalers from other states or Uttar Pradesh–outside Agra 
(not Delhi)
40
To cold storage operators in Agra 0.1
Total 100
Potato Traders and Value-Chain Finance
Table 8.20 shows potato traders’ engagement in value-chain finance. The 
following are the main findings. 
First, and most surprising, is the limited value-chain finance traders provided 
to farmers as advances. This is at odds with the widely held belief that traders 
usually give advances to secure output delivery from farmers. The table shows 
that few traders provided advances to farmers—only 24% in Bangladesh, 15% 
in Gansu, and none in Beijing did so. In India, 44% of traders provided some 
advances, but the share of farmers receiving these advances was merely 4% of 
small-scale farmers, 9% of large-scale farmers, and 6% of other traders.
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Table 8.20 Potato Traders and Credit (%)
Trader and Credit Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh     
Suppliers     
Suppliers paid with delay 6 17 65 29
Suppliers paid in cash (not check) 93 93 100 96
Suppliers paid in advance 23 43 6 24
Suppliers (of all traders) getting advances 10 16 2 9
Clients
Clients who paid with delay 12 34 30 26
Advance payments received from clients 13 30 0 14
Average share (of traders who received 
advances from clients) of the traders’ 
clients who paid advances to the 
traders
27 50 43
China, People’s Rep. of
Supplier paid with delay  70 …
Gave advance to potato suppliers  15 0
Paid by clients with a delay  70 10
Received advance from clients … 0
India 
Traders who paid suppliers with delay 95 10 60 56
Traders who provided advances to suppliers 30 68 47 44
Rural brokers receiving advances from trader 0 0 13 6
Traders paid by their clients with delay  93  95  57  76
… = no data available.
Second, many traders paid farmers with a delay, and thus de facto received 
credit from the farmers. This was so among 29% of traders (mainly urban) in 
Bangladesh, 70% in Gansu (mainly rural), and 56% in India (mainly rural). This
goes against the conventional wisdom that traders pay “on the spot” without 
delay. In policy debates, this conventional view is invoked to show that traders 
must have an advantage with farmers, compared with modern retail and other 
modern actors, who are thought to always pay with a delay and thus extract 
de facto credit from their suppliers. In fact, the payment delay from traders is 
about a week, and so this system of credit during the transaction period is built 
on trust between trader and supplier.
Third, potato traders do not commonly receive advances from their clients— 
only 14% of traders in Bangladesh, none in Gansu, and 6% in India received 
such credit. It is more common for clients to delay payment to traders, who 
were thus de facto providing finance to the downstream client—this happened 
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with 26% of clients in Bangladesh, 10% in the PRC, and 76% in India. However, 
the situation does not appear to have been onerous; rather, it was a regular 
and trusting finance relationship with a short transactional cycle. For example, a 
retailer got potatoes from a trader, took them to his stall, sold them over a few 
days, and then paid the trader for the previous lot while getting a new supply. 
Potato Traders and Other Services
Tables 8.21 and 8.22 show services other than intermediation that potato 
traders provided. The findings across the zones and trader types are notable 
primarily because of the lack of services. The services nearly all traders provided 
were weighing (the great majority done without an electronic scale) and 
sampling for quality. 
Table 8.21 Potato Traders and Other Services: Bangladesh and India  
(% of traders)
Zone, Service Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh
Picked up and delivered potatoes in own truck 3 7 0 3
Labeled product when sold to clients 3 16 10 10
Provided packing boxes/crates/bags to suppliers 33 23 7 21
Delivered products to buyer 20 33 0 18
Graded and sorted to sell to clients 83 93 47 74
Weighed potato when bought 97 97 90 94
If yes, weighed by electronic scale 0 3 11 5
Sampled potatoes for quality when bought 100 100 93 98
Weighed potatoes when sold 100 97 93 97
If yes, weighed by electronic scale 0 3 4 2
Clients sampled potatoes for quality when buying 100 100 100 100
India
Picked up potatoes and delivered in own truck 79 53 0 48
Graded and sorted potatoes for suppliers 31 32 0 21
Labeled potatoes 5 0 0 2
Provided packing boxes/crates/bags to suppliers 58 16 0 30
Delivered potatoes to clients’ locations 91 53 0 53
Graded and sorted potatoes 28 11 0 15
Further sorted and graded supplier-graded 
potatoes for some clients 
2 5 0 2
Weighed potatoes 93 100 97 96
If yes, share of traders who weighed on  
electronic scale
75 26 31 49
Sampled potatoes for quality 93 100 100 98
continued on next page
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Zone, Service Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Mean share of volume of potatoes per trader, 
through
    
Auction system 3 15 7 5
Direct sales 97 86 94 95
Total 100 100 101 100
For direct sales, mean share of volume sold per 
trader, through negotiations with buyers in
    
Suppliers’ presence 48 25 16 34
Suppliers’ absence 52 75 84 66
Total 100 100 100 100
Table 8.22 Potato Traders and Other Services: The PRC (% of traders)
Location Percent
Gansu Traders
Used own truck to transport potato 30
Labeled potatoes before selling 44
Provided case/box to suppliers 63
Delivered potatoes to buyers 63
Sorted and selected potato before selling 100
Received potatoes already sorted by farmers and then further sorted for specific buyers 48
Marketed by auction 0
Marketed by direct sales 100
If direct marketing, was the supplier present when negotiating? 23
If the supplier was absent, share of traders who negotiated by cell phone with the supplier 37
Beijing Wholesalers 
Picked up or delivered in own truck 90
Labeled product sold to client 3
Provided packing boxes/crates/bags to suppliers 97
Delivered to the buyer’s location 40
Graded and sorted potato 80
Weighed potato when bought 100
 If yes, used electronic scale (share of wholesalers) 30
Sampled for quality when bought 83
Weighed potato when sold 97
If yes, used electronic scale (share of wholesalers) 20
Had clients who sampled for quality when buying 100
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
The other services were highly variable across trader types and sites. Picking up 
the potatoes from the supplier was done mainly by Beijing wholesalers and half 
of the Indian traders, but very little was picked up in the Bangladesh or rural 
PRC zones. Labeling was nearly absent except on bags of potatoes coming into 
Table 8.21 continued
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Beijing from rural PRC; there was nearly none in Bangladesh and India. In the 
PRC, but seldom in the South Asian zones, traders provided bags to suppliers. 
Grading and sorting were more commonly done except in the India case, where 
it was rare; in Bangladesh and the PRC, the traders often received the potatoes 
ungraded and graded them. Thus, the trader, rather than the farmer, captured 
the value differentiation profit.
In Bangladesh and the PRC, potatoes were directly marketed; in theory in India 
the auction system was supposed to be widely used. The Indian government 
introduced the auction system to provide more transparency (open price 
discovery). However, the survey found that the auction system was used in 
only 5% of the cases; in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi, direct marketing (without 
auction) was used for 97% of the village trader transactions, 85% of the 
rural wholesale market transactions, and 93% of the Delhi wholesale market 
(Azadpur) transactions. In 66% of the transactions, the farmer was not present 
during the transaction, which instead took place between intermediaries or the 
market-based broker, who sold the potatoes on behalf of farmers who sent their 
potatoes to the market by a transporter. Thus, market regulation was “on the 
books” but not enforced. 
Performance of the Potato Trader Segment
Potato Traders and Quality Differentiation
Table 8.23 shows patterns across trader types and countries, and over time, in the 
trading of various varieties and qualities of potatoes. Several key points emerge. 
Table 8.23 Potato Traders: Variety and Quality Differentiation (%)
Variety and Quality Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh
Traded white table potatoes (% yes ) 83 100 100 94
Traded red table potatoes (% yes ) 93 100 36 77
Traded processing potatoes (% yes ) 47 40 20 36
Traded seed potatoes (% yes ) 53 87 7 49
Change in trade in last 10 years (shares 
of volumes for those who sold):
    
Share of white potatoes in total sold 
at survey time
65 66 98 76
Share of white potatoes in all 
potatoes sold 10 years earlier
14 21 87 42
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Variety and Quality Type/Location of Trader
Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
China, People’s Rep. of
Gansu traders: Average of traders’ 
reported shares of trade volume in the 
last 5 years
Trade (not traders) in common (table) 
potato, 2009
65
Trade in processing potato, 2009 20
Trade in seed potato, 2009 15
Trade (not traders) in common (table) 
potato, 2005
60
Trade in processing potato, 2005 18
Trade in seed potato, 2005 11
Beijing wholesalers: (%; does not add 
to 100%)
Wholesalers that dealt in potato types 
in 2010
Table (regular), fine quality 93
Table, common (middle) quality 77
Table, poor (low) quality 67
Processing (variety) 0
Seed potato 0
Specialty potato (“Low pollution” or  
“Green Food”)
0
Wholesalers that dealt in potato types 
in 2005
Table (regular), fine quality 87
Table, common (middle) quality 77
Table, poor (low) quality 60
Processing (variety) 0
Seed potato 0
Specialty potato (“Low Pollution” or 
“Green Food”)
0
India: Share of traders trading in 
(multiple answers possible):
Table varieties 100 100 100 100
Processing variety 2 10 50 22
Seed potato 39 5 0 9
First, the dramatic shift from red to white potatoes that had occurred during 
1999–2009 at the level of the urban traders also occurred in the Bogra zone, 
but somewhat more slowly than at the national level. Thus, variety and quality 
changes can diffuse quickly at the urban market level, which draws on diverse 
zones, each changing at a different pace.
Table 8.23 continued
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Second, the engagement of rural traders in seed potato markets varied sharply 
across the zones studied, apparently indicating different degrees of seed market 
development. Fully 87% of the traders in rural wholesale markets in Bangladesh 
also sold seed potatoes; the share was 39% in India and 15% in the PRC.
Third, a minority of rural traders dealt in processing potatoes: 40% in 
Bangladesh, 20% in the PRC, and 10% in India. This reflected the meager share 
of processing in the total potato economy of the economies studied (less than 
5% in South Asia, about 10% in the PRC).
Fourth, several notable changes occurred during the 5-year recall period in 
the PRC survey. The share of traders dealing in both fine and poor quality 
potatoes had increased modestly, while the share dealing in common (quality) 
potatoes had held steady. This suggests that the consumption of potatoes 
was spreading into poorer consumer strata as part of the general increase in 
vegetable consumption and that consumers whose incomes were rising were 
demanding better quality potatoes.
In Gansu, the share of traders dealing in table potatoes increased from 60% in 
2005 to 65% in 2009. Some of this shift may have been at least partly driven 
by government policy. The government-protected minimum price for potato 
went up on average by 84% during the period—for table potato, by 162%; for 
seed potato, by 55%; and for processing potato, by 100%. In 2000, the table 
potato price was just at the protected (minimum) price; a decade later it was 
49% above the protected price. The processing potato price was 70% of the 
table potato price in 2000; by 2009, it was at 50% of the table potato’s price. 
These trends may indicate why the study observed farmers and traders shifting 
from the processing to the fresh table potato market. Also, the premium for 
seed potato shrank—the ratio of the seed to the table potato price went from 
2.2 to 1 in 2000, to only 1.25 to 1 in 2009.
Moreover, Gansu traders who stored table potatoes realized better prices 
for them than for processing potatoes. The traders’ sales price of table and 
processing potatoes was similar during the harvest season, but then the table 
potato price rose more quickly than the processing potato price during the 
ensuing months. A lower grade may have been sold to processors later in the 
season. Yet despite the price premium for storing table potatoes, three times 
more table potatoes were sourced fresh than from storage. Interestingly, the 
share of processing potatoes sourced from storage was a third higher than 
the share of table potatoes sourced from storage, reflecting perhaps lower 
demand in quality by the processor firms. The lower share of sourcing table 
potatoes from storage could also reflect a lack of good storage facilities, as the 
local traders used cellars and not modern CSFs.
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Wastage among Potato Traders
Table 8.24 shows physical wastage traders reported for their last transaction, 
from the purchase of a lot to its full sale. Given the importance of the trader 
segments in the overall supply chain and the formation of food prices, the low 
levels of wastage are a significant finding. Moreover, this finding contradicts 
the conventional wisdom that wastage rates are very high in produce supply 
chains. The shares of wastage in the table variety form a simple average of 
1.5%. An important reason for the low wastage rates is that the great majority 
of the potatoes were marketed in bags and bought and sold in transaction 
cycles of 3–7 days, so long storage at ambient temperature was avoided. As 
noted in the section on cold storage, even when the potatoes were stored for 
a long period, the loss rate was low. 
Table 8.24 Potato Wastage (%, last transaction; all averages are means unless  
otherwise noted)
Item Type/Location of Trader
 Village 
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh
Share of wastage 1 2 0.29 1
China, People’s Rep. of (most recent full transaction of potato)
Gansu potato traders’ share of wastage    3
Beijing potato wholesalers’ share  
of wastage 
   1
India 
Fresh potato 0.03 0 0.2 0.1
Potato from cold storage 3 2 3 3
Potato Trader Costs
Table 8.25 shows transaction costs for potato traders. Three key points emerge. 
First, the costs in dollars per ton roughly clustered into two sets. In Bangladesh, 
India (fresh and from cold storage), and rural PRC, controlling for transaction 
distances (20–120 kilometers), the cost per ton clustered around $6–$10. 
However, the Beijing potato trader’s cost was $45/ton, due to a fourfold 
greater distance (at 450 kilometers; as this was the last transaction and the 
survey was held in September, it was the cost of a transaction from a province 
close to Beijing, not from Gansu). 
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Table 8.25 Variable Costs of Potato Wholesalers (last transaction)
Cost Item Type/Location of Trader
Village  
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
Bangladesh 
Distance between sales and  
purchase (km)
118 120 28 89
Cost ($/ton; % of total in parentheses)
Bagging  0.88 (11)  0.44 (7)  0.15 (4)  0.44 (7)
Loading and unloading  0.74 (9)  0.44 (7)  1.18 (32)  0.74 (12)
Transport of potatoes  4.26 (51)  3.09 (50)  2.21 (60)  3.24 (54)
Payments at checkpoints  0.29  (4)  0.00 (0)  0.00 (0)  0.15 (2)
Personal transport  0.59 (7)  0.74 (12)  0.15 (4)  0.44 (7)
Fee at market  1.18 (14)  0.59 (10)  0.00 (0)  0.59 (10)
Weighing fees  0.44 (5)  0.74 (12)  0.00 (0)  0.44 (7)
Total cost  8.38 (100)  6.18 (100)  3.68 (100)  6.03 (100)
China, People’s Rep. of 
Gansu traders: Cost ($/ton; % of total in parentheses)
Bagging and stitching at farm  2.09 (21)
Loading at farm  1.69 (17)
Transport to wholesale market  1.06 (11)
Payments at checkpoints or roadblocks  0.00 (0)
Personal transport to wholesale market  0.17 (2)
Fee for transaction at wholesale market  0.60 (6)
Weighing fees at wholesale market  1.32 (13)
Loading/unloading at wholesale market  0.88 (9)
Fee for cellar  0.05 (0.46)
Other expenses  2.09 (21)
Total  9.95 (100)
Beijing Wholesalers
Distance between purchase and sale (km)  419.06 
Time between purchase and sale (days) 3.17
Cost ($/ton; % of total in parentheses)
Bagging  and stitching  7.12 (16)
Loading/unloading charges  2.12 (5)
Transport costs  32.80 (73)
Road tolls  1.92 (4)
Personal transport  0.03 (0.06)
Cold storage  0.00 (0)
Transaction fees at the market  0.00 (0)
Other expenses  1.23 (3)
Total  45.22 (100)
continued on next page
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Cost Item Type/Location of Trader
Village  
Trader
Rural 
Wholesale 
Market
Urban 
Wholesale 
Market
All
India (% of toal in parentheses)
Fresh potato: Mean cost
Bagging  3.78 (30)  0.22 (8)  0.22 (4)  1.11 (15)
Loading and unloading  0.67 (5)  0.67 (25)  3.56 (57)  2.22 (30)
Transport of potatoes to wholesale 
market
 0.02 (0.2)  0.02 (0.8)  0.02 (0.4)  0.02 (0.3)
Payments at checkpoints  0.00 (0)  0.00 (0)  0.00 (0)  0.00 (0)
Personal transport  5.11 (40)  0.44 (17)  0.00 (0  1.33 (18)
Fee at market  1.78 (14)  0.89 (33)  2.44 (39)  2.00 (27)
Weighing fees  1.11 (9)  0.22 (8)  0.00 (0)  0.44 (6)
Other expenses  0.22 (2)  0.22 (8)  0.00 (0  0.22 (3)
Total  12.67 (100)  2.67 (100)  6.22 (100)  7.33 (100)
Potato from cold storage: Mean cost
Transport of potatoes to wholesale 
market
 0.02 (0.1)  0.00 (0)  0.00 (0)  0.02 (0.2)
Transport to cold storage  0.07 (0.3)  0.02 (0.2)  0.00 (0)  0.02 (0.2)
Fee at wholesale market  2.89 (13)  4.22 (45)  1.56 (70)  2.67 (30)
Fee at cold storage  5.56 (26)  4.44 (48)  0.00 (0)  2.44 (28)
Weighing fees  0.22 (1)  0.22 (2)   0.22 (10)  0.22 (3)
Other expenses  0.89 (4)  0.22 (2)  0.22 (10)  0.44 (5)
Loading and unloading  5.11 (24)  0.00 (0)  0.22 (10)  1.33 (15)
Personal transport  6.89 (32)  0.22 (2.4)  0.00 (0)  1.78 (20)
Total  21.56 (100)  9.33 (100)  2.22 (100)  8.89 (100)
km = kilometer.
Second, the share of transport in total costs was more variable than the total 
cost. It was about 60% in Bangladesh; 13% in Gansu, but 77% for Beijing 
traders (given the greater distance of the average transaction); and about
20%–40% for India.
Third, the lower share of transport in India’s total cost was due to a higher share 
of labor costs for bagging and loading (which, key informants anecdotally 
noted, were performed informally by strongly organized groups in the markets), 
and a higher share, about 30%–40%, went to market fees, versus about half 
that in the other zones. The market fees were relatively high in India due to the 
systems of licensed trader commission fees and high market taxes.
Table 8.25 continued
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Potato Traders’ Profit Rates
Table 8.26 shows profit rates for the categories of potato traders. The rates are 
gross of capital amortization, which may be substantial for the more capitalized 
urban traders. Thus, the results overstate the truly realized profit rates of urban 
traders. There are few other studies to compare with these findings: one is for rice 
trading in Bangladesh, by Chowdhury (1992) and based on a survey in 1989/90 
by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) that focused on profit 
rates (and provided figures gross of capital amortization due to the difficulty of 
figuring amortization in this setting). The IFPRI study reported profit rates of 35% 
for traders in dynamic, competitive zones, and 61% for hinterland zones where 
competition is lower. Chowdhury (1992) argued that profit rates were relatively 
high to compensate for the highly risky and variable nature of returns to trading.
Table 8.26 Potato Traders’ Profit Rates (%)
Item Village Traders Rural Wholesalers Urban Wholesalers
Bangladesh
Fresh 16 38 80
Cold stored 22 48 73
China, People’s Rep. of
Gansu … … 40
Beijing … … 48
India
Fresh 6 40 4
Cold stored 23 52 16
… = no data available.
The profit rates for potato traders were thus similar, but with two exceptions. 
(1) Urban potato traders in Bangladesh achieved “excessive” profits compared 
with Beijing and Delhi potato traders (as the authors found for Delhi rice traders 
and Chowdhury [1992] found for hinterland traders in Bangladesh). This was 
possibly because, of the three megacities, Dhaka had the least developed off- 
season potato supply flow. In India, cold storage was more developed, and in 
the PRC, Beijing sourced potatoes from a number of provinces with different 
growing season profiles. (2) The profit rates of Delhi potato traders were 
relatively low, possibly because the well-developed CSF sector increased supply 
during the off-season and facilitated competition among traders. 
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Conclusions
Cold Storage. The seven key messages regarding potato CSFs are as follows:
First, especially in the 1990s and 2000s, CSFs diffused rapidly in the Bangladesh 
and India zones. In Gansu, use of CSFs had been much more modest and 
recent. In India, rapidly growing potato demand from nearby Delhi, and 
subsidies and investment in the Agra power grid were key factors encouraging 
investment by the business sector (given the large investment per CSF). The 
PRC had a cold storage subsidy policy but it played a minor role.
Second, the farmers’ rapidly increasing use of CSFs, particularly in India (Agra), 
and secondarily in Bangladesh, suggests that there were limited or no barriers 
to accessing cold storage, regardless of farm size.
Third, the survey showed strong seasonality in the use of the CSFs, and 
significant underuse of capacity, at only 51% in India and 84% in Bangladesh.
Fourth, while traders’ value-chain financing of suppliers had largely disappeared 
over time, cold storage businesses were becoming important suppliers of 
value-chain finance to farmers.
Fifth, CSFs were becoming important points for facilitating potato exchange, 
supplanting wholesale markets in the India case. This is particularly interesting 
in a policy context in Uttar Pradesh, where the APMC Act had not been 
amended. The APMC Act required farmers to sell via the regulated wholesale 
markets, but in fact they had substantially shifted their exchanges to the CSFs. 
Market forces trumped the regulation.
Sixth, energy costs are very important in the CSF sector. Investment in the 
electricity grid was a major factor facilitating the growth of the cold storage 
sectors in the Bangladesh and India zones. In the future, cold storage may be 
vulnerable to energy cost shocks.
Seventh, the capacity of a portion of the cold storage in the South Asian sites 
was underused, and such facilities are likely to be nonviable. The cause appears 
to be overbuilding and some inefficient usage. With increasing competition 
in the potato market, some of the facilities may fail, and a trend toward 
consolidation may be apparent.
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Potato Traders. The five key messages regarding potato traders are as follows: 
First, potato traders had made substantial investments and employed 
significant labor. Trading had become somewhat concentrated, with the rise of 
large potato traders, particularly in the cities and especially in India. 
Second, wastage rates were much lower than conventionally asserted.
Third, tied credit as a form of trader value-chain finance was far less important 
than is conventionally assumed—traders made advances to only 3% of 
suppliers in the PRC and 7% in India, but the share was 24% in Bangladesh. 
Many traders paid suppliers with a delay after the purchase, rather than all on 
the spot, and thus were deriving value-chain finance from farmers (rather than 
the other way around).
Fourth, potato traders’ profit rates were similar across zones, but somewhat 
higher in urban and rural towns and lower in villages. The two exceptions 
were high profits for urban potato traders in Bangladesh and lower-than- 
usual profits for urban potato traders in Delhi. Both exceptions appear to be 
explained by the use of cold storage, which was low in Bangladesh and more 
developed in the India case.
Fifth, in the Bangladesh and India study zones, traders sold most of their 
potatoes to the nearby large cities—Dhaka and Delhi. Thus, transport costs 
(the bulk of marketing cost) were modest in the two zones. The costs were of 
course much higher in the PRC urban wholesale case, as the potato zones were 
much farther away from the major market. 
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For products such as potato, the conventional image of the retail sector in developing Asia is that it comprises only traditional shops, pushcarts, and wet markets. That is, it is seen as mainly in the “early stage” of 
retail evolution. Like food traders in general, food retailers are usually seen as 
charging higher prices to consumers than costs warrant. The retail sector is 
also evoked as offering little quality differentiation in staple products. 
The food retail sector is certainly not held up as a champion of food security 
by finding ways to cut costs in the supply chain through inducing supply 
chain modernization. For example, in India, food retailing is accused of being 
inefficient and traditional and adding costs to food consumers; it is also seen as 
a key source of employment and slow to change its performance or importance. 
Although the emergence of supermarkets is recognized, they appear to be 
seen as marginal to retail in general and to food security in particular. 
The study’s detailed survey results examine to what extent the foregoing 
assumptions remain valid. The survey results explore the degree to which 
retail modernization, quality differentiation, and evolution of retail practices 
among traditional retailers had begun to emerge in potato retail in the three 
megacities—Beijing, Delhi, and Dhaka. This chapter discusses in detail the 
survey findings. 
Structure of Potato Retail
Structure of Traditional Potato Retail
Table 9.1 shows characteristics of traditional potato retailers. These retail outlets 
were nearly all owned by middle-aged males, and were started on average 
only about a decade ago. They were typically a mix of small shops, stalls in wet 
markets, and pushcarts. The retailers in the study had low-to-moderate levels of 
education. Nearly all of them sold other food products, typically other fruits and 
Downstream—
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vegetables; they did not typically sell processed foods (such as rice, noodles, and 
oil) along with potatoes and other vegetables. In the South Asia sites, potatoes 
comprised only about half of their retail sales, and in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), only a fifth. 
Table 9.2 shows potato sales by various measures. Daily sales were limited but 
differed widely across zones due to the modest differences in average scale 
across retailers and differences in the share of potatoes in total sales. Beijing 
potato retailers sold 5–10 times more per shop than did the Delhi and Dhaka 
potato retailers. Delhi traditional potato stalls sold about twice as much as 
their Dhaka counterparts. 
The South Asian stores tended to have about 70–90 clients. Only a quarter to 
a third of the potato stalls’ buyers were regular clients; this could be because 
the product is seasonal and perishable, so the price fluctuated over time and 
among sellers. The customers bought very small amounts, less than 1 kilogram 
(kg) in Delhi and 4 kg in Dhaka. So the trade entailed many small transactions 
with a fluctuating clientele.
Table 9.1 Characteristics of Traditional Potato Retailers
Characteristic Bangladesh PRC India
Gender (% male) 100 … 95
Age (mean) 37 … 38
Education (%)
No schooling 15 … 11
Primary (1–5 years) only 41 … 24
More than 5 years but not more than 9 22 … 25
More than 9 years 22 … 40
Year started food retail business 2000 2003 1997
Year started potato retail business 1999 2003 1997
Also sold other food products (%) 100 96 88
Share of potato in his/her total retail sales (%) 54 21 44
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 9.2 Turnover of Traditional Potato Retailers (average)
Turnover Bangladesh PRC India
Sales per day (kg) 26 256 53
Size of last transaction (lot bought and retailed, kg) 220 476 51
Number of buyers sold to 91 … 71
Number of regular buyers sold to 22 … 25
Average quantity sold to a buyer (kg) 3.6 … 0.7
… = no data available, kg = kilogram, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Traditional potato retailers appeared to be in close competition with their 
fellows. For example, in Beijing, an average potato retailer competed with 
12 others in the same market or neighborhood, up from nine 5 years ago.
Table 9.3 shows measures of retail scale, in labor used, working capital, and 
value of retail assets. The ratios of these variables across zones and of turnover 
were not parallel, indicating differences in operations. All the retailers were 
very small operations with a few people minding the stall or shop, but the 
labor/turnover ratio was higher in Dhaka than Beijing, and the working capital/
turnover and asset/turnover ratios were higher in Delhi. Except for India, the 
scale measured in terms of working capital and assets for potato stalls was 
only about a half to a third of those of the retail shops. (Rice retailing tended 
to be part of shops selling a number of other products and having more fixed 
installations than was the case of potato and other vegetable retailers, which 
usually used only a table or tarp to display the produce.) Most of the retailers 
in Beijing had electronic scales, a cell phone, and a business vehicle. 
Table 9.3 Labor and Capital Use per Traditional Potato Retailer
Labor and Capital Bangladesh PRC India
Average number of people working in the business 1.6 2.0 1.3
Average amount spent on hired labor ($/month, mean) 15.6 0 89.0
Current working capital ($) 786 1,433 6,518
Retail assets in 2009 ($) 218 … 2,341
Share of retailers who had (%)
Electronic scale in 2009 … 92 …
Electronic scale at start of business … 65 …
Mobile phone in 2009 … 96 …
Mobile phone at start of business … 83 …
Business vehicle … 89 …
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
The scale of the retailers, as measured by labor, working capital, and assets, was 
well below that of the urban potato traders and the cold stores discussed in 
Chapter 8. The traditional value chain in potatoes has many small- and medium-
scale farmers on one end, larger (than farmers) wholesalers and cold stores in 
the midstream, and many small-scale retailers at the other end. Presumably, 
barriers for new entrants roughly reflected the scale in each segment. 
 Downstream—Potato Retail Transformation 239
Modern Retailers’ Participation in the Potato Market
Modern retail had started to enter the food markets in the cities, and was 
increasing quickly (see Chapter 5). In the case of Delhi, Minten, Reardon, 
and Sutradhar (2010) calculated from the survey data that modern retail had 
about 3.3% of the potato market. While the penetration in the Beijing potato 
market was not measured by the current study, the survey by Goldman and 
Vanhonacker (2006) showed that supermarkets had about 22% of vegetable 
retail (versus 79% of processed and packaged retail) in 2005. 
Historically, in the United States and Western Europe, modern retailing first 
handled processed products; fresh produce was introduced at a later stage. 
Supermarkets in the United States did not even sell vegetables for the first 
30–40 years of their existence; the same lag was seen in Latin America in the 
1990s–2000s (Reardon and Timmer 2007). Demand-side reasons for the lagged 
penetration of fresh produce into modern retailing include that the consumer 
habit of purchasing daily from wet markets wanes slowly, and supply-side 
reasons include that it is a slow and difficult process to improve fresh produce 
supply chains and marketing in order to create competitive advantages over 
traditional retailers who source from traditional wholesale markets. Minten 
and Reardon (2008) show that modern retailers start to gain price advantages 
over traditional retailers in fresh produce only after the supermarket sector has 
been developing for a number of years.  
Hence for example, Mexican supermarkets in the 1990s sold very little produce 
and had prices well above the wet markets; this began to change only in the 
mid-2000s, when modern retailing started to make significant inroads into 
retailing fresh produce. Ho (2005) tells a similar story for Hong Kong, China 
(with a food culture like that of the PRC and similar to that of other Asian 
countries), in which supermarkets had little role in fresh produce markets in the 
1980s but, by the mid-2000s, had 55% of vegetable retail. 
Thus, in 10–20 years, the urban retail markets of the study zones are likely to 
converge with those of economies with more modernized food markets, such 
as Japan and Hong Kong, China. In the meantime, modern retailers will have a 
minor role in fresh produce markets such as for potato. During the study, the 
modern retailers’ sales of potato were still modest. The Dhaka survey found 
that sales per day of fresh table potatoes by modern retail outlets were about 
127 kg, the equivalent of half a wet market’s daily potato sales.
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Conduct of Potato Retail
Procurement Methods of Traditional Potato Retailers
Table 9.4 shows procurement practices of traditional potato retailers. In all 
study cities, the potato retailer bought potatoes directly from the wholesale 
market. In the PRC, 10% of the retailers bought potatoes directly from Heibei 
farmers who came to the Beijing markets; retailers were not buying directly 
from the study zone farmers in faraway Gansu. 
Table 9.5 shows the transaction cycle of the retailers (from buying a lot to 
selling it all), the time they spend at the wholesale market, and the transport 
they used to get to the market and back. The time spent at the market was 
brief, but repeated every 1.5 days. The short transaction cycle minimizes 
working capital and waste, which is important in a perishable product that is 
not cold stored at the retail site. With transport time plus time at the market, 
an average potato retailer used about a day a week to buy inventory. 
Table 9.4 Procurement by Traditional Potato Retailers (%)
Procurement Dhaka Beijing Delhi
Share bought on the wholesale market 100 94 95
Share bought from traders operating between the retailers 
and wholesale market or other retailers (also called 
semi-wholesalers)
0 3 1
Share bought directly from farmers 0 10 0
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Table 9.5 Traditional Potato Retailers’ Procurement Methods
Procurement Information Bangladesh PRC India
Time between purchase and complete sale (days) 1.40 4.41 1.50
Total time at place of purchase (minutes) 65 136 117
Means used for transport and share (%)
Motorized transport 36 0 79
Bus 0 3 0
Car 0 74 0
Motorbike 0 11 0
Animal-drawn cart 0 5 4
Motorcycle/bike 8 0 17
On foot/with cart 56 7 0
Share of retailers who paid (third party)  
for transport (%)
71 41 81
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Many small-scale Dhaka retailers bought potatoes by walking or going by 
animal-drawn cart to the wholesale market. Beijing retailers mainly used a car, 
and Delhi retailers primarily used motorized tricycles. 
About 12% of potato retailers in Bangladesh arranged for the price and 
quality of their purchase by cell phone; in the PRC it was 15%, and in India, 
63%. This provided a rough measure of potential price arbitrage and price 
discovery, and of the importance of cell phones. The use of the cell phone to 
arrange a deal was relatively low in rice (Chapter 5), and was low in Dhaka 
and Beijing for potato, but high in Delhi. As the retailers (and traders) usually 
had cell phones, it appears odd that deals were not arrived at in advance. The 
most probable explanations are that (1) potato freshness and quality can vary 
significantly, and the retailers may have needed to see the quality of the potato 
and negotiate the price; and (2) retailers bought frequently, and negotiating 
prices and delivery each time would be costly per transaction, but the frequent 
visits to the wholesale markets (nearly two dozen per month for the Delhi and 
Dhaka retailers) would keep retailers apprised of prices as they evolved. 
Table 9.6 shows retailers’ assessments of quantity information available during 
their last purchase of potatoes from a wholesaler. Most of the retailers in Delhi 
and Dhaka reported getting enough information, but very few did in Beijing. 
In all three cities, most of the retailers reported knowing the quantity, and 
usually the lot was weighed in front of them, on an electronic scale. However, 
retailers (in Beijing and Dhaka, but not in Delhi) generally felt they were being 
cheated by the seller using a rounding off tactic to charge a little bit more than 
the quantity in the bag. 
Table 9.7 shows that most of the retailers in Dhaka, but only half in Delhi, felt 
they had sufficient information on potato quality before the transaction. The 
data show that most retailers checked at least part of the lot.  
Table 9.6 Traditional Potato Retailers: Information and Quantity Assessment  
in the Last Transaction (% of retailers)
Retailers’ Information Bangladesh PRC India
Felt they had enough information on quantity of produce 
in the lot, before buying
68 3 63
Felt they knew the exact weight of the lot 99 86 88
Lot weighed in front of them 79 99 82
Bought from seller using electronic/mechanical scale 91 66 73
Felt seller used “rounding off” tactic to charge more than 
was in the bag
64 92 11
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Table 9.7 Traditional Potato Retailers: Information and Quality Assessment  
in the Last Transaction (% of retailers)
Retailers’ Information Bangladesh India
Had sufficient quality information before the transaction 73 53
Had checked quality 87 94
Checked only part of the lot 100 83
Believed the part checked was representative of the lot 100 95
Traditional Potato Retailers and Value-Chain Finance  
and Home Delivery
Table 9.8 tests two common assumptions about traditional produce retail—
that potato retailers often allow clients to buy on credit, and that retailers 
often deliver purchases to clients’ homes. The survey results show that potato 
retailers provided little credit to consumers, except in Dhaka, and there only 
half of the retailers provided credit. The survey did not gather information on 
what share of the clients got this credit, but if the situation was like that of rice, 
then only a subset of the clients would have been allowed to pay later, and the 
share of consumers getting credit would have been a minority. In Beijing and 
Delhi, only a minority of retailers provided credit to consumers, and very few 
consumers could avail of it. Few retailers got de facto credit by paying suppliers 
late, except in Dhaka. 
The last row of Table 9.8 negates the common assumption that potato retailers 
delivered to consumers’ homes. Very few retailers did so in Delhi or Dhaka, 
and only a third of retailers did in Beijing. Because the Beijing retailers were 
doubtless delivering only to a portion of their clients, the practice was limited.
Table 9.8 Traditional Potato Retailers’ Credit with Suppliers and Customers,  
and Home Delivery (%)
Credit and Delivery Bangladesh PRC India
Suppliers paid by retailer with delay (on credit) 67 1 …
Retailers that paid suppliers later (on credit) … 6 17
If credit was provided, share of payment on credit 64 … …
Retailers giving credit to consumers (for delayed payment 
by consumer)
53 28 16
Share of all customers that paid on credit (paid later) … 1 …
Retailers that home-delivered 0 34 5
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Performance of Traditional Potato Retail
Costs and Wastage of Traditional Potato Retailers
Table 9.9 shows variable costs for the last transaction and operating costs that 
are fixed over the year (exclusive of amortization of capital). The two largest items 
for the traditional potato retailer were transport (at 61% in Dhaka, 36% in Beijing, 
and 32% in Delhi), and fees and commissions (9% in Dhaka, 16% in Beijing, and 
36% in Delhi). The figure that stands out is the high share of fees in Delhi. The 
Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee  Act (known as the APMC Act) that 
regulated the wholesale market made mandatory several fees: the fee for market 
use, the commission to the licensed wholesaler, weighing fees paid to inspectors at 
the market who observed the weighing of the product and gave a chit against that, 
and fees for using the retail space. This set of fees and mandated commissions were 
more than traditional retailers in Dhaka and Beijing paid—but the services received 
by Delhi retailers in the market exchanges did not appear to be commensurately 
more in return. The differences in variable costs per ton for the last transaction of 
potato in Dhaka, Beijing, and Delhi ($9, $22, and $50) were of roughly the same 
order as the variable costs of retailers in those cities for their last transaction of rice. 
Given that distances and transaction waiting times were roughly similar across the 
cities, and all three were congested, it appears that the differences in cost were 
due to the costs of transport. (In Dhaka, only 36% of transport was by motor 
vehicle versus 88% in Beijing and 79% in Delhi, as indicated in Table 9.5). Transport 
(including fuel) was the most important cost in the midstream and downstream 
portions of the food value chains. Because fuel costs are directly linked to food 
security, this may be an important area for future policy analysis. 
Table 9.9 Traditional Potato Retailers’ Costs
Cost Element Bangladesh PRC India
Variable costs in last transactions (%)
Bagging 0 6 2
Labor to load/unload  24 6  27
Transport from supplier to retailer  54 14   28
Personal transport from place of purchase to retailer 7 22  4
Fee at wholesaler in market or to broker that brought 
from source
1 16  11
Commission to wholesaler  4 0  9
Weighing fees 3 0  7
Fee at retail place 1 …  5
Transformation fees … … 4
Miscellaneous 5 17 3
Total variable costs 100 100 100
Variable cost per ton ($)  9.34 21.50 50.00
Operating costs per year ($) 407 2,813 1,234
… = no data available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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Contrary to  the strongly held assumption that there are high rates of wastage 
in produce value chains in Asia, the survey data showed that the retail segment 
entailed very low wastage rates—2% in Bangladesh, 5% in the PRC, and 3% in 
India. Reasons include that the retail lots were small, were not stored long at 
ambient temperature, and were moved in short transaction cycles. 
Retailers informed the survey that little of the potato had to be discarded due 
to  damage from handling or reduced in quality from storage to sale. Some 
value could be lost due to declining freshness or surface damage from rough 
handling, but this value reduction was minor. Retailers in Delhi and Dhaka 
reported that loss of quality in potatoes unsold in about a week forced them 
to reduce the price by about 10% toward the end of each transaction cycle so 
they could sell the remaining potatoes.   
Potato Quality Differentiation and Dynamics  
among Traditional Retailers
Table 9.10 shows dynamics in quality, variety, and packaging as shares of sales. 
In Dhaka, the share of white potatoes rose rapidly to dominate sales in 2009. 
White potatoes had displaced red ones due to a significant yield advantage. 
In the production zone under study, the choice of variety had shifted toward 
diamond from granola for disease resistance, but at the national level the shift 
had been in the opposite direction, for taste reasons. 
In Beijing, the share of fine grade potatoes rose modestly, from 9% to 14% 
of sales, but the middle grade of potato remained the most common type 
available. While rice retail had shifted from loose to packaged, almost all
Table 9.10 Traditional Potato Retail: Quality, Variety, and Packaging  
(% of type of potato in all potatoes sold)
Zone, Type, Quality, and Packaging Earliest Year Latest Year
Bangladesh 1999 2009
Share of white potatoes in all potatoes 73 95
Share of diamond variety in all white potatoes sold 69 84
China, People’s Rep. of 2004 2009
Fine (grade) 9 14
Middle (grade) 87 78
Poor (grade) 4 8
Loose 96 95
Packaged with company name 0 0
Packaged without company name 4 5
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potatoes were sold loose. Potatoes are not likely to be packed (except in wide 
mesh) even in the medium term, as consumers are used to inspecting and 
choosing each potato from bulk bins or tables in the wet markets. 
Potato prices varied significantly in all three zones, often linked with quality 
differentiation. To determine the variation, retailers were asked about prices 
and quality indicators pertaining to the grade, variety, and appearance of the 
potatoes they were selling and whether they were packaged or loose. These 
prices were then converted to United States dollars using the official exchange 
rates at the time. 
Figure 9.1 shows cumulative density functions for the prices. The figure shows 
that price variation was much lower in Dhaka than either Beijing or Delhi. Only 
4% of the potatoes in Dhaka sold for more than $470/ton, versus 44% in Beijing 
and 61% in Delhi. The slope of the distribution is much steeper in Dhaka than 
in the other two cities, reflecting less variation in Dhaka. This might be driven by 
the greater quality differences in Delhi and Beijing. In Dhaka, only red and white 
potatoes from cold storage were in the market at the time of the survey, with 
little price difference between them. The Delhi market had higher-priced fresh 
potatoes, supplied by hill states, in addition to potatoes from storage. 
Figure 9.1 Potato Price Variation in Beijing, Delhi, and Dhaka: Cumulative  
Density Functions of the Traditional Retail Price of Potato
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Seasonal Prices and Margins of Traditional Potato Retailers
Table 9.11 shows significant seasonal variation in the absolute and relative 
margins traditional potato retailers achieved. In general, the relative margins 
varied inversely with the amount of potato being sold on the market; thus, 
retailers had lower margins for cold-stored potatoes during the off-season and 
higher margins at the lower volume time before the fresh harvest. 
The relative margins varied in India from a high of 41% during the Agra harvest 
period (when volume was lower, see the trader results discussed earlier), to 
24%–27% during the higher volume quarters of April–September (when 
potatoes were being withdrawn from cold storage). When the volume waned, 
the relative margin returned to 40% in October–December. That is, the margin 
varied positively with scarcity. The findings for Bangladesh and the PRC were 
similar, but the patterns were less pronounced for the PRC case, because 
potatoes came into Beijing from different regions during most of the year.
Table 9.11 Margins of Traditional Potato Retailers ($/ton)
Zone, Season/Month Absolute 
(sales price–purchase price  
in $/ton)
Relative 
([sales price/purchase price]
[100}-100, in %)
Bangladesh  
Oct–Nov 2008 29.4 21.0
Dec–Jan 2009 37.4 15.9
Feb–Mar 2009 26.7 15.3
Apr–Jun 2009 33.4 15.9
Jul–Sep 2009 33.4 11.7
Oct–Nov 2009 36.0 10.5
China, People’s Rep. of
Jun–Jul 2010 64.2 17.3
Apr–May 2010 43.3 10.7
Feb–Mar 2010 55.8 14.1
Dec–Jan 2010 61.4 15.9
Nov 2009 36.3 10.9
Oct 2009 51.6 17.4
Aug–Sep 2009 60.0 21.3
Average 53.0 15.4
India
Oct–Dec 2008 58.4 39.7
Jan–Mar 2009 50.4 41.4
Apr–Jun 2009 62.4 27.2
Jul–Sep 2009 84.6 23.5
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Table 9.12 shows profit rates for traditional potato retailers. Because capital 
amortization could not be included, the profit rates are somewhat overstated. 
That bias was smaller for the small retailers than for traders and cold storages, 
which had a much higher capital/labor ratio. The profit rates in Delhi and Dhaka 
were a bit higher for potato than was the case for rice and were higher than 
in Beijing, where the profit rates for potato and rice were the same. Retailers’ 
profit rates were somewhat lower than traders’ profit rates, and much lower 
than the rice retail profit rates calculated by Chowdhury (1992) from survey 
data in 1989–1990 by the International Food Policy Research Institute. There is 
a dearth of case studies with which to compare these findings, but they appear 
reasonable relative to the other findings in this study and the Chowdhury study. 
Table 9.12 Traditional Potato Retailers’ Profit Rates
Location Profit (%)
Dhaka 37
Beijing
Overall (all qualities) 20
Fine quality 36
Medium quality 5
Poor quality 10
Delhi 32
Potato Price Comparisons between Modern and Traditional Retailers
Table 9.13 compares potato prices of modern and traditional retail in Delhi. In 
Delhi, potato prices were lower at modern retail outlets than from pushcarts 
(their nearest competitor) and wet markets. This is an important result, as modern 
retailing in Delhi was still at an early stage of marketing the most important 
vegetable staple in India. The implication is that modern retailing can bolster the 
food security of the urban poor. However, in Beijing, supermarkets sold medium 
(quality grade) potatoes at a higher price ($653 per ton) than did traditional 
stalls ($447 per ton).
Table 9.13 Potato Price Difference: Modern versus Traditional Retail, India
Price Difference with Modern Retail
 Observations Mean 
($/ton)
Std. 
Error
Mean 
($/ton)
Std. 
Error
t-Value Pr 
(|T|>|t|)
Modern retail 84 139 0.13
Pushcarts 158 156 0.13 17 0.20 3.922 0.000
Wet markets 289 168 0.17 29 0.32 4.185 0.000
… = no data available, Pr = probability, Std = standard.
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Table 9.14 reports hedonic price regressions for modern versus traditional 
potato retail in Delhi. The hedonic price regression methodology was used to 
regress the retail price per kilogram on categorical variables for the type of retail 
outlet, the quality of the product, the ward (which controls for both location 
and time, as the survey was rolled out over a month across wards), a wealth 
indicator of the colony (a subdivision of a ward) to control for local potential 
demand factors, and a branding dummy. The hedonic price regression shows 
that both private sector modern retail and cooperative modern retail were 
cheaper than the traditional shops. 
Table 9.14 Hedonic Potato Price Regression Results: India
Condition Value
Dependent variable (Rs/kg)
Version 1*
Modern retail dummy
Coefficient -0.44
t-value -1.72
Wet market dummy
Coefficient 0.51
t-value 2.57
Number of observations 522
R2 0.25
Modern retailers versus pushcarts, F test, 2.95, probability > F = 0.09
Modern retailers versus wet markets, F test, 11.05, probability > F = 0.00
Version 2*
Private–Modern retail dummy
Coefficient -0.28
t-value -1.11
Cooperative–Modern retail dummy
Coefficient -0.89
t-value -1.50
Wet market exit interview dummy
Coefficient 1.45
t-value 4.79
Wet market trader interview dummy
Coefficient -0.36
t-value -2.11
Number of observations 522
R2 0.32
Private–Modern retailers versus pushcarts, F test, 1.24, probability > F = 0.27
Private–Modern retailers versus exit interview wet markets, F test, 24.16, probability > F = 0.00
Private–Modern retailers versus wet market trader interview, F test, .09, probability > F = 0.76
Private–Modern retailers versus exit interview wet markets, F test, 1.08, probability > F = 0.30
* P in Rs/kg = f(retail outlets, quality/branded indicators, ward dummy, wealth colony dummy)
Only retail outlet coefficients are reported.
Pushcart prices are the default.
kg = kilogram, Rs = Indian rupees.
 Downstream—Potato Retail Transformation 249
Table 9.15 further explores the price differences using propensity score 
matching probit regressions; these were run with dummy variables of 
potatoes sold in supermarkets coded as 1 and potatoes sold in traditional retail 
outlets coded as 0, as dependent variables. The controls included measures 
for quality, labeling, quantities sold, ward dummy variables, wealth dummy 
variables per colony, and an intercept. Using the results of these regressions to 
construct a propensity score, the table shows the propensity score matching 
impact estimates on prices for potato comparing modern retail (treated) with 
traditional markets (control). The table presents the results of the unmatched 
sample and the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). 
Table 9.15 Propensity Score Matching Results of Potato Price Comparisons: 
Modern versus Traditional Retail in India
Sample Treated  
(modern)
Controls 
(traditional)
Difference Std.  
Error
t-Statistic
Unmatched 6.23 7.31 -1.07 0.27 -3.98
ATT 6.27 6.77 -0.50 0.49 -1.03
Number of 
observations
41 431
ATT = average treatment effect for the treated.
The table shows that that potatoes were less expensive in modern retail in 
unmatched samples, but that modern retail was not significantly less expensive 
for similar products, i.e., the matched samples, as shown by the smaller 
t-values for the ATT compared with unmatched sample. The price differences 
of similar products in modern compared with traditional retail was 7% for 
potato. In sum, after controlling for confounding factors, potatoes were not 
more expensive in modern retail no matter which method is used. 
Conclusions
First, as revealed by the detailed survey, actual traditional potato retailing was 
somewhat different from the traditional images and assumptions, although 
not to the same extent as for rice retail. Traditional potato retailing was 
evolving toward greater quality differentiation; however, unlike rice, there was 
still nearly no packaging or brand development. 
Second, several common assumptions about potato retailer services were proven 
wrong. Traditional retailers provided very little value-chain finance by letting 
customers buy on credit, and they did little home delivery. In that sense, they 
did not have advantages over modern retailing. Traditional retail had locational 
advantages, which are likely to wane over time as modern retail outlets spread. 
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Third, modern retail had just started to market potatoes in the urban study 
zones. While supermarkets still charged more for potatoes in Beijing, they did 
not charge more than traditional retailers in Delhi. This suggests that, for price 
and food security reasons, modern retail will probably make inroads into the 
potato markets in these economies during the next decade or so. 
Fourth, governments had generally not played a direct role in transforming 
the retailing of potatoes in the study zones. The exception was government 
facilitation and initial leadership for promoting modern cooperative retailing 
in India (Reardon and Minten 2011), which is now gradually penetrating the 
potato retail market. 
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This chapter presents findings on the distribution of costs, rewards, and overall margins across the value-chain segments, and the composition of value-chain costs in terms of functional categories (such as labor, 
transport, and wastage). 
Costs, Rewards, and Overall Margins  
in the Potato Value Chain
Tables 10.1–10.3, for Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and 
India,  show value-chain segments’ shares in total costs and rewards in the 
overall potato value chain. The chains for Bangladesh and India include harvest 
and off-seasons because of the significant amount of potato cold storage in 
these two study zones. Only the harvest season is shown for Gansu in the PRC, 
because little of the potato was stored in that zone. 
Rewards are calculated as gross price less costs per kilogram. For farmers, 
the rewards are further divided into rewards to farm operation and to cold 
storage. The assumption is that, had farmers not stored their potatoes, they 
would have received the same rewards during harvest and off-harvest periods. 
The additional rewards earned in the off-harvest period were thus due to cold 
storage. For wholesalers and retailers, the rewards are the difference between 
the sales and purchase prices per kilogram of potato. For farmers, traders, 
and retailers, costs comprise nonlabor (purchased) operational costs, wage 
(hired) labor costs, all costs incurred in marketing, and physical wastage per 
kilogram of potato produced and distributed. Storage costs for rural traders 
are subsumed in their nonlabor operational costs. For farmers, the storage 
costs are broken out as a separate category of costs. Storage costs paid by 
farmers are the gross income of cold stores. Total gross income (per kilogram) 
is calculated as the sum of rewards and costs.
Performance of the Potato 
Value Chain—Rewards,  
Costs, and Margins
10|
 Performance of the Potato Value Chain—Rewards, Costs, and Margins 253252 The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains 
In general, the tables show that the farmers’ share in the potato value 
chains’ total value added was higher than typically viewed, (1) partly due to 
disintermediation in the potato chain with a reduction of the role of village 
brokers, a rise in the role of sales at cold stores to traders, and increased sales 
directly to wholesale markets and interprovince or interstate traders; and (2) 
partly as a result of farmers storing potatoes. However, cold stores, traders, 
and urban retailers had gained shares in the value chain transformation 
process relative to traditional value chains, where farmers sold directly to 
local consumers and rural markets.  Results by country are discussed below and 
then compared.
Bangladesh. In both seasons, the Bogra farmers took the preponderant 
share of the urban retail price (total margins), reaching 69% in the harvest 
season and 77% in the off-harvest season (Table 10.1). The main reason for the 
increase in the off-season was the farmers’ rewards for storage, which were 
substantial—the farmers captured 43% of rewards in the total value chain just 
from selling in the off-harvest season after storing. They also bore 23% of the 
value chain’s costs by their storage expenditure. 
Table 10.1 Shares of Rewards, Costs, and Total Margins in the Potato  
Value Chain from Bogra to Dhaka in Bangladesh, Harvest and Off-Season Periods
Item Harvest (March) Off-Season (October)
Average retail price 
of potato in 
Dhaka  
(in $/ton)
233 359
Share of rewards, 
costs, and total 
margins accruing 
to
Rewards  
(% of total 
rewards 
in VC)
Costs  
(% of total 
costs  
in VC)
Total 
Margins  
(% of retail 
price in 
Dhaka)
Rewards  
(% of total 
rewards 
in VC)
Costs  
(% of total 
costs  
in VC)
Total 
Margins  
(% of  retail 
price in 
Dhaka)
Farmers (%)       
For production 54 85 69 30 64 43
For storage 0 0 0 40 25 34
Total 54 85 69 70 89 77
Wholesalers (%)
Rural wholesalers 9 7 8 5 5 5
Urban wholesalers 17 4 11 9 3 6
Urban traditional 
retailers (%)
20 4 12 16 3 11
Total % (parentheses 
show % of Dhaka 
retail price)
 100 ( 55)  100 (45)  100 (100)  100 ( 62)  100 ( 38)  100 (100)
VC = value chain.
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By contrast, the wholesalers’ share of total margins was only 19% in the 
harvest season and 11% in the off-season. Urban retailers had only 12% of 
the total margin in the harvest season and 11% in the off-season. Thus, their 
combined share of the total margin for the postharvest segments was 31% in 
the harvest season and 22% in the off-season. The cold storage cost borne by 
the farmers was also the income share of the cold storage segment. The share 
of total margins can be approximated as the share of costs in the total margin 
(about 38%) multiplied by the cold stores’ share in costs (23%), or about 9%. 
Hence, all the postharvest actors captured about 30% of the total margins in 
the off-season and 31% in the harvest season. 
The People’s Republic of China. In Gansu (Table 10.2), during the harvest 
season (when the great majority of potato is sold), the farmers’ share in the 
urban retail price (total margins) was 60%. By contrast, the wholesalers’ share 
of total margins was 26%, and their share of costs was 27%. The share of 
urban retail in the total margin was 14%. The postharvest share of the Gansu–
Beijing potato value chain was thus about 40%. 
Table 10.2 Shares of Rewards, Costs, and Total Margins in the  
Potato Value Chain from Gansu to Beijing, Harvest Season
Item Rewards Costs Total Margin
Farmers
For production 73 56 60
For storage 0 0 0
Total 73 56 60
Wholesalers
Rural wholesalers 5 11 9
Urban wholesalers  19  16 17
Urban traditional retailers 3 18 14
Total (parentheses show shares of  
Beijing retail price)
 100 (25)  100 (75)  100 (100)
Note: The assumption is that farmers sell immediately after harvest with barely any storage in the cold storages. Margins 
received by each agent across the value chain add up to the final retail price, which is equal to CNY2.9/kilogram.
India. In both seasons, the Agra potato farmers’ share in the urban retail price 
(total margins) was just over half (57% in the harvest season and 52% in the 
off-season) (Table 10.3). Thus, the farmers got a little less and the wholesalers 
and retailers slightly more of the margin during the off-season than during the 
harvest season. The farmers captured 49% of rewards in the total value chain 
in the off-season, just from selling after storing. The farmers also bore 19% of 
the value chain’s costs by so doing.
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Table 10.3 Shares of Rewards, Costs, and Total Margins in the Potato Value Chain  
from Agra to Delhi, Harvest and Off-Harvest Periods
Harvest Season (Jan–Mar 2009) Off-Harvest Season (Jul–Sep 2009)
Average retail 
price of potato  
in Delhi  ($/ton)
149 478
Share of rewards, 
costs and  
total margins 
accruing to
Rewards  
(% of total 
rewards in 
value chain)
Costs  
(% of total 
costs in value 
chain)
Total Margins 
(% of average 
retail price in 
Delhi in this 
period)
Rewards  
(% of total 
rewards in 
value chain)
Costs  
(% of total 
costs in value 
chain)
Total Margins 
(% of average 
retail price in 
Delhi in this 
period)
Farmers     
For production 66 49 57 15 21 18
For storage 0 0 0 49 19 34
Total 66 49 57 64 40 52
Wholesalers
Rural wholesalers 13 11 12 10 14 12
Urban 
wholesalers 
11 8 9 12 11 12
Urban traditional 
retailers 
10 32 21 15  35 24
Total rewards costs 
and total margins 
in the value chain 
(parentheses 
show share of 
Delhi retail price)
 100 (45)  100 (55)  100 (100)  100 (61)  100 ( 39)  100 (100)
Rural and urban wholesalers’ combined share of total margins was 21% in the 
harvest season and 24% in the off-season. Urban retailers in Delhi had similar 
percentages, at 21% of the total margin in the harvest season and 24% in 
the off-season. Thus the postharvest segments’ share of the total margin was 
about 42% in the harvest season and 48% in the off-season. (This increased to 
about 60% if the cold stores’ share was added, weighted by half the share of 
costs in margins.) 
The Three Zones. In general, farmers’ shares of the margins ranged from just 
over half in India to almost three-quarters in Bangladesh. Wholesalers’ shares 
(combined rural and urban) ranged from about 15% in Bangladesh to 26% in the 
PRC. Traditional retailers’ shares ranged from about 10% in Bangladesh to 23% in 
India. In addition, several specific points stand out.
First, farmers in both India and Bangladesh earned rewards for storage of 
potatoes when selling in the off-season. That effect was strong: for example, 
in India, through storage, farmers captured fully 49% of all the rewards in 
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the value chain during the off-season. Farmers’ cold storage costs comprised 
a major share of total value chain costs in the off-season: 23% in Bangladesh 
and 19% in India. The counterpart of these costs was, of course, gross incomes 
for cold storage facilities.  
However, there is a difference between how cold storage affected farmers’ 
shares of the total margins in Bangladesh and in India. In India, in both 
seasons, the farmers received only just over half of the urban retail price 
(total margins)—57% during the harvest season to 54% in the off-season. 
By contrast, the farmers in Bangladesh gained a slightly higher share of total 
margins in the off-season than during the harvest season.
Second, the wholesalers had a larger share of total margins in the PRC case 
(at 26% during the harvest season) compared with Bangladesh (20% in the 
harvest season, and 12% in the off-season) and to a lesser extent with India 
(21% in the harvest season, 23% in the off-season). This is primarily because the 
supplying zone, Gansu, is 4–5 times farther from the urban retailers in Beijing 
than the Bangladesh and Indian supply zones are from Dhaka and Delhi. Yet 
the PRC potato-chain costs were only about twice those in Bangladesh ($25/
ton from Gansu to Beijing versus $13/ton from Bogra to Dhaka). Thus, the cost 
per ton per kilometer in the PRC was actually half that in Bangladesh. 
Third, potato retailers in Delhi had a much greater share of total margins 
(23%) than did those in Dhaka (at only 12% in the harvest season and 8% 
in the off-season) and Beijing (at only 14%). This may be evidence that Delhi 
potato retailers exert market power (that is, the ability to influence the price of 
potato due to their control over its supply). It could also be evidence of relative 
inefficiency, but the potato retail operation in all three cities was performed 
in a similar way, with short periods of several days of inventory cycles, short 
distances to procure potatoes, and similarly small scales of operation. 
Cost Items in the Potato Value Chain
Tables 10.4–10.6 show cost items in the potato value chains in the three zones 
studied. 
Bangladesh. Table 10.4 shows several striking findings about the composition 
of costs in the Bangladesh potato value chain. As costs made up roughly 40% 
of the margins of the potato value chain, the share of a particular cost item, 
multiplied by 40%, gives a rough idea of that item’s impact on the cost to the 
potato consumer.
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Table 10.4 Shares of Cost Items in the Total Cost of the Potato Value Chain  
in Bangladesh, Harvest and Off-Season Periods
Cost Item Harvest 
(March)
Off-Season 
(October)
Producer’s input purchases (all purchased inputs other than 
land and labor; Tk3.96/kg)
44 34
Producer’s rental costs (Tk0.53/kg) 6 5
Producer’s wage labor costs (Tk1.60/kg) 18 14
Costs for cold storage (Tk2.40/kg) … 21
Wastage cost for the whole chain (Tk0.56/kg at harvest; 
Tk0.89/kg during off-season)
6 8
Transport costs in whole chain (Tk0.88/kg) 10 8
Trader’s wage labor costs (Tk0.28/kg) 3 2
Market Fees (Tk0.16/kg) 2 1
Weighing fees (Tk0.05/kg) 1 0.43
Operational costs of trader (Tk0.80/kg) 9 6
Other costs borne by trader (Tk0.09/kg) 1 0.6
Total 100 100
… = no data available, kg = kilogram, Tk = taka.
Table 10.5 Shares of Cost Items in the Total Cost of the Potato Value Chain  
in the PRC, Harvest Season
Cost item Percent 
Producer’s inputs (all purchased inputs other than land and labor; CNY0.47/kg) 35
Producer’s wages (for hired labor)a 0
Wastage costs in the whole chain (CNY0.10/kg) 7
Wage costs of traders (CNY0.15/kg) 11
Transport costs for the whole chain (CNY0.42/kg) 31
Market fees (CNY0.10/kg) 7
Weighing fees (CNY0.01/kg) 1
Traders (wholesalers and retailers) operational costs (includes electricity, telephone/fax, 
and stall rents but not transport; CNY0.10/kg)
8
Total (CNY1.36 /kg) 100
CNY = yuan, kg = kilogram, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
a   Hired labor is only 2% of the level of family labor, so this was assumed to be near zero.
The highest single cost item was the farmers’ purchased inputs, at about 
40% of value-chain costs and thus with a rough impact of 16% on the 
consumer price. 
Next was the cold storage, at 21% of costs in the off-season. Chapter 8 noted 
that about two-thirds of potatoes in Dhaka came from cold stores and that 
energy comprised fully 63% of the cold storage operating costs. Thus, 15% 
of the potato value-chain costs and about 6% of the potato price was directly 
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Table 10.6 Shares of Cost Items in the Potato Value Chain from Agra to Delhi, 
Harvest and Off-Season 
Cost Item Harvest 
(March)
Off-
Season 
(October)
Producer’s inputs (all purchased inputs other than land and labor; Rs1.07/kg) 26 14
Producer’s rental (rented-in land; Rs0.56/kg) 14 7
Producer’s wages (hired labor; Rs0.23/kg) 6 3
Storage (Rs2.40/kg) … 32
Wastage (Rs0.76/kg for off season; Rs0.09/kg for harvest season) 2 9
Transport (Rs0.40/kg ) 10 5
Wage costs of traders  (hired labor; Rs0. 50/kg) 12 7
Market Fees (Rs0.50/kg) 12 7
Weighing fees (Rs0.20/kg) 5 3
Traders (wholesalers and retailers)  operational costs (electricity, telephone, 
fax, permanent employees; Rs0.35/kg)
9 5
Other costs of traders (Rs0.16/kg) 4 2
Total 100% 100%
… = no data available, kg = kilogram, Rs = rupees.
affected by energy costs in cold storage. This applies to two-thirds of the 
potatoes consumed in Dhaka and is an important fact, given the recurrent 
energy crises.
The third-ranked factor was the wage of hired labor. In the whole system, 
wages comprised roughly 18%–20% of costs (excluding cold storage labor 
costs), and thus had about an 8% impact on prices. In Bangladesh, rising 
wages, improved incomes, and demand pressure from the nonfarm sector will 
affect labor costs in the potato value chain, probably leading to a continued 
drive for farm mechanization to reduce the labor demand. 
Transport ranked fourth, with only 9% of total costs (and an impact of about 
3% on retail prices). This is relatively modest because of Bogra’s proximity to 
Dhaka. Trucks leaving Bogra around midnight reach Dhaka wholesale markets 
in the early morning for the prime sales time. Transport costs were equivalent 
to $13/ton, which was relatively low, given that the potato price was about 
$233/ton in the harvest season and $359/ton otherwise. 
Fifth, physical wastage was 7% from harvest to retail. This was well below the 
levels of 30%–40% often asserted in food policy circles (Mattoo, Mishra, and 
Narain 2007). The lower importance of wastage and transport costs that the 
study found may be due to the development over time of better infrastructure 
(cold storage and road infrastructure) in the area studied and the spread of the 
mobile phone to allow better coordination of transactions. 
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The People’s Republic of China. Table 10.5 shows several interesting 
findings. Because costs made up roughly 75% of total margins in the potato 
value chain, the share of each cost item, multiplied by 75%, gives a rough 
idea of that item’s impact on the cost of potatoes to consumers. The first 
ranked item, the cost of farmers’ external inputs, was about 35% of the 
value-chain costs (thus with a rough impact of 26% on the consumer price). 
Next was transport, which consumed 14% of total costs and comprised 10% 
of consumer prices. Third, physical wastage was only 7% in the potato value 
chain, from harvest to sale at retail at least 1,000 kilometers away, strongly 
contravening the usual assumptions of high wastage rates. 
India. In the India potato value chain, costs were about 50% of the total 
margins, so the share of a cost item, multiplied by 50%, gives a rough idea 
of its impact on the consumer’s price (Table 10.6).
First was the set of farm costs, including 19% (averaging over the seasons) 
from external inputs used by farmers, 11%  from land rental, and 10% from 
wage labor. With increasing pressure on land markets in areas around large 
cities such as Delhi, the land-related costs of staple food prices will be an 
increasing factor in food costs. 
Second was cold storage, with 21% of costs in the off-season (similar to 
those in Bangladesh). The cold storage share of potato chain costs exceeded 
the external input costs of farmers but the food security debate focuses 
mostly on the farm-level costs. About two-thirds of potatoes in Delhi came 
from cold stores, and 71% of the cost of operating cold storage was for 
energy (Chapter 8). Therefore, 21% of the potato value chain costs—and 
thus about 11% of the potato price—were directly affected by energy costs 
in cold stores for two-thirds of the potatoes. 
The third-ranked item was market fees, at 5% of total costs and with about 
a 2% impact on potato prices. Market fees’ impacts on potato prices were 
much more modest than assumed in the public policy debate, where they are 
pointed to as an important cause of food price inflation. 
Fourth, transport contributed a modest 8% of costs in the harvest season 
and 11% in the off-season, with an average low impact of about 5% on 
potato retail prices. This modest impact is because the Agra zone is only 
200 kilometers from Delhi, and the great majority of Delhi potatoes were 
from nearby zones. The transport rate was a mere $8/ton, about 60% of the 
Bangladesh rate (for a similar distance traversed). 
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Fifth, physical wastage from farm to purchaser accounted for about 6% of 
costs. Cutting wastage rates in half would be an important achievement, but 
would reduce potato prices to consumers by less than 3%. 
The Three Zones. In all three zones, farmers’ inputs ranked among the 
most important cost items in the value chains, at roughly 40% (averaged 
across zones) of total costs in the chains in the harvest season. Therefore, 
the efficiency of input supply chains to farmers and of input use has an 
important impact on potato prices. 
Second, cold storage costs were about one quarter of total costs. About 
two-thirds of cold storage costs were for energy alone, and formed 17% of 
chain costs. Thus, making the cold stores as energy-efficient as possible is 
very important to consumer prices.
Third, transport costs were also a significant item, at about 9%–10% of costs 
in South Asia and 14% in the PRC. These costs, however, differed greatly 
over the economies in absolute terms (due to the different distances in the 
value chains from farmer to retailer) and in cost per ton per kilometer. The 
PRC transport costs per ton per kilometer were substantially lower than those 
in Bangladesh, and somewhat lower than those of India. This suggests the 
importance of an improved transport sector as a significant factor in supply 
chain efficiency.
Fourth, with increasing pressure on land and labor markets in all three 
economies due to urbanization and a rapidly developing local nonfarm and 
migration labor market (in particular in the PRC and India), the costs of land 
rental and labor hire will loom increasingly large in forming potato (and other 
food) prices. Consequently, food will likely be sourced farther from the cities 
(in areas with lower land and labor prices), and potato farming is likely to 
become more mechanized (such as for land preparation and harvesting) and 
to use more chemical treatment of weeds. Indeed, the study documented 
the increasing use of herbicides.
Finally, wastage rates (at about 6%–7% of total supply chain costs) were 
much more modest than the rates posited in current debates in the region. 
Postharvest handling is important, but many of the needed practices 
and investments may have been put in place so that wastage has already 
become modest. 
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Potato Market Prices
The potato markets were changing, transforming, and restructuring; however, 
they were not yet well integrated, arbitrage was incomplete, and significant 
seasonality was still an issue. Prices varied substantially even at the same time 
across transactions in a segment of the potato value chain, and between 
seasons. This was true even in India, where cold storage was well established, 
potato production was the most commercialized, and the market was the 
largest among the zones studied. Despite the ready availability of cold storage 
in South Asia, prices and absolute margins varied considerably with the seasons. 
There is a significant price variation at any point in time in any segment of the 
potato value chain. This is reflected in Figures 10.1 and 10.2 for Bangladesh 
and India, where the price variation of potato is shown for each segment at 
the time of the survey. Retail and wholesale prices vary significantly, depending 
primarily on quality and location. For example, in the case of Bangladesh in 
Figure 10.1, while the average margin between sales and procurement price 
is about Tk2.5/kg and the wholesale price distribution shows a parallel shift 
to the left, prices at each trade level vary significantly. Retail prices differed by 
100% between the lowest and the highest levels, i.e., Tk17/kg and Tk34/kg, 
respectively, at the time of the survey.
Moreover, the study’s findings concerning the links between value-chain 
margins and potato price inflation refute the accusation that traditional 
retailers’ margins are driving the food price inflation. In India, the study 
examined the extent that price inflation was linked to increasing margins of 
agents in the value chain. For this analysis, only the time series of potato price 
data at the wholesale and retail levels in Delhi were available from secondary 
sources (the government), thus limiting the discussion on potato price inflation 
to the relative impact of retail margins and wholesale prices. 
Figure 10.3 plots the monthly nominal wholesale and retail price during 
2000–2010 (Fcainfoweb online n.d.). The figure demonstrates that nominal 
prices of both indicators trended upward, thus indicating nominal inflation 
in potato prices in both the wholesale and retail segments. To determine the 
different extents to which wholesalers and retailers benefited from or caused 
this upward trend, the ratio and the difference between the two series are 
examined in detail. Figure 10.4 plots the share of the wholesale price over 
the retail price in that period, and shows significant variability of this ratio 
through time but no clear upward or downward trend. Figure 10.5 plots 
nominal and real retail margins, which were obtained by dividing the prices 
by the consumer price index for industrial workers (Labour Bureau online n.d.), 
where the index in 2009 is equated to 1. The real retail margin is defined as the 
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absolute difference between wholesale and retail prices over time. The nominal 
price went up over time (with significant variability); however, there seems to 
be no evidence that real margins increased over time.
Figure 10.1 Potato Prices in Dhaka 
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Figure 10.3 Potato Wholesale and Retail Prices in Delhi 
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To statistically test how nominal potato prices had changed over time and 
what the contributing factors had been to that inflation, the authors ran 
several regressions of the form where the price of potato (expressed in rupees/
kilogram) is linked with quarterly dummies, to capture the seasonal variation in 
prices, and yearly dummies, to capture nominal inflation in prices (Table 10.7). 
Several important insights emerged.
Table 10.7 Potato Regressions in India: Nominal Wholesale and  
Retail Prices and Margins
Explanatory 
Variables
Dependent Variables
Nominal 
Wholesale 
Price (Rs/kg)
Nominal  
Retail Price  
(Rs/kg)
Nominal  
Retail Margin  
(Rs/kg)
Real Retail  
Margin  
(Rs/kg)
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Intercept 1.39 2.50 2.72 3.98 1.33 3.20 4.52 6.46
April–June 1.87 4.46 2.43 4.72 0.57 1.82 0.51 0.97
July–September 3.37 7.88 5.55 10.53 2.17 6.78 1.44 2.68
October–December 2.20 5.08 3.70 6.92 1.49 4.59 0.99 1.82
2001 1.80 2.58 1.51 1.77 -0.28 -0.54 -0.66 -0.75
2002 2.12 3.04 3.01 3.52 0.90 1.73 0.19 0.22
2003 0.20 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.11 0.21 -1.17 -1.34
2004 0.94 1.35 1.89 2.21 0.94 1.82 -0.68 -0.78
2005 1.80 2.58 2.64 3.08 0.84 1.62 -0.56 -0.64
2006 2.37 3.41 4.18 4.88 1.81 3.47 -0.05 -0.06
2007 2.75 3.95 4.89 5.71 2.14 4.11 1.22 1.39
2008 2.38 3.42 4.18 4.88 1.82 3.50 0.89 1.02
2009 4.98 7.16 8.51 9.94 3.54 6.80 -1.03 -1.18
2010 (till July) 2.94 3.60 5.36 5.32 2.41 3.94 0.14 0.14
kg = kilogram, Rs = Indian rupees.
First, there were important seasonal movements in the prices and margins. 
Prices and margins were both significantly higher during the latter part of the 
year (the off-harvest period). Potato retail prices in the third and fourth quarters 
were Rs5.6/kg and Rs3.7/kg higher, respectively, than in the first quarter. Because 
of the structure of the regressions and the dependent variables, the sum of the 
coefficients of wholesale and retail price regressions allow an estimation of 
their relative contribution to this seasonal price hike. About 40% of the higher 
retail price during the off-season was driven by higher retail margins, possibly 
due to a “thin markets” effect (where prices are volatile due to few sales), and 
60% of the seasonal movement was explained by wholesale price movements. 
Second, the coefficients of the yearly dummies indicate how prices had changed 
over time, on average. Potato prices in 2009 were estimated to be Rs8.5/kg 
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higher than in 2000. Again, about 40% of that increase is explained by higher 
nominal retail margins and 60% by higher wholesale prices. As the coefficients 
of the yearly dummies in the retail margin regression were always smaller than 
those in the wholesale price regression (except for 2004), increases in retail 
margins always contributed less to retail price inflation than did wholesale 
price inflation. 
Third, the last two columns present the results of a regression of the real retail 
margin on time dummies. None of the time dummies is significant during 
the period studied, suggesting that margins in the food retail sector had not 
increased in real terms.
The results thus indicate that 40% of seasonal and yearly inflation of potato 
prices was explained by increasing retail margins and 60% by increasing 
wholesale prices. However, the increasing retail margins were in line with the 
rest of the economy as, using a general economy-wide deflator, they had not 
significantly increased or decreased over time. Of inflation in nominal potato 
prices, 60% was explained by increased wholesale prices. Unfortunately, the 
lack of consistent data on farm gate price precluded an analysis of the extent 
to which wholesale price rises were captured by the farmers or by agents in the 
value chain that operated between them and wholesale markets.
Conclusions
This overview of the distribution of costs and rewards in the potato value 
chains in Bangladesh, the PRC, and India, and the composition of the costs, 
brings to light several main points. 
First, potato farmers “captured” most of the total margins (retail prices). In 
Bangladesh, the farmers had 69% of the margins in the harvest season and 
77% in the off-season (34% of which came from margins from cold storage 
and selling the potatoes later when prices were higher). In the PRC, farmers 
got 60% of the harvest season retail price in Beijing. In India, farmers had 57% 
of the retail price during the harvest season and 52% in the off-season, but 
with about 34% coming from cold storage margins. Thus, the share of the 
postharvest segments of the value chain (wholesale, cold store, and retail) was 
about 40%–50% of the total price (with cold storage counted as a recipient of 
outlays by farmers). In Bangladesh and India, this varied a little by season, as 
farmers tended to gain from cold storage. Cold storage was much less used in 
the PRC study zone. 
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Second, the leading cost in the value chain was the external cost of potato 
farm inputs. These were 40% of the margins in Bangladesh, 56% in the PRC, 
and 20% in India, averaging about 40%. Improving efficiencies in farm input 
supply would thus redound to the benefit of potato consumers. 
Third, cold storage, especially in Bangladesh and India, was an important cost 
component in the value chains—at about a quarter in each. About two-thirds 
of potatoes consumed in Delhi and Dhaka had been cold stored. 
About two-thirds of the cold storage cost was for outlays on energy (electricity 
and diesel). Thus, about a fifth of potato value–chain costs were just from 
energy outlays in the cold storage segment. Consequently, potato prices are 
vulnerable to energy price shocks, and improving the efficiency with which 
energy is used will have a positive effect on the retail prices of potatoes. 
Fourth, while transport costs are generally considered to comprise a very large 
share of potato prices, the study found the share to be modest—at about 9% 
of value–chain costs in both South Asian economies and 14% in the PRC (due 
to the much greater distance involved). 
Fifth, wastage in the potato value chain, from harvest to the consumers, was 
about 6%–7% in all three zones studied. This contrasts with the 30%–40% 
wastage rates in food supply chains bandied about in public debates in the 
region. Reducing wastage will have a positive impact on value-chain costs and 
retail potato prices, but the impact is likely to be less than is commonly assumed.
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Spurred by the food crisis in 2008, governments and multilateral institutions in Asia called for upgrading the food value chains in the region. At the same time, few hard data existed on how domestic staples value chains 
were structured and performing. The Asian Development Bank commissioned 
the International Food Policy Research Institute to collaborate with research 
institutions in the region on a detailed study of rice and potato value chains. The 
study comprised a survey in 2009–2010 (with recall of selected variables over 
5 and 10 years). About 3,500 farmers, traders, millers, cold storage facilities (CSFs), 
and modern and traditional retailers were surveyed. The study was conducted in 
six zones (two in each economy, one being the area studied for potato and the 
other, the area studied for rice). The results for Bangladesh, the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), and India are reported in this book. The book’s subtitle refers 
to three emblems: the tiger for Bangladesh, the dragon for the PRC, and the 
elephant for India. All three are large economies with a powerful impact on the 
emerging world food economy of the 21st century. 
Three questions are addressed in the research: (1) Are staples value chains 
transforming structurally? (2) Is the conduct of staples value chains’ actors 
transforming? (3) Is the performance of staples value chains leading to the 
inclusion of small-scale farmers, small-scale midstream actors, and workers, 
and is it leading (all else being equal) to lower food costs for consumers?
In addressing these questions, the focus of the research was on (1) domestic 
value chains, as they include 98% of the staples in the region; (2) rice and 
potatoes, which are the main grain and the main vegetable staple in the 
region; (3) the “market catchment areas” within 8–10 hours of the capital 
cities, Dhaka, Beijing, and Delhi, to understand the rural–urban staples value 
chains feeding the cities of Asia (urban areas constitute roughly two-thirds to 
three-quarters of food demand in the Asian region); (4) private sector action in 
input supply, farming, processing, storing, trading, and retailing, because the 
private sector (traditional and modern) is the most important direct actor in 
staples value chains in the region; and (5) the impacts of government policies 
and development strategies. 
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By way of a basis for comparison and identification of the current transformation 
under way, we note that traditional rice value chains are perceived in 
conventional wisdom (which was established in important works in the 1960s 
and 1970s such as Lele [1971]) as characterized by (1) farming being oriented 
toward subsistence; (2) the supply chain being oriented mainly toward local 
rural markets (and thus being geographically short); (3) in the rural-to-urban 
supply chain, there are “many hands” or market agents between farmers and 
consumers, what we term “intermediationally long”; (4) each segment of the 
chain being highly fragmented and dominated by small-scale actors; (5) each 
segment’s conduct being characterized by the use of traditional technology 
and commercial practices; and (6) a prevalence of tied credit–output market 
relations between farmers and village traders.1 This conventional image paints 
a picture of inefficient and static chains, forcing farmers into relations with few 
options, and consumers into purchasing from costly supply chains. 
By contrast, the study found changes in the staples value chains that make 
today’s chains very different from the traditional value chain. The study showed 
that changes in the staples value chains involve an important transformation 
that is a modern revolution, with modern retailing starting to market staples. 
It is also a quiet revolution in traditional value chains for two reasons. First, 
compared with the rise of modern supermarket chains, the avalanche of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in processing, and changes in world food 
trading systems, the changes that are transforming traditional staples chains 
tend to be in the midstream, among traders, mills, and CSFs. These midstream 
changes are like the more visible and debated downstream modernization in 
that they involve consolidation and technological and organizational change 
in the segments, but they are unlike the modern food revolution in two ways 
beyond being in the midstream. They are generally not spurred by FDI, and they 
generally involve investments by small and medium midstream firms. Second, 
the midstream changes are “quiet,” because they are grassroots in nature and 
are as yet generally unrecognized, and their importance is underappreciated, 
especially in policy circles.
In general, the above transformation appears to be transforming in a “V” 
shaped formation similar to that of flying geese, using the metaphor evoked 
1 Lele (1971) found a surprising degree of integration and competition in India’s national rice 
market, in terms of arbitrage among urban wholesalers. However, she also showed that 
(except in more advanced cases such as the Punjab) the more usual situation (for example, 
as in Uttar Pradesh) was characterized by the “traditional” (intermediationally long and inef-
ficient) rice supply chains, with a preponderance of local retail markets, village traders, and 
small mills.
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in Akamatsu (1935). In the rice value-chain transformation, the “lead goose” 
is the PRC, which appears to be changing faster or has transformed further, 
especially in the remarkable development of its milling sector. In the potato 
value chain, India is taking the lead, with the spectacular rise of potato 
CSFs in Agra. But value chains in each of the three economies studied were 
transforming, albeit at different speeds. 
This chapter summarizes the main findings and draws implications as to 
governments’ roles in facilitating desirable transformations. The chapter notes 
the development strategies and policy paths that are likely to help economies 
to further transform their staples value chains so as to pursue growth, reduce 
poverty, and enhance food security. 
Structural Changes in Rice and Potato Value 
Chains: Macro View
Rapid but Differentiated Transformations 
The overall findings are that value chains in rice and potatoes in Bangladesh, 
the PRC, and India are transforming rapidly, and that modernized or 
disintermediated value chains coexist with, while apparently displacing, 
traditional value chains. 
In general, the rice and potato value chains can be grouped into four types, 
varying in terms of geographical and intermediational length. 
For the rice value chains in the zones studied (from Noagoan to Dhaka, 
Heilongjiang to Beijing, and Shahjahanpur to Delhi), the four types of value 
chains are as follows:  
(1) The most traditional rice value chain, contained in the rural area, is 
“geographically and intermediationally short” and is the local supply 
chain of paddy grown by the farmer, dehusked in a local village mill, 
and consumed by the farm household or sold to the local village 
market for local consumption. 
(2) The rural–urban traditional rice value chain is “geographically long 
and intermediationally long” and features sale of paddy to local 
brokers (village traders), who sell it as paddy or have it milled in village 
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mills, which sell it to rural wholesale markets, where wholesalers 
from the cities buy it. The rice is then sold to semi-wholesalers (who 
sell to retailers) and/or traditional retailers.
(3) The intermediate (or transitional) rice value chain, which is 
“geographically long and intermediationally medium,” entails the 
rice farmer selling paddy directly to mills. The mills then sell rice to 
city wholesale market traders, or sell paddy to rural or city wholesale 
market traders, who have it milled and then sell the rice in the city 
wholesale market. At the city wholesale market, traditional retailers 
buy the rice directly. 
(4) The modern rice value chain is “geographically long and 
intermediationally short,” with the farmer selling paddy directly 
to mills that then sell rice to supermarkets and/or urban wholesale 
markets to sell to supermarkets and traditional urban retailers. 
The surveys showed that in the Bangladesh study value chain (Noagoan 
to Dhaka), the rural–urban traditional value chain still dominated, but the 
intermediate (or transitional) value chain was emerging quickly, with direct 
sales to mills. In the PRC study (Heilongjiang to Beijing), the intermediate (or 
transitional) and modern value chains dominated. In India (Shahjahanpur to 
Delhi), the intermediate (or transitional) value chain strongly dominated, with 
the continued use of village traders and rural wholesale markets upstream, 
but direct sale from mills to urban traders downstream. The most traditional 
value chain no longer had a significant presence—in fact, it had a very minor 
presence—in any of the study zones. The PRC rice value chain stood out as 
being the most advanced in the transformation of the rice value chains, and 
only in the PRC had the modern value chain emerged in a significant way. 
The four types of potato value chains that were evident in the areas studied 
were as follows: 
(1) The most traditional potato value chain, contained in the rural area, 
is “geographically short and intermediationally short,” and is the local 
supply chain of potato from the farmer sold, fresh at harvest or within 
a few months after traditional on-farm storage, to the local village 
market for local consumption. 
(2) The rural–urban traditional potato value chain, which is “geographically 
long and intermediationally long,” includes selling potatoes, fresh 
at harvest or after a few months of traditional on-farm storage, to 
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local brokers (village traders), who then sell the potatoes to rural 
wholesale markets, where wholesalers from cities buy the potatoes, 
then resell them to semi-wholesalers (who in turn sell to retailers) and/
or traditional retailers.
(3) The intermediate (or transitional) potato value chain, which is 
“geographically long,” features the potato farmer selling both fresh 
at harvest and after storage in modern CSFs directly to city wholesale 
market traders. 
(4)  The modern potato value chain, which is “geographically long and 
intermediationally short,” features the potato farmer selling, both 
fresh at harvest and after modern cold storage, directly to processing 
firms or supermarkets. 
The surveys in the Bangladesh zone showed that the rural–urban traditional 
value chain still predominated, but the intermediate or transitional value chain 
was emerging quickly, due mainly to the proliferation of CSFs, and was already 
important. In the PRC, the rural–urban traditional value chain still dominated, 
with little use of modern cold storage by farmers in Gansu Province. In the India 
study zone, the intermediate (or transitional) value chain strongly predominated 
after the rapid development of modern CSFs in the last decade. The most 
traditional (meaning confined to rural areas from farmer to consumer) value 
chain had only a minor presence in any of the study areas, and the fully modern 
value chain had not emerged in a significant way. India stood out as the most 
advanced in the transformation of the potato value chains.
Important drivers of the transformation of rice and potato value chains were the 
increase in scale and change in technology of rice milling and potato storage. 
Mill and storage changes were in turn functions of demand- and supply-side 
forces, and other factors. 
On the one hand, there was a huge surge in the demand for potatoes and other 
vegetables with the increase in incomes and populations of the megacities 
such as Beijing, Delhi, and Dhaka. This created in turn a demand for off-season 
supply of potatoes and for higher-quality rice. 
On the other hand, there was a large increase on the supply side, of medium– 
large mills, with modernized technologies, and of modern CSFs. Both the 
diffusion of CSFs and the modernization of mills were favored by direct 
government subsidies, as well as indirect government support through major 
investments in road improvement and the installation of energy grids so 
 Summary and Policy Implications 273
crucial to milling and cooling. Moreover, private investment was attracted, 
as the demand-side factors favored profitability of these investments, and by 
the supply of investable funds due to growth in the three economies. The 
investments were further encouraged by deregulation and privatization in 
the food sectors of all three economies. In India, regulations limiting the size 
of processing entities were removed. Constraints on FDI were relaxed. For 
example, in the processing sector in the PRC, giant agribusinesses such as 
Wilmar were allowed to enter the milling business. 
Conduct and Performance
Several key conduct and performance findings accompany and derive from the 
structural changes just noted.
Distribution of Value Added. First, averaging across seasons and product 
quality grades (such as fine versus common or coarse rice) and the value chains 
in the three economies, rice farmers captured 60% and potato farmers 64% 
of the total margins (measured by the urban retail price) of the value chains. 
The corollary is that the off-farm components of the value chains are 
important—they accounted for about 40% of the total margins in the rice 
chain and 36% in the potato chain. Despite the importance of the postharvest 
segments, the food security debates in the Asian region focus on farm, and 
even just on rice farm, yields. Rather, the productivity of processing, storage, 
and distribution merits nearly equal weight with the productivity of farms in 
the Asian food security debate.
Second, the share of farmers in the value chains varied by the length of 
the chain. Transport costs explained a large part of the differences in the 
farmers’ share of the total margin across study sites. In the South Asian rice 
chains, farmers averaged 65% of the total margin, versus 48% in the PRC’s 
geographically much longer chain. Bangladesh potato farms derived 75% 
of the total margin, versus only 60% in the PRC (from the distant Gansu to 
Beijing). The outlier was the potato chain in India, which was geographically 
relatively short compared with the PRC’s, but where the potato farmers’ share 
averaged 55%. This appears to be due to traders and retailers being larger 
and fewer in Delhi compared with those in Dhaka, and apparently from their 
having “market power” (that is, being able to at least partly control the price 
and thus earn higher than normal margins), at least partly offsetting the 
advantage the farmers had by using cold storage to avail of higher prices in 
the off-season. 
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Third, the share of farmers in the value chains varied by the quality of rice and 
the season of potato sales. 
On the one hand, rather than a higher quality of rice bringing the farmer a 
higher share of the total margin, in all the economies it brought a lower share. 
The effect was slight in India, moderate in the PRC, and strong in Bangladesh, 
where farmers captured 79% of the total margin for coarse rice but only 52% 
for fine rice. The greater shares of the off-farm segments in Bangladesh and the 
PRC could be due to their adding value by branding and packaging, polishing 
and reshaping the kernels, and perhaps, in the case of the midstream actors, 
to their scale and strategic position in the value chain. 
On the other hand, farmers chose to store their potatoes in CSFs, which earned 
profits for them because of higher prices off-season and provided urban 
consumers with potatoes outside the harvest season. The demand for this 
supply is huge: The study estimated that two-thirds of the potatoes consumed 
in Delhi and Dhaka were from cold storage rather than fresh from harvest. 
As a reward for storage, the price was higher in the postharvest seasons, and 
farmers in both countries earned substantial rewards from using modern CSFs. 
In Bangladesh this actually allowed farmers to capture more of the total margin 
of the chain (from 69% in the harvest season to 80% in the off-season). 
Farmers’ Empowerment and Consumers’ Benefit in Transforming Value 
Chains. The structural change in value chains has multiplied the market options 
that farmers have. From the traditional situation of selling directly to rural 
consumers or to a village trader, intermediate and modern value chains have 
opened the doors to a host of other buyers: rural town and urban wholesale 
market traders, CSFs, mills, and supermarket chains. The surveys showed that 
farmers seldom chose village traders and instead sold to these new actors. 
Farmers gained from these options. An example is their selling to or at the CSFs 
in India, eschewing village traders and regulated markets and selling to urban 
traders that went to the CSFs. 
While the conventional image is of tied credit–output relations between 
farmers and village traders, thus reducing the farmer’s market options, the 
farm surveys showed that only a very small share of farmers received advances 
from rice or potato traders. This was also corroborated by the surveys of 
traders. Traders and farmers explained that during the last decade or two 
the advent of cell phones, better roads, many more rural wholesale markets, 
new credit sources such as CSFs and Kisaan Credit Cards (in India), and major 
growth in off-farm income as a source of cash had displaced the need for 
farmers to rely on traders for financing. By contrast, value-chain financing 
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between retailers and traders, traders and millers, and CSFs and farmers had 
become significant.
Cell phones empowered farmers, as these had become an important linkage 
between segments in the value chains, conveying information about market 
options and requirements. 
Consumers also appeared to be benefitting from the structural change in value 
chains. The transitional and modern chains were reducing the seasonality of 
potato supply, differentiating the quality of rice, and introducing packaging and 
branding to communicate quality and thus opening the door to traceability. In 
some cases, such as in Delhi, the survey showed that rice and potatoes were 
sold more cheaply in supermarkets than in traditional shops, implying that 
structural transformation can improve the food security of the urban poor. 
Cost Formation in the Value Chains. Three cost components (waste, 
transport, and market fees) loom larger in food security debates in the region 
than their impacts merit. By contrast, three other costs (farm inputs, labor, and 
energy costs post farm gate) receive inadequate attention but are already major 
cost components with important effects on staples prices. They comprise costs 
that are likely to increase in the future and merit particular attention.
First, there is a current debate in food policy circles in Asia and elsewhere 
concerning food wastage, which is often asserted to consume about 30%–
40% of the costs in the food supply chain (Mattoo, Mishra, and Narain 2007). 
The survey’s finding of only about 7% physical wastage in the potato value 
chain (from harvest on the farm to retail sale in the city) strongly contradicts 
this assertion. Furthermore, wastage in the rice chains was found to be only 
about 1%–2%. 
The lower importance of wastage and transport costs that the study found 
may be due to the development over time of better infrastructure (cold storage 
and road infrastructure in the areas studied, which tend to be close to rapidly 
developing big cities) and the spread of mobile phones, which may enhance 
market coordination. The low wastage rate also suggests that individual actors 
in all segments of the value chains were attempting to minimize costs. There 
may still be ways to reduce waste, such as through more cold storage in rural 
areas of Bangladesh, but dramatic gains in the value chains’ efficiency should 
not be expected through waste reduction strategies. 
Second, rice transport costs had less than a 4% impact on retail rice prices in 
Bangladesh, less than 7% in India, and less than 12% in the PRC. However, the 
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Indian rice zone studied is 200–400 kilometers from Delhi, about a quarter of 
the distance that the PRC rice zone is from Beijing. Even though transport costs 
are a modest share of the Indian rice value chain from Shahjahanpur to Delhi, 
note that the Indian costs were about twice the PRC costs measured per ton 
of rice per kilometer. This means there is still room for further reduction of the 
transport cost component of food prices by road improvement, vehicle stock 
upgrading, and reduction of nonofficial payment requests from transporters 
in India. The figures and points are roughly similar for the potato value chain, 
except that PRC costs per ton per kilometer to move potatoes from hinterland 
Gansu were commensurate with those in South Asia.
Third, although market fees figure prominently in the Indian debate in particular, 
the survey showed these to have less than a 1.5% impact on rice prices in India, 
and less than 1% in the other economies’ rice chains. The market fee shares in 
total potato value-chain costs in Bangladesh and India were somewhat more 
(2% and 1% for harvest and off-season shares, respectively, in Bangladesh, and 
3% and 7%, respectively, in India) but were still modest. The attention paid to 
market fees in the policy debate is disproportionate to their real effect. 
Fourth, farm inputs (outside labor and land rental) had a large impact on 
the price of rice to the consumer—17% in India, 14% in Bangladesh, and 
12% in the PRC. The impacts on consumer prices were 10%, 16%, and 26%, 
respectively, in the potato value chains in the three economies. Therefore, 
efficient input supply chains to farmers and correct use of inputs are important 
to reduce value-chain costs. Reducing farm input and machine costs would 
have a significant effect on rice prices. 
Farm input supply chains were already overwhelmingly in the private sector in 
the study zones. Governments had a minor role as direct purveyors of subsidized 
inputs (in comparison with the overall aggregate of inputs used). Thus, the 
efficiency and costs in the provision of inputs depended mainly on hundreds 
of thousands of private wholesalers and small retailers of chemicals, fertilizers, 
seeds, and machines, and of thousands of factories and repair shops involved 
in this supply. Finding ways to encourage investment, reduce transaction costs 
through better infrastructure, increase scale, improve commercial practices, and 
modernize technology in these input supply segments could reduce farm costs. 
Fifth, labor was an important cost in the rice value chain in Bangladesh and 
India. Hired labor was a third of total value-chain costs in Bangladesh and a 
quarter in India, and thus had a substantial impact on the consumer price of 
about 17% and 12%, respectively, in the two countries. The rising cost of labor, 
under pressure from the developing rural nonfarm and urban labor markets, will 
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translate into increasing pressure on rice prices and will induce mechanization, as 
has transpired in the PRC and appears to be happening in Bangladesh and India.
Sixth, energy costs are significant along the supply chain. The survey showed 
that energy had about 20% of the total costs in the postharvest segments of 
the rice value chain in the PRC—equal to the share of external inputs used by 
farmers. Another estimated 5%–10% of value-chain costs comes from farming 
(for irrigation in India and Bangladesh, and machine and vehicle use in all three 
economies). Thus, the direct uses of energy along the value chain exceeded the 
cost of farm external inputs. 
In potato chains in South Asia, significant energy costs came from just cold 
storage. About three-quarters of the cold storage operational costs were 
attributable to energy, and cold storage costs were fully 21% of total potato 
value-chain costs in Bangladesh and 32% in India. Energy costs in potato 
value-chain costs were 13% and 23% in those two economies, respectively. 
The importance of energy costs in transport, milling, cold storage, and 
farming in the rice and potato value chains of the three economies indicates 
that food prices are vulnerable to energy cost shocks. Consequently, energy 
costs in the food supply chain should be as important a food security debate 
topic as is farm productivity per se. Adding indirect use of energy (such as 
fuel and oil used in production of fertilizer as well as for pumping tube wells) 
strengthens this point.
Meso Perspective of the Transformation in  
Each Segment of the Value Chains
The individual segments of the rice value chains had transformed, albeit at 
widely different rates across the study zones and economies, conditioned by 
differences in economic context and regulations. 
Upstream
First, in the policy debate, there is often a view that the rural areas have millions 
of tiny, homogeneous grain farmers with similar land and nonland assets. The 
survey showed instead, in both the rice and potato areas, great heterogeneity 
in farm sizes and distribution of nonland assets. The behavior and nonland 
assets of the marginal farmers were often quite different from those of the 
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small and medium farmers. This heterogeneity of farmers implies the need for 
differentiated policy approaches for different strata of farmers, in particular for 
marginal versus other farmers.
Moreover, especially in the PRC rice and the India potato and rice areas, the 
medium and semi-medium strata were a minority of farmers but often they 
supplied the lion’s share of staples to the value chains feeding the great cities, 
while the more numerous marginal farmers provided a small share.
Second, farmers have been increasing commercialization and use of external 
inputs per hectare.2 The start of these trends was signaled by Pingali and 
Rosegrant (1995) in Asian farming, and the findings in the present book 
demonstrate how far the trends have proceeded. The ubiquity and intensity 
of farmers’ engagement in output and input markets was striking. The survey 
showed that farmers’ marketed surplus rates (sales divided by output) tended 
to exceed 90% in all sites in both rice and potatoes, and in all strata (except for 
marginal rice farmers in Bangladesh, who marketed only about 70% of their 
rice). Farmers have undertaken capital-led intensification, with widespread 
participation (even among marginal farmers) in fertilizer, insecticide, herbicide, 
and seed markets. Varietal use underwent waves of change (high-yielding 
varieties and hybrids), facilitated by actions of the national agricultural research 
centers and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.  
Moreover, farmers became highly engaged in nonfarm labor markets (especially 
in the PRC and India, and to a limited extent in Bangladesh). Farmers were 
also engaged in a variety of other factor markets—in farm machine markets 
(machine-traction rental or outsourcing was widespread), water markets 
among farmers in India and Bangladesh, and land rental markets. 
Third, however, in Bangladesh in particular, and to a lesser extent in the PRC 
and India, the farm gate price for better quality rice was only slightly higher 
than that for the lower quality rice, and the labor rewards for growing high- 
and low-quality rice were not significantly different. The survey results showed 
that farmers were not benefiting from the relatively higher retail prices and the 
increased willingness-to-pay for quality staples, which is what one would expect 
if farmers can easily switch from one to the other, as seemingly was the case.
Fourth, very few farmers in any of the economies received advances from 
traders or mills and then had to sell them their output at harvest. This practice, 
common several decades ago, had disappeared over time as farmers found 
2 Termed “capital-led intensification” of agricultural technologies by Lele and Stone (1989).
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new cash sources (mainly nonfarm income) and other credit sources (such as 
Kisaan Credit Cards in India). Better roads and the advent of cell phones opened 
up more options for receiving price information and contacting buyers.
Midstream 
Rice Mills and Traders. First, the rice mill segment has been modernizing 
rapidly, in ways paralleling the changes in retail, but starting somewhat earlier 
and being more widespread across sites. 
On the one hand, consolidation (the increase in average scale of mills along with 
increased market share of medium and large mills) coupled with technological 
change had occurred in the mill sector as medium and large mills had emerged 
rapidly starting in the mid-1990s. This was driven mainly by the private sector 
in all three economies, but the PRC differed somewhat by also having state-
owned enterprises participating, and by having FDI from huge agribusinesses 
such as Singapore’s Wilmar. In India, the concentration was initiated after 
deregulation in the late 1990s allowed investment by medium and large 
companies instead of reserving the sector for small-scale millers. At the same 
time, the number of small village mills declined rapidly, particularly in the PRC 
and India. In India, the government subsidized technological upgrading of 
mills during the last several decades.
Especially in the PRC and to some extent in Bangladesh, rice mills had changed 
their procedure and were buying directly from farmers, selling directly to their 
agents in wholesale markets, and branding and packaging the rice. These changes 
may make the chain more efficient, and certainly help in quality differentiation 
and traceability. India’s mills had advanced far less in these changes, as they 
were constrained by the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) Act, 
which was still in force in many states, including the study state of Uttar Pradesh. 
Second, the rice and paddy wholesale segment had also been transforming 
rapidly, especially in the PRC and Bangladesh, and somewhat in India. The 
roles of village traders linking farmers and rural wholesale markets or mills, 
and of semi-wholesalers linking rural mills and urban wholesale markets or 
supermarket chains, had diminished. 
Traders in wholesale markets had made important investments in warehouses 
and trucks and on average increased their scale. In some cases, the survey also 
identified profit rates that were outliers, such as among rice traders in rural 
Bangladesh and urban India. This may indicate situations of market power 
possibly produced by entry constraints. 
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Potato Cold Storage Facilities and Traders. First, the study found a rapid 
spread of modern potato CSFs, especially in the India study zone and second 
in Bangladesh. The CSF development in Agra, India is simply amazing. Farmers 
rapidly took up using cold storage, dropping their traditional storage methods, 
and massive investments went into CSFs of all sizes. The scale had been rising 
over time, and thus a process of consolidation was occurring. Investment in 
CSFs was encouraged by partial government subsidies and by government 
investment in the electricity grid, which is very important to CSFs, given that 
the majority of their costs are for energy. 
In India, the CSFs have “re-intermediated” the market system so that most of the 
trading shifted to the CSFs from the government-mandated wholesale markets, 
against the APMC Act. Farmers, even small-scale ones, ubiquitously used the 
CSFs and gained significant price advantages from storing. Consumers gained 
the advantage of greater year-round access to potatoes. The surveys found that 
two-thirds of the potatoes sold in Delhi and Dhaka had been cold stored.
Second, potato trading was transforming in ways similar to rice trading. The 
trend of disintermediation was similar (with the decline of village traders 
particularly under competitive pressure from CSFs and urban traders who used 
the CSFs as exchange venues). The survey showed abnormally high profit rates 
for urban potato wholesalers in Bangladesh, which may indicate some informal 
entry barriers. Wholesalers were making substantial investments in vehicles to 
facilitate direct purchase.
Downstream 
The retail segments had started to transform in several ways.
First, supermarkets had penetrated urban rice retail, most deeply and widely in 
Beijing, where they had about half the market. This is similar to the situation 
in Hong Kong, China in the early 1990s (Ho 2005). Delhi supermarkets 
had only started to penetrate the rice market, with about 7% of sales, and 
in Bangladesh, supermarkets had barely started to enter the market. In the 
PRC, this was driven by large and small, domestic and foreign supermarket 
chains. In India, it was mainly by domestic chains, as regulations constrained 
FDI in multibrand retail in India until September 2012, when India’s central 
government removed them (Mehdudia 2012). Supermarkets have been slower 
to penetrate the urban market for potatoes, as well as for other fresh produce. 
However, this is expected to pick up gradually following the penetration of the 
processed and semiprocessed food markets, as occurred in other developing 
countries in the last 2 decades, and historically in Western Europe and the 
United States (Reardon and Timmer 2012). 
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Second, supermarkets and traditional rice shops and stalls had been shifting 
from loose, unbranded rice to packaged, branded rice. This had progressed 
furthest and fastest in the PRC, driven by the practices of modernizing rice 
mills. Branding allows traceability in the supply chain for rice in particular (but 
not yet for potato)—an important development. Packaging also helps signal 
quality differentiation.
Traditional retailers in Beijing tended to buy rice from wholesale markets, where 
an important percentage of traders were agents of large mills, and wholesalers 
sold rice packaged with mill brands. Supermarket chains bought some rice 
from the wholesale markets, and directly from large mills. These trends had 
gone far and fast in the PRC, and had just barely begun in the South Asian 
sites. Potato retail had not yet followed this path in a significant way, with sales 
of loose, bulk, unbranded potatoes persisting.
Third, as noted above, while the governments in Bangladesh and the PRC 
no longer directly engaged in rice retail, the government still did so in India. 
The survey showed that the share of the Fair Price Shops was only about 15% 
in Delhi (only twice that of the incipient supermarket chains). 
Government Roles in Transforming Value Chains
Direct Market Operations of Government
While much policy debate centers on direct government operations in food 
value chains, buying and selling agricultural products and inputs (what we call 
direct market operations), such operations were in general quite small in the 
value chains and economies studied. 
In the output market, the government was a major direct purchaser only in the 
rice chain; only in the study zone in India;3 and mainly from mills, from which 
the government bought 59% of the rice sold. In the rice chains in the other 
two study zones and in all the potato chains, governments had from a very 
minor to no involvement in the purchase or sale of the products studied. In 
all three economies, the government had little or no direct role in cold stores, 
wholesale trade, or retail, with the exception of a minor share of urban rice 
markets in India’s Fair Price Shops.
3 India’s direct involvement in the market is an anomaly in Asia, where most countries (includ-
ing Bangladesh and the PRC) have reduced to very minor levels direct rice purchase by the 
government (Rashid et al. 2007).
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In the input markets in the survey areas for this book, governments were involved 
in only a few areas (for rice seed, 40% of farmer purchases in the PRC and 25% 
in Bangladesh; for fertilizer, 28% in India). For chemicals, potato seed, fertilizer, 
and rice seed except as just noted, the government share in the input market was 
very minor, from nil to 9%. 
Rather, the rice and potato value chains were overwhelmingly private sector. 
Thus, a great deal of emphasis should be placed on enabling the private 
sector’s involvement and providing it with the incentives to assist in attaining 
national food security objectives. 
Where governments were involved in direct sale of rice to consumers or of 
inputs to farmers, the survey revealed neither efficiency nor equity in these 
actions. This raises the issue of whether such sales should continue—if yes, 
in what form; and whether they are cost-effective and beneficial or necessary 
to overall food security. The survey showed that Fair Price Shops in Delhi were 
seldom open during business hours (in two-thirds of the cases in the survey, 
they were not), consistent with extensive literature critiquing the efficiency of 
the public distribution system. The survey also showed, particularly for India, 
that the great majority of the subsidized inputs and equipment such as tube 
wells ended up with medium–large farmers, rather than marginal or small 
ones. Equity problems in government input supply were less evident in the 
PRC and Bangladesh, where the incidence of such sales was also much smaller 
except in a few cases (such as rice seed in Bangladesh).
Important Enabling Roles of Government  
in Value-Chain Transformation
The governments have played important enabling roles in the transformation—
providing private players in the value chains’ incentives to transform (such as 
via subsidies or reduction of regulatory constraints) and developing capacity 
(such as by improving roads and building wholesale markets) for the private 
sector (traditional and modern) to respond to market and government-
provided incentives. 
First, governments have spurred transformation by investing in rural areas 
through (1) research and development, and distribution of seed; and 
(2) investments in irrigation canal systems, road and railway systems, rural 
wholesale markets, and power grids—these were major investments in the 1990s 
and 2000s, and all were essential to the transformation in the midstream the 
study observed; and (3) investment in extension, which was important overall, 
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but the data suggest a limited impact and availability of extension services in 
some areas, particularly in the Uttar Pradesh study zone in India. For example, 
in the rice zone in Uttar Pradesh, 33% of the farmers used some extension 
services, but only 14% of farmers used government-provided extension services. 
There is a need to redress constraints on the provision of extension.
Second, government subsidies had important effects, but evidence of 
accessibility to and the impact of the services was mixed. Subsidies for 
rice seed and fertilizer in all the study countries, for private tube wells in 
Bangladesh and India, for CSFs in India, and for mill upgrading in all the 
zones, all appear to have encouraged use of and investments in all these 
productive items, and all the items played important roles in transforming 
the value chains. However, the survey results show that sometimes the 
subsidies were not directed to the target beneficiaries. For example, tube 
well, fertilizer, credit, and seed subsidies in India were taken up mostly by 
medium and large farmers, with little going to marginal farmers. And in 
the PRC, on-farm storage construction subsidies reached very few farmers, 
although a number of traders used subsidies for cooling-tunnel construction. 
A key policy implication is that, if large subsidies are distributed, great care 
should be taken to assure that they are properly targeted and delivered. 
Third, the findings of the study point to the great importance of farm input 
supply chains upstream from farmers and of midstream and downstream 
postharvest activities such as logistics and wholesale, cold storage and 
milling, and retailing. Little empirical research work has been done on these 
areas but is needed for the policy debate and the systematic evaluation of 
policy impacts. 
There needs to be a concerted public policy debate on how to enable and 
encourage input supply chains to become modernized, and midstream and 
downstream businesses to invest in upgrading equipment and expanding. 
The PRC has in fact enshrined that objective in its 12th 5-year plan for the 
food processing sector. A multipronged approach to that encouragement 
seems warranted by 
(1) reviewing and revising the provision of subsidized inputs, which have 
in some cases flowed to the wrong recipients;
(2) selectively subsidizing or providing tax incentives for upgrading 
equipment and plant with energy-saving equipment; 
(3) addressing the need for reliable power grids and warehouse facilities; 
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(4) reducing or eliminating remaining limitations on FDI, which is needed 
in logistics and retail; 
(5) reducing or eliminating unnecessary direct government intervention 
in the value chains (for example, by rethinking India’s public 
distribution system and reforming or eliminating the APMC Act) to 
encourage as much competition and investment as possible across a 
wide set of actors; 
(6)  preparing food supply chains for the increasing need to ensure food 
safety by encouraging or rewarding traceability measures (e.g., by 
streamlining regulations to label and brand products and by providing 
incentives for using monitoring and tracing equipment along the supply 
chain); and
(7)  instituting intellectual property rights and other investment protection 
and incentives to maximize and harness private sector investment in 
segments of all value chains.
Strategies for Transforming the Agrifood Economy 
and for Food Security 
The study has several broad strategic implications. 
First, there is no “silver bullet” for the challenges facing staples value chains 
in the region, although individual changes like technology changes can have 
powerful knock-on effects in the chain. Rather, a suite of policy and program 
measures is needed at various levels of the supply chain in order to stimulate 
the efficiency and competitiveness of expanding staples markets. Even small 
reductions in margins can lead to large benefits for producers and consumers. 
The most effective government interventions occurred with a cluster of activities 
that supported various parts of the value chain in an integrated way. 
A good example is that of CSF development in Agra, India, where government 
research and development in potato varieties and extension services for 
the new varieties were combined with tube well and CSF subsidies and 
major investments in road improvements, power grid, and communications 
networks. Individually, these actions may have been relatively fruitless; taken 
together, they were successful. Businesses were thus eager to invest in CSFs, 
farmers were eager to store in the CSFs, traders from cities came to buy from 
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farmers at the CSFs, and consumers in Delhi welcomed the greater availability 
of potatoes beyond the harvest season. 
Second, different policies are needed for the widely different zones and farm 
strata within them. Asian staples-producing farm areas are not homogeneous, 
composed only of millions of tiny farms with similar nonland assets. Rather, 
there is a wide degree of heterogeneity across rice and potato areas, and major 
differences across farmer strata in the study zones for this book and between 
them and other zones for which like information is available.4 This implies that 
“one size does not fit all” and that government strategies need to be tailored to 
different situations. In particular, marginal farmers (versus even small farmers, 
and certainly compared with semi-medium and medium–large farmers) are at 
a disadvantage in these transformations, as are more hinterland zones (which 
are endowed with less private and public infrastructure, are farther from 
markets, and have less favorable climates for agriculture).
Third, growth, market modernization, and agribusiness and food industry 
themes and debates are often held at arm’s length from policy discussions on 
poverty reduction and food security. This study has shown that value-chain 
transformation is important to farmers’ incomes, rural employment, and 
access to and affordability of staples for urban consumers. This is especially 
important, given that Asia’s urban areas are home to half of Asia’s population 
and account for two-thirds to three-quarters of its food demand. Harnessing 
the value-chain transformation for food security should be front and center in 
the policy agenda of the 21st century.
Lastly, the successes in dynamic areas feeding major cities documented in this 
study may provide lessons that could be applied elsewhere. The study found 
much evidence of success, of ferment of change and transformation, and in 
many cases of improved performance. Thus, many of the implications will be 
based on what the authors saw that governments and the private sector did 
well in these zones and that could be extended to other nearby zones and, 
if possible, to the poorest and hinterland areas. Lessons from dynamic zones 
today can be important for allowing today’s poor zones to join the ranks of the 
dynamic areas tomorrow.
4 This is also in comparison with other similar surveys in hinterland zones such as in eastern 
Uttar Pradesh or Bihar in India, see Minten et al. (2010) and Reardon et al. (2011).
286 The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains 
References
Akamatsu, K. 1935. Waga Kuni Yomo Kogyohin no Boueki Susei (The Trend of 
Foreign Trade in Manufactured Woolen Goods in Japan). Shogyo Keizai 
Ronso. 13: 129-212.
Ho, SC. 2005. Evolution versus Tradition in Marketing Systems: The Hong 
Kong* Food-Retailing Experience. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing.
24 (1): 90–9.
Lele, U. and S. Stone. 1989. Population Pressure, the Environment and 
Agricultural Intensification: Variations on the Boserup Hypothesis. MADIA 
Discussion Paper, No. 4. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mattoo, A., D. Mishra, and A. Narain. 2007. From Competition at Home to 
Competing Abroad. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mehdudia, S. 2012. Ailing Economy, UPA Get FDI Dose. The Hindu. 
14 September. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3897241.
ece?homepage=true#.UFNWUND55aI.email
Minten, B., T. Reardon, K.M. Singh, and R. Sutradhar. 2010. The Potato 
Value Chain and Benefits of Cold Storages: Evidence from Bihar (India).
Report of the IFPRI Project for the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and the National Agricultural Innovation Project 
(NAIP) of India. December.
Pingali, P. and M. Rosegrant. 1995. Agricultural Commercialization and 
Diversification: Processes and Policies. Food Policy. 20: 171–85. 
Rashid, S., R. Cummings, and A. Gulati. 2007. Grain Marketing Parastatals 
in Asia: Results from Six Case Studies. World Development. 35 (11): 
1,872–88.
Reardon, T., B. Minten, M. Punjabi Mehta, S. Das Gupta, S. Rajendran, 
and S. Singh. 2011. Agri-Services in Uttar Pradesh for Inclusive Rural 
Growth: Baseline Survey Findings & Policy Implications. Report of the 
IFPRI-PIKA Project on Rural Service Hubs: Business Catalysts for Rural 
Competitiveness and Inclusiveness. Delhi: United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). 
Reardon, T. and C.P. Timmer. 2012. The Economics of the Food System Revolution. 
Annual Review of Resource Economics. 14: 14.1-14.40. In-press version 
posted online. June. doi:10.1146/annurev.resource.050708.144147
* ADB recognizes this member by the name Hong Kong, China.
The Quiet Revolution in 
Staple Food Value Chains
Enter the Dragon, the Elephant, and the Tiger 
Thomas Reardon, Kevin Chen, Bart Minten
and Lourdes Adriano
The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains
Enter the Dragon, the Elephant, and the Tiger 
The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains: 
Enter the Dragon, the Elephant, and the Tiger 
Major changes have been occurring almost unnoticed in staple value chains in 
Asia. The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains documents and explains 
the transformation of value chains moving rice and potatoes between the farm 
gate and the consumer in Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China, and India. 
The changes noted are the rapid rise of supermarkets, modern cold storage 
facilities, large rice mills, and commercialized small farmers using input-intensive, 
mechanized technologies. These changes affect food security in ways that are 
highly relevant for policymakers across Asia—the rise of supermarkets provides 
cheaper staples, more direct relations in the chains combined with branding have 
increased traceability, and the rise of cold storage has brought higher incomes for 
potato farmers and all-season access for potato consumers. The book also joins two 
debates that have long been separate and parallel—food industry and agribusiness 
development and market competitiveness—with the food security and poverty 
alleviation agenda. 
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